

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

FOR RELEASE ON RECEIPT

8 July 1975

STATEMENT

Office of the Assistant to the Director
(703) 351-7676
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Vail Report

The Director of Central Intelligence, with the approval of the President, is today releasing the Director's report of 24 December 1974 to the President, including the annexes, covering matters related to the New York Times article of 22 December alleging CIA involvement in a massive illegal domestic intelligence effort. This release is a follow-on to the decision to release the Rockefeller Commission report in view of the public interest in this matter.

The report is released without alteration, as is Annex F, a "Memorandum for All CIA Employees," of 9 May 1973, both of which were and are unclassified. Several other annexes have been declassified. Unclassified versions of all other annexes have been substituted for the originals by deleting classified portions from the original versions. Each such newly prepared version is so identified by an appropriate notation. Bracketed spaces indicate the size and location of all deletions. No textual changes have been made in the report itself or in any of the annexes.

It is to be emphasized that the report was prepared on an urgent basis and forwarded to the White House on 24 December. Continuing review of the topics covered in the report has resulted in some corrections in Director Colby's subsequent discussions with the President, the Director's testimony given the Rockefeller Commission, and in his various statements to congressional committees in the intervening months.

Regarding the memorandum entitled "Influencing Human Behavior" attached to Annex I of the report, it should be noted that no such drug or experimental activities are currently conducted and the Director has approved none.



CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

December 24, 1974

The President
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. President:

This report is in response to your request for my comments on The New York Times article of December 22nd alleging CIA involvement in a "massive" domestic intelligence effort. While CIA has made certain errors, it is not accurate to characterize it as having engaged in "massive domestic intelligence activity."

The National Security Act of 1947 states that CIA shall have no "police, subpoena, law-enforcement powers, or internal security functions." The Agency's functions thus relate solely to foreign intelligence. Included in this responsibility is foreign counterintelligence, as stated in National Security Council Intelligence Directive No. 5. This provides that CIA shall, inter alia, conduct clandestine counterintelligence outside the United States and its possessions. Under this charge, CIA for many years has maintained liaison with the intelligence and security services of other nations and has conducted independent counterintelligence activities abroad. Whenever such matters relate to the internal security of the United States, information derived from such operations is passed to the Federal Bureau of Investigation and other Departments or Agencies of the Government when appropriate. In addition, CIA has responded to requests from the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and on occasion other Departments, for counterintelligence work abroad.

In 1967, when concern grew in the United States Government over domestic dissidence, questions were raised as to whether there might be stimulation or support of such activity from outside the United States. As a result, the Director of Central Intelligence on 15 August established within the CIA counterintelligence office a program to identify possible foreign links with American dissident elements (Annex A). Later that same year, this became a part of an interagency program (Annex B). In November 1967, the Agency produced a study, International Connections of US Peace Groups, in response to a request by the President. In late 1967 or early 1968 the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

requested an assessment of possible foreign links with American dissident student groups (SDS). In mid-1968 the Agency produced an assessment of youth movements throughout the world, including a section analyzing the American scene to complete the picture. This study concluded that: "There is no convincing evidence of control, manipulation, sponsorship, or significant financial support of student dissidents by any international Communist authority."

In September 1969 the Director reviewed the counter-intelligence program and stated that he believed it to be proper, "while strictly observing the statutory and de facto proscriptions on Agency domestic involvements" (Annex C).

In 1970, in the so-called Huston Plan, the Directors of the FBI, DIA, NSA, and CIA signed a report to the President recommending an integrated approach to the coverage of domestic unrest. While not explicit in the Plan, CIA's role would have been to contribute foreign intelligence and counterintelligence. The Huston Plan itself was not implemented but was followed by the establishment on 3 December 1970 of the Interagency Evaluation Committee which was coordinated by the Counsel to the President, Mr. John Dean. This committee was chaired by a Department of Justice officer, Mr. Robert Mardian, and included representatives from CIA, FBI, DOD, State, Treasury, and NSA. Pursuant to this Government-wide effort, CIA continued its counterintelligence interest in possible foreign links with American dissidents. A full description of the CIA project, prepared on 1 June 1972, is attached (Annex D).

Because of CIA's effort during these years, some CIA employees, not directly involved in the program, misinterpreted it as being more focused on American dissidents than on their possible connections with foreign governments. In addition, however, there were individual cases in which actions were taken which overstepped proper bounds. For example, the Agency recruited or inserted individuals into American dissident circles to establish their credentials for operations abroad against those foreign elements which might be supporting, encouraging, or directing dissidence in the United States. In the course of their preparatory work or on completion of a phase of their mission abroad, these individuals reported on the activities of the American dissidents with whom they came in contact. Significant information thereby derived was reported to the FBI, but in the process CIA files were established on the individuals named.

In 1972, with the approval of the Director, the Executive Director issued an internal memorandum to senior CIA officials describing the program in order to clarify its scope and to invite reports of any departures from its policy:

"To carry out its responsibilities for counter-intelligence, CIA is interested in the activities of foreign nations or intelligence services aimed at the U.S. To the extent that these activities lie outside the U.S., including activities aimed at the U.S. utilizing U.S. citizens or others, they fall within CIA's responsibilities. Responsibility for coverage of the activities within the U.S. lies with the FBI, as an internal security function. CIA's responsibility and authority are limited to the foreign intelligence aspect of the problem, and any action of a law enforcement or internal security nature lies with the FBI or local police forces."
(Annex E)

On 9 May 1973, the Director issued a bulletin to all employees requesting them to report any indication of any activity they believed might be outside CIA's charter (Annex F). Responses from some employees referred to the counterintelligence program. As a result, on 29 August 1973 the Director issued specific direction to the managers of the program re-emphasizing that the focus of the program was to be clearly on the foreign organizations and individuals involved in links with American dissidents and only incidentally on the American contacts involved (Annex G).

In March 1974 the Director terminated the program and issued specific guidance that any collection of counter-intelligence information on Americans would only take place abroad and would be initiated only in response to requests from the FBI or in coordination with it; furthermore, any such information obtained as a by-product of foreign intelligence activities would be reported to the FBI (Annex H).

In the course of this program, files were developed on American citizens. The total index of these Americans amounts to 9,944 counterintelligence files. Approximately two-thirds of these consisted of the by-product coverage of the activities outlined above or stemmed from specific requests from the FBI for information on the activities of Americans abroad. One-third consisted of FBI reports on American Communists. We have for the past several months been in the process of

eliminating material not justified by CIA's counterintelligence responsibilities, and about 1,000 such files have been removed from the active index but not destroyed.

Aside from our Congressional liaison working records, we hold files on fourteen past and present Members of Congress. These were opened prior to their election to office and were caused either by the process of clearing them for work with the Agency or because we were interested in them for foreign intelligence purposes. There is no, and to my knowledge never has been any, surveillance--technical or otherwise--of any Members of Congress.

