



**Director of  
Central  
Intelligence**

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# **Conflicts in the Horn of Africa: Prospects for the Next Year**

**Special National Intelligence Estimate**

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CONFLICTS IN THE HORN OF AFRICA:  
PROSPECTS FOR THE NEXT YEAR

Information available as of 15 June 1981 was  
used in the preparation of this Estimate.

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THE NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE BOARD CONCURS, EXCEPT AS NOTED IN THE TEXT.

*The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of the Estimate:*

The Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, and the intelligence organization of the Department of State.

*Also Participating:*

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## KEY JUDGMENTS

Ethiopia, Sudan, Kenya, Somalia, and Djibouti have been involved in regional struggles which stem largely from the expansion and contraction of the traditional Ethiopian Empire over the past 1,000 years. Separatism in northern Ethiopia as well as Somali irredentist claims upon territory in Ethiopia, Kenya, and Djibouti have deep historical roots, and the local conflicts arising from them will not be settled within the next year. Resolution of these conflicts is further complicated by the growing involvement of outside powers, particularly the USSR and the United States.

While Ethiopia seems to have contained the guerrillas in both the Eritrean and Ogaden conflicts, these insurgencies cannot readily be resolved either politically or militarily, and Ethiopia will require continued military support from the Soviet Union. This dependence on the Soviets severely limits Ethiopia's maneuverability on the international scene beyond the Horn. However, Ethiopian leader Mengistu and his close associates are highly nationalistic and have largely retained autonomy in internal matters. Nevertheless, his need for massive military assistance (about \$2.5 billion of Soviet supplies have already been delivered) to combat the insurgencies has enabled the Soviets to gain a foothold in Ethiopia that complements their close military and political relationships with South Yemen. Mengistu could survive against internal political opponents without the 1,400 Soviet military advisers and the 12,000 or so Cuban military personnel in Ethiopia, but he will continue to depend on their presence to help cope with internal insurgencies and with related external military threats. Ethiopia's dependence on the Soviets and the Cubans would increase further should the guerrillas in either Eritrea or the Ogaden receive significant additional support. <sup>1</sup>

Somali President Siad has gambled that the military access agreement and association with the United States will help reverse Somalia's deteriorating economic and military situation and thus improve his weakening political position. As long as Siad is able to show benefits from his relations with the United States and can cope with Somalia's myriad economic problems and military pressure from Ethiopia, we believe he will survive the coming year.

<sup>1</sup> *The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, believes that Ethiopian dependence on the Soviets and Cubans would remain strong as long as anti-Ethiopian insurgency persists in Eritrea and the Ogaden, irrespective of additional support.*

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Djibouti is the most politically fragile state in the region. While we believe that President Gouled will remain in office for at least the next year, his departure would probably lead to instability caused by heightened ethnic rivalry. This would undermine the French position in the country and endanger the important US military access there. Instability might also provoke military intervention by Ethiopia or Somalia.

Djibouti is almost totally dependent on French aid, which amounts to one-third of all bilateral French aid to Africa. A force of about 4,600 French military personnel is stationed there and France pays for most of Djibouti's own somewhat smaller forces. With the exception of the foreign ministry, most government functions are carried out with the assistance of French civilian advisers. No equivalent facilities are available elsewhere in the area for support of France's Indian Ocean naval force and the Giscard government was firmly committed to maintaining a strong French presence in Djibouti. While the attitude of the new Mitterrand government toward Djibouti is not clear, we believe that the French military involvement will continue for at least the next year.

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Despite economic problems, Kenya and Sudan—both of which have close relations with the United States—are relatively stable. Although we expect no serious challenge to Kenyan President Moi in the near future, Sudanese President Nimeiri is somewhat vulnerable, particularly to subversion from Libya. As in the past, these countries will be affected by regional conflicts. Kenya will continue to regard Somali irredentism as its most serious threat. Persisting hostilities in Eritrea will frustrate Sudan's efforts to alleviate the refugee and security problems along its eastern border and to reduce the number of Soviet and Cuban military personnel in Ethiopia.

These local conflicts have become enmeshed with heightened superpower competition fueled by:

- Soviet exploitation of new opportunities in Sub-Saharan Africa beginning around 1974 when the Portuguese African Empire collapsed.
- The proximity of the Horn to the Persian Gulf and the critical dependence of the West on oil from this region evident since the 1973 embargo.
- The overthrow of the Shah and vulnerability of other regional regimes to radical change.
- The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and Moscow's warnings to Pakistan.

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Since the mid-1970s, Moscow has seized the opportunities afforded by the Ethiopian revolution, the cooling of US relations with the successors of Haile Selassie, and the Somali invasion of the Ogaden, to fashion a greater political-strategic presence in the Horn of Africa. Moscow no doubt also viewed Ethiopia as an asset that partially offset the losses from its earlier setbacks in Egypt and Sudan.

The Soviets apparently hope to employ their presence as a means to:

- Maintain at least one pro-Soviet regime in the Horn.
- Weaken Western political influence in the broad Indian Ocean–Persian Gulf–Red Sea–East African region and encourage a more pro-Soviet or at least neutralist orientation in local regimes.
- Reinforce the USSR's claim to play a major role in any future Indian Ocean–Persian Gulf security arrangements.
- Promote pro-Soviet antiregime movements over the longer term in African countries adjoining the Horn and in the Arabian Peninsula.
- Monitor and counter Western military activities in the region and undermine local support for expansion of these activities.
- Improve and expand Soviet naval and naval aviation capabilities in the region.
- Work over the long term toward a credible capability to threaten Western access to Persian Gulf oil supplies.

