



**Director of
Central
Intelligence**

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Conflict in Southern Africa: Regional and International Dimensions

Special National Intelligence Estimate

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CONFLICT IN SOUTHERN AFRICA: REGIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL DIMENSIONS

Information as of 10 December 1981 was
used in the preparation of this Estimate.

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THE NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE BOARD CONCURS.

The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of the Estimate:

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KEY JUDGMENTS

Southern Africa is becoming increasingly polarized and unstable. Over the past year there has been an escalation of military activity by anti-South African insurgents based in black states, by the South African armed forces trying to neutralize these groups, and by guerrillas fighting the Governments of Angola and Mozambique.

The fundamental conflict in the region stems from black opposition to white minority rule in Namibia and South Africa. Soviet and Cuban involvement has increased the complexity of the problem and raised the stakes.

The black states and the anti-South African insurgents feel increasingly threatened by Pretoria's growing willingness to use its military power beyond its borders. Although the results of Soviet efforts in southern Africa have been mixed, the deepening conflict is enhancing the USSR's and Cuba's opportunities to build their influence and undermine that of the West, primarily through military assistance.

The more the black states look to the USSR and Cuba for military aid, the more Pretoria will fear an imminent Marxist onslaught. And the more South Africa strikes back, the more Moscow and Havana will be able to strengthen their military links with black states and anti-South African nationalist movements. Thus the scene is set for further Soviet exploitation and escalating conflict.

Ironically, these trends serve Pretoria as well as Moscow. Both governments benefit from growing tension in the region because it contributes to a closer identification of black southern Africa with the USSR and of South Africa with the United States.

The Namibian struggle is to a great degree an extension of the larger issue of white rule in South Africa itself. The Soviets—unlike the West—have no conflicting interests preventing them from wholeheartedly endorsing black African efforts to bring majority rule to Namibia and South Africa. Thus they can freely grant military assistance to the South-West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO)—the Namibian insurgent group—and the African National Congress (ANC)—the leading South African insurgent group.

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The spiral of insurgent activity, South African aggressive reaction, and Soviet exploitation of black African security concerns manifests itself in various ways in the black states of the region. In Marxist-ruled Angola and Mozambique, South African intervention—military incursions and aid to insurgents—and black dependence on Soviet and East European military assistance mutually reinforce each other:

- Even a settlement of the Namibia problem probably would not be sufficient by itself to bring about a major withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola, given the political and security problems plaguing the Angolan regime.

Fear of Pretoria's intentions has also been a factor in decisions by some of the more moderate southern African countries such as Zambia and Botswana to turn to the Soviets for arms and training—developments that have exacerbated South Africa's own anxiety and aggressiveness.

But the more moderate governments remain distrustful of Moscow and have sought to keep it from expanding its influence into their domestic politics. Even elements within the Angolan and Mozambican regimes show signs of wanting to limit their dependence on the USSR.

African distrust of Moscow reflects differences between Soviet and African interests and perspectives. Moscow tends to antagonize southern African black leaders by dealing with their countries mainly in the context of East-West and Sino-Soviet competition.

The Soviets have an interest in continued tension in the region because their influence there is largely founded on military assistance. African governments by and large want a negotiated settlement in Namibia—just as they did in Rhodesia—to hasten the end of minority rule and to ease the economic and military burdens such issues create for them.

A further constraint on expansion of Soviet influence in the region is Moscow's unwillingness to meet pressing African economic needs. This is readily apparent even in Marxist-controlled Angola and Mozambique. Also, the continuing dependence of most southern African countries on economic links with South Africa limits their willingness to antagonize Pretoria by deepening their ties with Moscow.

The Africans know that only the West is in a position to help them ease their economic troubles and resolve the region's political problems through negotiations with South Africa. This gives the United States and

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the West important leverage. Most African governments are unlikely to allow their actions to be dictated by the USSR as long as the United States and the West remain engaged.

Yet such US involvement entails risks. In trying to play the part of an honest broker between South Africa and black Africa, the United States increases its susceptibility to black African charges of US-South African collusion. Moscow will continue to exploit these suspicions.

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DISCUSSION

INTRODUCTION

1. The situation in southern Africa is becoming increasingly polarized and unstable, marked by rising mutual suspicion and tension between white-ruled South Africa and its black neighbors. Over the past year, there has been an escalation of military activity by anti-South African insurgents based in black states, by the South African armed forces trying to neutralize these groups, and by guerrillas fighting the Marxist Governments of Angola and Mozambique.

2. The black states and the anti-South African insurgent groups feel increasingly threatened by Pretoria's growing willingness to use its military power beyond its borders, illustrated recently by its large-scale incursion into southern Angola in late August and early September. The deepening regional tensions have enhanced the USSR's and Cuba's opportunities to build their influence and undermine that of the West in the region, primarily through military and security assistance programs.

3. Moscow's growing involvement with black states and nationalist movements is in turn aggravating South African fears and accelerating the trend toward more aggressive policies in Pretoria. The result is an ever-deepening cycle of mistrust and hostility in which each side has tangible evidence to support its worst case analysis of the other's intentions.