The New York Times articles makes a number of specific allegations of improper activity domestically by CIA and relates these to the above program. In the 1973 compilation by the Agency of all activities which might be questionable, a number of items were raised which were not related to that program. The Agency's action in most of these cases was founded upon the section of the National Security Act of 1947 which provides that the Director of Central Intelligence is responsible for protecting intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure. Over the many years in which CIA has been operating, some actions have been taken which were improper extensions of the charge contained in this language. Apparently The New York Times reporter learned of some of these items and erroneously associated them with the above program. Examples include:

a. Unauthorized entry of the premises of three individuals, a defector and two former employees, to determine whether they had classified documents, and in one case to recover them (in 1966, 1970 and 1971). Two of these incidents involved breaking and entering.

b. Electronic surveillance (telephone tap) of two newspaper reporters (1963) and physical surveillance of five reporters (in 1971 and 1972) to determine the sources of classified information published by them. Similar physical surveillance of three ex-employees of the CIA who were suspected of unauthorized possession of classified documents (1969, 1971, and 1972).

c. Development of paid informants among construction workers at the time of construction of the Agency building (1960-1961) to protect against the placement of electronic traps therein.

d. During the period 1967-1971, agents were also developed to monitor dissident groups in the Washington area considered to be potential threats to Agency personnel and installations, and Agency security field officers in the US also collected information on similar dissident groups, to advise the Agency of potential threats to its personnel and installations.

e. A list of individuals suspected of particular offenses considered to pose a security vulnerability was collected over a number of years prior to 1973. This practice was terminated and the file destroyed in 1973.

f. From May-September 1971 a long-time CIA source was under surveillance in the US in connection with a reported plot to assassinate or kidnap Vice President Agnew and the DCI. The individual covered was a Latin American revolutionary, but the surveillance expanded to cover several American citizen contacts in New York and Detroit.

A final category of questionable activity identified during the 1973 survey was related to the Agency's mission to collect foreign intelligence. In some cases the Agency exceeded proper bounds or its activities were subject to misconstruction as being aimed at purposes outside its charter. The following examples, for instance, may be related to the charges made in The New York Times article, although they have no connection with the program first discussed above:

a. Records were made of the identities and addresses of individuals exchanging correspondence between the United States and certain communist countries, as an aid to determining possible leads to potential operations. This program included the surreptitious opening of certain first-class mail to extract positive intelligence or data valuable for the development of foreign intelligence operations against the communist country. This program was initiated in 1953, and from its inception was fully coordinated with the FBI, which received much of its product. The operation was approved by three Postmasters General and one Attorney General. The program was terminated in 1973.

b. We obtained names and addresses of persons telephoning a communist country so that we could follow up for possible operational leads.

c. Individuals were recruited or inserted into dissident groups in the US to establish their credentials to collect foreign intelligence overseas. By-product information reflecting planned violence or similar activity was passed to the FBI.

The items listed above are those questionable activities relating to matters covered in The New York Times article. Obviously, I am prepared to brief you fully on such matters, as I did the Chairmen of the Congressional Armed Services Committees.

Following our identification of all these matters in 1973, I issued detailed and specific instructions dealing with each activity. Some were terminated; others were continued but only as fully authorized by our statute and in accordance with law (Annex I).

The New York Times article also states that I am considering the possibility of asking the Attorney General to institute legal action against some of those who had been involved in these activities. I have conferred with the Acting Attorney General, Mr. Silberman, as to my responsibilities with respect to evidence relating to possible illegal activities by Agency personnel. On December 21st I agreed with him that I would review the questionable activities noted in this letter and others to determine whether these should be brought to his attention for legal review. I will certainly keep you advised of any such action.

As I stated to you on the telephone, Mr. President, you have my full assurance that the Agency is not conducting activities comparable to those alleged in The New York Times article. Even in the past, I believe the Agency essentially conformed to its mission of foreign intelligence. There were occasions over the years in which improper actions were taken as noted above, but I believe these were few, were quite exceptional to the thrust of the Agency's activities, and have been fully terminated. Agency personnel are instructed each year to advise me of any activity they consider questionable, and I am resolved to follow your directive that no improper activity be conducted by this Agency.

Respectfully,

W. E. Colby

W. E. Colby
Director.

ANNEX A

[This is an unclassified version of the original memorandum. The only difference between this and the classified original is that the names of two CIA officers are omitted from this version.]

15 August 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, CI Staff

SUBJECT : Overseas Coverage of Subversive Student
and Related Activities

1. Further to our discussion with the Director this morning, please take the steps necessary to accomplish the following:

a. Designation of the officers in the CI Staff who will be the responsible focal points and coordinators of operational activity in this matter. (Harry Rositzke and Dick Ober appear to be excellent candidates, as you suggested.)

b. The exclusive briefing of specific division chiefs and certain selected officers in each division, on the aims and objectives of this intelligence collection program with definite domestic counterintelligence aspects.

c. The establishment of some sort of system by one of the CI Staff officers (or whatever officer you select) for the orderly coordination of the operations to be conducted, with the responsibility for the actual conduct of the operations vested in the specific area divisions.

d. The identification of a limited dissemination procedure which will afford these activities high operational security while at the same time getting the information to the appropriate departments and agencies which have the responsibility domestically.

e. The establishment of a periodic reporting system, preferably monthly, to gauge progress in the enterprise.

2. The officer you select for the operational end of this will have a few leads to start with. He should confer with Mr. [redacted] for a couple of leads and with Mr. [redacted] for a follow-up on some ideas that he has. Your suggestion of this morning, that some of our liaison may be helpful in this, certainly should be pursued energetically but carefully. One of the CI Staff officers, or whoever you select, should feel free to seek the assistance of the FI Staff as he requires this to run down leads or otherwise to do his job. It may be well to assign a cryptonym to the effort, so that cable traffic can be suitably handled on a limited basis.

3. I should appreciate some sort of interim report by 31 August on the steps we have taken to get into position to move on this program.

/initials/

Thomas H. Karamessines
Deputy Director for Plans

cc: ADD/P
C/FI

ANNEX B

[This is a cable of 3 November 1967 from CIA Headquarters to CIA addressees abroad. Certain deletions were necessary to permit production of this unclassified version.]

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1. HDQ IS PARTICIPATING IN HIGH LEVEL INTERDEPARTMENTAL SURVEY OF INTERNATIONAL CONNECTIONS OF ANTI-VIETNAM WAR MOVEMENT IN U.S. FOR PURPOSES OF THIS STUDY WE ARE ATTEMPTING TO ESTABLISH NATURE AND EXTENT OF ILLEGAL AND SUBVERSIVE CONNECTIONS THAT MAY EXIST BETWEEN U.S. ORGANIZATIONS OR ACTIVISTS INVOLVED AND COMMUNIST, COMMUNIST FRONT OR OTHER ANTI-AMERICAN AND FOREIGN ELEMENTS ABROAD. SUCH CONNECTIONS MIGHT RANGE FROM CASUAL CONTACTS BASED MERELY ON MUTUAL INTEREST TO CLOSELY CONTROLLED CHANNELS FOR PARTY DIRECTIVES.