Judgments regarding the prospect that the Soviets will achieve these broader objectives are treated in other Estimates. <sup>2</sup>

Ethiopia is now Moscow's most important client in Sub-Saharan Africa and is the focus of Soviet policy in the Horn. In late 1976, the Soviets chose to risk their longstanding position in Somalia—they were eventually expelled from their base in Berbera by President Siad—by assisting Ethiopia in order to:

- Establish a position of influence in the country that historically had been the dominant regional power in the Horn and a major African power.

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- Acquire a better position from which to extend Soviet influence in Africa and the Northwest Indian Ocean region.
- Accelerate the reduction of the US presence in Ethiopia.

Moscow's access to Aden and its nearly unrestricted use of Ethiopia's Dahlak Island and use of the Asmara airfield helps the Soviets to support their presence in the Indian Ocean. It also assists the Soviets to pursue interests in the Red Sea region including protection of their own lines of communication through the Suez Canal between the eastern and western USSR and to exert leverage against Red Sea littoral countries including Saudi Arabia, North Yemen, Sudan, Egypt, and Jordan.

We believe that present US plans to provide defensive weapons to Somalia will only marginally increase the prospects for a higher level of fighting between Ethiopia and Somalia or for a serious negative reaction by moderate governments in the area. But US military access and assistance to Somalia substantially above currently announced levels would:

- Allow the Soviets to improve their position in Ethiopia by playing more heavily upon Addis Ababa's fears of Somalia.
- Probably lead Moscow to ease restraints upon Ethiopian efforts to put military pressure on Somalia.
- Increase chances of terrorist attacks upon US personnel in Somalia, particularly in Berbera.
- Bring into question the US use of military facilities in Kenya. Kenyans fear Somali irredentism and might react to increased US military support to Mogadishu by threatening to reconsider our access agreement.
- Cause Djibouti to reevaluate US military access there, if intensified conflict in the Ogaden posed a threat to the Djibouti regime.
- Provoke negative reactions from some Arab states, both from radicals such as the Libyans who oppose the US generally, and from conservative Arabs such as the Saudis who fear intensified superpower competition close to home.<sup>3</sup>

Moscow has threatened Siad and is seeking openings to pressure him; it sees value in the antiregime activities of the Ethiopian-based Somali Salvation Front which receives support from Libya, South Ye-

<sup>3</sup> The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, believes that it is not feasible to generalize, as in the text above, regarding the effects of possible US policies which are not clearly described.

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men, and Syria, and there are indications that Moscow is directly involved with the group.

The Soviets have not been able to exploit their presence in Ethiopia as a means to improve their position significantly in adjoining Sudan and Kenya. Relations between Sudan and the Soviet Union have long been poor and President Nimeiri has rejected periodic Soviet attempts to improve ties. He is convinced Soviet policy aims at the removal of Egyptian President Sadat and himself as steps toward dominating the Arabian Peninsula and the Persian Gulf. For their part, the Soviets would like to see a realignment of Sudan's policies, and no doubt approve of Qadhafi's efforts to destabilize Sudan. In Kenya the Soviets have sought, so far unsuccessfully, to gain influence, and have invited President Moi to visit Moscow later this year. President Moi may be somewhat more susceptible to pressures toward nonalignment as he serves as OAU chairman during the coming year.

The Soviet attitude toward continued local conflict in the Horn is ambivalent. Overall, the Soviets probably prefer:


- A political settlement of the Eritrean and Ogaden problems if the Soviets' position in Ethiopia were not jeopardized and they could successfully portray themselves as peacemakers.
- Failing this, a manageable level of political tension and guerrilla fighting that would perpetuate Ethiopian dependence on Soviet military assistance but avoid a confrontation with the United States.
- Continued diplomatic tensions between Somalia and Kenya which would complicate US relations with both.

We believe, however, that the USSR's political position in the Horn is unlikely to improve significantly in the coming year. Ethiopia will continue to be a difficult client, and the pro-Western states in the Horn will attempt to resist developments that might advance Soviet goals.

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### Horn of Africa



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## DISCUSSION

## I. INTRODUCTION

1. In the Horn of Africa four states—Sudan, Kenya, Somalia, and Djibouti—have become independent only since World War II, while Ethiopia is the oldest independent state in Africa. These countries have been involved in regional conflicts which stem largely from the expansion and contraction of the traditional Ethiopian Empire over the past 1,000 years. Separatism in northern Ethiopia as well as Somali irredentist claims upon territory in Ethiopia, Kenya, and Djibouti have deep historical roots.

2. The intensification of conflict in the Horn from 1975 through 1981 resulted from breakdown of the preponderance of power established by an Ethiopia closely tied with the United States in the immediate post-World War II period. Three factors combined to bring about the breakdown in Ethiopian power:

- Soviet arming of Somalia from 1963 until 1977.
- Waning US interest in Ethiopia beginning in the early 1970s, particularly as the Kagnew communications facility (the quid pro quo for US military aid to Ethiopia for 20 years) became technologically obsolescent.
- The Ethiopian revolution, which began in 1974 with the overthrow of Haile Selassie by a leftist military junta.

Any resolution of conflict will be complicated by superpower competition, which has been fanned by:

- Soviet exploitation of new opportunities in Sub-Saharan Africa beginning around 1974 when the Portuguese African Empire collapsed.
- The proximity of the Horn to the Persian Gulf and the critical dependence of the West on oil from this region evident since the 1973 oil embargo.
- The overthrow of the Shah, and vulnerability of other regional regimes to radical change.
- The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and Moscow's warnings to Pakistan.

