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L 1 Yale University

L 2 Yale Political Union, New Haven, Connecticut

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Thank you very much. I not only have a sweat shirt with super spook on it but a good friend of mine, a retired Naval Officer, is a wood carver, carved me a sign that says "Super Spook." I took it to the office—I happen to have a bathroom off my office--and I put the sign on there and you should see the number of people that wonder whether they should open and check on what's behind the "Super Spook."

Now, I'm really pleased to be with you. It's always important and stimulating for us to come onto a university campus because the Intelligence Community of our country is so dependent upon its universities. We depend on them for stimulation in research and help from the people on university campuses. We're also very dependent for gleaning some of the best and all numbers of the very high quality of college and university graduates to come into the Intelligence Community of our country every year. We are going to maintain the same high quality that you have. You might be interested in knowing that the Central Intelligence Agency has had a very, very strong Yale flavor over the years. As a matter of fact, we're disappointed in Yale. I was up testifying before Congress the other day and I made the comment that we were grateful....[garbled]....whereupon a Senator from one of the far western states says "so what."

I want to be very informal tonight and try to talk briefly and then open up for questions and discussion. This looks like an informal group and I think it would be more fun to do that. But first let me address a couple of quick questions to make clear some of the territory.

Why do we need intelligence? Why in this day of openness, a day with wide communications between countries do we need an intelligence effort? Well, I think if you look back 30 years when the Central Intelligence Agency was founded in September 1947, you can see how different the world is today. Thirty years ago we were the dominant military power. There was nobody who could touch us. We had nothing to worry about in that sphere. Today, we are really much closer to a condition of parity in the military world. Now when you reach that condition of having good intelligence, good information about what the other fellow's equipment is, how much he's got, how he is going to use it; or, if you ever do (heaven help us) go to war, how you can employ your forces to the best advantage is just tremendously important. It's much more important when you're close to equal than when you've got great superiority. In the economic environment - thirty years ago we were totally independent economically and we dominated the world's economy. Today we have to emphasize the view and the fact that we are in a very interdependent economic situation. We are very beholden on some countries, the OPEC countries, and we have economic relations with almost every country in the world. And if the EEC, or Japan, or the Soviet Union makes major economic moves, it affects you, and it affects me in our pocketbooks. So we must be able with intelligence to find out what's going on, or we're going to lose our shirts economically.

Look back thirty years ago when we were so dominant politically. We stepped forward and took a position and most of the world went along with it. Today, we've got a hundred and forty some countries in the United Nations, none of whom would want to cowtow to either the Soviet Union or us as the big powers. They are much more independent. It is critical, I believe, that we be able to understand their cultures, their values, their attitudes, if we are going to deal with them and not be left behind. But why, you may ask, do we have to do this with intelligence when there is so much other information around. Well, you must never forget, please, never forget that we are an unusually blessed people, living in an unusually open society. If you are an outsider, a foreigner, and come to our country, walk down the street, talk to people, turn on the television, read the newspapers; and if you are with us awhile and if you make some effort without having to be secretive, you begin to get a good feeling about the United States. You can understand where this country is going, what its values and attitudes are. Not so in a closed society where you cannot walk down the street and talk to people. You don't bother to read the newspapers. You can't get that same understanding, that same view. Yet it is very important that we have a genuine need as Americans to know what is going on in many of these closed societies. Why? Would you want your government tonight to be negotiating a strategic arms limitations treaty with the Soviet Union if I, as your chief intelligence officer, could not assure you that I would be able to give you some feel for the overall political, economic and military policies of the Soviet Union? Where they're going and what they intend, or whether I could assure you that we can verify, check whether they are going to comply and are complying with the treaties that we make. And it isn't just a military question because of what I said before of economic interdependence. We need to be able to anticipate economic moves which are made by the Soviet Union or China or other closed societies so that we can be prepared. Look at the great grain robbery of 1972 when the Soviets suddenly entered the world market. We need to do better in anticipating that kind of thing in the future.

