




Director of
Central
Intelligence

~~Top Secret~~

25X1



NIC/AV

Angola: Short-Term Prospects for UNITA

Special National Intelligence Estimate

LOGGED

~~Top Secret~~

SNIE 71-86

February 1986

Copy 157

25X1

THIS ESTIMATE IS ISSUED BY THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE.

THE NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE BOARD CONCURS.

The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of the Estimate:

The Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, and the intelligence organization of the Department of State.

Also Participating:


The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army


The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy

The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force

The Director of Intelligence, Headquarters, Marine Corps

25X1





25X1
25X1

SNIE 71-86

**ANGOLA: SHORT-TERM
PROSPECTS FOR UNITA**

Information available as of 14 February 1986 was used in the preparation of this Estimate, which was approved by the National Foreign Intelligence Board on 20 February 1986.



Top Secret

25X1

Top Secret

25X1
25X1

CONTENTS

	<i>Page</i>
SCOPE NOTE	1
KEY JUDGMENTS	3
DISCUSSION	7
Prospective MPLA Military Initiatives	7
Soviet and Cuban Support	7
South African Involvement	9
Other Foreign Support to UNITA	10
UNITA's Military Prospects	10
Key Variables	11
Scenarios	12
The Most Likely	12
Alternative Scenarios	12
Prospects for Meaningful Negotiations	13
Implications for the United States	13
 ANNEXES	
<div style="border: 1px solid black; height: 15px; width: 100%;"></div>	
B. Overall Force Picture	17

25X1

25X1

Top Secret




25X1
25X1

SCOPE NOTE

We have addressed the significant augmentation of Soviet and Cuban support to Angola and prospects for the future Soviet and Cuban roles in Angola in two recent publications.¹ Neither specifically analyzed the prospects for UNITA (National Union for the Total Independence of Angola) in depth. Given the considerable Community and customer interest in this subject, this Estimate looks at the remainder of 1986 from the perspective of UNITA's prospects. It updates the judgments contained in these two previous publications, with which it is essentially consistent.



25X1
25X1



25X1



1
Top Secret

25X1

Top Secret [redacted]

25X1
25X1

KEY JUDGMENTS

The military campaign for the remainder of 1986 is unlikely to alter the military picture profoundly in favor of either UNITA or the MPLA (Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola). [redacted]

25X1

The Angolan armed forces (FAPLA) are preparing another major offensive, expected to begin after the rainy season ends in April, which will be the dominant factor in the military situation for most of 1986. We expect FAPLA to advance along two axes with the UNITA-held town of Mavinga as a major objective. Because of logistic, terrain, and weather constraints, the offensive may well be slow in developing. UNITA has been making extensive defensive preparations, bringing in additional troops, and ambushing the government's supply convoys. Although the full extent of the FAPLA attack has not yet been discerned, it will be at least comparable to the 1985 effort (about 10,000 men) [redacted]

25X1

Key Variables

We see four key variables setting the parameters of military action:

- UNITA tactics and strategy.
- FAPLA weaponry and performance.
- The South African role in combat.
- The level of Soviet/Cuban support to FAPLA. [redacted]

25X1

Most Likely Outcome

Although these factors are volatile and interrelated, it is our judgment that the most likely outcome will be a relative standoff, with tactical gains and losses on both sides throughout the year. [redacted]

25X1

UNITA claims to be prepared for the forthcoming FAPLA offensive, and Savimbi has declared that UNITA will utilize a mobile, fluid defense to blunt it. UNITA is also undertaking harassment attacks around the area of FAPLA buildup to try to delay the offensive from forming and is planning new endeavors in northern Angola. We believe that FAPLA's 1985 gains resulted from the fielding of improved weaponry and improved performance because of Soviet training and increased Soviet direction as well as from UNITA's underestimation of

[redacted]

25X1

Top Secret [redacted]