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2. INFORMATION COLLECTED BY OTHER AGENCIES IS BEING TAPPED]

HERE IN ADDITION TO OUR OWN FILES TO SUPPLEMENT THIS DATA, PARTICULARLY ON RECENT ACTIVITY RELATED TO 15-21 OCT. DEMONSTRATIONS. WE NEED CURRENT CHECK ON STATION HOLDINGS. ADDRESSEES ARE REQUESTED TO CANVASS INFO ON FILE OR OTHERWISE READILY AVAILABLE, AND CABLE SUMMARY OF FINDINGS PLUS ANY COMMENTS STATIONS BELIEVE RELEVANT. COVERAGE SHOULD BE LIMITED TO EVIDENCE OF CONTACTS BETWEEN ELEMENTS OF U.S. PEACE MOVEMENT AND FOREIGN GROUPS OR INDIVIDUALS. VIETNAM PROTEST ACTIVITY IN YOUR AREAS SHOULD BE REPORTED ONLY INSOFAR AS DIRECT CONNECTION WITH U.S. ORGANIZATIONS OR CITIZENS IS INVOLVED. WHERE CONNECTION IS EVIDENT, ADDRESSEES SHOULD TRY TO SHOW OR ESTIMATE WHETHER ACTIVITY IS LOCALLY INSPIRED OR IS EXTERNALLY DIRECTED.

3. VIEW SENSITIVITY THIS MATTER, PLEASE DO NOT DISCUSS WITH NON [] PERSONNEL. THESE REPLIES SHOULD BE SLUGGED [] ONLY. SHOULD NOT BE DISSIMINATED LOCALLY OR LATERALLY. APPRECIATE THIS IS SHORT NOTICE, BUT NEED REPLY BY 7 NOV.

END OF MESSAGE

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ANNEX C

6 September 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Plans
Deputy Director for Intelligence
Deputy Director for Support
Deputy Director for Science and Technology

1. I recently have reviewed the Agency's efforts to monitor those international activities of radicals and black militants which may affect the national security. I believe that we have the proper approach in discharging this sensitive responsibility, while strictly observing (sic) the statutory and de facto proscriptions on Agency domestic involvements.

2. My understanding is that OCI carries this responsibility in the Intelligence Directorate, and that arrangements have been made in each geographic division to ensure continuing coverage of pertinent activities and systematic compilation of useful information. Mr. Corscadden's reassignment removes from the scene an experienced and knowledgeable analyst of these matters, and it is my hope that a suitable replacement will be found and developed.

3. I appreciate that there are several components in the Clandestine Service with a legitimate operational interest in the radical milieu. At the same time, it should be understood that Mr. Ober's Special Operations Group of CI Staff has the principal operational responsibility for coordinating and developing operations to collect information on aspects of activities abroad which have a direct bearing on U.S. radical and black militant movements. I expect that area divisions and senior staffs will be fully cooperative in this effort, both in exploiting existing sources and in developing new ones, and that Mr. Ober will have the necessary access to such sources and operational assets.

4. It is most important to ensure that Mr. Ober's Group has a small coterie of knowledgeable, effective officers. He needs two kinds of people: skilled analysts who can produce written material coherently and quickly, and experienced operations officers, ideally with a demonstrated ability to work in this sensitive area. If the right people are scarce and already ensconced in other activities, a select few nonetheless ought to be broken away for assignment to CI Staff.

5. A formidable obstacle to Mr. Ober at present is the backlog of undigested raw information at his disposal. In addition to assigning skilled analysts to deal with the flow of information, there is an obvious need for introducing expanded, sophisticated computer support. I understand that the Office of Computer Service possesses on-line capabilities and other facilities which not only would provide vastly improved information storage and retrieval but also affords the possibility of a data link with certain other elements of the security community. I would urge the earliest utilization of this capability. A rational combination of able officers and computers ought also to foster the twin virtues of holding Mr. Ober to an acceptable level and minimizing the number of individuals with access to sensitive intelligence and operational information.

6. It is also important to ensure that a cooperative and supportive relationship exists between the Office of Security and Mr. Ober's Group. I expect that information collected by the Office of Security as part of its normal security mission; but which has a bearing on the targets of the Group, will be provided to the Group. Office of Security checks with other domestic repositories of information, involving targets of interest to the Group, should be closely coordinated with it.

/initials/

Richard Helms
Director

ANNEX D

1 June 1972

BRIEFING PAPERS

SPECIAL OPERATIONS GROUP, COUNTER INTELLIGENCE STAFF

- I. Program Objectives
- II. Program Interagency Relationships
- III. Operational Program
- IV. Program Manpower Resource Requirements

1 June 1972

Program Objectives
Special Operations Group, Counter Intelligence Staff

The Special Operations Group is responsible for managing and implementing the Agency program for collection and dissemination of information on the countersubversive aspect of counterintelligence. This responsibility includes:

A. Collection: Clandestine collection abroad of information on foreign([

]efforts to support/encourage/exploit domestic extremism and dissidence in the United States. These efforts include funding, training, propaganda, provision of safe haven, provision of alias documentation, etc. The collection emphasis is on foreign involvement, whether directly or by indirect third national leftist groups or individuals. Principal concern is for coverage of foreign involvement in the extremist anitwar movement, extremist student/youth/faculty groups, black extremism, Chicano extremism, Puerto Rican extremism, deserter/evader support and inducement, and international aspects of domestic underground media.]

B. Dissemination: Information on the above subject, collected by all elements of this Agency, including the Clandestine Service, the Office of Communications, the Foreign Broadcast Information Service, and the Domestic Contact Service, is disseminated as obtained via special reports series. The bulk of the disseminations are to the Federal Bureau of Investigation but disseminations are also made to other agencies, including the White House as appropriate.

C. Data Base Maintenance: Since all cable and dispatch correspondence in relation to the program is compartmented for reasons of operational security and sensitivity, and is not processed by either the Cable Secretariat or the Information Services Division (ISD) of the Clandestine Service, a complex, highly sophisticated system is utilized for the control and retrieval of this information. (An additional reason for the need for such a system is the receipt of a large volume of reporting from the Federal Bureau of Investigation which requires detailed retrieval capability for pertinent names cited, and which would not otherwise be retrievable under existing ISD procedures.) The control and retrieval system has an on-line remote query and remote input capability and is linked to an IBM 360/67 computer of the Office of Computer Services. Hardware involved includes nine IBM 2260 Cathode Ray Tube Terminals, five IBM 2741 Typewriter Terminals, one Data 100 Offline Printer, and one Data 100 Card Reader.

D. Production: In addition to disseminating pertinent information as collected, the Agency is responsible for preparation and provision of special reports, studies, and estimates on the sub-paragraph A above subject, in response to requirements levied upon it by other elements of the Government. To maximize compartmentation, such special studies, reports, or estimates are prepared by the Special Operations Group, rather than the DDI, utilizing either all information available to the Agency or all information available to the Government, depending upon the nature and scope of the particular requirement.

[This is an unclassified version of the original memorandum. A minor deletion was necessary to permit the production of the unclassified version.]

1 June 1972

Program Interagency Relationships
Special Operations Group, Counter Intelligence Staff

Implementation of the Agency's program for collection and dissemination of information on foreign exploitation of domestic dissidence and extremism involves a complex series of interagency relationships. These fall into the following categories: operational; dissemination of information; and provision of special studies, reports, and estimates.

