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## A New Look at an Old Power

For years, America's cold warriors have been able to count on the government's intelligence agencies to help sustain the supposed threat of world conquest by supposedly all-conquering Communist Russia. But the cold warriors are getting cold comfort (so far at least) from the new director of the CIA, Adm. Starsfield Turner.

The hardliners were, of course, delighted when they helped force the withdrawal of Ted Sorensen as President Carter's first choice to head the CIA, and their satisfaction was compounded when, as Sorensen's replacement, the President named Turner, then the commander-in-chief of Allied Forces in Southern Europe.

However, in his first meeting with the press, following his confirmation by the Senate, the admiral made a surprisingly restrained but shrewd answer when he was asked for his views on Soviet strength and intentions.

He coolly described the Soviet Union as trailing the United States both economically and technologically and possessing an ineffective and dying ideology. He sounded more like an objective scholar than the typical military hawk.

The Soviet Union, he said, is trying to make up for these weaknesses by a 19th century type of concentration on military strength. And he would have been on solid ground if he had added that Soviet influence in the world, including the Communist sphere, has steadily dwindled even as its military might increased.

What a contrast Turner's detachment is with the almost frantic alarms of Maj. Gen. George J. Keegan Jr., who recently retired as the Air Force chief of intelligence. Keegan believes Moscow is not only well on the way to subjugating the world, but has already achieved military superiority over the United States.

The differences between the incoming intelligence officer and the outgoing one are as sharp as those between Andrew Young, President Carter's new ambassador to the United Nations, and Daniel P. Moynihan, who served at the United Nations before his election to the Senate last fall.

Moynihan, who downgraded the United Nation as a "theater of the absurd," also saw Russia as a rampaging power that was hell bent on "recolonizing" Africa. He warned that Moscow's intervention in Angola was just the first step in Sovietizing the dark continent.

Ambassador Young, though, doesn't see communism as much of a threat in that region. What Africans are really concerned about, he notes, is racism. As to more Angolas, he says, "there isn't a rebel group that won't turn to the U.S." for economic dealings "once it's in power."

Young seems to echo former Secretary of State Kissinger's admonition that no good purpose is served by picturing the Soviets as "10 feet tall." In the words of another critic, this endows them with a heroic stature they could not achieve on their own.

To the best of my knowledge, Adm. Turner is the first American military leader to publicly call attention to Russia's greatest vulnerability—its fading ideological hegemony.

There was a time, in the aftermath of World War II, when the entire Communist world was under the thumb of Moscow. The Kremlin dominated not only the other Communist governments around the globe, but controlled as well the Communist parties in the non-Marxist world. But year by year that hegemony has eroded.

Enlarged Soviet defense expenditures won't make up for the loss of Communist China, once Russia's greatest ally, now its greatest enemy—a nation of 800 million disciplined people, with a huge army and growing nuclear power. Imagine what the U. S. position would be if on one of our borders we were confronted with a hostile power of that magnitude.

Yugoslavia and Romania long ago loosened their ties with Russia, which has good reason to fear that its restless satellites in Eastern and Central Europe will also defect at the first good opportunity.

Moreover the once-obedient Communist parties in Italy, France and Spain, among others, have openly declared their independence of Moscow, and now are proclaiming their allegiance to democratic government.

This contagious apostasy can be largely traced to the spreading conviction that the Soviet ideology has seen

its best days, and can't be sold to the rest of the world. After all, communism has never in its history won a majority anywhere (including Russia) in a free election.

It is even getting more difficult for the Soviets to hold their own in strategic areas where not long ago they had formidable footholds, as in the Middle East and Southeast Asia. Egypt ejected the Russians bodily, while Hanoi, like Tito's Yugoslavia, now calls its own shots.

All that is good news, except to those who thrive on keeping the enormous military industrial complex going by magnifying the Soviet threat and by promoting the notion that Russia always strikes from strength. Actually, it has been the most dangerous when it was comparatively weak.

In all the postwar years, it has provoked only two outright confrontations with the United States. The first was the Berlin Blockade when the United States had a monopoly on the atomic bomb. The second was the 1962 Cuban missile crisis, when the United States enjoyed an overwhelming nuclear advantage.

Since then, having attained military parity with the United States, Moscow has been more cautious. It even chose to ignore our bombing of Russian ships in the harbor of Haiphong, North Vietnam, in 1972, rather than break off its then budding detente with America.

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