4. Thus the scene is set in southern Africa for escalating conflict that seriously threatens Western interests. The more the black states depend on the USSR for military assistance, the more Pretoria will fear an imminent Marxist onslaught. And the more military actions the South Africans take, the more Moscow will be able to strengthen its military links with black states and nationalist movements.

BLACK AFRICAN CONCERNS AND SOVIET EXPLOITATION

Perceptions of the Soviet Role

5. The conflict in southern Africa stems fundamentally from longstanding black opposition to white

minority rule. Soviet involvement adds a dimension that makes the problem more complex.

6. Black African leaders seek both Soviet and Western support against the South Africans; indeed, they have viewed the two as complementary rather than competitive. Whatever misgivings they have about Soviet involvement in the region are offset by their greater antipathy toward the white regime in Pretoria.

7. The USSR's unqualified endorsement of black African self-determination has made it an acceptable collaborator in African eyes, even for those governments that do not embrace Marxism. Unlike the West, Moscow has no major economic ties with South Africa and is not otherwise constrained by vested interests vis-a-vis the white minority regime.

8. The interlocking nature of the struggle in southern Africa has helped the Soviets expand their military assistance role. Moscow's early support for the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) helped pave the way for expanded Soviet military aid to the Angola-based South-West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) after the MPLA came to power at independence in 1975. Similarly, the USSR's ties with the regimes in Angola and Mozambique have facilitated its assistance to the main South African black nationalist insurgent group, the African National Congress (ANC).


9. Most African leaders believe that Moscow's and Havana's military roles in the region—and the potential for their expansion—acted as a strong inducement on the West to pressure the white Rhodesian regime into agreeing to independence and black majority rule. They believe that a similar incentive is at work in the case of Namibia.

10. These leaders have few illusions about the USSR's long-term aim of expanding its influence in the region, but they appreciate Moscow's unequivocal support for black rule and the military support that the Soviets and Cubans have provided to black African countries. The Africans believe that the economic and political interests of some Western nations in South

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Africa and Namibia constrain Western policy options. They think that the West, if presented with a choice between relative stability under white rule and uncertainty under black rule, would support the former.

Thus, while they are critical of superpower rivalry in the region, they believe that Soviet involvement helps keep pressure on Western countries to remain engaged.

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11. Pretoria views the conflict in southern Africa partly as a struggle against Communism, and emphasizes this point to gain US and other Western support. South Africa's August-September incursion into southern Angola, in which its forces killed four Soviets and captured one, highlighted Moscow's involvement in the region and reinforced Pretoria's conviction that the struggle over Namibia is not inspired solely by African aspirations for self-determination. Ironically, both Pretoria and Moscow benefit from continuing tension in the region because it contributes to a closer identification of black southern Africa with the USSR and of South Africa with the United States.

White Rule and Black Nationalism

12. *Namibia.* The conflict in southern Africa is being fought intensely over the future of Namibia. The Namibian independence struggle is to a great degree an extension of the larger issue of white minority rule in South Africa. A common perception among black Africans and white South Africans is that events in Namibia could set the stage for a final racial showdown in South Africa.

13. The Soviets see clear advantages in the Namibian situation because of the strains it causes between Western and African nations and among members of the Western alliance, and because of the opportunities it provides for the USSR to expand its ties with the black Africans.

14. The USSR, with Angola's cooperation, has been the main supplier of military assistance to SWAPO since the mid-1970s. Soviet aid has included small arms and ammunition, mines, mortars, rocket launchers, anti-aircraft guns, man-portable SA-7 surface-to-air missiles, communications equipment, trucks, and armored vehicles.

15. Most SWAPO guerrillas receive their basic training in camps in Angola. The instructors are primarily Cubans but include Soviets and East Germans.

16. SWAPO's heavy reliance on assistance from Moscow has resulted in close ties between Soviet officials and some SWAPO leaders, particularly guerrilla commanders. SWAPO president Sam Nujoma over the years has been a frequent visitor to Moscow.

Nujoma's loosely Marxist stance—his rhetoric has become increasingly leftist in recent years—probably reflects a desire to please SWAPO's Soviet, Cuban, and Angolan supporters rather than any deep-seated personal commitment.

17. A faction within the SWAPO leadership appears to be particularly pro-Soviet and advocates a military rather than a negotiated solution for Namibia. The influence of this faction has been growing, but it is not dominant.

18. *The South African Domestic Question.* Even if the Namibian problem is resolved, the lack of meaningful racial and political reform in South Africa will cause continued regional tension and opportunities for Soviet exploitation.

19. Prime Minister Botha entered office three years ago insisting that South Africa had to "adapt or die," but his government has implemented only limited measures. Botha's interest in reform was dampened by the loss of some of his conservative Afrikaner support during the 1981 national elections. Black frustrations—and the level of domestic violence and cross-border guerrilla operations—consequently continue to rise, although white rule is unlikely to be threatened during the next few years.