3. *The Reversal of Alliances.* The Soviet Union established a military-assistance relationship with Mogadishu shortly after Somalia's independence in 1960. By the early 1970s—following the seizure of power by a radical military junta headed by General Mohamed Siad Barre—Moscow's arms and advisory assistance had reached relatively high levels, and in partial return Somalia allowed Soviet naval ships and aircraft use of local facilities. This access, which helped support the Soviet Union's growing presence in the Indian Ocean, worried the United States, while Somalia's military buildup alarmed Ethiopia.

4. Ethiopian concern became acute after the 1974 revolution because the new leftist leaders in Addis Ababa were suspicious of the United States—due to our past ties with the Emperor—and apprehensive about continued assistance from Washington. After the military seized power, the debate in Washington over aid to Ethiopia intensified. The outcome was a continuation of aid at somewhat higher levels that, nonetheless, failed to satisfy the regime. (Total US military commitments from 1974 to 1977 were \$160 million.) By late 1976 the regime was in desperate straits. The revolution had weakened central authority, thus encouraging separatist movements throughout the country. The most serious were those in Eritrea—where the longstanding insurgency had escalated since early 1975—and in the Ogaden—where Mogadishu had renewed the insurgency in late 1975.

5. From 1974 on, Addis Ababa had sounded out Moscow for arms aid. Some junta members, especially Mengistu Haile-Mariam, regarded the USSR as a potentially more generous arms supplier than the United States and as more ideologically compatible with the Ethiopian revolution.

6. Initially, the Soviets were deterred from moving closer to Ethiopia by their doubts about the junta's staying power and their fears of losing military access in Somalia. The Soviets, however, then attempted to play both sides in the Horn. The first major Soviet arms deal with Ethiopia was signed in December 1976. US concern over Ethiopia's human rights viola-

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tions led to a cutoff in February 1977 of military grant aid. Following Ethiopia's closure of Kagnaw and expulsion of US military personnel in April, another more generous agreement was signed with the Soviets in May.

7. By this time a resentful Somalia was trying to counter the budding Soviet-Ethiopian relationship by improving relations with the United States and exploring our willingness to supply arms. In July 1977 Somalia invaded Ethiopia. Siad's decision to use his army to seize the Ogaden (after the insurgents had failed) was based on a calculation that Ethiopia—torn by revolution and in the midst of switching from US to Soviet weaponry—was at its most vulnerable.

8. In late 1976, the Soviets chose to risk their longstanding position in Somalia—they were eventually expelled from their base in Berbera—by assisting Ethiopia in order to:

- Establish a position of influence in the country that historically had been the dominant regional power in the Horn and a major African power.
- Accelerate the reduction of the US presence in Ethiopia.
- Acquire a better position from which to extend Soviet influence in Africa and the northwest Indian Ocean region.

9. The Somali invasion caused the United States to withdraw an earlier offer of defensive arms. The Soviet tilt toward Ethiopia led Siad in November 1977 to expel his Soviet and Cuban advisers, to cancel the friendship treaty with the Soviets, and to sever all military ties. Moscow then staged a massive military rescue on Ethiopia's behalf, including the use of Cuban troops, which succeeded in driving the Somali Army out of the Ogaden by March 1978.

10. Following the Somali defeat, the United States renewed its arms offer, but again shelved it as Siad's support for the Ogaden insurgency continued. In December 1979 the United States made another offer of arms in return for access to Somali military facilities. A US-Somali military access agreement was concluded in August 1980, but military aid—the quid pro quo—was delayed by Congress until the Intelligence Community could certify that Somali regular army units were out of the Ogaden. This assurance was given in December.

11. *Military-Political Situation Today.* Ethiopia is stronger than it was in late 1977. The Ogaden has been reconquered. In Eritrea, most of the insurgent-held towns have been retaken, and the level of fighting has declined over the past year. Most of the earlier Soviet military aid commitment of over \$2.5 billion has been delivered and absorbed, and significant assistance continues. The Ethiopian armed forces are now the largest (245,000 men) and best-equipped in black Africa. In addition, the Cuban troops (11,000-13,000 men, most of whom are organized in four combat brigades) provide a strategic reserve. The Soviets provide 1,400 advisers.

12. Mengistu has improved relations with all of his neighbors except Somalia. He is trying to put together a loose grouping of Horn states based on mutual endorsement of the principle of noninterference in internal affairs and respect for national boundaries. He has had some success because Sudan, Kenya, and Djibouti want peace and economic development, and are prepared to work with Ethiopia even though they have no affinity for Mengistu's political ideas or style of rule.

13. Nevertheless, Ethiopia does not have the military capability to resolve its insurgencies, and the parties have not yet been willing to negotiate political solutions. Resolution of the regional conflicts has been further complicated by the growing involvement of outside powers—the Communist states, the United States, Western Europe, and almost all Arab states.

## II. POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC SITUATIONS OF REGIONAL STATES

### A. Ethiopia

14. Seven years after the beginning of the revolution that overthrew Emperor Haile Selassie, Ethiopia is still governed by military-dominated political structures which are ostensibly temporary. In early 1977, after extensive factional fighting, Mengistu emerged as the undisputed leader of the government, and since then has further consolidated his personal leadership. Despite Mengistu's personal preeminence, however, we believe that he is ultimately dependent on the military and that he must take its views into account in setting major policies. Mengistu stays in power by shrewd maneuvering among elements within the military and ruthlessly uses force when necessary. A sus-

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tained challenge to Mengistu's rule from within the military seems unlikely over the next 12 months.

