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PUBLIC AFFAIRS STAFF

Admiral Stansfield Turner at Wabash College

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Q: Admiral Turner, I gather from what Richard Helms had to say after his sentencing this week that he doesn't feel any particular remorse about lying to the Congress. He seems to think that he's more of a tragic figure, that he was just sort of unfortunately caught between his duty to obey the law and his duty to protect the nation's security.

Do you think that's kind of a fair characterization of the position that he was in? And if you found yourself in a similar position, would you see your duty the same way?

ADMIRAL STANSFIELD TURNER: Well, let me say that I feel very, very fortunate today that I'm in quite a different position than Richard Helms because of the changes that have been made in what we call our oversight procedures since his day. Today there is a committee in each House of Congress dedicated only to reviewing intelligence and overseeing intelligence. So that committee has total jurisdiction, and we share as much as we can with each of those committees. And were I put in the kind of position that Richard Helms was before a different committee -- I think it was the Foreign Relations Committee, or some other one -- in a public hearing, or in a closed hearing, and was asked questions about the process of intelligence, I would respond that that's the jurisdiction of the Intelligence Committee and that they should get that information from them, not from me. And that would be of tremendous help.

And so that's one of the reasons we're pleased. And I will be talking to the students here tonight about these new oversight procedures that have been established and really are a help to us, as well as a check.

Q: Those committees existed in Helms's day, though, as well.

ADMIRAL TURNER: No, no. This oversight committee from the Senate was founded in May of 1976, and the one for the House in August of 1977. The oversight in those days, such as there was, was done by the Appropriations Committee, the Armed Services Committee, sort of combined; but nobody had real jurisdiction. It was divided between them.

And today it's quite clear one committee has -- now, I report to the others. I have to get the money out of the Appropriations Committee, I keep the Foreign Relations Committee informed about substantive intelligence; you know, what's going on in the world. And the same with the Armed Services Committee. But overseeing how I do my business, answering questions such as they asked Mr. Helms -- What are you doing in a certain country? -- is really the business of the Select Committees on Intelligence.

Q: Admiral, I think [unintelligible] specific answer. Two questions: First of all, do you think that it was a badge of honor for Mr. Helms to lie before...

ADMIRAL TURNER: I'm not going to, with benefit of hindsight, either criticize or praise my predecessors, because there're so many factors, that it's difficult to reconstruct. But let me give you my reaction to the Helms decision that was made. May I? I mean that, I think, is what's relevant and what should be important to all of you, because I'm now bearing the load that Helms had.

First -- I have two reactions. First, I believe the way the decision on Mr. Helms was worked out has been very salutary in reminding me and all the others in authority in the intelligence community once again that none of us, or any government servant, is above the law or authorized to lie. And this was a good reminder.

But my second reaction is that because the case did not come to public trial, the country is spared the necessity of revealing what would have been a lot of highly classified information that would have been necessary, in my opinion, to do justice to both the prosecution and the defense, if there were a trial.

So I think the country has benefited in both directions: a reminder of the importance of law, and the preservation of our national secrets and national interest in this case.

Q: As I understand, it's sort of your job to reshape the American intelligence operation, priorities, etcetera. First off, [unintelligible], what type of, quote, health, end quote, do you think the CIA was when you took it over? And number two, what are some of the priorities that you have set up [unintelligible]?

ADMIRAL TURNER: I think the health of the CIA was fine, was good when I took it over, and I think it still is. It's not easy on any organization when it undergoes as much public criticism and investigation as the CIA has over the last 2 1/2-3 years. But one of the first things President Carter did was establish a group to look in to how to strengthen the intelligence community, which extends far past the CIA itself. And in August he made decisions, as a result of that study, and he did try to strengthen my role as the Director of Central Intelligence. Not the Director of the CIA. I have two jobs. As the Director of Central Intelligence, he strengthened my role in coordinating all of the intelligence activities of the country.

That's one of my key objectives today, is to bring it all working together; not only because we want to be efficient, save money, and so on, but if we don't all work in a concerted way, we can drop the ball between the cracks, like Pearl Harbor, or we can duplicate and waste a lot of money.