20. As with the Namibian question, nothing prevents the Soviets from wholeheartedly endorsing black African efforts to bring majority rule to South Africa and granting military assistance to the African National Congress. The ANC is the leading South African insurgent group and is responsible for the recent wave of terrorist attacks inside the country.

21. The Soviets provide the ANC with financial support and almost all of its weapons. Most of the ANC's several thousand guerrillas have received military training at camps in Angola¹ from Cuban and probably some Soviet instructors. In addition, promising ANC members are sent to Cuba, the USSR, and East Germany for further military and political training.

¹ Angola, Tanzania (to a much lesser extent), and perhaps Mozambique allow training of ANC guerrillas on their territory. Most of the ANC's operations are launched from Mozambique, in many cases through Swaziland; neither country officially permits the group to stage attacks into South Africa from its soil, but they are unable—and at times unwilling—to control the organization completely.

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22. The ANC has been allied since the early 1950s with the South African Communist Party (SACP). The SACP has maintained close ties with the USSR and Eastern Europe since it was forced into exile over two decades ago. SACP members sit on the ANC's ruling Executive Committee, and a white SACP member based in Mozambique, Joe Slovo, apparently coordinates much of the group's sporadic cross-border guerrilla activity against South Africa. Younger ANC members, particularly those who came out of the black consciousness movement of the 1970s, are severely critical of the role white Communist activists play in the ANC.

The Black States: Security Issues

23. The spiral of South African aggressive reaction to guerrilla activities and Soviet exploitation of black African security concerns has manifested itself in various ways. In Angola and Mozambique, a substantial Soviet and Cuban military assistance role has heightened Pretoria's apprehension and intransigence, resulting in South African military incursions as well as growing support for antigovernment insurgents. In other countries—particularly Zambia and Botswana—fear of Pretoria has been a factor in recent decisions to turn to the Soviets for arms and training. But these two governments and others in the region remain distrustful of Moscow and have sought to keep it from expanding its influence into the internal politics of their countries.

24. *Angola.* Although Soviet and Cuban intervention was crucial to the MPLA's rise to power, important elements of the regime would like to reduce the country's dependence on Moscow and Havana. The Soviets and Cubans have not provided the assistance necessary to revive Angola's severely troubled economy or stem South African military incursions, and their massive presence is resented by much of the Angolan populace. (See tables).

25. Nonetheless, several factors have prevented Luanda from lessening its dependence on the Soviets and Cubans:

- South African military operations against SWAPO and Angolan military facilities in southern Angola have been growing in frequency and scope.
- Angolan forces remain unable to defeat Jonas Savimbi's National Union for the Total Inde-

pendence of Angola (UNITA).² Savimbi's forces dominate large portions of the sparsely populated southern half of the country and occasionally operate farther north.

- A mulatto-led pro-Soviet faction dominates the Luanda regime. The mulattoes know their political survival would be jeopardized by a sharp reduction in the Cuban and Soviet presence.
- As a result of the large-scale exodus of educated people when the country became independent from Portugal, Angola lacks alternatives to the Soviet and Cuban advisers and technicians who play key roles in running the country as well as in directing and supporting the Angolan armed forces.

26. The threat that the Angolans perceive from UNITA and from South Africa's cross-border military actions is thus a major factor behind Luanda's continuing heavy dependence on the Soviets and Cubans. A resolution of the Namibian problem presumably would end the South African military incursions, but Pretoria probably would continue to assist UNITA as a way of keeping pressure on Luanda. Savimbi, moreover, enjoys considerable popular support in southern Angola and would probably be able to continue his insurgency even if his outside backing dried up.

27. A continuing challenge from UNITA would be seen by Luanda as South African-backed regardless of whether this were the case. Such a situation, combined with the other factors behind Luanda's dependence on the Soviets and Cubans, would work against any major cutback in their presence.

28. *Mozambique.* The regime in Mozambique has also received substantial Soviet and Cuban military assistance. During the first few years after the country became independent in 1975, President Machel's government was relatively secure, and Soviet and Cuban aid—although it increased somewhat because of Rhodesian military incursions into Mozambique—remained on a far smaller scale than in Angola. During

² South African support for UNITA, which dates back to the beginning of the Angolan civil war, has included small arms, other equipment, and supplies. UNITA has also obtained aid from several other countries and captures substantial quantities of equipment from Angolan Government forces. Its dependence on South Africa is likely to increase, however, as a result of President Mitterrand's decision to end France's support for Savimbi and a decline in aid from other sources.

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the past two years, however, the National Resistance Movement of Mozambique (NRM) has received increased South African support and has steadily expanded its insurgent campaign, launched in 1977 in central Mozambique. The NRM now operates widely in rural areas of the country and occasionally attacks urban targets.

29. South Africa has replaced the former white regime in Rhodesia as the NRM's main source of arms, other equipment, supplies, and training. Pretoria at first viewed the insurgency as a means of intimidating Machel's government into restricting African National Congress operations from Mozambique into South Africa. Now it may regard the NRM as an eventual alternative to Machel.