Yet, let me admit to you as an intelligence officer that collecting intelligence is dangerous and that every secret which goes with collecting intelligence is dangerous to our own society. So we have to have checks and balances. And what I am excited about today is that we are in an important new phase of intelligence in our country. I think we are trail blazing a new, what I call an American model of intelligence. But traditionally intelligence operations around the world in all countries have been conducted under maximum secrecy with minimum supervision or control. That's the way it has been. But we are today, I believe, moving in two different directions contrary to that tradition.

The first is greater openness. We're trying to tell you more; first about the process of intelligence; how we go about our business. Now we can't tell you all. We can't tell you the detailed inside techniques of our technical collecting methods. We can't tell you the names and techniques of our spies. But we can tell you, for instance, that a large portion of the effort in the Central Intelligence Agency is what you would call here at Yale research. It's now taking the information that we get

from these collection systems, pulling it together, taking a little piece here and a little piece there, and really trying to synthesize it, trying to come up with an estimate and evaluation, something that will help the policy makers of our country make better decisions. Giving them an inside view of things. Giving them information which, if they hold it and other countries don't, would be of value in our decision making process.

Now being open we are also trying to share more of what we call the product of intelligence. What these analyses, what these estimates, what these evaluations, actually are. We have in recent months been publishing a good many unclassified studies. I see that you have already been subjected to some of these and there are more on the table over here in the front. One of these studies is a study of the overall energy prospects of the world. You may have read about it in the newspapers; it got some publicity, some good, some bad. What we were trying to say simply, is that our analysis indicates that in the next seven or eight years the world is not going to be able to pump out of the ground as much oil and gas as it would like to burn on the surface. We are not saying the world is going bankrupt or reserves are running out, but that you can't physically get it out as fast as you want to and that means you're either going to be forced into conservation or there is going to be tremendous pressure on prices. Another study we did was about the world steel market. You know the United States is only producing at 78% of steel capacity. And that we're the highest; japan is 72, European Economic Community is 60, Sweden at 48, and many of the lesser developed countries today are adding capacity because they want to be independent. And if they become potential exporters rather than importers of steel we don't think there is going to be an increase in demand to fill up this excess capacity that I described. Last summer we put out a study on the Soviet Union's economy.

We used to think it was on fairly firm ground and able to handle its substantial input to military matters, and still enhance the standard of living somewhat. We're not quite pessimistic. We think the tide has turned against them. They've got a demographic situation such that in the 1980s the growth of their labor force is going to drop at 1.5% a year to .5%. Their resources are getting more scarce and more costly. They have no sign, in my opinion, of showing greater signs of efficiency so that they can utilize smaller resources and get more productivity from them. So we think they may be up against some difficult choices. They're going to have to reduce their military, find more manpower, and more investment. They are going to have to stop exporting the same amount of oil to Eastern European satellites for soft currencies in order to earn hard currency and continue importing technology from us to make their economy grow or will they try to borrow from us? And if so, what will we do? We have been trying to share these thoughts with the American public. First of all it is very helpful to us. It gives us a feedback, it gives us a feel for what the American public is thinking and wants from us. Secondly, we hope that while we are not always right, that it will help sharpen the debate on at least the right issues.

But out of all this second part of our American model of intelligence is that we also want to be sure that we are conducting it in ways that will promote the ethical and moral standards of our country. We think that that is a very important consideration. So while we can't be entirely

open--we can't give you all the studies, all the secrets that we have-- what we are trying to do today is to declassify as much information as we can. We take a study that we have (one of these), look on the cover, and it says secret, top secret, destroy before reading, whatever it may be, and we take out of that those things that must be kept private. We keep out those things which would reveal how we got the information. We keep out those things which are so valuable to our decision makers if they are kept just to us. Will that study still be of value to the American public? If it will, we publish it. But let me emphasize that we are not opening up everything. We are not trying to do away with secrecy. We cannot conduct intelligence operations without some reasonable level of secrecy. But we think that in the process of declassifying information we will in fact help protect our secrets. Because when everything is secret nothing is secret. Nothing is respected if you have too much secret information. We hope to increase the respect for what is classified after we have taken as much as we can and made it unclassified.