And so, that's, I think, my key point in what I would like to achieve in the next few years, is to make the multiplicity of intelligence organizations mesh together and work together, be a real team, and let me be the coach and just call the signals, and let them run their own plays, just like Wabash and...

Q: What do you...

ADMIRAL TURNER: ...DePauw.

Q: What do you plan to do to prevent past abuses, such as drug experiments, dirty tricks, domestic spying, etcetera, from happening again? I think I should rephrase that alleged past abuses.

ADMIRAL TURNER: Thank you. Thank you. I really appreciate that, because a lot of them are alleged. Some of them are true.

As you know, I went to the Congress when I found documents on drug testing, and said, "Here's something we've uncovered in our files." Some of it was unfortunate.

There are a number of things that have been done and are being done. The oversight committees that I've mentioned to you are a very important part of it. Another very important part is what's known as the Intelligence Oversight Board, which was established a year and three quarters ago. These are three distinguished American citizens who are there only to look into the legality and the propriety of the entire intelligence operation of our country, and who report only to the President.

If after I've been on your campus here much longer you

decide you think I'm a scurrilous individual, you write to them and say so. They'll look into your allegation and turn it over to the President with their finding, for instance.

But beyond that -- and you're really listening to my whole speech for tonight, so don't come, if you were planning to. But seriously, beyond that, we're trying to open up the intelligence operation a little bit more, lift some of the mystique, so that people understand why we're doing what we're doing, so that we're in better rapport and understanding with the American public and know what they want, the kind of an intelligence operation they would prepare to have.

And finally, beyond that, I think my job requires that every morning I get up and ask myself: What could go wrong? And use my intuition and sixth sense, and probe around and ask questions, set an example of what standards I want, feel are important. And then go to bed at night and decide to start all over again the next day. You just have to be vigilant. You have to watch and look.

I say that not because I think anybody is really trying to do anything other than the way we've asked them to do it, but that it's a big operation, it's an operation that you must take risks in in some areas; and so you have to watch it carefully and you have to ask each of your principal subordinates to do the same, and you have to select them carefully and have confidence in them that they will do that. And I am confident that that's the case today. But if you ever get so confident you relax, then you're not doing your job.

Q: Admiral Turner, I was curious to ask you about the CIA's role in the SALT negotiations. I guess any general comments you'd have about that would be helpful, but I'm chiefly curious about one point. If the accounts that have appeared so far in the media are to be believed, apparently the United States is going to be permitted a certain number of both air-based and land-based cruise missiles. And what I don't understand, if that's true, is how are the Soviets possibly going to verify the range limitations on those cruise missiles, or, for that matter, even the number of them? I mean it seems to me that's a well-nigh insuperable problem for them. And if it is, how are they going to be dumb enough to let us have that many cruise missiles?

ADMIRAL TURNER: Well, you're getting into a very complex field. My role as an intelligence officer in SALT is to advise on what we think the Soviets have in the way of force structure, what they're planning and are building, and what we can do to verify their side of the agreement. And I will be very candid with you that verifying the specifics on a cruise missile is going to be difficult. There are ways we can do parts of it. Unfortunately, I'm unable to get into great detail about that, but I

will be in classified sessions with the Congress when they come to debate this, I'm sure. It isn't totally impossible but it's difficult, as you brought out. There are many other provisions of SALT that are difficult. But the difficulties do go in both directions, as you said.

Q: Admiral Turner, Senator Bayh has written a letter to President Carter asking him to stop the CIA activity that he says can be embarrassing. Are you aware of that letter?

ADMIRAL TURNER: A letter?

Q: A letter, or has said to President Carter. It was reported on the national media last...

ADMIRAL TURNER: Nope. Anybody heard about it? Does he say in the letter what...

Q: He didn't say what it was. He wouldn't reveal what it was, but he said it was embarrassing -- it was an operation that could be embarrassing for the U.S.

ADMIRAL TURNER: I'm in close contact with Senator Bayh because he's one of the people on our oversight committee. I talked to him about some intelligence operations just recently, so I think I know what he may -- I think -- I'll guess at what he's talking about, but I didn't know he's written any letter on that.

Q: You mean you are aware that he's concerned about some operation?