30. The Mozambican President views the insurgents as a growing threat to his power. As a result, his dependence on Soviet and Cuban military support is increasing; the number of Cuban military advisers in Mozambique has risen in recent months to at least 800. Tanzania has also agreed to help train Mozambican soldiers, but Machel has been largely unsuccessful in obtaining aid from Zimbabwe. He probably will feel compelled to seek higher levels of Soviet military aid and perhaps Cuban combat troops.

31. Moscow may be able to benefit from Machel's predicament. Up to now he has not granted the Soviets naval access rights to Mozambican ports.³ If the South African-backed insurgency continues to gain ground, the Soviets may find him more responsive to their interests, and they probably will succeed in strengthening the position of pro-Soviet hardliners within the regime. While Pretoria has recently expressed concern about the possibility of a Namibia-like "second front" along its northeastern border, neither the Soviets nor the Mozambicans want a major military confrontation with the South Africans.

32. *Zambia*. President Kaunda—convinced that southern Africa was heading for protracted turmoil, anxious to offset Zambia's military weakness and growing discontent in the armed forces, and disappointed over repeated failures to obtain a modern air

³ In late October 1981, however, the Soviets sent a 4,500-ton floating drydock to the port of Maputo. Ostensibly this drydock will be used to repair local and Soviet fishing boats, but it could also take Soviet surface warships, enabling the USSR to maintain an increased naval presence in the region.

defense package from the West—signed a major arms purchase agreement with the USSR in late 1979. During the past two years, Zambia has also accepted military assistance [redacted] from East Germany, and it has expanded its ties with several East European countries in nonmilitary fields.

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33. The expansion of relations with the Soviets and East Europeans followed a series of Rhodesian military raids against Zimbabwe African People's Union facilities in Zambia. Although the Rhodesian threat dissipated when Zimbabwe came into being under black rule in April 1980, Kaunda implemented the Soviet arms pact, in part because of the military threat he perceived from South Africa. The South Africans had begun in mid-1979 to conduct cross-border raids against SWAPO bases located in southwestern Zambia near the Namibian and Angolan borders. The Zambians have also been concerned that Pretoria might launch raids on the ANC's offices in Lusaka.

34. The more than \$200 million worth of military equipment Zambia has acquired from the Soviets—MIG-21 aircraft, MI-8 helicopters, SA-3 and SA-7 missiles, ZSU-23/4 self-propelled anti-aircraft weapons, and ammunition—has provided the Soviets with access to the Zambian armed forces. The Soviet equipment, however, is incompatible with much of the country's other military hardware and has not significantly improved the capabilities of the armed forces. Nor has it done much to shore up Kaunda's standing within the military, where discontent has been growing among junior officers and enlisted men over corruption and worsening economic conditions in the armed forces and in the country as a whole. Some senior officers, moreover, have been resentful that their opposition to the Soviet deal was ignored by Kaunda and his influential defense chief, Grey Zulu, who favors the Soviet connection.

35. Kaunda himself has long been suspicious of the Soviets and has sought to keep them from expanding their influence in Zambia. Pretoria, however, views Zambia's acquisition of Soviet and East German military assistance—including around 50 Soviet military advisers—as further evidence that South Africa is increasingly being surrounded by Communist-backed states and groups with aggressive intentions. Kaunda could provoke South African military retaliation if he deployed his Soviet weapon systems to the region bordering Namibia. Even in the absence of such a

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development, he may seek further Soviet weaponry if arms are not readily available from other sources.

36. *Botswana.* The pro-Western Government of Botswana is acutely aware of its vulnerability to South African economic and military power and consequently tempers its support for SWAPO and the ANC. The two groups are not permitted to stage attacks into South Africa or Namibia from Botswanan territory, although the ANC has offices in Gaborone and recruits members from among South African refugees in the country.

37. The Botswanan Government has sought to achieve a level of military strength that would enable it to continue restricting anti-South African insurgent activities and thus dissuade Pretoria from attacking Botswana. At the same time, the government probably also hopes that bolstering its military strength might enable it to cope with any low-level military harassment campaign Pretoria might launch along the Botswana-South Africa border.

38. Botswana in recent years has had difficulty obtaining Western arms. Moscow, meanwhile, has been working to persuade the Botswanan Government to acquire Soviet weapons. [redacted]

39. In December 1980, with SWAPO and the ANC stepping up their demands for permission to use Botswanan territory for anti-South African activities, President Quett Masire acceded to pressure [redacted]

and agreed to purchase from the USSR arms reportedly costing \$3.2 million. The arms, which began arriving in Botswana in August 1981, reportedly include armored personnel carriers and SA-7 air defense missiles. A small number of Soviet advisers were in the country briefly to provide some training, and Botswana reportedly is sending some 25 officers to the USSR for military training during the next several months.

40. The arms deal does not yet appear to be paving the way for a significant warming of Soviet relations with Botswana in other fields. The government has rejected other Soviet aid offers, is wary of Soviet intentions, and seems particularly concerned about limiting the impact of the arms deal on ties with the West and South Africa.

