

~~SECRET~~

29 August 1979

Memorandum for: SRP

Subject: Intelligence Community Estimative Products

1. I have done some research on the subject of intelligence community estimative products. These include National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs), Special National Intelligence Estimates (SNIEs), National Intelligence Analytical Memorandums (NIAMs), and Interagency Intelligence Memorandum (IIMs).

a. National Intelligence Estimate. This art form has been in existence since 1950, although its definition and content have undergone various changes.

b. Special National Intelligence Estimates. This product first appeared in 1954 and has been in active use since then.

c. National Intelligence Analytical Memorandum. Publication of this product was first authorized in 1973 (see attachment a). The NIAM was abolished as an art form in late 1977, apparently because people preferred the more loosely defined IIM.

d. Interagency Intelligence Memorandum. The IIM was authorized in 1974 to fulfill a perceived need for a new art form with a looser definition and which would not need NFIB endorsement but which would still be a community product (see attachment b).

2. The precise definitions as well as the content and usage of the above publications have undergone various changes over time. I have been assured by the Executive Secretary of NFIB, Walt Elder, that no formal definition of the estimative intelligence products is in existence. He said that the 1978 "Glossary of Intelligence Terms and Definitions", for example, is regarded only as a guide book or training aid rather than an official and binding NFIB document. In fact, he said that most members of the community have complained about various definitions and have asked for revisions, but the group which put out the document has been abolished. He regards the

25X1

STAT

File: SRP St.

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

definitions which appeared in the 1975 "Guide of the National Intelligence Community's Production Organizations and Their Products" as having more official status, as the guide was issued under a USIB directive. But since that time the usage and content of the products has varied in practice. Thus the field is wide open for a revision and redefinition of the various estimative intelligence products.

3. The process for the production of interagency intelligence products is also largely undefined. The last formal definition was in DCID 1/1 (see attachment c) in 1959. This was modified with a USIB directive by DCI George Bush in 1976 (see attachment d), but no official revision was ever issued. Instead, ad hoc working relationships concerning the production process for national estimates and the role of the NIOs have developed over time. The status of the NIOs also has been changed by their being subordinated to D/NFA, and much of their direction has come from that source over the last few years. Walter Elder has informed me that he has urged the DCI to issue new directives more clearly defining the production process and the role of the various participants, but that Turner has been reluctant to do so, preferring to work problems out informally.

4. In summary, it appears that the SRP can break new ground in defining the appropriate content and usage of various interagency intelligence products.



25X1

SECRET

USIB-D-13.1/39

19 April 1973

GAE

DOE

A


UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD

MEMORANDUM FOR THE UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD

SUBJECT : National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs) and
National Intelligence Analytical Memo-
randums (NIAMs)

REFERENCE : USIB-M-640, 19 April 1973, Item 3

Following discussion with USIB at its meeting of 19 April the
Director of Central Intelligence authorized the issuance of the attached
directive for the information and guidance of all concerned.


BRUCE A. LOWE
Executive Secretary

Attachment

Exempt from general declassification
schedule of E.O. 11652, exemption
category 5B(2). Automatically de-
classified on: date impossible to determine.

~~SECRET~~
SECRET

19 April 1973

1. The Director of Central Intelligence, having discussed the matter with the USIB, has decided to issue a new national intelligence publication to be known as the National Intelligence Analytical Memorandum (NIAM). Certain topics will be selected for treatment in this format rather than in the National Intelligence Estimate (NIE), although a few might require treatment in both formats.

2. Issuances in the NIE format will in future be governed by the following criteria:

a. The intended users will be NSC-level policy-making authorities.

b. Topics selected for treatment in the NIE format will be limited to those of high policy concern.

c. The exposition will normally be structured in such a way as to illuminate policy issues and, when appropriate, the choices which may be open to policy authorities.

d. Brevity; if backup material is required it will be published in separate annexes.