ADMIRAL TURNER: No, not a specific operation. No. I just have talked to him about the generalities of our operations.

Q: There's been a certain amount of concern aroused lately -- I guess it hasn't gotten very much in the public media -- about some mathematical research that's been done in academic circles that seems to have serious implications, I guess, for the making and breaking of codes. I realize that you don't run the NSA; but still, do you have some feel for what the implications of this might be. I gather it means that almost any country with money enough to buy a halfway-decent computer can soon have an unbreakable code. Now, do you think that's going to have any serious repercussions on American intelligence-gathering operations?

ADMIRAL TURNER: Well, throughout history, I guess, code making and breaking has been a constant game, like offense and defense in football. In one era of history one side is ahead, in the next era the other side. Apparently there are some mathematical and electronic developments here that are going to make code breaking more difficult, or code making easier. But I don't

think we ever see a pendulum stop steady and one place, and there usually are all kinds of alternative measures that can be taken. I don't know in this particular case, and these new technologies are pretty fresh right now. But there's no question, if you look back at the history of World War II, many books have come out in the last few years on code breaking on the European scene, code breaking on the Japanese scene, how critical that was to the success of our military campaigns.

So, yes, we're watching this kind of thing with considerable interest and it could be very important.

Q: Admiral, the New York Times has reported the President will be receiving a report on intelligence in the next several weeks and will recommend, apparently contrary to your wishes, that you not be appointed as a sort of a super head of intelligence operations.

ADMIRAL TURNER: I think this is concerned with the President's decision on reorganization...

Q: Right.

ADMIRAL TURNER: ...which was announced on the 4th of August.

Q: [Unintelligible]

ADMIRAL TURNER: Yes, I can explain what's happening. You see, he wrote a decision and delivered it to all of us, and it was a very good one. And I am not upset with it, as some people maybe have indicated.

Now, we translate that decision into a redraft of a basic executive order President Ford signed a couple of years ago, February '76, that is the basic guideline, the basic instruction under which I operate. The new decision, which will not be translated into this executive order, is the one I mentioned that gives me more authority -- didn't I mention that? I had another press conference today. Sorry.

Anyway...

MAN: The presidential decision language is in that [unintelligible].

ADMIRAL TURNER: Oh, okay.

Anyway, that's an elaboration on what's in your folder here that the President made his decision on 4 August; not only an elaboration, but a lot of other topics that didn't require the President's decision that get put into this charter, sort of, for

us. And we've all been working on that for some time -- well, since August. And it's coming close to being issued. And I think that's what they're talking about. But this is nothing new that wasn't announced in the decision in August. It's the implementation of that and more specifics and details. There may be a few new things in it but nothing...

Q: [Unintelligible]...you have final budget authority over the entire intelligence community. What power does that give you? And isn't there a danger of putting too much control over intelligence activities in one man? I think we saw that happen, in a way, with J. Edgar Hoover.

ADMIRAL TURNER: If you ever work in Washington, you'll know that no one man ever controls any budget. What's happened here is that up until this August 4th, I was chairman of the committee that set the budget for NSA, CIA, and all the other intelligence activities that are national, as opposed to the military ones that are with the troops and the ships. Now I'm simply the committee.

What does this mean? It means that I have a greater responsibility today to be sure I hear the views of all the other people before I make a decision. It's easier, in some ways, to make a decision with a committee. So we hope we will get crisper, better decisions.

But I can't, in as large an organization as ours, our government, expect just to sign my name and make decisions on hundreds of millions of dollars and not have to take lots of other people's views into account, not have to allow for their right to express dissenting views or try to make decisions that they don't agree with.

So, my decisions go to the Office of Management and Budget, the other Cabinet -- the Cabinet officers involved can go to him and say, "Look, Turner did a bad job." They can go to the President. Then you've got the Congress. There are lots of checks on this process.