25X1
25X1

its opponents. FAPLA's close air support and greater use of armored vehicles will continue to give UNITA problems in 1986 but will probably not prove a decisive advantage in the overall campaign. It remains to be seen whether UNITA, with better preparation and reversion to a more mobile defense strategy to which UNITA is more accustomed, can reestablish its overall superiority in terms of basic troop combat capability and offset the improved FAPLA performance. [redacted]

25X1

We expect the Soviet involvement in military support to FAPLA to approximate 1985 levels, albeit with possible new surges in military equipment deliveries once the major campaign begins. [redacted]

25X1
25X1

[redacted]

The Cuban role also will probably remain similar to 1985, although we envision more Cuban-piloted air sorties in support of the offensive, and we anticipate that Cuban-piloted MIGs would attempt to react more aggressively to any South African air intervention, raising the potential for direct air combat. [redacted]

25X1

We cannot judge how the tactical gains and losses will play out in the major campaign in the southeast. Although Mavinga could fall, we believe the major FAPLA offensive in the southeast will probably be contained short of Jamba. UNITA will also continue, if not step up, its activity in northern Angola. We believe, however, that there is a heightened risk that the Cubans and South Africans could be drawn into direct conflict. [redacted]

25X1

We see two tactical possibilities that would have some impact on UNITA's overall prospects:

- Should FAPLA garner even limited battlefield successes, such as the temporary capture of Mavinga or other towns in the southeast, it will reinforce the MPLA policy of seeking a military solution to the UNITA insurgency, much as the capture of Cazombo by FAPLA did in 1985. Such successes would be flaunted by the MPLA as "major victories," not only bolstering FAPLA-MPLA morale but also damaging UNITA's prospects in the eyes of many international observers. Moreover, it would be tactically significant if FAPLA could not only take but hold Mavinga, and to a lesser degree Lumbala N'guimbo or Cangamba, where there are airstrips. This could enable FAPLA to interdict UNITA supply lines to the north and provide sites for supporting air attacks deep into UNITA's heartland.

[redacted]

25X1

Top Secret

25X1
25X1

- On the other hand, should UNITA stop the FAPLA offensive short of Mavinga, avoid the loss of other major towns, and inflict new losses on FAPLA elsewhere, this could revive doubts among some MPLA leaders as to the efficacy of a military solution, as happened in 1983-84. We do not believe that such doubts would have a payoff this year in terms of changing MPLA policy regarding talks with UNITA or the MPLA's making meaningful concessions on Cuban troop withdrawal. We see the prospects for UNITA-MPLA talks in 1986 as virtually nil and the likelihood of meaningful MPLA concessions on Cuban troop withdrawal, a requisite to advance the negotiations, as remote. Should UNITA blunt the offensive without losing major towns and make gains elsewhere, this would heighten UNITA morale and raise the estimation of UNITA's prospects in the eyes of many international observers. UNITA's prospects in 1986 for gaining additional external support appear quite modest, however.

25X1

Alternative Outcomes

The volatility of the key variables leads us to envision two alternative outcomes, which we consider less likely but possible:

- **Greater FAPLA threat scenario.** If FAPLA produces unexpected successes in its campaign and also provokes extensive South African air or ground interventions in combat, Washington would share the effects of widespread condemnation of the South African intervention, which the Soviets would quite likely succeed in associating with the United States. Although we envision any such South African intervention as immediately successful in blocking a FAPLA advance, the intervention—especially using air assets—would increase the risk of air combat
- The intervention might also compel the Soviets and Cubans to increase support to FAPLA, including increasing equipment deliveries and taking more measures to negate the effects of South African intervention. This scenario would create the framework for heightened prospects of subsequent Cuban-South African military clashes—both within and beyond the time frame of this Estimate. The Soviets might well deliver nonspecific private or public warnings to Pretoria or Washington should South African intervention seriously threaten FAPLA's prospects.
- **Greater UNITA success scenario.** Should UNITA do better than expected in blunting the impending FAPLA offensive and

25X1

Top Secret [redacted]