A. Operational: Despite the disruption of liaison between the Agency and the Federal Bureau of Investigation in the Spring of 1970, the FBI has cooperated operationally with the Special Operations Group along three lines:

1. Exploitation of FBI Sources Abroad: Most common (about 18 cases since January 1971) has been participation by the Special Operations Group in the briefing and debriefing of FBI New Left and racial extremist sources who travel abroad as part of their undercover activities. Some such travel (five cases, not included in the preceding figure) has even been arranged to meet Special Operations Group needs. [

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2. Provision of Sources by the FBI: In a few cases, either in response to a specific request for a specific type of source for long-term use abroad by the Agency, or because an FBI informant who has done a good job for the FBI and who wants to work abroad has asked for it, the FBI had made available FBI sources in this country for turnover to the Agency and use abroad. There are three such sources now active abroad under Agency control and direction.

3. Provision of Informant Leads to the FBI: As a converse of sub-paragraph 2 above, the Agency on occasion has provided the FBI with leads on possible informants in the United States on extremist and dissident activity. Such leads arise from efforts

to spot and recruit assets suitable for dispatch abroad against targets of this program.

B. Dissemination of Information: Pertinent information is disseminated as collected in response to general standing requirements of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Secret Service, and the Immigration and Naturalization Service. Most of this information goes only to the FBI. Roughly 20 to 25 percent of that is responsive to specific FBI requirements. The Special Operations Group evaluates its disseminated product by regularly checking with the FBI on its adequacy and relevance. Counterintelligence of exceptional importance is disseminated over the signature of the Director of CIA and is sent, as appropriate, to the White House, the Secretary of State, the Attorney General and the Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation. The principal White House addressee is the Counsel to the President who has special cognizance over domestic affairs; when appropriate, the information is also sent to the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs.

C. Provision of Special Studies, Reports, and Estimates: In the earlier phase of the program, special studies and estimates were requested by and prepared for the President, his Counsel, and/or the Attorney General. Since mid-1970 such special reports and estimates have been prepared for a highly sensitive interagency committee physically located within the Department of Justice and working on behalf of the White House. This is the Intelligence Evaluation Committee, composed of representatives of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Department of Justice, the Secret Service (on behalf of the Treasury Department), the Department of Defense, the National Security Agency, and the Central Intelligence Agency. The primary function of the Committee is the evaluation of domestic intelligence for agreed-on national estimates, and the levying of collection requirements related thereto. The CIA contributions are limited to the foreign aspects. The Chief of the Special Operations Group serves as the representative for the Agency on the Intelligence Evaluation Committee Staff, and as the alternate to the Agency representative in the Committee (who is the Chief, Counter Intelligence Staff).

Note: Special Problem: There is no written agreement governing the activities of FBI Legal Attaches abroad in dealing with foreign liaison services on collection of information on foreign exploitation of domestic U.S. dissidence and extremism. The DCI has enunciated a policy that the Agency is the action instrumentality of the U.S. Government in this field with foreign liaison services. In actual practice, the FBI levies pertinent requirements directly

upon its own Legal Attaches and may or may not come to the Agency for assistance. An informal, usually followed, agreement has been reached, under which the Agency handles FBI requirements in this field (a) in countries where there is no Legal Attache, and (b) in situations in which several countries are involved (including countries in which there is a Legal Attache). Unilateral collection effort is requested of the Agency, however, whether or not there is a Legal Attache.

[This is an unclassified version of the original memorandum. Certain deletions were necessary to permit the production of this unclassified version.]

1 June 1972

Operational Program
Special Operations Group, Counter Intelligence Staff

To accomplish its objectives, the Special Operations Group seeks to achieve the maximum feasible utilization of existing resources of the Clandestine Services. Few assets have been recruited and are being run exclusively for this program. Instead, emphasis has been placed on the exploitation of new and old Agency assets who have a by-product capability or a concurrent capability for provision of information responsive to the program's requirements. This involves close continuing liaison with briefed officers in all area divisions and the Soviet Bloc Division; and provision of custom-tailored collection requirements and operational guidance. Where special targets exist, a few agents asset have been specially recruited and deployed against them. [

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Because of the emphasis on exploitation of existing assets to the extent feasible and of liaison service capabilities where appropriate, this has been and continues to be a low-cost collection program, particularly in relation to the total number of assets involved and the production therefrom. At present, operational expenses directly chargeable to the program are limited to eight approved operational projects [

] . The major costs of the program are the salaries of the Special Operations Group personnel and the computer-associated data base maintenance costs. These Headquarters resource requirements are covered in a separate memorandum.

The following statistics are a rough index of the extent of effort involved in the collection and related dissemination program. They show how much is being done with a relatively small resource input. The statistics apply to cables and dispatches sent or received through special handling channels for the exclusive action of the Special Operations Group; to the dissemination prepared and distributed by the Group; and to the number of FBI reports received by the Group for operational support and data base maintenance purposes.

	<u>1970</u>	<u>1971</u>	<u>1 Jan-31 May 72</u>
Cables In	2593	2190	1071
Cables Out	2114	2217	1076
Dispatches In	1016	1033	355
Dispatches Out	347	315	99
Disseminations (Regular)	746	711	307
Disseminations (Special memos, studies, estimates)	14	37	24
Incoming FBI Reports	10,486	10,110	3,043

1 June 1972

Program Manpower Resource Requirements
Special Operations Group, Counter Intelligence Staff

The program of the Special Operations Group originated in instructions of the Deputy Director for Plans on 15 August 1967, based on instructions to him by the Director, Central Intelligence Agency. These instructions were to establish a program for collection and dissemination of information on foreign involvement in domestic extremism and dissidence; and to maintain an adequate supporting data base, including full control of pertinent related information received from the Federal Bureau of Investigation. The program started with one officer and one IA, building strength gradually as personnel could be obtained.

The first formal strength authorization was provided in mid-1969 when a total of 36 positions was authorized with the understanding that, if this should prove insufficient, additional personnel would be authorized. (The Chief of the Special Operations Group estimated that a force of about 60 would be required as a minimum to fully implement the required program.)

To facilitate a rapid qualitative buildup of the program, a memorandum was sent in September 1969 by the DCI to each of the Agency Directorates requesting full support to the program; i.e., especially by the Office of Security and Office of Communications in the Support Directorate; by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service and the Domestic Contact Service in the Intelligence Directorate; by the Office of Computer Services in the Scientific and Technical Directorate; and by all pertinent elements in the Plans Directorate. As part of the buildup of the Special Operations Group, several key personnel assignments were made in mid and late 1969; i.e., three branch chiefs and a deputy chief.

By mid-1970 the authorized strength of 36 had been achieved and was inadequate for the workload, despite the use of a very large amount of overtime.

As a result, the question of overall strength was reviewed and a decision made in late Spring of 1971 that an additional 18 positions would be authorized for the Special Operations Group for fiscal year 1972. Due to the lack of an effective directed assignment system, the Group has been unable to date to build up to its authorized strength (and still is short of the space needed to accommodate that strength).

As of 2 June 1972, the Group has an on-board strength of 42, with two additional officers scheduled to report by early July. Four Group officers, however, are scheduled for transfer out by mid-July. The group thus needs not only to complete its buildup to authorized strength by filling existing vacancies, but also to obtain replacements for officers still in the Group whose tours with the Group either are already over or are close to their end. The early satisfaction of these personnel requirements is essential to bring a halt to the physical drain on the health of the Group's officers trying to keep up with the enormous continuing volume of

work. The Group has been staffed to date primarily by junior officers who are bright and hard-working but who require relatively close supervision because of lack of prior experience. The management span of the senior officers is thus larger than desirable; additional middle grade, experienced officers are required. Replacement of officers at or near the end of their tour of duty is also required to maintain a concept of rotation-tour-staffing which has proven the only effective means of attracting qualified, experienced personnel or bright, ambitious, young personnel.