41. Pretoria nonetheless is concerned over the appearance of Soviet arms and advisers in yet another country on its borders. The South Africans apparently tried to intimidate Botswana after the accord was signed by blocking an oil shipment in January, causing spot fuel shortages.

42. *Lesotho.* Prime Minister Jonathan's relations with South Africa, long relatively harmonious, have worsened in recent years. Jonathan has suspected the South Africans of assisting exiled opponents of his government, even though these dissidents are left-leaning and some have probably been trained in Libya. South Africa has in fact been turning a blind eye since 1979 to infiltration into Lesotho by opposition members exiled in Botswana who must pass through South African territory to reach their landlocked country.

43. Pretoria has become increasingly irritated over Jonathan's sharp criticisms of South Africa, a tack he has been taking since the late 1970s. In the past few months, moreover, several members of the ANC have escaped to Lesotho after conducting terrorist operations in South Africa, and the Lesotho authorities have dealt lightly with them. Pretoria may be starting to retaliate by providing direct assistance to Jonathan's exiled opponents.

44. The increasing tension with South Africa and the growing activism of dissidents have been key factors in Jonathan's moves to strengthen ties with Havana in recent years. The Cubans apparently are providing military training in Mozambique—and possibly in Cuba—for members of Lesotho's defense force.

45. Jonathan's relations with the Soviets, however, have remained distant. Lesotho has established diplomatic relations with the USSR and several of its allies in recent years, but the Soviets have not been permitted to open an embassy. The conservative Jonathan and his supporters are cool toward Moscow and generally lean toward the United States. They are also reluctant to antagonize the South Africans any further; they recognize that Pretoria can retaliate by aiding Jonathan's opponents, by curtailing the employment of workers from Lesotho in South African mines, or by blocking food shipments from South Africa on which Lesotho heavily depends.

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55. The Soviets are reported to have recently promised military assistance—possibly including Soviet and Cuban advisers as well as large quantities of equipment—through Angola to the Front for the National Liberation of the Congo (FLNC), the Angola- and Zambia-based Shaban dissident group that invaded the territory in 1977 and again in 1978. Some Soviet equipment earmarked for the Zairian rebels has reportedly reached Angola.

56. Moscow's intentions regarding the FLNC are intertwined with other aspects of the situation in southern Africa. The Soviets—and their Angolan allies—regard President Mobutu as an agent of the United States. They may view substantial aid to Mobutu's opponents as a counter to US policies in the region.

57. Although the FLNC is Zaire's most formidable opposition group, it suffers from low morale among its several thousand members, factionalism, and shortages of supplies. But if the Soviets come through with substantial assistance—

—the FLNC's ability to launch new military or guerrilla operations in Shaba would be greatly enhanced. The generally undisciplined and ill-equipped Zairian armed forces probably could not cope effectively with such a situation.

58. Now that former French President Giscard has been replaced by Socialist leader Mitterrand, Mobutu can no longer count on French forces to turn back an invasion of Shaba as they did in 1978. Major turmoil in Shaba would probably halt mining there, crippling the Zairian economy. Moreover, trouble in Shaba could spark unrest in Kinshasa and other areas, particularly given the growing links between the FLNC and other Zairian dissidents including Mobutu's former Prime Minister, Nguza Karl-i-Bond, who is from Shaba. Although Mobutu has repeatedly proved adroit during his 16 years in power at overcoming or preempting challenges to his rule, an outbreak of disorders in Shaba that spread elsewhere could undermine his government and even bring it down.

EXPANDING SOVIET INFLUENCE: PROBLEMS AND OPPORTUNITIES

59. Over the past five years, the Soviets, along with the East Europeans and Cubans, have considerably

expanded their military deliveries to the region. Since 1975 Moscow has supplied almost \$1.3 billion worth of arms. But the Soviets' and their allies' political influence is restricted to the states confronting South Africa—Angola and Mozambique. Several factors constrain their influence in the other countries of the region.

60. *Diverging Interests.* The suspicions of Soviet intentions harbored by Nyerere, Mugabe, and others are to a considerable extent the result of fundamental differences between Soviet and African interests and perspectives. Moscow tends to antagonize southern African leaders by dealing with their countries in the larger context of East-West and Sino-Soviet competition. Moscow's basic aims in the region are to undermine Western and Chinese influence, to promote pro-Soviet regimes, and to increase Soviet access to air and naval facilities.

61. Soviet objectives in southern Africa may also include the denial or complication of Western access to the strategic mineral resources of the region. Under current political and economic conditions, this Soviet objective is unlikely to be realized. Even if white rule ended in South Africa, a Soviet "denial strategy" would encounter serious obstacles—particularly Western reaction and resistance from the African leaders who depend on the hard currency generated by the sale of mineral resources.

62. The Soviets have an interest in continued tension and even military confrontation in the region because their influence and position are founded largely on military assistance. African governments by and large want a negotiated settlement in Namibia, as they did in Rhodesia, to hasten the end of minority rule and to ease the economic and military burdens such issues create for them. And they know that only the West is in a position to help them attain such a settlement with the South Africans.