25X1
25X1

gaining successes elsewhere, including recapturing ground lost in 1985, the Soviets and Cubans would face tough choices as to how to retrieve the fortunes of FAPLA. We believe in this circumstance a new surge of Soviet military deliveries would occur, and the Cubans might well be forced to utilize the [redacted] Cuban ground force in Angola to bear at least selectively some of the brunt of fighting UNITA. [redacted]

25X1
25X1
25X1

[redacted]

[redacted]

6
Top Secret

25X1

Top Secret

25X1
25X1

DISCUSSION

1. This paper assesses the prospects for the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) for the remainder of 1986. We expect the government to launch another major offensive against UNITA's stronghold in southeastern Angola, probably beginning after the rainy season ends in April. We believe that the main target of the coming offensive is likely to be the town of Mavinga, where a key battle took place last fall. The insurgents have made defensive preparations in the path of the anticipated government advance. [redacted]

Prospective MPLA Military Initiatives

2. We regard as plausible UNITA's conviction that the attack on Mavinga will be along two axes of advance—south from Cazombo/Lucusse, and southeast from Menongue and Cuito Cuanavale. The lack of roads/tracks in southeastern Angola works to UNITA's advantage because it severely limits possible axes of advance. We believe that this overall effort will take several months to play out, probably not beginning until after drier weather arrives in May. The advances may not be simultaneous and may well involve several actions as an advance is stopped, regrouping takes place, and then the advance is resumed. Such a scenario would be consistent with previous FAPLA (Angolan armed forces) actions, particularly the 1985 fall offensive. [redacted]

3. The speed of advance and timing of the offensive will be subject to two significant constraints: weather and logistics. The rainy season floods streams, makes the unimproved roads in the area difficult to pass, especially for FAPLA vehicles, and usually requires several weeks for drying out. In previous offensives, the government's forces have also suffered from lack of logistic support occasioned by difficult terrain, organizational weaknesses, and particularly UNITA's tactics of ambushing and interdicting the forces supporting advancing units. As a result, FAPLA required significant deliveries of water, POL (petroleum, oil, and lubricants), and ammunition from air assets, primarily helicopters, during the 1985 offensive as well as earlier offensives. This put great strain on the Air Force, making the government's air assets vulnerable to UNITA fire; many of FAPLA's helicopter losses in

the 1985 offensive were reportedly caused by UNITA mortar fire hitting helicopters on the ground as they offloaded supplies. [redacted]

4. Other FAPLA initiatives are likely to be reactive to UNITA's military operations. We anticipate some FAPLA effort to consolidate its position in the Cazombo salient. We also anticipate FAPLA sweep operations in the Central Highlands around the cities of Huambo and Kuito and reactive moves in the northwest to counter expected heightened UNITA activity. We do not expect UNITA's actions elsewhere in Angola to deter the main thrust of FAPLA activity into UNITA-held southeastern Angola, although UNITA operations near the capital, Luanda, or the oil production support facilities in the northwest could draw some FAPLA support away to reinforce these sensitive areas. [redacted]

Soviet and Cuban Support

[redacted]

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1


25X1

25X1

Page Denied

Top Secret

25X1
25X1



machineguns, RPGs, and mortars along with ammunition. We detected a surge in South African deliveries, probably ammunition, during FAPLA's July-October 1985 offensive. South Africa is the primary source of POL and spares for UNITA trucks and also provides food, medicines, and some hospital treatment for UNITA casualties. The annual dollar amount of South African materiel support is modest compared with the amounts provided to the MPLA by its allies, albeit increasing. In mid-1985 the MPLA claimed that the dollar value of South African aid to UNITA since 1975 was \$60 million. We are unable to put a dollar figure on South African assistance. Much of the equipment probably comes from captured South-West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) stocks.

25X1
25X1

UNITA pays for at least some of this equipment by bartering diamonds, ivory, and skins. South Africa also provides a very small number of more sophisticated weapons such as SA-7 hand-held antiaircraft missiles and perhaps reloads for captured multiple rocket launchers such as the BM-21 "Stalin organ." South Africa probably also serves as a conduit for modest numbers of weapons either purchased or otherwise obtained by UNITA from foreign sources and markets.