3. The NIAM will be governed by the following criteria:

a. The intended users will be officials involved in policy support activities below the NSC level.


b. Topics selected for treatment in NIAMs will be of important policy concern but will not usually have the high priority of NIE topics.

c. As in most NIEs of recent years the argument of the analysis and the supporting evidence will normally be exposed in some detail.

4. The procedures which have been used to accomplish interagency coordination of NIEs will apply also to the NIAMs, except that the NIAM will not normally appear on the USIB agenda; it will be subject to telephonic concurrence within a designated period after issuance of a final text by the Office of National Estimates. However, if any USIB member has a serious substantive problem with a draft NIAM, he may request that the paper be placed on the USIB agenda.

SECRET

ATTACHMENT



**Office of the Director
of Central Intelligence**

DATE: 1 February 1974

TO: George Carver, Jr.

SUBJECT: Art Forms

Attached is a talking paper on the subject of Art Forms. In response to your request, Lou Marengo, John Whitman and I discussed the subject and we would propose further discussion with all NIO's as convenient.

Ke

Keith Clark
NIO/WE

cc: All NIO's

B

SECRET/NIO's ONLY



Office of the Director of Central Intelligence

31 January 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR: All NIO's

SUBJECT : Art Forms for Estimative Papers

I. PRESENTLY AVAILABLE FORMS

1. What follows is a (fairly subjective) characterization of existing art forms available to us for estimative-analytical pieces -- including some observations on the characteristics of each as I understand them and as I think they are presently understood in the community. The aim is not to suggest that these are all our options, but merely that this is the array which, by usage, we have to work with at the moment. This should aid in determining what we want to propose that is new or what we want by way of extensions or modifications of existing entities.

A. The NIE

This is, of course, the most solemn and formal community document. Formerly some 60-80 of these were produced each year but in the past year probably no more than 20-25 have been done. Schlesinger's philosophy was that these should be confined to the most important and policy-relevant subjects. His test was that they should be such that the top policy makers would be ashamed to admit that they had not read them; this test, of course, puts a premium on brevity, cogency and relevance. Except the large military papers (11-8, 11-14, etc.) he conceived of these as being like 10 or 12 pages of tightly written analytical and judgmental matter, uncluttered by any more informative detail than was necessary to support the findings. (Since this view of the NIE excluded a number of papers that called for national coordination, his solution was to create the NIAM -- see below)

SECRET/NIO's ONLY

SECRET/NIO's ONLY

Colby has been less intent on keeping the NIE's confined to short and high level limits but I believe it to be true that the community as a whole and most of the customers like the distinction between the NIE and the NIAM.

B. The SNIE

This has remained pretty much unchanged in its essential nature over the years, namely the same procedural and bureaucratic status as an NIE except it is done on a shorter fuse and normally for a more specific purpose -- typically by request of some policy maker or USIB member. Long ago SNIE's were done to estimate consequences of alternate US policy options; this has been much less frequent in recent years but could be used again if convenient. The fact that we no longer systematically schedule National Estimates three to six months in advance may tend to increase the proportion of SNIE's to NIE's, but obviously too many SNIE's would inflate the category.

C. The NIAM

This category, as noted above, was created to accommodate many of the papers that once would have been called NIE's. Its typical characteristics are greater length and informative detail than NIE's (at least as Schlesinger conceived them), a slightly less sexy kind of subject matter, and a somewhat foreshortened mode of coordination; specifically USIB has normally concurred by telephone and there is less scrupulous massaging of the text.

D. The Joint Memorandum

This is a considerably looser art form with rather ill defined ground rules regarding interagency coordination and approval. One example is the short series on Chile put out in 1971 under OCI aegis which came complete with a cover containing the seals of CIA, DIA and State. I don't know how high up in the prospective Agency hierarchies approval was sought for this kind of job. There have been other experiments in this category, with different offices in CIA carrying the main burden of the action and working out various verbal formulae to indicate working level coordination without committing USIB principals. One

SECRET/NIO's ONLY

interesting anomaly occurred in May 1971 when INR published a "Research Study" called Latin America: The Situation and Trends, 1969-1975; An Overview. CIA (OCI) participated in preparing the paper but in the event refused to be officially associated with it and the paper appeared with a note on the cover as follows: "This study was prepared with the participation of the Directorate for Estimates, Defense Intelligence Agency". (An historical curiosity which is not likely to occur again).

