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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE

SOVIET PARTICIPATION IN THE
AIR DEFENSE OF MANCHURIA



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The intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force participated in the preparation of this estimate and concur in it. This paper is based on information available on 21 November 1950.

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= ESTIMATES - VIEW/OBTAIN FROM NARA

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SOVIET PARTICIPATION IN THE AIR DEFENSE OF MANCHURIA

THE PROBLEM

1. To estimate whether, in the event of UN air attack on targets in Manchuria, the Soviet Air Force would participate in the defense of such targets.

CONCLUSIONS

2. In the circumstances envisaged in the problem, the USSR would provide aircraft, anti-aircraft artillery, and trained personnel as necessary for the defense of Manchurian targets. Sufficient resources for rendering such aid are available in the Soviet Far East.
3. Soviet participation in the defense of Manchurian targets could take any of the following forms:
 - a. Actual participation without identification.
 - b. The open participation of ostensibly volunteer units.
 - c. The open participation of Soviet units as a limited commitment under the Sino-Soviet treaty.
 - d. The open participation of Soviet units as an aspect of a general war forced on the Soviet Union under the Sino-Soviet treaty.
4. At least initially, the most likely form of Soviet participation in the air defense of Manchurian targets would be the first—i.e., actual participation in action without open identification.
5. The open participation of Soviet units would be unlikely unless general war should develop.
6. A substantial risk that the situation may degenerate into a general war already exists. UN air attack on targets in Manchuria, alone, probably would not cause the Soviet rulers to decide to launch a general war, inasmuch as the Kremlin's basic decision for or against war would be based on global considerations. The events likely to follow such attacks, however, would carry with them a greater probability of a general war developing.

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DISCUSSION

7. See:

a. CIA Memorandum for the National Security Council, 9 November 1950.

b. NIE-3, 15 November 1950.

c. NIE-2/1, 24 November 1950.

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