15. Apart from separatist challenges in Eritrea, Tigray, and the Ogaden, the regime faces widespread discontent within many sectors of Ethiopian society due to erosion of the economy, including growing food shortages, foreign exchange losses, and breakdowns in the distribution system. Military spending—estimated at 45 percent of the government budget—diverts resources from economic development. But over the next year, it seems unlikely that this discontent on its own will threaten the regime.

16. Despite the Soviet Union's continuing efforts to influence the character of the Ethiopian regime, Mengistu and his close associates are highly nationalistic and have largely retained autonomy in internal matters. We believe that the Mengistu regime could survive against internal opponents in the absence of Soviet and Cuban military personnel but the regime depends on Soviet and Cuban military assistance to help cope with external and separatist military threats. This dependence on the Soviets limits Ethiopia's maneuverability on the international scene, particularly vis-a-vis the United States. Nevertheless, disappointment with Soviet economic aid has led Ethiopia to search for economic help from the West. (Despite Communist commitments of \$750 million in economic aid since 1959, less than \$10 million has been disbursed annually.)

**Ethiopia's Principal Backers: USSR,  
Eastern Europe, and Cuba**

17. Ethiopia is Moscow's most important client in Sub-Saharan Africa and remains the focus of Soviet policy in the Horn.

18. The Soviets apparently hope their presence will help to:

- Maintain at least one pro-Soviet regime in the Horn.
- Weaken Western political influence in the broader northwest Indian Ocean–Persian Gulf–Red Sea–East African region and encourage a more pro-Soviet or at least neutralist orientation in local regimes.
- Reinforce the USSR's claim to play a major role in any future Indian Ocean–Persian Gulf security arrangements.

- Promote pro-Soviet antiregime movements over the longer term in African countries adjoining Ethiopia and in the Arabian Peninsula.
- Monitor and counter Western military activities in the region.
- Improve and expand Soviet naval and naval aviation capabilities in the region.
- Work over the long term toward a credible capability to threaten Western access to Persian Gulf oil supplies.
- Protect lines of communication through the Suez Canal between the eastern and western USSR.

19. Having been expelled from naval facilities in Egypt and Somalia, the Soviets may be wary of making a substantial economic commitment to development of installations in an unstable area. Rather than one or two large facilities, the Soviets probably would prefer access to facilities in several more countries in the Indian Ocean region—especially at critical locations from which they could monitor the activities of US naval forces. They, of course, would like to establish a presence as close as possible to the US naval base at Diego Garcia.

20. The ships of the Soviet Indian Ocean squadron make occasional calls at Mozambique, the Seychelles, and Mauritius. Moscow also has been providing considerable assistance in the expansion of an airfield in Madagascar. The USSR has made overtures to all of these countries for increased naval access. The requests so far have been rebuffed. If the Soviets were able to establish a closer relationship with any of these countries, but in particular the right to fly military aircraft from them, they would gain greatly increased reconnaissance coverage of the south central Indian Ocean. From the Seychelles, Mauritius, and Madagascar, most Soviet maritime reconnaissance aircraft would be well within range of Diego Garcia.

21. The Mengistu regime has granted the Soviets access to certain air and naval facilities in return for military backing. The naval installation on Dahlak Island—which provides the Soviet Indian Ocean squadron with logistic support, light repair, and replenishment services—is the most important of these. (See annex.) Together with Moscow's access to Aden, its nearly unrestricted use of Dahlak Island and use of the Ethiopian airfield in Asmara provide key support for Soviet naval operations in the Indian

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Ocean. The Soviets also deploy two IL-38 maritime reconnaissance aircraft to Asmara to supplement four IL-38s they deploy to Aden. Access to these Ethiopian facilities is not absolutely vital for Soviet naval combatants. The Indian Ocean squadron can, if necessary, operate without access to shore facilities, although at reduced levels of flexibility and effectiveness. Nevertheless, access to Ethiopia enhances Moscow's capability to maintain augmented naval and air deployments in the Indian Ocean area, particularly during a crisis.

22. Despite his dependence on Moscow, Mengistu has been a less than pliable client. He has repeatedly refused Moscow the major coastal naval base it seeks. However, if events in the Horn should greatly increase Mengistu's dependence on the Soviets, he would be less able to resist Soviet blandishments and might agree to greater Soviet access to facilities.

23. In the symbiotic relationship between Mengistu and Moscow, the Soviets have supported Mengistu personally to maintain their influence while they attempt to develop a broader base by encouraging the formation of a Marxist-Leninist party. After protracted footdragging, in late 1979, Mengistu established a committee to organize a party but staffed it largely with his military supporters rather than civilian elements favored by Moscow. Nevertheless, we do not expect either Mengistu or Moscow to abandon the other during the period of this Estimate.

24. The Soviets—in coordination with their East European and Cuban allies—pursue other activities designed to strengthen ties with Ethiopia. Ethiopia's friendship treaties with the USSR, East Germany, Hungary, and Bulgaria reflect this effort as do the host of economic, scientific, and cultural accords concluded with Moscow and the East European states. In addition, East Germany plays a key role in advising the Ethiopians on security and intelligence and, along with Moscow, exercises influence over the Ethiopian media.

25. Cuban and Ethiopian foreign policy goals generally coincide, as evidenced by the overtures the two countries—with likely Soviet encouragement—made to the new regime in Liberia after the 1980 coup and Ethiopia's offer of aid—via Cuba—to guerrilla forces in El Salvador. Havana, however, remains sensitive to the conflicting interests of its radical Arab friends, thus contributing to Cuba's minimizing its support for Mengistu's counterinsurgency campaigns. Iraq, for example, which has the largest Cuban presence in the

Middle East, and provides significant hard currency earnings to Havana, is a backer of the Eritrean insurgents and the Somalis.