Let me say one other thing about the concern -- and it's a legitimate one. I understand that -- that you might be aggregating too much authority in one person. I have been given more authority on budgets, more authority in what we call tasking, directing what people are going to do in collecting information. Intelligence is a twofold process. You collect information and then you analyze it and come up with estimates and evaluations. The important is an important and a risky area. And I'm given more authority now to be sure we're doing the right things and doing them in good coordination. But I don't have any authority to suppress the research, the analysis, the estimating that goes on in the Department of Defense and the Department of State. They

have their own analytic organizations, their own research organizations. They're run by the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of State. And we want that and we want some overlap, so that there are different views coming forward on the interpretation of the intelligence that we collect. And if I should try to suppress those in producing a national estimate, let's say, which I don't want to do, but let's assume somebody thinks I do, you've got two Cabinet officers, the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of State, who won't be bashful in making sure their views get to the President if Turner is riding roughshod over them.

So, I don't believe we're in any jeopardy of concentrating too much authority in one individual with the present organization.

Q: Also, in another area, there've been reports in the press that Israel has nuclear weapons. Do you believe -- what does your intelligence tell you now, and do you believe, also, reports that some nuclear material from the U.S. was diverted to Israel?

ADMIRAL TURNER: I can't comment on that one. I'm sorry.

Q: Okay. Well, is the CIA actively investigating this?

ADMIRAL TURNER: No, I can't comment on that. We really don't comment on the kind of things that we're working on and involved in. And I just can't get into that. I'm sorry.

Q: This is sort of a trite question.

ADMIRAL TURNER: No.

Q: [Unintelligible]

ADMIRAL TURNER: Don't worry about that.

Q: How much knowledge is the President supposed to have of CIA operations?

ADMIRAL TURNER: All that he wants.

Q: All that he wants. I mean he has to -- does he have to come to you, or, you know, do you report to him?

ADMIRAL TURNER: I go to him. I mean if he comes to me, I say, "Aye-aye," and snap to and answer up. But I feel an obligation to keep him posted about what's going on in our organization. You know, not every detail, because he's got very many things on his mind. But we have specific rules, that will be spelled out in this executive order that comes out, and some in the law, which require his knowledge and involvement in our activities.

What the CIA was criticized for most in the past is what we call covert action; not collecting intelligence, but conducting programs to influence events in other parts of the world. Today, if we're going to do any covert action, and we do very little, the President himself must sign that he wants this done. I must then go notify a number of committees of the Congress. So these are typical checks, and it's a typical area where it's very sensitive, and there's no question that the President gets involved in it in any detail.

Q: How many times has the President signed a statement that he wanted covert action?

ADMIRAL TURNER: That, again, is something I can't discuss.

Q: Numbers?

ADMIRAL TURNER: Pardon me?

Q: Just raw numbers?

Q: How do you feel about this, really, making the CIA more answerable to the President than it has in the past? That's what these new laws, or whatever do -- correct?

ADMIRAL TURNER: Well, not really, because the CIA has always been totally answerable.

Q: [Unintelligible]

ADMIRAL TURNER: I feel they're good. I think the degree of extra controls that have been instituted in the last few years are desirable.

And let me point out, there are two sides to controls. One is it does limit your freedom of action in the intelligence world, but on the other it gives you a check, it gives you a sharing of responsibility. When somebody else has to approve the action, he then is in part responsible for it. So it takes some burden off my shoulders. But mainly it helps to be sure that we're aware of what the people of this country want for an intelligence activity. A lot of the things that were done in the '50s were perfectly acceptable to the country in the '50s. And attitudes and outlooks and circumstances have changed, and people don't want that same kind of activity today. That means, if you were an intelligence officer through that period, that you have to change, you have to adapt to what the mores and attitudes of the country are. And these oversight procedures, these controls are one of the ways that we do keep in touch: have other people who are outside our sort of cloistered, secretive atmosphere to help.

Time to go? One more?

[Confusion of voices]

MAN: I wish you'd told me. I would have worn regular shoes.

[Laughter]

ADMIRAL TURNER: I just took mine off. I played tennis this afternoon.

MAN: I did too. How about that. We can have a game tomorrow.

ADMIRAL TURNER: All right.

Q: The CIA's estimates on a Soviet possible first strike, I gather, were essentially negative; and that there was this so-called B team formed, under the chairmanship of Professor Pipes from Harvard, to challenge those estimates.