25X1

9. South Africa has also maintained a periodic presence in south-central Angola since 1978 to obtain intelligence on SWAPO and to make periodic preemptive strikes on SWAPO guerrilla camps and units. South African military "special forces" are almost certainly attached to UNITA units near areas of SWAPO operations and probably elsewhere as well. The abortive South African commando strike on oil facilities in Cabinda in 1985 revealed that South African commandos operate clandestinely at least occasionally to strike Angolan targets in support of UNITA objectives.

25X1
25X1

South African Involvement

8. The principal South African involvement in recent years has been to supply UNITA with training, light weapons, ammunition, and POL. Much of UNITA's military materiel—possibly as much as two-thirds of it, according to estimates by DIA—is captured from the FAPLA. South Africa since 1980 has supplied UNITA with weapons to supplement captured equipment—primarily basic infantry weapons,



11. The South African supply of military equipment to UNITA is relatively low cost and provides some concrete returns in the form of intelligence cooperation on targets of vital interest to South Africa,

25X1

Top Secret

25X1

Top Secret

25X1
25X1

such as SWAPO and the African National Congress (ANC). SWAPO has been required to commit roughly half of its 7,000 combatants in Angola against UNITA in response to MPLA pressure. We anticipate that South African support to UNITA will continue and even increase should the pace of combat require a surge in UNITA's need for ammunition. South Africa is much more chary of direct involvement in combat, however, particularly with regard to its scarce air assets. Nonetheless, we believe—as does UNITA—that South Africa will commit air and even ground assets to protect what it sees as its vital interests.

states would be unlikely to break ranks publicly with the OAU's position of support for the MPLA government in Luanda.

25X1

14. We envision some incremental benefits to UNITA, however, in terms of increased private support, more favorable press treatment, and a warmer—albeit “unofficial”—reception of UNITA emissaries in some capitals.

25X1

UNITA's Military Prospects

25X1

12. South African actions in 1985 lead us to believe that Pretoria defines its vital interests in the situation in terms of providing whatever support is necessary to save major concentrations of UNITA from defeat and prevent FAPLA capture of the UNITA “capital” of Jamba. We do not believe that South Africa will necessarily commit air or ground units to assist UNITA to defend Mavinga. Should a FAPLA advance proceed much beyond Mavinga, we would anticipate direct South African support to UNITA, including airstrikes. South African air units have adjusted mission profiles out of concern for the growing number of air defense units in order to reduce the likelihood of confrontation with Cuban-piloted MIGs and surface-to-air missiles. We believe, however, that South African forces are prepared to deal with either threat should the need arise.

15. We expect the remainder of 1986 to be a period of sustained and periodically intensive combat in Angola, particularly in the southeast. The most likely course of events will occasion no substantial gains or losses for either the MPLA or UNITA, but rather some tactical gains and losses for both sides. During the fighting, the possibility of South African air attacks could arise, heightening the risk of direct clashes with Cuban-piloted MIGs.

25X1

16. For UNITA, the 1985 offensive was a sobering experience because the insurgents underestimated their opponents. Although we anticipate UNITA to mount a spirited defense, we do not expect the insurgents to expose themselves to the government's strengths. So far, UNITA has concentrated on attacking FAPLA supply lines and rear bases in the south-east. We expect the insurgents will continue this effort during the offensive.

25X1
25X1

Other Foreign Support to UNITA

13. We do not see any major “bandwagon effect” on foreign support for UNITA resulting from Savimbi's highly publicized visit to the United States in January or from allegations of US support to UNITA. Although we believe South Africa will remain Savimbi's key source of foreign assistance for the near term, UNITA may acquire limited new external support from African or Western states.