2. One further distinction occurs to me that we ought to keep in mind. The kinds of documents discussed above have almost all been published with a fairly wide audience (or at least wide circulation). There have been, of course, many instances of joint Agency productions which were circulated in very limited form, as typescript memorandums, etc. Probably ^{with} we are going to want to do a number of these since they accord/the preferred style of the present policy making system. But I don't see that rules of format or procedure are or should be a significant problem in these cases since by definition such decisions should be made on the merits of each case.

SECRET/NIO's ONLY

II. POSSIBLE NEW FORMS: ATTENDANT PROBLEMS AND DESIDERATA

3. We should consider whether it is not sensible, in addition to using and adapting existing art forms, to establish something new. An innovation is attractive both because it could be tailor-made to our purposes and because it would underscore in a general way the fact that business is being done in a different fashion. On the other hand, it also seems desirable to continue to make use of certain established instruments where these now enjoy good acceptance and lend themselves to valid purposes.

A. Clearly one of our purposes is to provide ways of carrying out the Director's desire that NIO's take the lead in preparing national intelligence by taking the best possible expertise without too rigid attention to conventional bureaucratic procedures. In a word, we should be able to tailor groups to prepare and consider papers, choosing the best possible people no matter who they are or where they sit in the government. The problem arises over the status of the finished intelligence, and most particularly over the form of USIB Agency endorsement of it or dissent from it. There are numerous possibilities ranging across a spectrum.

At one end would be intelligence pieces prepared and published on the Director's behalf, under the leadership of the NIO, with the participation of any combination of individuals and agencies deemed suitable by the NIO, and with no statement of concurrence by agencies. In effect, this would reflect the concept of the NIO picking the brains of the people he deemed desirable for the project in hand and producing the results.

At the other end of the spectrum is the interagency memorandum signed off on by the Agency heads, with clear indication of this on the cover.

4. The first of these is desirable in terms of how the Director wants us to do a lot of our business. The trouble is that it is hardly "national intelligence" under the terms of NSCID #1. That document, in defining "national intelligence" says the DCI shall produce it and that it will carry "a statement of abstention or any substantially

-4-

SECRET/NIO's ONLY

SECRET/NIO's ONLY

differing opinion of a United States Intelligence Board member or of the Intelligence Chief of a Military Department."

5. One possibility is to make use of the rubric "Interdepartmental Intelligence" also defined in NSCID #1. The definition is so broad as to be a license for almost anything we want to do but it has the merit of not requiring formal Agency chops. This rubric has never, to my knowledge, been well-defined or even used to any great extent.

6. On the subject of NSCID's we should keep in mind that #3 defines "joint intelligence" as a special category produced by defense intelligence organizations for the Joint Chiefs of Staff; (this makes undesirable the use of the term for us).

7. As for titles, if we decide to establish a new art form there are several possibilities. We might want to call them "National Intelligence Memorandums", "NIO Memorandum", "DCI Intelligence Memorandum" to name three.

8. Lou Marengo, John Whitman and I have discussed this problem, having before us Section I of the foregoing and also NSCID #1 and #3. Section II of the foregoing reflects our discussions.

S

Keith Clark
NIO/WE

SECRET/NIO's ONLY

SECRET

DCID No. 1/1
(New Series)

DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE DIRECTIVE NO. 1/1¹
PRODUCTION OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES
(Effective 5 August 1959)

Pursuant to the provisions of paragraphs 3 and 4, NSCID No. 1, and in order to facilitate department participation in the production of national intelligence estimates, the following operating procedures are established:

1. *Programming*

Periodically, but not less than quarterly, the Board of National Estimates, Central Intelligence Agency, will present to the United States Intelligence Board (Intelligence Board) for approval a program of National Intelligence Estimates and Special National Intelligence Estimates (NIE's and SNIE's) for production during the following six months. In preparing this program, the Board of National Estimates will consult with the NSC Planning Board and appropriate committees of the Intelligence Board, and will coordinate with the Intelligence Board agencies.