Let me with sincerity suggest to you tonight that it is time that we increase respect for what the government believes should be secret information. You may be reading in the press that I'm in a little bit of a struggle these days with a gentleman who is a disaffected CIA employee and wrote a book on Vietnam. He did not adhere to the honor of his oath he had signed with us that he would give us an opportunity to check it for secret information. And he completely went against his trust to me. He came to me and personally assured me, on the 17th of May this year, that he would do that--he would honor that oath. He published that book surreptitiously with assistance from a publishing company and a television studio, both of whom participated in his duplicity. I was trusting him. And I say to you that the logical extension of Mr. Snepp's action--of taking it upon himself to decide what should be classified and what should be declassified--is that everyone of you and everyone of the other 215 million Americans in our country should be qualified to determine what should be kept private and what should not. That, I suggest, is chaos and that can only lead to great problems for our country.

I believe that it has come to the time when you and the rest of the citizens of this country must remember that Watergate is behind us and that we must restore some sense of confidence in your elected officials and those public servants who they appoint. Now, let me not suggest that I'm asking you to take us totally on trust. Because the second part of the new American model of intelligence is a series of checks and balances; a series of controls. These are very, very important to all of us. We cannot, as I have been intimating here, have total public oversight or scrutiny of our secret intelligence process. But what we have been evolving for several years now in the crucible of all the criticism and all the investigation of the intelligence world; what we've been evolving is what I call a system of surrogate public oversight. The first surrogate is the President of the United States. The second is the Vice President. Let me assure you those two gentlemen today are very active, very supportive of our intelligence in this country. Let me assure you that I keep them fully and well advised of what's going on.

Another form of surrogate oversight are two committees of Congress - one in the Senate, one in the House. Oversight committees, special select committees on intelligence. I report to them. Yes sir, and I tell them what we are doing. I answer their questions when they think they hear of something they want to know about or they're not sure what we're doing, we go up there and we report to them. But I also use them as a sounding board. They are very helpful to me in going up and saying what do you think we should be doing in this case? What do the American people want?

Still another form of oversight is what's known as the Intelligence Oversight Board--three distinguished Americans appointed by the President reporting only to the President. If anyone of you here tonight thinks I'm doing something wrong in the intelligence world you are entitled to write them a note. So are my employees and it doesn't go through me. They look at this note and it says "Look that guy Turner is really....[garbled]...." They'll investigate it. They'll report only to the President and he'll decide whether something should be done.

Still another form of oversight are the controls on what is called covert action. Let me take just a minute and describe what I mean. Covert action is the influencing of events or opinions in foreign countries without it being made known who is doing the influencing. This is really not intelligence work. Intelligence is collecting information. But for many years the government has assigned to the Central Intelligence Agency exclusively the responsibility for any covert action. Here's where we got in so much trouble and so much bad publicity in the past, because it was a very big thing in Vietnam and sometimes in Cuba and so on. It is not a very big thing now, it is a very small thing, a very small part of our activities. But it is a very necessary one--that we keep it as an arrow in our quiver when we may want it. We may have to operate against terrorists and that kind of thing. But today, if we are going to have a covert action anywhere in the world, I must get clearance through the National Security Council. I must then obtain the signature of the President of the United States, and I must then report to eight committees of the Congress. And if you don't think all that's inhibiting, that I'm running off and doing things without control, I assure you that it indeed is. And properly so.

So let me emphasize again, we're moving in the new American model to a greater sense of openness on the one hand and a greater sense of control on the other. I would suggest to you that it's going to take two or three years for this to settle itself out, until we find that right balance between how much openness we have and how we still preserve what is a necessary level of secrecy. On the other hand, how much control we establish and yet how we still maintain the necessary degree of initiative and risk taking is inherent in our kind of activity. But I do assure you that we're persuaded that the world is not yet so benign that we can do without intelligence collection activities or secrets. But as this new model evolves and we establish the proper balance which will give you, the public, assurance that we're doing the job in conformance with the standards the country wants, it's going to take a lot of understanding and support from you and the American public. And as university graduates you will be principle shapers of American opinion. We are going to need understanding and not knee-jerk reactions that every time you see those three letters--CIA--there is something wrong. We are sincerely trying to do the job

right and we are sincerely trying to establish those goals that will give you the assurance we are doing it right. We're going to need your support. We're going to need your constructive criticism and that's why I'm pleased to be here with you tonight. And now let me have your questions and comments and we'll see what we can do with them. Thank you.