63. Soviet-African differences along these lines surfaced during the Rhodesian peace talks when the Soviets lobbied against African participation in the negotiations. Similarly, the Soviets now are frustrated over their inability to keep southern black African governments from taking part in Western-sponsored negotiations on Namibia.

64. *African Economic Needs.* In theory, the economic troubles that prevail in most of black southern

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46. *Zimbabwe*. Prime Minister Mugabe is convinced that South Africa is trying to destabilize or at least intimidate his regime. When Mugabe took power at independence in April 1980, he agreed to continue bilateral economic relations but downgraded political ties.

47. This year Pretoria, reacting in part to hostile rhetoric from Salisbury, has canceled a number of trade, labor, and transportation agreements it had originally established with the white Rhodesian regime. In addition, the South African-backed NRM has begun attacking road, rail, and pipeline links in Mozambique that are also vital to Zimbabwe's efforts to reduce its economic dependence on South Africa. Mugabe, moreover, has charged that the South Africans are training Zimbabweans who had been loyal to one of his opponents, Bishop Muzorewa, for possible insurgent or military action against his government. Mugabe also believes that South Africa was behind the recent assassination of the ANC's top official in Salisbury, Joe Gqabi.

48. South Africa's policy toward Mugabe is partly a function of its toughening stance toward most of its black neighbors. Pretoria is probably warning him to maintain his restrictive policies toward the ANC. Some ANC personnel reside in Zimbabwe and the group maintains several offices there, but Mugabe does not allow ANC cadre to receive guerrilla training or to stage operations from Zimbabwean territory.

49. Despite his concerns about the South Africans, Mugabe has not turned to the Soviets or Cubans for military assistance. He recognizes that such aid would simply anger Pretoria without giving Zimbabwe the ability to stand up to South African military might. Even more importantly, he distrusts Moscow because of its extensive military assistance to his main black nationalist rival, Joshua Nkomo, during the Zimbabwean independence struggle. Mugabe belatedly agreed to establish diplomatic relations with the USSR in February 1981, but bilateral ties have remained cool. Even so, he could feel compelled to accept Soviet military assistance if he concluded that Pretoria were about to step up its actions against Zimbabwe.

50. Mugabe recently turned to an alternative Communist source of military aid, accepting an offer by North Korea to provide training and equipment for a new army brigade. Over 100 North Korean advisers have arrived in Zimbabwe with the equipment; they are scheduled to remain for eight to 12 months.

51. Mugabe's primary purpose in accepting the North Korean assistance is to strengthen his hand against potential dissidence at home. He still views Nkomo's Zimbabwe African People's Union as a threat even though its military arm has been integrated into the country's new national army. The North Korean-trained unit will be comprised almost entirely of troops from Mugabe's Zimbabwe African National Union. But regardless of Mugabe's reasons for accepting Pyongyang's aid, Pretoria will view the North Korean presence as further evidence of the Communist threat to South Africa.

52. *Tanzania*. President Nyerere also expects growing strife between Pretoria and black southern Africa in the years ahead. Nyerere, moreover, wants to keep his armed forces mollified in the face of Tanzania's mounting economic troubles and popular discontent. These concerns, together with the situation in Uganda and Nyerere's African leadership ambitions, have led him to accept sizable quantities of advanced Soviet military equipment in recent years. Deliveries have included MIG-21 fighters, SA-3 and SA-6 missiles, medium tanks, and large artillery pieces. The Soviets have about 130 military advisers stationed in Tanzania.

53. Nyerere, however, strongly distrusts the USSR and has minimized its influence on his government. China is still his closest Communist ally. His relations with Moscow over the years have been generally cool and at times tense, and he has disagreed with the Soviets on a variety of African and international questions. His leading role in pushing for political settlements of the Rhodesian and Namibian problems has been aimed in part at forestalling further Soviet involvement in these issues and great-power conflict in the region.

54. *Zaire*. Soviet exploitation of African turmoil takes a different form in Zaire than in countries further south. In Zaire, the Soviets are trying to capitalize not on black sentiment against South Africa but rather on discontent within a regional/ethnic group—the people of mineral-rich Shaba Region. Shabans, like many other Zairians, are increasingly restive over the country's economic malaise and what they regard as an exploitative and corrupt central government.

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Africa—food shortages, inflation, unemployment, stagnant growth, low export earnings, and massive debt obligations—should enhance Moscow's prospects in the region through aid to hard-pressed governments as well as dissident groups. In practice, however, the Soviets have done little to meet African aid and capital needs.⁴ Only Western governments and private institutions—and Western-sponsored multinational organizations such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund—are in a position to address southern African requirements. Even the Marxist regimes in Angola and Mozambique have recognized the need to establish economic relations with the West and, in the case of Mozambique, to maintain with South Africa economic ties that were established during the Portuguese colonial period.