In fulfillment of a requirement set forth when a 54 strength Group was authorized, a formal Table of Organization has been recently approved. The Group is organized around two worldwide operational branches, each of which is concerned with the collection and dissemination of information on foreign involvement in certain specific aspects of the domestic U.S. scene. These branches are supported by a special operational unit and by sections concerned with the control of correspondence and the maintenance of a retrievable data base. In addition, the Office of Computer Services provides five full man years and two partial man years of programming and system design support for the computer systems under development for and utilized by the Group. Without such computer support, it would be impossible to run this program with the relatively small number of people authorized and with the short time deadlines required to provide effective requirements and guidance for field operations, and to respond effectively to special studies and estimates requirements levied upon the Agency.

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21 APR 1972

ANNEX E

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Intelligence
Deputy Director for Plans
Deputy Director for Support
Deputy Director for Science and Technology
Heads of Independent Offices

(For Distribution to Office/Division Chief
Level Only)

SUBJECT : CIA Activities in the United States

1. From time to time some of our employees express concern over various allegations or rumors of CIA activities in the United States. The attached memorandum is designed to clarify this subject so that supervisors can authoritatively reply to any employees indicating such concern. It is a statement of the facts of the situation. If incidents or activities are reported which appear to conflict with this statement, they should be reported to appropriate senior authority for resolution (or correction if unauthorized activities might have occurred).

2. Because of the possible sensitivity of this description of the Agency's methodology, this memorandum is not being given the usual broad circulation of the "FYI -- Allegations and Answers" series. Office and Division Chiefs are urged, however, to use it to inform Branch Chiefs so that its points can be readily available to supervisors to react to expressions of employee concern.

/s/ W. E. Colby

W. E. Colby
Executive Director-Comptroller

Attachment

WEC:sfc

Distribution:

0 - DDI

1 - Each Other Addressee:

DDP

D/DCI/IC

A/DCI (Thermer)

DDS

D/PPB

SAVA

ALLEGATION:

In a variety of ways it has been alleged that CIA is working within the United States, with particular attention to extremist groups.

FACTS:

1. Section 102 of the National Security Act of 1947, subparagraph D3, states, "The Agency shall have no police, subpoena, law-enforcement powers, or internal security functions."

In his speech to the American Society of Newspaper Editors on 14 April 1971, the Director states:

"I can assure you that except for the normal responsibilities for protecting the physical security of our own personnel, our facilities, and our classified information, we do not have any such powers and functions; we have never sought any; we do not exercise any. In short, we do not target on American citizens."

In the Director's "State of the Agency" speech to employees on 17 September 1971, he said:

"I gave a talk to the American Society of Newspaper Editors last winter, as you know, and I did it for only one purpose. That was to try and put in the record a few of these denials that we've all wanted to see put in the public record for some time. And you can rely on those denials. They're true, and you can use that as any text that you may need to demonstrate that we're not in the drug traffic, and that we're not trying to do espionage on American citizens in the United States, and we're not tapping telephone lines, and that we're not doing a lot of other things which we're accused of doing. One of the things that tends to perpetuate some of these silly ideas are jokes that are made about them, particularly about domestic espionage. Although the jokes have no basis in fact they nevertheless give us a name which we don't deserve. I don't say that that makes all that much difference, but it does make some difference, and this tends to spill over, so I would like to suggest that if you have it in your hearts to do so that you speak up when the occasion arises and try and set the facts straight."

2. From time to time some employees have been concerned that Agency activities might conflict with these statements. They can be assured that Agency activities do not. For clarification, some activities which may have been subject to misunderstanding are listed as follows:

a. Domestic contacts. The Domestic Contact Service establishes discreet but overt relationships with American private citizens, commercial, academic and other organizations and resident aliens for the purposes of collecting on a voluntary basis foreign intelligence information or soliciting their cooperation in assisting the Agency to perform its mission overseas. Records of the individuals and organizations cooperating with the Agency are maintained as a necessary practical element of this process.

b. Security Investigations. Security investigations are conducted on prospective employees, contractors, and consultants, and on security problems which arise. These investigations involve a wide range of investigative procedures, including neighborhood inquiries, checks with other Government agencies, review of credit reports, and interviews with former employers and business associates. This is essential to assure that our personnel possess a high degree of personal integrity, sense of responsibility, and competence and to protect classified information and sensitive intelligence sources and methods. The resulting files are held separately by the Office of Security and are not merged with other Agency files.

c. Foreign Resources. On some occasions, foreign citizens of interest to CIA are contacted and recruited in America for work abroad. The purpose of this activity is entirely restricted to the Agency's foreign operations.

d. Recruitment. CIA recruiters maintain a wide variety of contacts within the United States, assisting individuals interested in employment with CIA to learn more about it and to join its employee force.

e. Contracting. In the course of CIA business and operations, a number of contracts for procurement, research, or analysis are made with a variety of U.S. companies and individuals. This in no way constitutes operations in the U.S. but rather secures the assistance of these groups in carrying out the CIA mission against foreign targets.

f. Operations. The 1967 Katzenbach Committee report was approved by the Director in March 1967 and is binding on any of our relations with American organizations today. It specifically prohibits covert financial assistance or support, direct or indirect, to any U.S. educational or private voluntary organization. Any relationship or operation the Agency has with an American organization must be and is within these guidelines.

g. Details or loans. On rare occasions, details of technically qualified CIA personnel, technical advice, or loans of CIA equipment have been made available to other U.S. agencies at their request to assist them to carry out their responsibilities. An example is the skymarshal program, in which some CIA personnel were temporarily detailed to the FAA in order to assist in a rapid initiation of that program. Such personnel and equipment are under the operational control of the receiving agency. Assistance of this nature in no way constitutes an assumption of responsibility or authority by CIA for the program.

h. Counterintelligence and Drugs. To carry out its responsibilities for counterintelligence, CIA is interested in the activities of foreign nations or intelligence services aimed at the U.S. To the extent that these activities lie outside the U.S., including activities aimed at the U.S. utilizing U.S. citizens or others, they fall within CIA's responsibilities. Responsibility for coverage of the activities within the U.S. lies with the FBI, as an internal security function. CIA's responsibility and authority are limited to the foreign intelligence aspect of the problem, and any action of a law enforcement or internal security nature lies with the FBI or local police forces. (CIA's assistance to the U.S. Government program against narcotics and drugs is handled in the same fashion.)

i. Operational Support. To support CIA operations, arrangements are made with various U.S. business or other entities to provide cover or other support for CIA personnel or activities abroad. This can include proprietaries formed or controlled by CIA. While these may exist within the U.S., their purpose is to conduct or support operations abroad.

j. Defectors. As provided by law, CIA occasionally resettles in the U.S. defectors and other foreign individuals of operational interest. This resettlement may involve a new identity, relocation, employment, etc. Although this activity takes place in this country, its purpose is the support of operations abroad.



CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

9 May 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR ALL CIA EMPLOYEES

1. Recent press reports outline in detail certain alleged CIA activities with respect to Mr. Howard Hunt and other parties. The presently known facts behind these stories are those stated in the attached draft of a statement I will be making to the Senate Committee on Appropriations on 9 May. As can be seen, the Agency provided limited assistance in response to a request by senior officials. The Agency has cooperated with and made available to the appropriate law enforcement bodies information about these activities and will continue to do so.

2. All CIA employees should understand my attitude on this type of issue. I shall do everything in my power to confine CIA activities to those which fall within a strict interpretation of its legislative charter. I take this position because I am determined that the law shall be respected and because this is the best way to foster the legitimate and necessary contributions we in CIA can make to the national security of the United States.

3. I am taking several actions to implement this objective:

I have ordered all senior operating officials of this Agency to report to me immediately on any activities now going on, or that have gone on in the past, which might be construed to be outside the legislative charter of this Agency.

I hereby direct every person presently employed by CIA to report to me on any such activities of which he has knowledge. I invite all ex-employees to do the same. Anyone who has such information should call my secretary (extension 6363) and say that he wishes to talk to me about "activities outside CIA's charter."

4. To ensure that Agency activities are proper in the future, I hereby promulgate the following standing order for all CIA employees:

Any CIA employee who believes that he has received instructions which in any way appear inconsistent with the CIA legislative

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charter shall inform the Director of Central Intelligence
immediately .

/signed/

James R. Schlesinger
Director

Administrative-Internal Use Only

ANNEX G

29 August 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Science and Technology
Deputy Director for Intelligence
Deputy Director for Management and Services
Deputy Director for Operations

INFO: Inspector General

SUBJECT: Questionable Activities

1. As an aspect of the allegations of improper CIA activity in connection with the Watergate and associated matters, the Inspector General was directed to assemble all information available in the Agency on any such activities. Certain specific matters were provided to him, and the Director by memorandum of 9 May 1973 directed all employees to report any activities, current or past, "which might be construed to be outside the legislative charter of this Agency." This information was assembled and consolidated by the Inspector General in a memorandum of 21 May 1973 and certain individual memoranda thereafter supplementing it. This material was used in a detailed, page-by-page review of all such information with Senator Symington and Congressman Nedzi, as Chairman of the Senate and the House Armed Services Intelligence Subcommittees, respectively. In addition, I undertook very specific commitments in my confirmation hearings to ensure that the Agency will remain within its legislative charter. I am arranging for the published transcripts of those hearings to be circulated throughout the Agency for compliance, and at that time will reaffirm the specific direction made by Dr. Schlesinger in his memorandum of 9 May 1973. This will also be incorporated into appropriate regulations.

2. With respect to the specific questionable activities which were reported as a result of the search made throughout the Agency, however, I believe it essential to take specific action in order that these not seem to be condoned or overlooked. I have therefore developed specific instructions on each reported activity. These are included in the attachments to this memorandum, and have the force of specific direction to you to pass on to appropriate subordinates the instructions outlined. Separate packages of such instructions are being developed for each Directorate in order to respect the sensitivity of some of the activities discussed, including those which are deemed quite

appropriate within CIA's charter. Similarly, each activity is placed on a separate page so that the Deputy Director concerned may most easily forward it to the office or offices directly concerned without distributing it more broadly.

3. In the event that these instructions raise substantial difficulties of implementation or compliance, I would appreciate your raising such cases with me directly, with whatever recommendations you may have for modification to carry out the spirit of the action undertaken here but to avoid undue disruption of legitimate activities. In the absence of such notice, I will expect full compliance with the instructions outlined herein.

4. Each addressee Deputy Director is instructed to recommend to the DDM&S modification or addition to Agency regulations of appropriate language to reflect the direction included in this memorandum and attachments addressed to him. DDM&S will be responsible for consolidating such recommendations and making an overall report to the Director through the IG, coordinating with General Counsel.

/signed/
W. E. Colby

Attachments

[This is an unclassified version of the original memorandum. A minor deletion was necessary to permit the production of this unclassified version.]

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: []CHAOS

[]CHAOS is restricted to the collection abroad of information on foreign activities related to domestic matters. CIA will focus clearly on the foreign organizations and individuals involved and only incidentally on their American contacts. As a consequence, CIA will not take on the primary responsibility for following Americans abroad, although CIA can accept a request by the FBI to be passed to an appropriate liaison service in a foreign country for the surveillance of such an American and the transmission of the results back to the FBI. It must be plainly demonstrated in each such transmission that the CIA is merely a channel of communication between the FBI and the appropriate foreign service and is not to be directly engaged in the surveillance or other action against the American involved.

With respect to Americans abroad who become suspect for security or counterintelligence reasons, any official U.S. personnel will be reported to their parent agency's security authorities, CIA will merely serve as a transmission belt for the information concerned. Specific CIA operations will not be mounted against such individuals, but they will be reported when their

identities come as an incidental result of other CIA foreign intelligence or counterintelligence operations. With respect to private American citizens abroad, any such information arising will be reported to the FBI. CIA involvement thereafter will be restricted to following intelligence or counterintelligence aspects of the case and transmitting any FBI requests for assistance from foreign security or intelligence services on the matter, in the fashion outlined above.

ANNEX H

[This is a cable of 5 March 1974 from CIA Headquarters to CIA addressees abroad. Certain deletions were necessary to permit the production of this unclassified version.]

[

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[

]CHAOS

FROM COLBY

SUBJECT: TERMINATION OF []CHAOS PROGRAM

1. THIS MESSAGE IS TO NOTIFY YOU OF THE TERMINATION OF THE []CHAOS PROGRAM AND TO PROVIDE GUIDELINES UNDER WHICH HQS HAS BEEN OPERATING FOR SOME TIME ON CERTAIN ACTIVITIES FORMERLY INCLUDED IN []CHAOS.

2. GUIDELINES

ALL COLLECTION TAKES PLACE ABROAD. COLLECTION IS RESTRICTED TO INFORMATION ON FOREIGN ACTIVITIES RELATED TO DOMESTIC MATTERS. CIA WILL FOCUS CLEARLY ON THE FOREIGN ORGANIZATIONS AND INDIVIDUALS INVOLVED AND ONLY INCIDENTALLY ON THEIR AMERICAN CONTACTS. IN DOING THIS, FOLLOWING WILL APPLY:

A. WHENEVER INFORMATION IS UNCOVERED AS A BYPRODUCT RESULT OF CIA FOREIGN-TARGETED INTELLIGENCE OR COUNTER-INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS ABROAD WHICH MAKES AMERICANS

[

ABROAD SUSPECT FOR SECURITY OR COUNTERINTELLIGENCE
REASONS, THE INFORMATION WILL BE REPORTED BY CIA IN
THE FOLLOWING MANNER.

(1) WITH RESPECT TO PRIVATE AMERICAN CITIZENS
ABROAD, SUCH INFORMATION WILL BE REPORTED TO THE
FBI.

(2) WITH RESPECT TO OFFICIAL U.S. PERSONNEL
ABROAD, SUCH INFORMATION WILL BE REPORTED TO
THEIR PARENT AGENCY'S SECURITY AUTHORITIES, AND
TO THE FBI IF APPROPRIATE.