17. We anticipate UNITA's defense against the main FAPLA offensive in the southeast to be more mobile and fluid than in 1985, reverting to more traditional UNITA tactics. This may well entail the loss of additional UNITA-held towns in Moxico and Cuando Cubango Provinces, specifically Mavinga, Cangamba, and Lumbala N'guimbo. Each of these towns is an important objective for FAPLA in that each has an adjacent airstrip that would enable FAPLA to receive supplies. The tactical and even strategic question posed by the fall of these towns would be whether FAPLA could retain such gains, consolidate its hold, and convert the airstrips into fields that could be used to launch airstrikes deeper into UNITA-held territory. This question is unlikely to be answered in 1986; should the towns be captured by FAPLA, UNITA would almost certainly utilize the rainy season from November 1986 to April 1987 to try to dislodge FAPLA (FAPLA has had great difficulty in holding towns in UNITA-controlled areas during the rainy season when resupply by road becomes impossible because of weather and UNITA activity and when air supply becomes chancy for the same reasons).

25X1
25X1

[Redacted] We believe these reports are accurate and expect that such support will continue—in the form of funds, propaganda, diplomatic assistance, training of UNITA specialists, and a very modest amount of weaponry. A few conservative African nations—Gabon and Ivory Coast, for example—have quietly expressed sympathy for Savimbi, but we expect no more than a handful will join Zaire in providing behind-the-scenes assistance. Several conservative Arab states have aided UNITA in the past, but we do not know whether such aid is continuing or, if so, at what level. Most black African

25X1

[Redacted]

25X1

Top Secret

25X1
25X1

18. Even a temporary FAPLA capture of one or more UNITA-held towns in the southeast will have some damaging effects on UNITA:

- At least temporarily disrupting logistic lines that support UNITA formations in northern Angola.
- Providing the MPLA with a public “victory” to flaunt both internally and to the world.
- Probably affecting international perceptions of UNITA’s prospects.
- Perhaps most important, reinforcing the belief within the MPLA leadership that a military solution to the UNITA insurgency is the “correct” policy and enhancing FAPLA’s morale.

19. On the other hand, UNITA could regain some territory lost in 1985 and increase military pressure on the sensitive capital and oil production areas in northwestern Angola. UNITA will almost certainly attempt several military and sabotage “spectaculars,” such as the overrunning of a major town, the sabotage of key economic facilities such as power or water utilities near major MPLA-controlled cities, or raids on airfields or the oil support and storage facilities near Soyo or Cabinda.

20. Although the 1986 military campaign will probably not produce decisive results for either side, UNITA will try to blunt FAPLA’s main effort in the southeast, make new gains elsewhere in Angola, repulse the main FAPLA effort, and, as in 1983-84, heighten concerns in Luanda as to the validity of its commitment to a “military solution.” FAPLA in turn will try to recapture some additional territory, gain psychological and propaganda advantages by recapturing a few towns, interdict UNITA supply lines, and possibly gain new tactical and strategic steppingstones into UNITA territory in the form of airfields and radar sites at Mavinga, Cangamba, or Lumbala N’guimbo.

UNITA wants advanced antitank and antiaircraft weapons. We doubt that UNITA will obtain sufficient weapons to negate the government’s armor and air superiority in the period of this Estimate, although its defensive capabilities may be improved. Even with relatively unsophisticated weapons, however, the insurgents were able to destroy 20 to 30 aircraft during the last offensive, enough to cause the government concern

Key Variables

22. We believe the key variables in determining UNITA’s military prospects for the short term will be:

- UNITA’s own strategy and tactics.
- FAPLA’s weaponry and performance.
- The South African role in combat.
- The level of Cuban/Soviet support to FAPLA.

25X1

23. We believe the most likely course for each of these variables this year to be the following:

— UNITA will revert to a more classic insurgent posture in defending against big FAPLA offensives, relying on mobile defense and the interdiction of supply columns, trading some territory for FAPLA losses.

25X1

— Although UNITA will continue to have difficulty with FAPLA close air support and with FAPLA’s increasing use of armored vehicles, the insurgents will probably be able to exact sufficiently heavy losses to preclude FAPLA’s enhanced capabilities from playing a decisive role overall. We believe that FAPLA’s 1985 gains resulted from improved

25X1

as well as from UNITA’s underestimation of its opponents.