Isn't that, in historical perspective, for the CIA, rather irregular procedure to go outside the agency to have people evaluate an agency intelligence conclusion?

ADMIRAL TURNER: No.

Q: What were the pressures involved for forming that B team, and what effect has there somewhat contrary conclusion had on you all?

ADMIRAL TURNER: I don't think it's unusual to go outside. I'm not really too sure how far back this goes, but I know that for many years they've had outside consultants and reviewers. And what I have established, instead of a B team, is a group of people whom I call upon at different times, different numbers of them, to participate in a major study effort that we're doing, to get them in at the beginning, when we write the terms of reference and say, "This is what you're supposed to do in this study"; bring them back in the middle and say, "How's it coming?" and, "Are you going in the right direction?" And then you bring them back towards the end and say, "Does it hang together? Does it make sense? Is it logical?"

Some of the people you get are experts in that field. Some of the people I want to get are just good thinkers who are not well informed in that particular area, but who will sit back and look and say, "Can we see the woods for the trees here?"

So, I think there's a great value, particularly in going out to places like this and getting academic people to come and participate and consult with us.

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The B team experiment didn't work out very well because it all blew into the press, and so the B team experiment was never completed. So I can't tell whether it failed or worked.

Q: The study was never completed?

ADMIRAL TURNER: No. They got through one topic out of, I think it was five or six they were supposed to be working on, and it all appeared in the newspapers. And, of course, they folded up the operation at that point because it was a great big breach of security. And I think that was in part because it was so polarized by A and B. And I don't intend to use the A and B, but I don't want to eschew it completely either, because there may be some circumstances when that sort of competitive thing is good.

I prefer to be sure that in my consulting groups and in my study groups we have all sort of basic views represented right within the group, and they have to hammer it out right there. And when they can't agree, then we try to write majority and minority views.

Time to go?

I wish we could stay longer, but I....

Q: The capabilities of the CIA and the KGB. What -- how important is verification now in the arms negotiations between the U.S. and the Soviet Union?

ADMIRAL TURNER: Well, you certainly wouldn't want to be without any capability to verify. But then you have to ask yourself: How close do I have to be able to verify? If they have one more missile out of 2000, does it make any difference to me?

Q: How close can you verify right now? Can you verify one missile out of 2000?

ADMIRAL TURNER: Oh, I think, you know, that would be very difficult to get down to that precision. But I'm confident that with missiles we can verify within a reasonable range that it isn't going to upset the strategic balance of the situation.

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[Start of speech]

ADMIRAL TURNER: I can't tell you how exciting it is to be here on your campus, not only because it's [unintelligible] game weekend, but because this is Wabash. Wabash is an exciting place, and I'm pleased to be with you.

[Laughter and applause]

ADMIRAL TURNER: I'm very serious in this. I'm most pleased to be here. I'm pleased because you would have me, you would invite me. I'm pleased because you would tolerate me on this busy weekend. And I'm pleased because you would let me in the door after I've been to another academic institution...

[Laughter]

ADMIRAL TURNER: ...in Indiana this very day, one that some -- I can't quite remember the name. It's a little town called -- Is it Greenhouse?

[Laughter and applause]

ADMIRAL TURNER: I don't know how it's going to end up tomorrow night, but I'm glad it's ending up for me tonight at Wabash.

[Laughter]

[Cassette turned]

ADMIRAL TURNER: ...college community like this play an extraordinarily important role in our country in helping to shape public opinion and attitudes. And public opinion and attitudes towards intelligence, after the years of battering and criticism and investigations that we have had, are very important to us; not because we want to feel good and popular, but because every one of us in authority in the intelligence game knows that we can only have a good foundation for our intelligence activities if they rest in the moral and ethical attitudes of our country. And it isn't always easy for us to discern just what those attitudes are with respect to intelligence operations, because the ethical standards and values of our country, and I suppose any country, do change with time and circumstance. What was approved of in intelligence work [unintelligible] 20 years ago may well be unacceptable or criticized today.

And beyond that, we have impediment in testing public opinion with respect to intelligence activities because we can't put up trial balloons, as you can in some other areas of government work. We can't take a sounding into what public opinion may want or accept, simply because so much of what we do either is kept secret or you don't do it at all.