65. In all probability, Moscow's refusal to compete with the West in addressing the economic needs of various countries in the region is largely due to the USSR's own economic constraints and its recognition of African economic dependence on the West. Rather than compete on Western terms, the Soviets have tried to turn the situation to their advantage. This is readily apparent in Angola. Despite the extensive Soviet role there, only about 8 percent of Angola's trade is with Communist countries. The only successful sector of the economy, oil production, is operated by US and other Western firms, and the oil industry's capital needs are met in Western financial markets. Indeed, it is the hard currency earned by its Western-run oil industry that enables Angola to pay for Soviet arms and Cuban troops.

66. In Mozambique, Western economic assistance dwarfs Communist aid despite the country's close ideological and military ties with Moscow. In the rest of the region as well, Western economic aid far outstrips that of the Soviets and their allies. The West is also a much more important trading partner. This is vividly illustrated in the key area of minerals marketing: in addition to Angola's dependence on oil sales in the West, Zambia, Zaire, and Zimbabwe rely heavily

⁴ For instance, donors' conferences for Zimbabwe and for the Southern African Development Coordination Conference, a regional body, have taken place without Soviet participation. The East Europeans, moreover, have effectively blocked Mozambique from becoming a member of the Soviet-sponsored Council for Mutual Economic Assistance because they realize that Maputo would be a drain on the organization's resources.

on Western purchases of copper, cobalt, and chrome to generate foreign exchange.

67. The economic assistance that the Soviets do provide has significant drawbacks. Soviet goods, machinery, and technical support are widely regarded as inadequate both in quantity and quality, and in many instances Soviet machinery is not compatible with Western equipment already in place. Soviet advisers and technicians frequently are regarded by Africans as heavyhanded and even racist. In the area of military aid, the Soviets are often criticized for trying to use supplies of spare parts to gain political leverage and for failing to provide adequate training for Africans.

68. *South African Leverage.* The extent to which black southern African governments are willing to antagonize South Africa by radicalizing their policies and by deepening their ties with the Soviets is also limited by their economic dependence on Pretoria. At the same time, however, black Africa's overriding hostility to white rule in Namibia and South Africa has blocked further expansion of ties with Pretoria.

69. The countries of the region depend on South Africa in a variety of ways. Zaire, Zambia, and Zimbabwe use South African ports for most of their foreign trade because of the unreliability of the insurgency-plagued Benguela rail link through Angola and the limited port facilities in Zaire, Mozambique, and Tanzania. Zambia, Zaire, and Mozambique, moreover, have all relied on Pretoria to varying degrees for food and other imports. Mozambique depends on the South Africans for 70 percent of its foreign exchange earnings: it exports electricity to South Africa from the Cabora Bassa Dam, obtains port and storage fees for South African exports passing through its ports, and receives remittances from the 35,000 Mozambican migrant workers in South Africa.

70. Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland are even more dependent on South Africa. These landlocked states rely on Pretoria to move virtually all of their exports as well as to supply many imports, including petroleum. They also count heavily on the employment opportunities for and earnings of their 250,000 migrant workers in South Africa, on South African investment, and on receipts from South African tourists. The three countries are members of the South African Customs Union, and earnings from this institu-

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tion play a key role in the finances of their governments.

71. South African military action has caused complications and embarrassment for the Soviets and Cubans. Angolan Government and military personnel, for example, complain that Cuban ground forces engage in little actual combat. Most Cuban ground units have been deployed in areas that minimize the likelihood of combat with the South Africans, and Angolan forces have done the bulk of the fighting in recent years against the UNITA guerrillas. The Cubans do continue to provide air support against UNITA and operate anti-aircraft weaponry.

72. In the wake of South Africa's August-September incursions, the Soviets and Cubans have probably come under pressure from the Angolans to play a larger role against future South African attacks.

OUTLOOK AND IMPLICATIONS

73. Southern Africa will remain an area of conflict over the next several years. Collapse of the Namibia settlement effort would be certain to sharpen tensions between Pretoria and its neighbors. An internationally accepted settlement in Namibia would reduce tensions but would not end the hostility between black Africa and South Africa. The black Africans, prompted by opposition to apartheid, will continue their support of anti-South African insurgents, although they will try to avoid direct armed conflict with Pretoria.

74. South Africa has the resources and the will to punish neighbors who appear to threaten it. Its weapons include economic pressures, sponsorship of insurgencies, and military operations. Whatever the outcome in Namibia, Pretoria will not relinquish its option to use these weapons. Indeed, with terrorist incidents and domestic unrest likely to increase inside South Africa, the government will probably step up its actions against neighboring countries harboring South African insurgents.

75. The South Africans will probably continue to support UNITA even if the Namibia problem is settled. UNITA is likely to continue to plague the Angolan Government, although it might have to adjust

its tactics and the scale of its activity after a settlement. In any event, UNITA probably will not be able to expand its area of operations beyond central Angola as long as the Cubans maintain a massive troop presence in the country. The South Africans will also intensify their pressure on Mozambique through the NRM. Pretoria would clearly like to see the regimes toppled in both Angola and Mozambique.