25X1

— The South Africans will continue to supply UNITA with materiel and light weaponry but cannot meet UNITA’s needs for advanced anti-aircraft and antitank weapons. South Africa will be reluctant to use its military assets directly in combat but will do so if it sees its vital interests being damaged, such as a major threat to concentrations of UNITA forces or a direct threat to Jamba.

25X1

— We expect that the Cubans and Soviets will continue to provide levels of support approximating the 1985 level without significant new escalations of involvement. The exceptions to this would be triggered by direct South African involvement that threatened the viability of major FAPLA formations, in which case we would anticipate air cover for FAPLA forces, or significant new UNITA victories that might occasion higher levels of support and Cuban reinforcements.

25X1

25X1

25X1
25X1

Top Secret [redacted]

25X1
25X1

Scenarios

The Most Likely

24. FAPLA has apparently "telegraphed its punch" in terms of its most likely axes of advance, giving UNITA an opportunity to prepare defenses in depth as well as to conduct active harassment of areas where the government is building up its forces. Although we cannot determine where FAPLA's advances will be stopped, we believe they are unlikely to pose a serious threat to Jamba. It is possible, however, that a series of determined FAPLA pushes, which would incur heavy losses, could reach Mavinga, Lumbala N'guimbo, or Cangamba. FAPLA aircraft might raid Jamba for psychological and propaganda reasons, but such an attack would probably be ineffectual because of the dispersed layout of the facilities at Jamba. [redacted]

25. In other areas, UNITA is likely to intensify operations, particularly in the northwestern part of the country. UNITA operations will continue to devastate the economic infrastructure in MPLA-controlled areas. UNITA will continue harassing already disrupted coffee-producing areas and will continue essentially to shut down the MPLA's diamond production. A UNITA raid on oil production support facilities at Soyo or even the onshore production and storage facilities in Cabinda is possible because UNITA has publicly targeted these facilities, but we believe such attacks would not seriously disrupt oil production. UNITA is also likely to stage more sabotage operations, including bombings in urban areas. [redacted]

26. The South Africans will probably not see a need to intervene directly in combat unless UNITA's forces are seriously threatened. Should FAPLA present a particularly inviting target, however, South Africa's leaders would be tempted to authorize airstrikes or commando attacks in circumstances that would provide plausible denial of involvement. Similarly, we expect the Cuban and Soviet support to FAPLA combat operations to continue at levels roughly similar to those in 1985. [redacted]

Alternative Scenarios

27. The volatility of the key variables leads us to envision two alternative outcomes, which we consider less likely but possible [redacted]

28. **Greater FAPLA Threat Scenario.** A change in the variables regarding UNITA strategy and tactics and FAPLA weaponry and performance could bring about a much more threatening scenario. [redacted]

29. This scenario would arise from FAPLA's massing a larger force for its offensive than in previous years, with greater concentrations of armor and more extensive close air support. Should UNITA underestimate FAPLA capabilities or commit tactical blunders, the FAPLA offensive could not only capture Mavinga but continue to advance. This would almost certainly bring in South African air attacks and possibly some ground units in an attempt to stiffen UNITA's morale. Although active South African involvement would stop the offensive, numerous South African air sorties would greatly increase the risk of air clashes with [redacted]

A South African intervention that threatens large FAPLA formations might well prompt the Soviets and Cubans to escalate their own level of involvement in subsequent military operations, setting the scene for heightened prospects of Cuban-South African direct military clashes, UNITA's activity elsewhere would probably be curtailed as Savimbi would be forced to pull back additional units to defend Jamba. Despite the probable ultimate failure of such an offensive to capture Jamba, the military initiative would clearly belong to the FAPLA and its Soviet and Cuban allies. [redacted]