QUESTION AND ANSWER SESSION. NOTE: Throughout the Q&A session the questions from the audience were inaudible.

Q:

A: How accurate was the book and what's my evaluation of the CIA's performance in the evacuation of Vietnam? I have not read the book. I'm told it is well written. I'm told that it has some good information about the evacuation. I don't think anyone would question the evacuation was not done in an ideal manner. Let me tell you that Mr. Snapp, who wrote it, was thirty-two years old at the time and had been with us for six years, was not the senior CIA official in Vietnam as he has portrayed himself. He was a rather junior one. While there were mistakes made in that evacuation, I do not believe that Mr. Snapp was in a position to judge well, whether the mistakes were made in Washington, in the Embassy, the CIA, or where in that process. Anytime somebody writes a criticism of us I must pay attention to it if it's reasonably well expressed and sounds like it has some merit. But of all the criticisms we have received, this is one that I'm not as interested in as others. I'm interested in them all because what I want to learn is not how to flagellate myself for what the CIA did in the past but how to avoid what might be a repetition. The last thing I'm seeing on the horizon of CIA today is a massive evacuation of Vietnam or any other country. So I'm not really intent on learning the lesson of what went wrong there because I don't think it's going to be replicated. I don't want to denigrate Mr. Snapp and his effort, but it's a piece of history that I'm not finding terribly relevant and I don't think he is particularly qualified for it.

Q: What things do you consider the most valid criticism of the CIA?

A: Now are you taking the whole panapoly of things for the last thirty years? What I was trying to say to you in my talk ladies and gentlemen is let's get on the constructive side. Let's look at what we're going to do, let's look at what the CIA is here for and is going to try to do for you and if you've got some complaints about what we're doing today I really want to hear them. But, you know, one of the few frustrating things about this wonderful exciting job that I've been given is that I have to spend so much time looking over my shoulder. I really don't want to look that way because the country needs an intelligence effort in the 1980s and 1990s. And that's why I'm here tonight because some of you are going to be the ones who are leading.

Q: What do you think should be the plans and policies.....

A: None. We are not in the policy business. Today I get involved in advocating a policy. We should recognize Cuba, or do this over in Asia, of whatever it may be. We are in great danger that intelligence would be slanted to support policy. The reason we have the Central Intelligence Agency separate from the intelligence organizations elsewhere in the government, is that this is the only one not related to policy making. It is the only one where there is not a temptation. I don't say other people do this in the intelligence business, in Defense and in State, and so on. But I'm saying it is a natural concern when the same man is making policy and sending forward intelligence. We're trying to be as aloof from that as we can.

Q:

A: Military matters are a very large percentage of the whole intelligence community's effort at the beginning. But as we become more entwined internationally with other economies, international economics is becoming a more and more important function of our activities and I think it will become more and more so in the future even because much of the competition in the world today is economic. So much of what we do and the cost of what we buy is dependent upon other countries' economic policies. Look today in the newspapers--what are we in with Japan--a major struggle over their economic policies and the fact that they have a great surplus of foreign sales and all the rest of us have a negative balance with them. So we must be aware of what's going on in those countries and help our policy makers decide how to handle those problems. So that's why we're in these particular things. Now I will also say to you, sir, that it is a little easier to declassify an economic study than a military study. We get to where in a military study there is so much classified information that it's hard to publish as much on those. So we do publish more in the economic sphere and it may look a little disproportionate. But we also hope that this kind of a study is really easily understood by the public and therefore it is of more value to publish it.

Q:

A: Yes, I've done that. I don't think there is a lot of stress in the press about Mr. Colby trying to suppress the Glomar Explorer, is that's what's on your mind? I don't think there is anything wrong with Mr. Colby doing that. I don't think there is anything wrong with Catherine Graham and the Los Angeles Times and others assisting her. Most people were being patriotic. Now it turned out it was futile and the one time I've asked the press to withhold something it turned out it was futile also after awhile. It got out. But I don't think there is anything immoral about asking people to be patriotic, if the information is truly classified. If it is not classified and we're trying to withhold it to protect ourselves or our Agency's reputation, why that's clearly wrong. Now when the Snepp book came out, a leading columnist wrote an article very shortly thereafter and said the only reason the CIA wanted to screen that book was to protect its own reputation. I resented that. Because that's not my function. That's not in accordance with the laws and the policies of our country. Our function is to screen the book for genuine security information and the basic implicit knee-jerk reaction that we would, as good

public servants, simply try to coverup, I think is unjustified and incorrect. And I wrote a two column rejoinder in the Washington Post two days ago. I was so infuriated at that basic assumption. Now, there's nothing wrong with exploring to see whether that's what I'm doing but don't just assume that I'm a scoundrel.