26. Cuban troops in Ethiopia protect Soviet interests, provide a strategic reserve in case of renewed hostilities in the Ogaden, and serve as a psychological deterrent to potential enemies of the regime. Moreover, Havana's commitment demonstrates solidarity with a "fraternal" regime. Given the current passive role of the Cuban troops in Ethiopia, as well as Havana's need for technically skilled military personnel at home, a lowering of tensions in the Ogaden could lead to a reduction of the size of the Cuban military presence. But even in these circumstances, the basic Ethiopian relationship with Havana would probably remain intact.

### B. Somalia

27. Since coming to power in a coup in 1969, President Siad has ruled Somalia by placating the Army and by keeping the many Somali clans and subclans balanced. Basically, Siad's political strategy has worked well: except for one narrowly based coup attempt in 1978 following the withdrawal of the Somali Army from the Ogaden, there have been no serious challenges to his rule. Part of Siad's political strength is a general Somali perception that, given persistent interclan tensions, he is the only figure who can keep the country together at present.

28. Serious internal problems and the deteriorating military situation vis-a-vis Ethiopia led Siad to declare a state of emergency in October 1980. At that time, he downgraded the role of his ruling party and reconstituted the junta of military officers that had taken power with him in 1969. Siad's revival of the junta—the Supreme Revolutionary Council (SRC)—was an effort by him to dilute personal responsibility for Somalia's growing problems.

29. The SRC is the only institution capable of limiting Siad's authority. But the members of the SRC are beholden to Siad and probably would try to overthrow him only under critical circumstances, such as sharply stepped up Ethiopian military pressure or his failure to come to terms with economic deterioration.

30. Siad faces growing criticism of his policies and growing pressure to introduce economic and political reforms. Somalia is experiencing its worst economic

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crisis (including a severe food shortage) since 1969—caused by the conflict with Ethiopia, government mismanagement, the refugees from the Ogaden, and drought followed by heavy flooding.

31. Siad has gambled that the access agreement and association with the United States will provide him with the support that he believes would help rebuild the country's economic and military structures and thus bolster his position. Some individuals in the military are increasingly frustrated over the lack of visible US support in the face of Somalia's problems. While the possibility of plotting against Siad cannot be dismissed, there is no evidence that discontent has reached this point. As long as Siad is able to show benefits from his relations with the United States and can cope with Somalia's myriad economic problems and military pressure from Ethiopia, we believe he will survive the coming year.

32. Moscow has threatened Siad and is seeking openings to pressure him. Since Somalia abrogated its Friendship Treaty with Moscow and expelled Soviet advisers in 1977, Mogadishu has severely limited the number of Soviet and East European diplomats in the country. The Soviets, for example, are permitted only four diplomatic representatives along with support staff, all of whom are closely watched.

33. Leftist military and party members trained or indoctrinated by the Soviets during the 1970s are regarded with suspicion by the Siad government and are being phased out of positions of responsibility. While some disaffected leftists may be plotting the overthrow of the Siad regime, we doubt they would succeed without the support of the Army, which remains under Siad's control.

### C. Djibouti

34. The Republic of Djibouti became independent from France in 1977. The basic political dynamics of the new nation are the strong tribal hostility between the dominant Issas (ethnic Somalis) and the minority Afars (linked to the Afar ethnic group of Ethiopia); the inevitable interrelationship between Ethiopian-Somali rivalry and the internal political balance; and the heavy dependence on the French presence to keep both neighbors at bay (see map). At present, internal tribal hostilities are muted by the attention given to economic development in Afar territory by President Hassan Gouled Aptidon, who is an Issa. Gouled's

departure from the scene would precipitate instability, since there is no constitutional mechanism for succession and there is no clear candidate to succeed him. We believe, however, that he will remain in office over the next year.

35. Gouled is anxious to see an end to tensions over the Ogaden. The growing influx of refugees from Ethiopia and Somalia is adding new strains to Djibouti's narrowly based economy. Their numbers have increased the population of Djibouti by some 40,000 and pushed the unemployment rate in the capital beyond 50 percent. In coming months Gouled probably will try to mediate the Ethiopian-Somali conflict, but apart from being considered an honest broker, he has little influence with either Siad or Mengistu.

36. France has a wide-ranging relationship with Djibouti. The country is highly dependent on French aid, which amounts to one-third of all French bilateral aid to Africa. A force of about 4,600 French military personnel will probably remain in Djibouti for the immediate future, and France pays for most of Djibouti's own somewhat smaller forces. French advisers are prominent in the local armed forces and civilian advisers work in most sectors of the government bureaucracy except the foreign ministry.

37. French policy is motivated primarily by the desire to preserve a base of operation there for France's naval forces in the Indian Ocean since no equivalent facilities are available in the area. The Giscard government was firmly committed to Djibouti and agreed to continue its military presence through 1985. While the attitude of the Mitterrand government toward Djibouti is not fully clear, we believe that the French military presence will continue for at least the next year.

The Soviets would almost certainly prefer to see the French leave Djibouti and may attempt indirectly to exacerbate tensions within the country to encourage the new French Government to withdraw—although they are unlikely to challenge France openly.