IN BOTH SUCH CASES, UNDER THIS SUB-PARAGRAPH, SPECIFIC
CIA OPERATIONS WILL NOT BE MOUNTED AGAINST SUCH INDIVIDUALS:
CIA RESPONSIBILITIES THEREAFTER WILL BE RESTRICTED TO
REPORTING ANY FURTHER INTELLIGENCE OR COUNTERINTELLIGENCE
ASPECTS OF THE SPECIFIC CASE WHICH COME TO CIA ATTENTION
AS A BY-PRODUCT OF ITS CONTINUING FOREIGN-TARGETED
OPERATIONAL ACTIVITY. IF THE FBI, ON THE BASIS OF THE RECEIPT
OF THE CIA INFORMATION, HOWEVER, SPECIFICALLY REQUESTS
FURTHER INFORMATION ON TERRORIST OR COUNTERINTELLIGENCE
MATTERS RELATING TO THE PRIVATE AMERICAN CITIZENS INVOLVED
IN THE SPECIFIC CASE, CIA WILL RESPOND ACCORDING TO THE
GUIDANCE IN SUB-PARAGRAPH B BELOW. IN PERFORMING THESE
FUNCTIONS CIA WILL BE DISCHARGING ITS RESPONSIBILITIES FOR
PRIMARY FOREIGN COUNTERINTELLIGENCE COLLECTION ABROAD,

[

]

PARTICULARLY AS ASSIGNED IT UNDER PARAGRAPHS 1B AND
3B OF NSCID 5.

B. CIA MAY RESPOND TO WRITTEN REQUESTS BY THE FBI FOR
CLANDESTINE COLLECTION ABROAD BY CIA OF INFORMATION ON
FOREIGN TERRORIST OR COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS INVOLVING
PRIVATE AMERICAN CITIZENS. SUCH COLLECTION ACTIVITY MAY
INVOLVE BOTH LIAISON SERVICES AND UNILATERAL OPERATIONS.
IN THE CASE OF LIAISON SERVICES, WHENEVER FEASIBLE IT SHOULD
BE PLAINLY DEMONSTRATED IN THE TRANSMISSION OF THE REQUEST
TO SUCH LIAISON SERVICES THAT CIA IS ACTING AS A CHANNEL OF
COMMUNICATION BETWEEN THE FBI AND THE APPROPRIATE FOREIGN
SERVICE. ANY UNILATERAL OPERATIONAL ACTIVITY WILL REQUIRE
SPECIFIC PRIOR APPROVAL OF THE DDO, AND THE DCI WILL BE
ADVISED THEREOF. PERTINENT INFORMATION OBTAINED WILL BE
PROVIDED BY CIA TO THE FBI.

3. THE ACTIVITIES DESCRIBED IN PARAGRAPH 2 ABOVE WILL BEAR THE
CRYPTONYM []. TRAFFIC WILL BE IN [] STAFF CHANNELS
SLUGGED []. DISPATCH TRAFFIC SHOULD BE
ADDRESSED TO CHIEF, OPS/ITG (2 COPIES) WITH ONE INFO COPY FOR THE
CHIEF OF THE AREA DIVISION (EYES ONLY).

[

]

ANNEX I

NOTE: A selected group of attachments to this memorandum is attached. The selection includes all those which might be related to the allegations in The New York Times article of December 22nd.

W. E. Colby

29 August 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Science and Technology
Deputy Director for Intelligence
Deputy Director for Management and Services
Deputy Director for Operations

INFO: Inspector General

SUBJECT: Questionable Activities

1. As an aspect of the allegations of improper CIA activity in connection with the Watergate and associated matters, the Inspector General was directed to assemble all information available in the Agency on any such activities. Certain specific matters were provided to him, and the Director by memorandum of 9 May 1973 directed all employees to report any activities, current or past, "which might be construed to be outside the legislative charter of this Agency." This information was assembled and consolidated by the Inspector General in a memorandum of 21 May 1973 and certain individual memoranda thereafter supplementing it. This material was used in a detailed, page-by-page review of all such information with Senator Symington and Congressman Nedzi, as Chairman of the Senate and the House Armed Services Intelligence Subcommittees, respectively. In addition, I undertook very specific commitments in my confirmation hearings to ensure that the Agency will remain within its legislative charter. I am arranging for the published transcripts of those hearings to be circulated throughout the Agency for compliance, and at that time will reaffirm the specific direction made by Dr. Schlesinger in his memorandum of 9 May 1973. This will also be incorporated into appropriate regulations.

2. With respect to the specific questionable activities which were reported as a result of the search made throughout the Agency, however, I believe it essential to take specific action in order that these not seem to be condoned or overlooked. I have therefore developed specific instructions on each reported activity. These are included in the attachments to this memorandum, and have the force of specific direction to you to pass on to appropriate subordinates the instructions outlined. Separate packages of such instructions are being developed for each Directorate in order to respect the sensitivity of some of the activities discussed, including those which are deemed quite

Similarly, each activity is placed on a separate page so that the Deputy Director concerned may most easily forward it to the office or offices directly concerned without distributing it more broadly.

3. In the event that these instructions raise substantial difficulties of implementation or compliance, I would appreciate your raising such cases with me directly, with whatever recommendations you may have for modification to carry out the spirit of the action undertaken here but to avoid undue disruption of legitimate activities. In the absence of such notice, I will expect full compliance with the instructions outlined herein.

4. Each addressee Deputy Director is instructed to recommend to the DDM&S modification or addition to Agency regulations of appropriate language to reflect the direction included in this memorandum and attachments addressed to him. DDM&S will be responsible for consolidating such recommendations and making an overall report to the Director through the IG, coordinating with General Counsel.

signed/

W. E. Colby

Attachments

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Care in Relation to Significant Domestic Events

All Deputy Directors will exhibit particular sensitivity to the possible coincidence of CIA training, testing, or support activities and significant domestic, political or other events to which they could be wrongly related by the unwitting observer. This refers particularly to political conventions, the activities of dissident groups, etc., in which cases CIA activities should be deactivated, moved away, or suspended temporarily.

[This is an unclassified version of the original memorandum. A minor deletion was necessary to permit the production of this unclassified version.]

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Audio Surveillance

[

] CIA will not operate audio equipment or otherwise actively assist other agencies in such operations against domestic targets. Equipment may be made available in such cases if:

1. There is full disclosure of the operation and there is no legal inhibition against it when carried out by the other agency.
2. No CIA participation is involved.

[This is an unclassified version of the original memorandum. Two minor deletions were necessary to permit the production of this unclassified version.]

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: [cryptonym]

[] Project [cryptonym] is approved as a necessary support to foreign intelligence operations. Care will be taken that, during the training and development period of such agents in the United States, they will not be operated by CIA against domestic targets. To the extent that incidental knowledge is gained of such matters, it may be passed to the FBI on the approval of the Deputy Director for Operations.

[This is an unclassified version of the original memorandum. A minor deletion was necessary to permit the production of this unclassified version.]

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: [] CHAOS

[] CHAOS is restricted to the collection abroad of information on foreign activities related to domestic matters. CIA will focus clearly on the foreign organizations and individuals involved and only incidentally on their American contacts. As a consequence, CIA will not take on the primary responsibility for following Americans abroad, although CIA can accept a request by the FBI to be passed to an appropriate liaison service in a foreign country for the surveillance of such an American and the transmission of the results back to the FBI. It must be plainly demonstrated in each such transmission that the CIA is merely a channel of communication between the FBI and the appropriate foreign service and is not to be directly engaged in the surveillance or other action against the American involved.