As a result, there is a burden upon us to exercise judgment and to try to decide what the country does want today and what it will continue to approve as it looks in retrospect in the years ahead.

[Microphone difficulties]

ADMIRAL TURNER: I don't mean to say that we don't have instructions, guidance and regulation from above, because surely we do. For instance, we have laws in this country particularly to regulate the activities of the intelligence community with respect to American citizens. There has been for some time a law about wiretapping the telephones of American citizens. And this Administration, this spring, sent a revision of that law to the Congress, where it's being debated. This is an attempt to strengthen the controls, to strengthen the rights of privacy of the average citizen of our country, while at the same time maintaining the possibility of the government obtaining information that is genuinely deemed to be of importance to the national interest. I think a balance is being struck here that will be very useful.

Beyond the walls of the Congress, we have some orders of the President of the United States, orders specifically, for instance, that no member of the intelligence community will contemplate, plot, or conduct assassinations.

And from these laws and from these orders we then set out our own internal regulations to guide our activities and to tell our people what they may and may not do. You might be interested in a couple of examples of that.

One is with respect to members of the American media, television, radio, newspapers, news magazines. We simply do not have any paid contractual relationships with accredited American media representatives. We will not use this type of person as an agent of intelligence.

Now, let me balance that by telling you that we still look on American media representatives as citizens, with all rights and privileges, despite their profession. And by that I simply mean I believe any citizen, and every citizen, is entitled to share with his government information which he has and which he believes will be of value to it. So if a newsman voluntarily comes to us and says he has something of value -- of information that would be of value, we're happy to see him, we're happy to talk with him. We do not task him. We do not ask him to do things for us.

More to home for you, perhaps: our relationships with academia. Now, here we do have paid and contractual relationships. We have professors who do research for us, write for us, and come and work with us for short periods of time. Obviously, we have to pay them. It's unfortunate -- not that we pay them.

[Laughter]

ADMIRAL TURNER: I don't think they're overpaid.

It's unfortunate that there is an attitude in some areas

of academia in the United States today that any relationship between the academic community and the intelligence community is improper. I think that is choking off some of the useful interchange and proper interchange that can be had between these communities. And I hope very much in the next few years to redress that and to open up those channels again.

I believe the intellectual capabilities of our academic community in the United States are so great that they must be shared with all areas and all levels of our government's activities.

Let me dwell on this for just a bit more, because it's not only important, relevant here in the college community, but it's controversial. I do not want in any way to undermine American academia, either by influencing curricula or teaching procedures, or by tarnishing the image of the American academic. Thus, we will not enter into paid or contractual relationships which would prejudice teaching responsibilities or which would deliberately try to utilize an academic -- status as an academic to hide intelligence activities.

But still, within these limits, there is lots of room, in my opinion, for associations between the academic and the intelligence world which will not cast into doubt the authenticity or the credibility of the academic community.

Recently, for instance, I asked a Sovietologist of eminent renown to do some work for us on a difficult problem about the Soviet Union. I think it would have been a great shame if regulations at his university had precluded his doing so, because he brought to us new insights, new attitudes, assurance that we weren't getting set in our bureaucratic ways and attitudes and outlook, that we were taking into account all of the most important and relevant factors that we could. Let me suggest that when he went back to his academic campus, I think he too was in a better position, because he had seen how the Soviet government works from greater sources of information than perhaps he had on his campus. He had a greater depth of understanding of that process. Now, there was lots that he maybe couldn't share with his students when he came back because it was classified information, but I believe his teaching at that point would inevitably be more relevant and enhance his ultimate worth to his students because of the deeper insights that he had from his activities with us.

But this also raises another controversial question. Some academic institutions require that any relationship between a member of their faculty or administration and an intelligence activity be reported, at least to the administration, if not to the public. I think this is not a reasonable position for an academic institution to take.

I haven't asked President Seymour. Maybe my neck is out

here -- what your rules are here at Wabash.

Let me say, I think it's unreasonable that intelligence is singled out. There are some institutions where any relationship that a professor has with an outside activity must be reported. I can't question that. But I don't think it's fair to the individual or to us to single out an intelligence relationship and treat it in a biased way.