### D. Kenya

38. Since becoming independent in 1963, Kenya has experienced political stability and economic growth. President Daniel arap Moi peacefully succeeded Jomo Kenyatta in 1978 and, despite some ero-

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
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### Tribes and Major Clans of the Somali Nation



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sion of his position, will almost certainly remain in power for at least the period of this Estimate. Nevertheless, Kenya now faces tougher economic conditions caused primarily by high population growth, deteriorating terms of trade, rising food imports, and increased military expenditures. But the economic situation is unlikely to affect decisively either Kenya's internal or international orientation over the next year.

39. Kenya has had a defensive alliance with Ethiopia against Somalia since 1963. Despite the radicalization of Addis Ababa's policies after 1974, the joint Ethiopian-Kenyan opposition to Somali irredentism has survived and has recently been reconfirmed. We believe that the prospects for any meaningful rapprochement between Kenya and Somalia are not bright because Siad is unlikely to renounce formally Somalia's irredentist claims to northeastern Kenya. Without continuing efforts by the United States and its allies to ameliorate tensions, relations between the two countries would deteriorate further.

40. Moi's intentions regarding the conflicts in the Horn are ambiguous, although he is probably more moderate than most of his advisers on the problem of relations with Somalia. It seems unlikely that Moi would take any major diplomatic initiative on regional issues, but he would probably participate in any multilateral effort to seek a reduction of tensions.

41. The Western-oriented government of President Moi, like the Kenyatta regime that preceded it, has maintained cool but correct relations with Moscow. Kenyan leaders, traditionally moderate in outlook and heavily invested in Kenya's capitalist-oriented economy, have resisted Soviet efforts to cultivate influence in Kenya. Kenyan authorities, for example, carefully monitor and limit Soviet presence in the country and circumscribe Soviet contacts with students and labor officials.

42. Over the years, Kenyan suspicions of the Soviets have been fueled by Moscow's military ties to antagonistic regimes in neighboring Somalia, Uganda, and Tanzania, by Soviet contacts with opposition figures in the early years of independence, and by Soviet moves in the international area. Moi and the Kenyan press, for example, were outspoken in their criticism of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and Moi was the first African head of state to announce a boycott of the Moscow Olympics.

43. The Soviets have sought, so far unsuccessfully, to gain influence in Kenya, including an invitation to Moi to visit Moscow this year. Moi may become somewhat more susceptible to pressures toward nonalignment as he assumes the OAU chairmanship in June. From time to time, the Soviets probably have encouraged the Ethiopians to intercede with Nairobi on their behalf, but such efforts have not allayed Kenyan suspicions of Soviet intentions in the region.

### E. Sudan

44. President and Prime Minister Gaafar Mohamed Nimeiri came to power by a military coup in 1969. He has succeeded in building relatively effective political institutions and in reconciling most of the former politically active groups to the present regime. The Sudan Communist Party remains in open opposition to the government, but by itself does not constitute a major threat. Nimeiri succeeded in 1972 in dealing with Sudan's major separatist problem by negotiating the end of the 17-year rebellion in the non-Muslim south, although north-south tensions have recently increased somewhat.

45. Sudan's short-term economic prospects are bleak, and discontent over economic conditions is widespread. Nevertheless, there appears to be no coherent internal threat to the Nimeiri government. Nimeiri's health has improved and he should remain in power at least through the next year.

46. Overt aggression against Sudan is discouraged by a 1976 defense pact with Egypt that would bring Egyptian combat assistance should Sudanese security be threatened. External meddling does, however, represent a threat to the Nimeiri regime. The government is vulnerable to subversion by Libya, particularly through involvement with unreconciled or opportunistic tribal, political, and perhaps military leaders. Recently, Qadhafi has actively tried to stimulate the opposition to Nimeiri. Although Ethiopia in 1976 played a limited role in a Libyan-sponsored coup attempt against Nimeiri, Addis Ababa's relations with Sudan are now good. We do not believe that there is much chance of Ethiopian moves—alone or in concert with Libya—against the Sudanese Government in the coming year.

47. Relations between Sudan and the Soviet Union have been poor since an abortive Communist-led coup attempt in 1971, and have deteriorated further since

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1977 when Nimeiri reduced the Soviets' diplomatic presence and expelled their military assistance mission. Nimeiri is convinced Soviet policy aims at the removal of Sadat and himself as steps toward dominating the region. Although the Soviets continue to try to improve bilateral relations with Sudan in order to offset Nimeiri's Western orientation, they will use their links with the Sudanese Communist Party—and perhaps ties with other Sudanese dissidents—to exploit opportunities to undermine the Nimeiri regime. The Soviets, however, are skeptical of the current ability of the Sudanese Communist Party to effect a change and remember the damage done to bilateral ties by the abortive Communist coup. No doubt they approve Qadhafi's efforts to destabilize Sudan. Over the next year Nimeiri will continue to rebuff Soviet efforts to improve relations although he will seek to avoid a complete rupture of diplomatic ties.

48. Of all the regional actors, Nimeiri's intentions toward the various conflicts in the Horn are the clearest. He is committed to searching for peaceful settlements to these conflicts, particularly the war in Eritrea. His objectives are: to neutralize the potential military and subversive threat from Ethiopia; to relieve instability along the Ethiopian border in order to focus on the Libyan threat from Chad; to enable the large number of Ethiopian refugees in Sudan to return home; and, in the longer run, to facilitate the removal of Soviet advisers and Cuban soldiers from Ethiopia. Nimeiri has invested considerable political capital in this campaign, and we believe he is likely to pursue these efforts at least over the period of this Estimate.