Q:

A: Yes, I am still in the same pickle that George was, and I talked with him about it yesterday morning. When an agency has been attacked for two or three years as this one was morale can't help but go down. I talked to one of our senior employees the other day and he happened to mention to me that his son was there on the campus unable to tell people that his father was in the CIA...[tape ended]...the whole fabric. Then, they were just getting over that and along came Carter and Mondale and now Turner administration of the CIA. And they wondered what these people were going to do and there had been a lot of rhetoric in the campaign and they were nervous and understandably so. Now the first thing the President did was sign a directive to study the organization of the intelligence community. They were nervous and felt it was going to be a subtle way of doing away with the CIA. A study came out and I tell you it's intended to strengthen the CIA; it's intended to strengthen the Intelligence Community and everybody is reasonably happy with it. Then along comes Turner and says boy we're just over-strength here and we're going to eliminate 820 of you people and that shattered morale again. What would you want me to do--keep 820 people on the payroll that you don't need? Discourage people like yourselves when you come into the Agency and you find you are over supervised and under-employed. We're trying to build an Agency for 1985, 1995 and you've got to attract fine young people and keep them in the Agency. You can't do that when you're not properly employing them. So I said I'll take the hard bullet, I'll make these reductions. But beneath it all the people down there are first class. They're capable and they're dedicated and I haven't any question that they're going to come out and the morale will come back up. I know the President and the Vice President and I are behind them 100%. We want a very strong and capable, properly run and properly controlled intelligence organization. That message will get through and there will be pretty good morale too.

Q:

A: Yes, if a terrorist organization abroad has acquired a nuclear weapon and has threatened New Haven, Connecticut with it, I think the country would be very made at me if I didn't have a good handle on what they were doing and where they were doing it and some means of getting in and castrating the thing.

Q:

A: Yes, with the demise of J. Edgar it has disappeared very much and with a recognition on both sides that there must be cooperation with a clear resolution of the Latin American jurisdictional issue. The problems have really gone away. We have good cooperation with the FBI. We are in charge

of counterintelligence--countering enemy intelligence efforts overseas-- they are in charge in the United States. But, of course, if a foreign agent gets on an airplane from overseas and comes to this country, we've got to have a handoff. We've got to have real cooperation. And it is working and it's working well.

Q: Going back to something you said earlier about the work of politics and intelligence. One of my major complaints against the CIA is that most of the data that they've put out in the past ten, and certainly the past 15 years, about the economics of the Soviet Union.... [inaudible]

A: Well, I haven't had a question like that George and I'm not sure I accept your premise. I'm not sure the estimates are that biased and while you're saying that they were always over, it was just two years ago that we made a major increase in our estimate because we thought it had been under evaluated; that their gross national product was not about 6-8% but 11-13% going into military things. This was a re-costing exercise. We just found their industry, their military industry, was inefficient and it was proportionately costing them more to do the same. It wasn't increasing the number of tanks they had. I'm not sure that they've always underestimated but your question is a valid one. How do we prevent bias. To begin with, and you won't like this, but I hired an eminent Harvard professor to head this thing up. I brought in an outsider, somebody new to the organization; a very eminent man who headed the Center for International Studies, Dr. Robert Bowie, at Harvard. Secondly, Dr. Bowie and I are engaging a series of about 30 or 40 distinguished outside acquisitions, former government people, and we're making them a series of consultants. When we do a study like any one of these, we'll ask three or four of them depending on their skills and depending on the spread of both expertise and possible bias that we have in our own internal study group. If I don't have somebody way off on the right wing, then I will take a man in my own family, then I'll go to this roster of 40 consultants and I'll ask somebody who has that sort of coloring, a real anti-Russian, to come with me on the group. Or, if I need somebody who's very dovish, I'll ask him to be on the group if I don't have that in my own stable. Therefore, they will be consultants who will come in at the beginning, the middle, and the end of the study and sort of follow along and give me a detached review of whether the study does have a bias in it. Or whether it answers the questions properly, or whether it gets to the point. We're trying to do that but we're human and we'll make mistakes. But if we publish them, hopefully people like you will write us and point out our shortcomings. I have a professor at the University of North Carolina who thinks we've done this costing of the rules all crazy. He wrote me a long paper, a very erudite good paper, wonderful. We've invited him up to really go over it with us, in detail. It will help us, and maybe help him.