Let me also point out just briefly that this isn't always a one-way street. There are real benefits to the academic world of association with the intelligence world.

For instance, we publish a great deal of unclassified literature of considerable value to the academic community of our country. Recently we put out a study on the prospects for the Soviet economy into the 1980s. We put out another study about the world steel market situation: where there is productive capacity in excess, where there are shortages, and what the demands are, and so on.

But also there are some very unusual and interesting connections between intelligence and academic research, some that you wouldn't ever guess at. I just found out the other day that we can be a real boon to the archaeologists of this country. There are many areas that archaeologists would like to go that are too forbidding geographically or where they are forbidden politically. But with aerial photography, you not only can get to some of those places, but you can often find more than is visible on the ground: the remnants, the ruins, the roads, the stadiums, and so on, are often visible in their buried state from aerial photographs. What a shame it would be if academic regulations on various campuses prohibited interchange of this sort.

Now let me move on to how we judge our relationships when we deal with non-Americans, particularly in our overseas activities, which is, of course, the principal world of intelligence. Here the problem of reflecting our nation's values is a very difficult one, and it's much more a judgmental question than it is within the United States.

When we're dealing with an open society, like our own, any outsider can get a very good idea of the trends and the policies, the attitudes, the general direction that this country is going to go. He gets it by reading the newspapers and watching television, by having a certain number of friends and contacts within our country, and generally keeping his eyes open. But I'm sure you appreciate that the reverse is not the truth, is not true when it comes to the closed societies behind the Iron Curtain.

We have the same need to sense the trends, the policies, the attitudes in many of these closed societies, but we simply can

not do so as readily as they can with us. The clandestine, the secretive collection of intelligence is often the only way we can obtain that information.

And would you want us in any way to today be negotiating with the Soviet Union a strategic arms limitation, something that will help reduce the probability, the possibility of nuclear warfare in the world, and yet not have a sense of what is going on in that country, militarily, politically, or economically? And I would emphasize that it is not just the military that we need to know about. Today the world is so interdependent economically, that what happens in a major economy like the Soviet Union, or our own, has ripple effects throughout the entire world. And yet, even here, a simple world of basic economics, we have to rely, frequently, on secret intelligence work to tell us what's going on behind the Iron Curtain, lest we be caught up in repercussions of their activities that have an impact on everyone of us in the United States.

Still, benefits that we gain from secretive intelligence collection operations must be weighed carefully, they must be weighed against our fundamental preference as a country to deal openly and straightforwardly with other nations and to treat the citizens of other countries with the same respect as we do our own.

As a result, clandestine, or secretive, collection of intelligence today is an avenue of last resort. We turn to it when we are sure that the information is not available in open sources or by less risky means. And I assure you, however, that despite all the new, wonderful technical techniques for collecting intelligence information, in my view the plain old spy, who's been with us since the days of Jericho, is going to be with us well into the future. It is an arrow in the quiver of intelligence for our country that we cannot do without.

But the length to which we should go in spying and the limit to which pragmatism should overrule idealism, and on whose should we depend as to what can and should be done in this field are important and difficult questions. And if I can come back to the beginning, where I pointed out that we cannot launch trial balloons, we cannot ask 210 million Americans would they approve of this or that intelligence operation -- I believe that what we need in order to decide how to do these affairs is what I would call a surrogate for public opinion. And I also believe that out of the crucible of the last two or three years of criticism and investigation of the intelligence community has come a surrogate process for testing public opinion. It comes in the form of new oversight and control procedures. And let me cite just a few of them to you, to tell you how we are controlled and operating today.

First, your President and your Vice President today take

a very intensive and complete interest in what is going on in the intelligence world, and they take the time to be informed.

Beyond that, we have in the Senate of the United States, and have had for about a year and a half, a committee dedicated specially to the oversight of the intelligence process. It just so happens that both of your senators from Indiana are on that committee. In fact, in January Senator Bayh is scheduled to become the chairman of it; and we enjoy working with him very much, and also with Senator Lugar, who has joined the committee this year.