### III. REGIONAL CONFLICTS

#### A. The Somali Irredenta

49. Mogadishu seeks to unite all Somali-speaking peoples under a single flag. Only about two-thirds of these live in Somalia. The others are in the Ogaden region of Ethiopia, in northeastern Kenya, and in Djibouti. The Somalis fared poorly at the end of the 19th century when European powers and Ethiopia negotiated the approximate present-day national boundaries. The Somalis continued to do poorly—losing out in the post-World War II territorial settlements by the Allies; again in 1963 when the UK, in the face of opposition from the Kenyans and other Africans, abandoned a plan to unite northeastern Kenya with Somalia; and finally in 1977 when the French territory of Djibouti

chose independence, thwarting Siad's plans for union of the young republic with Mogadishu.

#### The Ogaden

50. The origins of the Ogaden problem go back to the last century:

- In the late 19th century, Ethiopia expanded into the Somali-inhabited lowlands of the Ogaden, which had rarely experienced Ethiopian overlordship before that time.
- In 1897, the European powers principally involved in the region—France, the UK, and Italy—signed treaties accepting boundaries for Ethiopia that approximate its present boundaries.
- Fascist Italy occupied the Ogaden from 1936 to 1941. The Allies returned it to Ethiopia after World War II.
- Emperor Haile Selassie used his African prestige to win OAU (Organization of African Unity) endorsement of existing colonial boundaries in 1963 and to relegate Somalia to an odd-man-out position in inter-African affairs.

51. The result is an Ethiopian-Somali boundary that Somalia does not recognize. Mogadishu claims that the 1897 treaties violated treaties between the Europeans and various Somali clans signed in the 1880s. In addition, the 1897 treaties' definitions of borders were vague and contradictory and have never been resolved.

52. Beginning in 1960, Somalia set out to wrest the Ogaden from Ethiopian control. Over a period of two decades, Mogadishu:

- Sponsored an insurgency in the Ogaden (1960-64).
- Renewed the Ogaden insurgency from late 1975 until mid-1977.
- Invaded and occupied most of the Ogaden with its regular army from July 1977 until March 1978, when it was defeated militarily and forced to withdraw.
- Continued the insurgency after the 1978 withdrawal of the regular army and reintroduced regular army units in late 1979 which remained until the end of 1980.

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53. The insurgent struggle for control of the Ogaden is conducted primarily by the Western Somali Liberation Front (WSLF). The Somali regime created the WSLF in 1975 and exerts considerable control over it by providing sanctuary, funds, equipment, training, cadres, and, until recently, combat support from regular army units.

54. Regular Somali army cadres remain with the WSLF forces in the Ogaden. The army sends reconnaissance elements into the area, and at least on two occasions in February and June 1981 Somalia briefly reintroduced small regular elements for tactical purposes.

#### Estimated Personnel Strengths in and Near the Ogaden

Ethiopia	
Government Forces	100,000
SSF Guerrillas	2,000-2,500
Cuban Forces	6,000
Somalia	
Government Forces	50,000
WSLF Guerrillas	20,000-30,000

55. Ethiopian military strength in the Ogaden will continue to expand over the next year as trained manpower increases and additional Soviet weapons systems are integrated into the Army and Air Force. The strength of the Ethiopian Army will increase in the Ogaden by about 10,000 by late 1981. Ethiopia's superior ground and air assets give it the capability to conduct brigade-size ground incursions in any area immediately inside the Somali border and large-scale air strikes throughout Somalia.

56. The Somali armed forces are severely limited in their ability to respond to Ethiopian attacks. The Somali Army has never recovered from losses sustained during the 1977-78 Ogaden war and suffers from poor mobility, weak air defense, and logistic shortfalls. The Somali Air Force recently obtained MIG-19 jet fighter aircraft from China, but inoperative radars and the lack of trained pilots leave the balance of air power heavily in Ethiopia's favor. Shortages of equipment and supplies also limit Mogadishu's ability to supply the WSLF.

57. The recent lull in Ogaden activity has made the Somali Salvation Front (SSF)—composed of anti-Siad dissidents—the immediate security threat. The SSF mines roads, raids civilian or lightly defended military targets, and undertakes minor terrorist acts in urban

areas. Somalia's security forces are capable of containing, but not preventing, SSF guerrilla raids launched from Ethiopia. The SSF receives weapons, funding, training, and combat support from Ethiopia and also receives funds and materiel from Libya, South Yemen, and Syria. The Soviets clearly approve this outside assistance and there are indications they are directly involved with the SSF.

58. Siad's intentions toward the Ogaden over the coming year are uncertain. Assuming that the politically important clans continue to support the Ogadeni cause (we have little current evidence on this point), Siad will continue support to the guerrillas, but at a level designed to avoid provoking serious Ethiopian retaliation. Presumably, such support will also be discreet to avoid antagonizing the United States.

59. At least until he has an assured external source of military aid, Siad is unlikely to reintroduce Somali regulars into the Ogaden in significant numbers. It is also possible that Siad would be prepared to reduce tensions—probably based on a tacit understanding—provided he would not be obliged to renounce the Ogadeni cause. No matter what Siad intends to do about the Ogaden, he will continue to look to the United States for help in building up regular Somali military capabilities to meet the perceived Ethiopian threat to Somalia.

60. For his part, Mengistu would probably welcome a *modus vivendi* in the Ogaden, but he is not prepared to negotiate a permanent settlement except on the basis of token autonomy. In the meantime, he will concentrate on consolidating Ethiopian control over the Ogaden. To discourage Somali activity there, he continues to apply pressure on Somalia through air attacks and limited cross-border operations by Ethiopian regulars, as well as by increasing support to the SSF.