Q:

A: That's a very delicate and difficult question because I don't think this country is ready for an official secrets act like the British. I don't know that we could have any more laws. It's possible that you could have a law that either would have civil or criminal sanctions for this

kind of thing. It is very difficult because it gets into the freedom of the press and the Constitution. I think really what will do it as much as anything is if public opinion fails to make heroes out of Ellsburgs and Snepps; fails to instantly accept this kind of conduct, this kind of performance with approbation and if Random Houses and CBS' don't engage in the kind of things they've done with them.

Q:

A: I'm doing my best to see to it that promotion in the different branches of the Agency is dependent upon the man's abilities, not what branch he comes from. The people who have gotten to the top have probably been more from the operations and covert side. But there have been quite a few-- the highest ranking professional in the organization today is a non-operational type. The one before him who was the most senior was also. He retired a few months ago. I don't know that there is that same bias today that there was in the past. But I can only say to you that I hope to make my selection for top assignments based on the man's ability not his gender.

Q:

A: Well it does. The people overseas are part of the Agency and they're our operating edge for the collection of intelligence. The analysis, of course, is in Washington. I don't know that I agree with Mr. Schlesinger on that one at all, because the people in the field are really no different than the people in the operations part of the Headquarters. That is, they rotate around and people in the Headquarters all go over to the field, and again, I'm talking about the operations section, I'm not talking about the analysis section. So I think they are all birds of a feather myself and not more sophisticated in one place than the other. The analysts are more sophisticated in some sense but their job is quite different.

Q:

A: Was it because Allende was a terrorist? I don't know why the CIA was involved in Chile. I haven't gone into that history either, or just what its involvement was. But today I'm saying to you that if you are going to get involved in anything like that it's well controlled.

Q:

A: Well if we're going to get involved in foreign policy through what I've defined as covert action, we have to go through this control procedure.

Q:

A: No, these procedures are relatively new.

Q:

A: That's correct, that's new. It's not in the last year, it's in the last year and a half of two years. I forget the exact date, I think it

may be within the last two years. The Hughes-Ryan Amendment which required us to report to the Congress--it was February 26, 1976. President Ford signed an act that required this to go into the National Security Council for signature of the President and so on. It's been gradual pieces. But one of the things I didn't really mention, that is within the next year starting with the next session of Congress starting in January, Congress will pass what we call charters for all the intelligence agencies. And these things will be spelled out. What you can't do, what you can do, the rules, the reporting and so on. It will be a very interesting process to spell them out because it is not easy. They're very delicate, you sometimes can't carve that granite precisely in a straight line and still have it useful and understandable.

Q:

A: That's a very, very broad question. For instance, I'm fully supportive of a specific prohibition in law that we will not plan, participate in, or conduct assassinations. It doesn't seem to me that it's the proper thing to be in our quiver. I think that there will be other prohibitions and controls in the charters, such as the Hughes-Ryan Amendment will be recast now, for this reporting procedure. I have to report to eight committees today. That's too much, I'm hoping that they will get that down to the appropriations Committees and the Intelligence Oversight Committees. So that kind of legislation can be very helpful to us. There will be specific prohibitions on the utilization of American media people. I have a regulation against that now but, of course, I can change that tomorrow afternoon. Congress will put that in a statute, you see, that we don't hire a news broadcaster or a newspaper man to be an agent for us. We don't want to realign, or rather to pervert the purpose of the American media.

Q:

A: I have to again check your premise because the Intelligence Community did not try to quash it. An individual employee of the National Security Agency wrote them a letter and suggested that it was inadvisable and possibly illegal to publish their findings on this coding material. The Intelligence Community did not support him and has not taken that position.