This committee is our oversight in the Congress, on the Senate side. They check on what we're doing, they ask us about our activities, and we keep them well posted on them. And at the same time, they are an important and helpful buffer for us, between us and the rest of the Senate committees. So we have a good relationship here in which we both benefit: in which the Congress, through these 17 senators, obtains a good insight into what is going on, has an opportunity to exercise its influence; and yet we also keep closer in touch with the American people and the standards that they want by our associations with this committee.

On the other side of the house, in the House of Representatives, a similar committee was established last August, and we're very pleased to be working with it.

Next, let me make a quick technical differentiation for you of some of the terminology of intelligence. The area in which perhaps the intelligence world has been most criticized in recent years has been in what we call covert action. This is not intelligence gathering, this is not seeking information; this is the process of attempting, without attribution, to influence attitudes or events in foreign countries.

There is today a very rigorous control procedure before any covert action can be conducted by the Central Intelligence Agency, and the Central Intelligence Agency has been designated by the President as the only agency of the government that will conduct covert actions for it. It is not part of the intelligence agency's intelligence function; it's a separate one.

But today, before a covert action is authorized, it has to be approved by the National Security Council, the President of the United States must sign off that he wants that action to be taken, and then I must go and notify a number of the committees of the Congress.

I suggest to you that these are adequate controls to insure that this process does not go on by itself or go on in ways that these leaders of the American government do not desire.

Beyond these committees, beyond this process for approving

covert action, we have another very important mechanism which is known as the Intelligence Oversight Board, a board of three distinguished Americans whose only task is to look into the legality and the propriety of the way intelligence is being conducted in our country. They report only to the President of the United States.

Thus, if you or some member of my organization wants to submit a criticism of me and the way I'm doing business, or any other activity that he or she sees going on around him, they simply write a postcard or a letter to the Intelligence Oversight Board in Washington, D.C., and that board will look into it and report to the President on whether they think something more should be done. This is also, I think, very helpful and very reassuring to all of us.

Now let me be totally honest and frank with you. Out of this process of oversight today there are coming risks, and we have to take those into account.

First there's the risk of what I call committeeism (?). If as we go through and clear these activities with these various oversight bodies we end up with what I would call least-common-denominator intelligence, really not being willing to take risks when they are justified, we're going to lose out. We're going to lose what is important in terms of the kind of information I was mentioning earlier that we frequently need and which is not available in any other way.

There's also a risk that as you proliferate the number of people who are involved in the innermost secrets of intelligence through this oversight process, you're going to have security leaks, and information that should not get out to the public, should not get out to the other people in the world may get out.

And I say to you that today I cannot assure you that we have struck the right balance here, but we're still working on it. And I think it will be two or three years, as we work with these oversight boards, committees and with these procedures that I've outlined, before this will settle down into the right relationship. But I am quite confident today that we are going to be able to do that in the way that will balance the taking of these risks and the protection of our society at the same time. I'm confident that we are moving smoothly in that direction, but it's going to take time.

And I'm not quite satisfied to leave this surrogate process of public review of our activities in just the surrogate stage. We are not trying, as part of your intelligence community, to share more with you, the American public; to be as open as we possibly can. We have, for instance, increased the amount of these publications that I talked about on an unclassified basis. When today we conduct a major study in the intelligence world, we subsequently look at it

carefully and ask ourselves if we took out and classified the very secretive information, would this still have meaning and import to the American public? Would it help improve the quality of the debate on public issues in our country? And if it does, we will publish it.

And I believe that this sharing with the public will do even more to help us insure that we stay in touch with our society.

What I think I'm saying to you tonight is that in this mix of greater openness, greater oversight, greater scrutiny of the risks when we take them, and yet a willingness to take those risks when the interests of our country determine it, [unintelligible] we are in an exciting period in American intelligence because we are developing a new model of intelligence, an American model of intelligence, and it's different than the traditional model of intelligence, which has always been built on maximum secrecy.

So I say to you, in closing tonight, that I sincerely believe and I am confident that we are today, despite the requirements of certain secrecy, conducting your country's intelligence operations only in ways that will strengthen our open society.

Thank you. And I'd be happy to take your questions.