With respect to Americans abroad who become suspect for security or counterintelligence reasons, any official U.S. personnel will be reported to their parent agency's security authori-

ties, CIA will merely serve as a transmission belt for the information concerned. Specific CIA operations will not be mounted against such individuals, but they will be reported when their identities come as an incidental result of other CIA foreign intelligence or counterintelligence operations. With respect to private American citizens abroad, any such information arising will be reported to the FBI. CIA involvement thereafter will be restricted to following intelligence or counterintelligence aspects of the case and transmitting any FBI requests for assistance from foreign security or intelligence services on the matter, in the fashion outlined above.

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Restrictions on Files of American Citizens

The Office of Security or the Chief, CI Operations will not maintain files of American citizens other than those developed as an incidental aspect of foreign intelligence or counterintelligence matters or as employee, applicant, contact, etc. The arrest records formerly received from the Washington, D.C., and certain other areas have been destroyed and will not be reconstituted.

[This is an unclassified version of the original memorandum. A minor deletion was necessary to permit the production of this unclassified version.]

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Projects [cryptonym, cryptonym, cryptonym]

No surveillance, telephone tap, surreptitious entry or other action will be taken by Agency personnel in the United States against United States citizens not connected with CIA, under the claimed authority of "protection of intelligence sources and methods." This provision of the law lays a charge and duty on the Director and the Agency to act so as to protect intelligence sources and methods. It does not give it authority to take action with respect to other American citizens. If a threat or exposure of intelligence sources and methods occurs, the Agency can appropriately assemble its information on the topic and conduct such steps within its organization as may be appropriate. With respect to outsiders, the appropriate lawful authorities must be approached for assistance on the matter, e.g., the FBI or local police.

[This is an unclassified version of the original memorandum. A minor deletion was necessary to permit the production of this unclassified version.]

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Project [cryptonym] and Project [cryptonym]

Projects [cryptonym] and [cryptonym] are terminated. It is appropriate under certain circumstances to record the mail addresses of senders and receivers, but no such lists should be developed as a watch list on American citizens, such as, for example, the list of doctors who studied abroad.

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Testing of Equipment in U.S.

Testing of intelligence and espionage-peculiar equipment may be undertaken in the United States, but care will be taken that no recordings are made of U.S. citizens or otherwise conducted on unwitting subjects in the United States. If it is essential to test equipment on an American communications system or other establishment, this may be done provided that no recordings of the material are retained or examined by any element other than the original test engineers.

[This is an unclassified version of the original memorandum. A minor deletion was necessary to permit the production of this unclassified version.]

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Project [cryptonym]

Per our discussion with the retiring Director of BNDD, Project [cryptonym] will be phased out. CIA will not develop operations to penetrate another Government agency, even with the approval of its leadership.

[This is an unclassified version of the original memorandum. A minor deletion was necessary to permit the production of this unclassified version.]

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Project [cryptonym]

It is appropriate for the Office of Security to develop private sources among CIA employees. It is not appropriate for CIA to penetrate domestic groups external to CIA, even for the purpose of locating threats to the Agency. Notice of such threats should be reported to the appropriate law enforcement bodies and CIA will cooperate with them in any action required which does not involve direct CIA participation in covert clandestine operations against U.S. citizens in the United States.

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Influencing Human Behavior .

Any experiment or use of drugs or other techniques for influencing human behavior will be undertaken only with the Director's specific approval and in no case on unwitting American citizens.

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Postal Service

The assistance provided the Office of the Chief Postal Inspector by OTS seems appropriate, provided it is essentially defensive in orientation and would not assist penetration of the mail.

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: OEL Speech-Processing Assistance

Speech-processing assistance by OEL should be limited to assistance in the technique developed for speech processing and should not involve the processing of the tapes themselves by CIA' or with CIA participation.

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Restrictions on Operational Lists on Americans

The accumulation of operational leads to Americans with access to significant foreign targets must be conducted in a fashion which clearly avoids the charge that black lists of any sort are being accumulated by CIA. If such listings cannot be made by CIA in a non-misunderstandable manner, arrangements should be made for the service to be performed by the FBI or other service which can legitimately do this function. This particularly refers to matters such as mail watches, overseas telephone call watch lists, doctors who studied abroad, etc.

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: U.S. Citizens Involved in Narcotics Abroad

NARCOG is directed to review its passage of information with respect to U.S. citizens involved in narcotics trafficking abroad. To the extent these reports reflect intelligence incidentally acquired on U.S. citizens in the course of operations against foreign intelligence targets in the narcotics field, these reports may be continued, but no operations are authorized to be launched aimed at individual U.S. citizens as a target in themselves. Assistance can be provided for DEA operations abroad in the narcotics field, even in provision of intelligence-related equipment, so long as it is clear that the operation belongs to the DEA and is not a joint activity by CIA and DEA against U.S. citizens.

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Foreign Connections with Organized Crime in the U.S.

The SEC request for assistance with respect to information on any foreign connection with organized crime in the U.S. should focus on foreign targets and not on U.S. citizens. To the extent that information on the latter appears to be acquired incidentally to the foreign coverage, it may be passed to the appropriate agency.

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: DCS Assessment of U.S. Citizens

DCS assessment of the suitability and willingness of U.S. citizens to cooperate with CIA in its foreign intelligence mission is an appropriate action.

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: DCS Interest in Foreign Students and Foreign National Physicians

DCS collection of information on foreign students studying in the U.S and on foreign national physicians trained abroad but practicing in the U.S. may continue. DCS may also continue to accept information on possible foreign involvement in U.S. dissident groups and narcotic trade, when sources refuse to deal directly with the FBI or DEA.

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: The Intelligence Evaluation Committee

The Intelligence Evaluation Committee has been disbanded. In the future, CIA participation in interagency domestic intelligence discussions will be restricted to the provision of foreign intelligence which might bear upon the matters being considered. CIA will not participate in recommendations or actions with respect to domestic affairs.

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Reporting on Dissident Groups

Reference to U.S. dissident groups can appear only in the most incidental form in CIA publications, and no study in depth will be developed of such groups, such as occurred in OCI publications in 1967 and 1968. However, it is appropriate to focus on significant foreign intelligence such as black radicalism, even when such subjects have substantial impact on domestic situations.

[This is an unclassified version of the original memorandum. A minor deletion was necessary to permit the production of this unclassified version.]

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Project [cryptonym]

In the course of foreign intelligence or counterintelligence operations, it may on occasion be appropriate to conduct surveillance of foreign individuals temporarily within the United States. Any such surveillance will be conducted in coordination with the FBI. Such surveillance by CIA will also be limited to the foreign personnel and will not be extended to include surveillance of American contacts or associates.

[This is an unclassified version of the original memorandum. A minor deletion was necessary to permit the production of this unclassified version.]

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Projects [cryptonym, cryptonym, cryptonym]

No surveillance, telephone tap, or surreptitious entry will be conducted against employees or ex-employees of the Agency outside Agency property.

In the event that threats to intelligence sources and methods appear from Agency employees or ex-employees, the appropriate authorities will be advised, and the Agency will cooperate with the appropriate authorities in the investigation of possible violation of law.