Q:

A: We have done so. He is not, has not been, we have never had any association with Anatoliy Scharanskiy.

Q:

A: I'm sorry, I've obviously overstated it. You're absolutely right. I do want to learn the lessons from the past. It's also a question of division of effort here and how much time I can put on what. But, really there are a number of past actions of the Agency I've gone into in innumerable detail because I really felt that there was a lesson to be learned there. They aren't always the ones that get publicity, that end up on the front page, is what I'm trying to say. Snepp has not uncovered

something that is of great value to me in his two accusations that we botched the evacuation and that we misrepresented the reporting in Vietnam. Among other things, I have a memorandum from Snepp three weeks before he left Vietnam defending the quality of the reporting and its independence from the Ambassador. So I'm not very enamored at his change of heart. But in other areas, and some which I can't discuss with you, I've found things from the past that I felt really merited my personal close attention to be sure there was nothing of that possibly returning again--you're absolutely right.

Q:

A: Well, I want to make it clear that we have no role in the domestic intelligence against American citizens. What we do in the United States is that we overtly ask American citizens, American companies, for information. We're in the phone book. We call you up and say we work for the CIA, you've just come back from the Soviet Union, could you tell us something about what you've learned. That's the kind of thing we do. And very frankly if there are foreigners in our country and we think they may be willing to be on our side when they go home, we look at them and talk to them. But we don't operate in this country here, so to speak.

Q:

A: They have total oversight in the budget appropriations because there is not a penny we get that doesn't come through both the oversight committees and the appropriations committees of the Congress. There are four committees that have to approve our budget. Now it is a secret budget but not secret from those people, that is, they know all the details they want practically because they've got to. All they have to say is you won't get any money if you don't tell us about this. Seriously, we work it out, we don't want to tell them the names of agents, we don't want to tell them details they wouldn't want to hear because it's so fragile that you wouldn't want to know the name of one of our agents because his life is immediately in your hands. So we have a good working relationship with them and to the best of my knowledge they are quite satisfied with the amount of effort and the amount of information that we are giving them to do their oversight job.

Q:

A: Are there guidelines to our agents in the field as to what actions they may take, do they exist and have they changed? There are guidelines, they have not specifically changed. But you can't write all these things down in specific rules. I'm really showing terrible bias tonight, but I engaged a Harvard professor to help me write a code of ethics only because he wrote an article saying we need a code of ethics and I took him up on it. I said help me write one which would be for these people. It's very difficult to do. If it's so specific it may be unreasonable and inhibiting. If it's too general, it's not really guidance. I think and hope there is new guidance going out to people in the field but it's the sense of what Carter, Mondale and Turner want them to do. It's the general direction and thrust that I give in my overall direction to them.

I have not gone out with a tablet of commandments and changed their instructions. And I don't think they needed a major change. I made a very thorough review of this clandestine covert side of the house in the first six months I was there and I gave one man nothing to do but that for me--an outsider. When he was finished and when I was finished, we made adjustments but didn't make major changes because they're running the thing well. And they're trying to be responsive to the direction they get. They are not a rogue elephant running off on their own. They just don't have that attitude. That's a false impression.

Q:

A: No, I don't think so at all. All I believe that we're going through now is not a period of retrenchment and isolationism in the wake of Vietnam. I think we're going through a more realistic appraisal of what a potential power is likely to do to influence events abroad and where our national interests lie in doing that and really evaluating the risks of these things much more objectively than we have in the past.

Q:

A: I will not contract with any academic institution without that institution knowing it. My relations with professors and administrators in the institutions is another thing. I do not very candidly believe in the Harvard guidelines. I believe in the Yale guidelines. I just discussed this with Mrs. Gray this afternoon. The Harvard guidelines say that any professor contracting with the Central Intelligence Agency or any intelligence agency in the United States must notify the administration at Harvard. The Yale guidelines say any Yale professor contracting with anybody, IBM, Intelligence Community, United Fund, anybody he's getting paid by, must notify the administration. That's non-discriminatory. But, to live near Salem as you do in Harvard and to issue a discriminatory thing against one group of people is awfully witchy.