2. *Initiation*

Requests for estimates other than those programmed will be transmitted to the Intelligence Board via the Board of National Estimates. This Board will take such action as is indicated by the circumstances prior to transmitting the request to the Intelligence Board for action; e.g., comment, initiate immediate action subject to subsequent Intelligence Board ratification, or attach draft terms of reference to its recommendation that the estimate be approved for production.

3. *Normal Preparation*

Estimates will normally be prepared in four stages:

a. *Terms of Reference and Contributions* — The Board of National Estimates, after consultation with the Intelligence Board agencies, will circulate terms of reference indicating the scope of the estimate and the intelligence material needed. The Agencies, or an Intelligence Board Subcommittee or other appropriate group, will then prepare contributions and submit them to the Board of National Estimates.

b. *Drafting and Board of National Estimates Consideration* — After considering the contributions, and such consultation with any contributing agency which may be appropriate, the Board of National Estimates will prepare a draft.

c. *Consideration by Representatives of the Intelligence Board Agencies* — Representatives of the Intelligence Board agencies will

¹ This Directive supersedes DCID No. 1/1, effective 21 April 1958, which in turn had superseded DCID No. 3/5, of 1 September 1953.

SECRET

meet with the Board of National Estimates to review, comment on, and revise the draft as necessary.

d. *Intelligence Board Consideration* — The final draft will then be submitted to the Intelligence Board for approval.

4. *Preparation under Exceptional Circumstances*

Any of the steps listed in 3a, b, and c above may be omitted under exceptional or unusually urgent circumstances.

5. *Dissents*

Any agency may dissent to any feature of an estimate. Such dissents identify the dissenter and will state the dissenter's position on the matter.

6. *Publication and Dissemination*

Finished estimates will be published by CIA and disseminated by the DCI according to established procedures. Published estimates will carry a note indicating the extent of coordination within the intelligence community.

ALLEN W. DULLES
Director of Central Intelligence

SECRET

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

4 June 1976


MEMORANDUM FOR THE NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE BOARD

SUBJECT : Guidelines for National Intelligence Production

1. I have approved the attached guidelines for national intelligence production. In so doing, I am stating my strong support for the National Intelligence Officer concept.

2. The Deputy to the DCI for National Intelligence will organize the Intelligence Advisory Panel and the steering group called for in Paragraph 6.

3. Issuance of a revised DCID 1/1 will be deferred until satisfactory procedures involving these new entities have been evolved. In the interim, present procedures for the production of National Intelligence Estimates and related papers will remain in force.


George Bush

Attachment:
Guidelines for National
Intelligence Production

Exempt from general
declassification schedule of E.O. 11652
exemption category 5B(1),(3),(3)
Automatically declassified on
Date Impossible to Determine

NOFORN
CONFIDENTIAL

Attachment
NFIB-D-14.2/2
4 June 1976

National Production

1. Organizational Location: Responsibility for national intelligence production, other than current, will be lodged in the Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, in accordance with Executive Order 11905.

2. National Intelligence Officers: The National Intelligence Officers will constitute the DCI's staff for this purpose.

- a. The NIO structure will be headed by the Deputy to the DCI for National Intelligence. He will work in close cooperation with the DCI's Deputies for the Agency and for the Community.
- b. Each NIO will be a senior staff officer who will serve the DCI directly as senior counselor on his assigned area of substantive responsibility.
- c. The NIOs will be drawn as broadly as possible from elements of the Intelligence Community, other government components, and outside government. In principle, NIO assignments will be rotational for two to three years.
- d. The number of NIOs and the apportionment of portfolios among them will depend on the DCI's perception of his needs at any given time.