30. In addition to increasing deliveries and possibly becoming even more involved in combat operations, the Soviets would probably mount a major political/propaganda campaign against a direct South African involvement. The Soviets would attempt diplomatically to encourage regional and international organizations to condemn South African actions, and the Soviets would also make major efforts to associate the United States with South Africa's support for UNITA. The Soviets might also warn South Africa against further actions, as they did privately in 1984 [redacted]

31. **Greater UNITA Success Scenario.** This scenario would arise from UNITA's successfully disrupting FAPLA's offensive preparations or inflicting such high losses that the offensive does not advance very far but rather quickly turns into an ignominious retreat. Should UNITA acquire new weaponry, it could significantly increase FAPLA's losses of armor and helicopters. This might also enable UNITA's forces to retake areas gained by the MPLA in 1985, such as the three towns in the Cazombo salient, and to make new gains in the north. Such UNITA successes could devastate FAPLA's morale and force the Cubans and Soviets to make tough choices regarding greater Cuban involvement in combat. We believe in this circumstance a new surge of Soviet military deliveries would occur and that the Cuban forces would probably feel compelled at least selectively to engage in combat. Although UNITA still could not capture major towns and [redacted]


25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1

25X1


Top Secret



25X1
25X1


cities garrisoned by Cubans, UNITA would clearly have captured the military initiative. This scenario would also prompt the Soviets into heightened diplomatic and propaganda activity, again seeking condemnations of the United States and South Africa. The Soviets might make representations to the United States and possibly some nonspecific threats regarding possible effects of US aid to UNITA on other areas of US-Soviet relations. 

Prospects for Meaningful Negotiations

32. No interested party has written off further participation in US-brokered regional settlement talks. But the reaffirmation of the MPLA's commitment to a military solution at its December 1985 party congress, Luanda's recent reiteration of its longstanding refusal to talk with Savimbi, and the government's preparations for another prolonged military offensive against UNITA this year all suggest that Luanda is not likely to make adequate concessions in negotiations in the near term. Moreover, Angola's dependence on the Cubans for military support and guidance will continue so long as the MPLA views both UNITA and South Africa as military threats. We expect fitful negotiations to continue, but we do not believe a withdrawal of Cuban troops or a reconciliation between the MPLA and UNITA is likely over the next 12 months. 


Implications for the United States

33. Although we believe the prospects for MPLA-UNITA reconciliation or for substantive progress in


negotiations on a withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola are virtually nil for the period of this Estimate, we expect that all parties will maintain lines of communication with the United States. Should UNITA succeed in repelling the major FAPLA offensive without sustaining serious losses or losing major towns, this could well generate afresh questions among the MPLA leadership as to the validity of an exclusively military policy toward UNITA. In that contingency, should UNITA make and sustain dramatic new gains—less likely in our judgment—this might eventually lead Luanda to show more active interest in the US-sponsored regional negotiating process if only to gain some diplomatic insurance against increased outside aid to UNITA. 

25X1

25X1

34. Should FAPLA succeed in prosecuting its offensive to the point of triggering direct South African combat involvement beyond an isolated response, this could not only risk Cuban-South African air clashes but also stimulate the Soviets and Cubans into increasing their involvement to offset the South African intervention. Although the full effects of this would probably not be seen during 1986, an atmosphere of crisis could be generated by the Soviets, which would be compounded by Soviet diplomatic and propaganda activities. 

25X1

35. In either contingency—substantial gains by UNITA or direct South African involvement in combat—the United States would be the target of not only Soviet, but also widespread African and other Third World criticism and condemnation. Soviet posturing could include warnings not only to South Africa, but also to the United States. 

25X1

25X1



25X1



Page Denied

Top Secret

25X1
25X1

ANNEX B

OVERALL FORCE PICTURE

1. Luanda and its Cuban allies hold a better than 2-to-1 advantage in manpower over UNITA and an even more pronounced advantage in firepower. In our view, UNITA holds the edge in the quality of its troops, although this advantage may be eroding because of gradual improvements in the government's forces.

such as tanks and conventional artillery, most are primarily infantry units with little or no armor and only limited artillery support.