76. South Africa will probably rely on economic pressures—and perhaps occasional covert operations or small-scale military action—against Zimbabwe, Zambia, and Botswana to warn them against supporting ANC operations. Pretoria is prepared to launch armed assaults on these comparatively moderate neighbors should it conclude that their behavior was threatening its own security.

77. Given these conditions, the Soviets will find ample opportunity to increase further their influence and presence. They will continue to rely on the means of entry that they have found most effective in Africa—weapons sales, military training, and associated technical expertise. The level and character of Soviet military aid programs will vary from country to country, but on the whole we expect to see the USSR increase its efforts in the region.

78. Moscow has several further options. It could facilitate a sizable increase in Cuban combat forces in Angola and Mozambique, deploy additional Soviet naval units to southern African waters, or provide advanced air defense equipment requiring Soviet manning.

Implications for the United States

79. In this environment of South African aggressiveness and Soviet and Cuban exploitation, Washington's room for maneuver depends to a great extent on the willingness of the principal parties to seek peaceful solutions to the region's problems. The Soviets have little influence on peaceful diplomacy; the main role they have played is to help the Africans prepare for war. Because most of the key actors want a peaceful settlement, the West—especially the United States—retains important leverage in the region.

80. Final military victory in southern Africa will elude both sides for the near future. South Africa can

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hold off SWAPO, the ANC, and other domestic black dissident groups. But it cannot crush all of them. An all-out effort to do so would precipitate enormous domestic and international pressures.

81. Similarly, while the black insurgents and the black southern African countries seem committed to fight as long as necessary to bring about a settlement in Namibia and an end to apartheid, they cannot defeat South Africa militarily without large-scale outside assistance including troops. There is no evidence at present that the USSR, Cuba, or any other power is prepared to provide the necessary forces.

82. So long as the United States and the West offer the black Africans a chance for a peaceful resolution of their problems—and appear to do so evenhandedly—most African leaders will not allow their actions to be dictated by the USSR or any other foreign power. At the same time, such US involvement entails risks. In trying to play the part of an honest broker between South Africa and black Africa, Washington increases its susceptibility to black African charges of US-South African collusion. US attempts to play a constructive role, either alone or with others, stimulate traditional African suspicions that Washington's efforts are designed to protect US interests in South Africa.

Table 1

**Selected Southern African Countries: Soviet, East European,
and Cuban Military Assistance, 1975 - 30 June 1981**

	Million US \$							
	USSR		Eastern Europe		Cuba		Total	
	Agreements	Deliveries	Agreements	Deliveries	Agreements	Deliveries	Agreements	Deliveries
Total	1,348	1,273	390	240	15	130	1,753	1,643
Angola	500 ^a	490	155 ^a	115	15	130 ^b	670	735
Botswana	3	3	—	—	—	—	3	3
Mozambique	315	215	115	80	—	—	430	295
Tanzania	265	315 ^b	80	35	—	—	345	350
Zaire	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Zambia	265	250	40	10	—	—	305	260
Zimbabwe	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—

^a Excludes \$151 million of Soviet aid and \$1 million of Romanian aid committed in 1975 before independence. Of the 1975 Soviet agreements, \$59 million was recommitted in 1976.

^b Includes deliveries made under agreements concluded before 1975.

Table 2

**Selected Southern African Countries: Soviet, East European,
and Cuban Military Personnel**

	USSR	Eastern Europe	Cuba
	Total	1,880	450
Angola	1,200	400	20,000-25,000 ^a
Botswana	— ^b	—	—
Mozambique	500	50	800
Tanzania	130	—	—
Zaire	—	—	—
Zambia	50	—	—
Zimbabwe	—	—	—

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Table 3

**Selected Southern African Countries: Soviet, East European,
and Cuban Economic Assistance, 1975-80**

	Million US \$							
	USSR		Eastern Europe		Cuba ^a		Total	
	Agreements	Deliveries	Agreements	Deliveries	Agreements	Deliveries	Agreements	Deliveries
Total	185	30	325	50	50	—	560	80
Angola	15	10	100	15	25	—	140	25
Mozambique	150	10	65	35	—	—	215	45
Tanzania	20	—	50	—	25	—	95	—
Zambia	—	10 ^b	110	—	—	—	110	10

^a Delivery data not available.^b From earlier commitments.

Table 4

**Selected Southern African Countries: Soviet, East European,
and Cuban Economic Personnel**

	USSR	Eastern Europe	Cuba
Total	1,205	3,245	7,575
Angola	500	2,000	6,500
Mozambique	350	1,000	1,000
Tanzania	75	25	75
Zaire	10	200	—
Zambia	270	20	—

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ANNEX: CUBAN MILITARY PRESENCE IN ANGOLA

1. We estimate that as of 10 December there were 20,000 to 25,000 Cuban military personnel in Angola.

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3. The range in the numbers is due mostly to uncertainty about the extent of troop rotations during this period. Fragmentary information suggests that the actual augmentation falls closer to the lower end of the range. These figures are subject to change pending analysis

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