3. Responsibilities: The NIOs will be responsible to the DCI for:

- a. Supervising non-current* national production including:

* *Current intelligence at the national level will continue to be a responsibility of CIA. CIA and the NIOs will concert to avoid inconsistency in substantive reporting.*

CONFIDENTIAL

2 IMPDET CL. Y. 005827

- Formal National Intelligence Estimates and Special National Intelligence Estimates
 - National Intelligence Analytical Memoranda
 - Interagency intelligence memoranda and studies
 - Intelligence Alert Memoranda
 - Selected DCI briefings
 - Other analyses and assessments of varying degrees of formality requested by senior consumers -- or commissioned to fill an obvious need -- whose preparation involves the work of more than one component of the Intelligence Community.
- b. Providing a coordinating mechanism, operating on behalf of the DCI, to focus the talents and resources of all Community components on problems of particular importance.
- c. Maintaining continual dialogue with senior consumers at the Assistant Secretary level or above, or their military equivalents, to ensure that they receive the best possible intelligence support, and to provide a channel for continuous feedback on intelligence matters. This responsibility will also include providing for the policy level consumer one point of contact to which he can turn for any form of intelligence support, knowing that his request will be passed on to those elements of the Community best equipped to handle it.
- d. Within the Intelligence Community, developing and maintaining contact among all who work on any given substantive area -- collectors, analysts and producers.

CONFIDENTIAL

- e. Maintaining contact with knowledgeable experts outside the government to ensure that intelligence production benefits from the full range of thinking in the United States.
 - f. Developing major substantive requirements and providing assistance to the evaluation of intelligence performance, in cooperation with the Deputy Director, Community and his staff.
 - g. Performing any other tasks the DCI assigns.
4. Production Mechanism:
- a. The NIOs will not normally function as a production office.* The NIO structure will not include a drafting staff.
 - b. The actual drafting of national products will be done by line officers drawn from the Community components best equipped to handle the particular project in question.**
 - c. The drafting of national products will be done under the supervision of the NIO responsible for the project in question. A draft so produced will not be viewed as an institutional product, i.e., neither the office nor the component to which the drafter(s) belong will be obligated to support the draft during the coordination process.
 - d. After a draft has been produced and reviewed, it will be submitted to concerned line components for coordination and discussion. The precise nature of these coordination procedures will vary with the formality of the document -- NIEs and SNIIEs being the most formal. In every instance, however, line entities will have ample

* There will be occasional instances where, on matters of great sensitivity, some senior official will ask for a substantive comment quietly prepared by a single person.

** Procedures for minimizing the disruption of line offices' work and erosion of line command jurisdiction entailed by this approach are outlined in Paragraph 6.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

opportunity to express their views and the NIO responsible will be under an obligation to ensure that the final product fairly reflects significant differences of opinion.*

5. Collegial Review (The Intelligence Advisory Panel):

One criticism of the current approach has been that national products do not, at any stage in their production, receive a collegial review. This deficiency will be rectified by the creation of an Intelligence Advisory Panel to the DCI.

- a. This Panel will consist of approximately three dozen highly-qualified people drawn from a variety of disciplines. The Panel will be recruited from within the Intelligence Community, the non-intelligence components of the government, and -- to the extent feasible -- the outside world: academia, industry and journalism.
- b. The optimum point for collegial review in the production process is after the basic draft is prepared and before it is circulated for coordination. Consequently, for each NIE/SNIE or other significant national product (deadlines permitting), three people will be picked from the Intelligence Advisory Panel to go over that particular paper in draft.
 - The Panel members involved will meet in Washington and spend whatever time is necessary going over the draft with the NIO, the project chairman and the drafters. They will critique the draft for balance and objectivity, ensuring that it addresses the right questions, is clear and cogent, and

* *Coordination among Intelligence Community components is an essential feature of the production of truly national products. The concept of coordination does not involve the development of consensus judgments. Divergent views will be submitted to debate among knowledgeable experts, but where significant differences on important issues remain unresolved, they will be reflected in the final finished product so that policy level consumers will be fully aware that there are such differences, what they are, and what are their bases.*

CONFIDENTIAL

takes proper account of ancillary issues and critical variables.