25X1

2. *Angolan Armed Forces.* Luanda has at least 100,000 men under arms in the regular army and other security forces and militia. The Angolan Army is organized in brigades that average about 1,000 men; we believe there are more than 60 brigades. Many of these troops are conscripts. With the exception of a few mechanized brigades that have heavy weapons

3. The Angolan Air Force is expanding its capabilities aided by substantial deliveries of Soviet aircraft and helicopters and a training program for Angolan pilots in the Soviet Union. Angolan and Cuban pilots fly MIG-21, MIG-23, and SU-22 fighters and MI-24/25 and MI-8/17 helicopters.

25X1

25X1

4. Angola's air strength is backed by a substantial number of air defense missiles and radars. Moreover, Angola, unlike Pretoria, can easily replace its aircraft losses.

25X1

Table B-1
Angola: Balance of Forces

Manpower			
MPLA	100,000	UNITA	50,000 to 60,000
Regular military	70,000	Regulars	20,000 to 25,000
Other security forces	30,000	Guerrillas	30,000 to 35,000
Cuban military contingent	36,000	South Africa (in Namibia)	21,000
Combat troops	28,000	South African forces	7,000
Support and advisory personnel	8,000	Territorial forces	11,000
Soviet advisers	1,200	South African security police	3,000
East European advisers	500		

25X1


25X1

25X1

Top Secret

25X1
25X1


25X1



5. **Cuban Military Contingent.** The Angolan Army is backed by a 36,000-man Cuban military contingent—including some 28,000 combat troops—which guards rear bases, provides security detachments to guard Soviet military advisers, performs essential support services, and frees an equivalent number of Angolan troops for field operations. We believe that Cuban combat activity is limited to small groups that supplement the Angolan armed forces by piloting aircraft and helicopters, manning much of the air defense system, driving armored vehicles, and filling other support roles. Over the years, we have not seen evidence of significant Cuban troop deployments in combat operations.



25X1



7. **UNITA.** The insurgents probably have some 50,000 to 60,000 armed combatants of which about 20,000 to 25,000 are lightly armed but well-trained regulars organized in battalions, most of which are deployed in UNITA-held territory in southeastern Angola. In addition, about 30,000 to 35,000 guerrillas operate in smaller units throughout the country. We believe that UNITA's troops have generally higher morale than the Angolan soldiers. UNITA may have as many as 60 battalions, each averaging between 350 to 450 men. The guerrillas are organized in company-size columns of about 150 to 200 men or in smaller local militias. UNITA also fields small, specially trained sabotage groups.

25X1
25X1


25X1

8. **South Africa.** Pretoria has about 20,000 troops in northern Namibia, including Namibian territorial forces and a smaller number of South African regulars

25X1



Top Secret




25X1

25X1

and conscripts in a small strike force. South Africa also uses its "foreign legion"—the 32nd battalion, with a nominal strength of 1,100 men—and "special forces" teams of five or 10 to 50 or more men for operations in Angola. Pretoria deploys a portion of its Air Force

forward in Namibia for operations in Angola. If Pretoria's total air strength is counted, Angola—from a purely numerical perspective—has an edge, with more modern supersonic fighters than South Africa. Pretoria has the edge, however, in pilot skills and tactics.



25X1



DISSEMINATION NOTICE

1. This document was disseminated by the Directorate of Intelligence. Because of the sensitive nature of some source material reflected herein, this copy is for the exclusive information and use of the recipient only.

2. This document may be retained, or destroyed by burning in accordance with applicable security regulations, or returned to the Directorate of Intelligence.

3. When this document is disseminated overseas, the overseas recipients may retain it for a period not in excess of one year. At the end of this period, the document should be destroyed or returned to the forwarding agency, or permission should be requested of the forwarding agency to retain it in accordance with IAC-D-69/2, 22 June 1953.

4. The title of this document when used separately from the text is unclassified.

Top Secret

Top Secret