-- Membership on the Intelligence Advisory Panel will not entail a large expenditure of time over a prolonged period, but rather a willingness to work intensively for periods of short duration. (The reason for having so large a Panel is to ensure that on any given national product three good reviewers will be available.)

- c. The Intelligence Advisory Panel can also advise the DCI on the overall quality of the national production effort and can engage in that effort the best talent available in the United States. While the Panel will seldom, if ever, meet as a whole, various members of it can and will be convened to participate in seminars or discussion groups critiquing the totality of our effort in various fields.
- d. Although the Panel will be advisory to the DCI, its normal point of contact with the DCI's office will be D/DCI/NI.

6. Minimizing of Line Disruption: Since the NIO structure will not have its own independent drafting staff and will be forced to borrow talent from line components, some intrusion on line offices is inevitable. The amount of this intrusion, however, will be minimized by the following steps:

- a. The D/DCI/NI will be responsible for ensuring that requests for intelligence support levied on the Intelligence Community through the NIOs do not overburden the system. Should this occur, he will raise this problem directly with requesting consumers to refine their requests or put them in priority order, and will advise the DCI on the problems involved as appropriate.

CONFIDENTIAL

- b. The D/DCI/NI will chair a steering group that will include the heads of the major production components of the Intelligence Community. This group will meet regularly to review the national production effort and ensure that the workload is properly and fairly distributed. It will keep under continuing review production schedules and requests for specific projects involving extensive work to ensure that tasking for national products is handled with the greatest efficiency and least disruption to line components.
 - c. Each NIO will be specifically charged with levying his requirements through the appropriate chain of command of the Intelligence Community components involved. The procedures used by each NIO with each component will be worked out to the satisfaction of the component's head.
 - d. Any component head who feels that NIO-sponsored tasking is disrupting his office should take this matter up initially with the NIO involved, then with the D/DCI/NI and -- if that does not prove satisfactory -- directly with the DCI.
7. Credit for National Products:
- a. When a national product involves the work of more than one Intelligence Community component, identification of the offices and components contributing to it will be prominently noted in the document.
 - b. Where a request from a senior consumer, passed through the NIO structure, is met by a product which is predominantly the work of a single Community component, that component will issue the response. It will be forwarded by the NIO to the consumer with the transmittal note calling attention to the fact that the consumer's request was taken care of by the attached "CIA Memo," "DIA Memo," etc.

CONFIDENTIAL

8. The CIA Relationship: One of the NIOs' main functions is to help knit the Community together as an organic whole and, in producing national intelligence, draw on the totality of Community resources. The NIOs will, however, have a special relationship with CIA, growing naturally from the fact that CIA, as the only producing organization fully dedicated to national intelligence needs, plays a proportionately larger role in national production. Arrangements will be worked out with the Deputy for CIA to ensure that he is kept abreast of the uses that the NIOs are making of CIA resources.

9. Relations with the Deputy to the DCI for the Intelligence Community: The relationship between the NIO structure and the Deputy Director, Community will obviously have to be a close and cooperative one -- particularly with respect to the DCI committees (formerly USIB committees) on which the NIOs will have to rely and for which the Deputy Director, Community has supervisory responsibility.

- a. Arrangements will be devised to ensure a mutually supportive relationship between the NIO structure and the Intelligence Community Staff to:
 - Give the Deputy Director, Community guidance with respect to basic needs, requirements, future perspectives, etc;
 - Help him strike the right balance between resources and substantive needs, matching the former to the latter wherever possible but arranging substantive needs in priority order.
 - Assist the Deputy Director, Community in his and his staff's evaluation work.
- b. These arrangements will be structured to minimize areas of non-productively overlapping responsibilities. The NIOs, for example, will be in continuous touch with consumers to stay abreast of their evolving needs; the IC Staff will be responsible for evaluation of products and services -- but both will contribute to giving the DCI overall assessments of the Community's total performance.