61. Should Somali activity increase significantly, Addis Ababa would probably resort to even stronger action. This could involve more extensive penetrations of the border areas, a full-scale invasion, an attempt to oust Siad, or some combination of these options.

#### Kenya

62. The Somali claim to northeastern Kenya is a continuing strain on relations between Nairobi and Mogadishu. A number of unsuccessful efforts have been made to ease tensions between the two countries.

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The Kenyans, recalling the 1963-67 insurgency in the northeast that was backed by Mogadishu, fear renewed Somali meddling, pointing to the continued existence of the insurgent organization's office in Mogadishu. In turn, the Somalis charge that the Kenyans support the Somali Salvation Front.

63. Despite occasional violence by Kenyan Somalis against officials in the northeast, there is no active insurgency. Siad recognizes the implications for his relations with the United States of any significant attempt to destabilize northeastern Kenya.

64. While it is unlikely that Somalia will renew the insurgency during the period of this Estimate, were it to do so, Kenyan security forces would be capable of containing small-scale rebel activity. If Somali support were extensive, however, Kenya's ability to resist would be severely taxed.

#### Djibouti

65. Djibouti's vulnerability to major external and internal threats makes it the most politically fragile of the Horn states. Both Ethiopia and Somalia covet it: the first because Djibouti's port and rail link to Addis Ababa are significant for Ethiopian trade; the second because Djibouti is one of the irredenta. But both countries also accept Djibouti's independence—at least for now—to keep the other out.

66. Djibouti's independence is underwritten by the French forces stationed there, because the local armed forces have little or no capability to stop an attack from its neighbors. The French could hold the country for a limited time against attack from either Ethiopia or Somalia, but their presence is not designed to hold out against a large-scale attacking force. If Ethiopia should launch an offensive against Djibouti, the French, without reinforcements, could hold out for only a few days. French defense against a Somali attack would be more successful.

67. Internal instability now is a more serious threat to Djibouti than external dangers because Ethiopia and Somalia are preoccupied elsewhere. A number of actors—contending domestic elements, the Soviets and Libyans—are maneuvering for influence. Although internal security is not the responsibility of the French, they might well honor a request for help against domestic unrest. But significant casualties at the hands of terrorists or insurgents could cause the new

Mitterrand government to reevaluate its commitment to Djibouti.

#### B. Northern Ethiopia (Eritrea and Tigray)

68. Over the years, Ethiopia has exercised greater control over the area now known as Eritrea than was ever the case with the Ogaden. This control, however, was largely confined to the Christian highlands and only occasionally reached the Muslim lowlands. Eritrea was basically a creation of the Italian colonial administration (1889-1941). Italian-subsidized social and economic development implanted a sense of Eritrean superiority vis-a-vis a far less developed Ethiopia. Eritreans were further alienated by Ethiopia's destruction of the Ethiopian-Eritrean Federation, which lasted only 10 years (1952-1962), and the incorporation of Eritrea into the Empire as a province.

69. Shortly after the demise of the Federation, an Eritrean insurgency got under way that subsequently received substantial Arab aid. The major insurgent organization in the 1960s was the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF), which is largely Muslim-dominated and pro-Arab. After 1975, it lost ground to a breakaway Christian-led and Marxist-Leninist group—the Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF)—which is now the strongest of the Eritrean movements. A third group—the Eritrean Liberation Front/Popular Liberation Forces (ELF-PLF)—plays a minor role on the political/diplomatic front. ( See map.)

70. After the 1974 revolution the insurgency escalated, and by late 1977 the Eritreans had come close to achieving independence. In 1978 the Ethiopians, with Soviet arms and advice, regained most of the insurgent-held towns, but another Ethiopian offensive in 1979 failed, leaving most of the countryside in the control of the insurgents.

71. Since 1979, there has been a lull in the fighting while Sudanese President Nimeiri, despite his longstanding support for the Eritreans, has explored the possibility of a political settlement. So far, Nimeiri's efforts to broker a unified insurgent position for peace talks with Ethiopia have been unsuccessful.


72. Despite Mengistu's cooperation with Nimeiri, he seems unwilling at present to grant significant concessions to the Eritreans and appears to be trying to isolate them diplomatically in order to reduce their

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### Principal Insurgent Groups



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**Estimated Personnel Strengths in Eritrea and Tigray**

Ethiopian Armed Forces	110,000
Guerrilla Forces	40,000
ELF	10,000-12,000
EPLF	20,000-24,000
TPLF	6,000-8,000

sources of supply. Prospects for a settlement are bleak, particularly given the strong opposition of the EPLF to any solution other than independence.

73. Another insurgency in neighboring Tigray Province is led by a six-year-old Marxist-Leninist movement—the Tigrean People's Liberation Front (TPLF). The TPLF receives limited Sudanese support. It has ethnic and ideological ties with the EPLF and cooperates militarily with it to the extent of holding down Ethiopian forces and threatening their supply lines to Eritrea.

74. The military capabilities of the Ethiopian forces deployed in the north are expected to improve. Another infantry division, with about 10,000 personnel, will probably arrive in the area later this year. If the Ethiopians were to launch another major offensive they probably would overrun many guerrilla positions and would try to capture the remaining town held by the EPLF—Nakfa.

75. The military value of successes of this nature is questionable. While they would provide a psychological boost to the Ethiopians, the basic military situation in the north would probably remain much the same. The rebels would probably retain control of large parts of the Eritrean countryside, as well as the more inaccessible areas of Tigray.

#### IV. NON-COMMUNIST EXTERNAL INVOLVEMENT IN THE HORN

##### A. West Europeans

76. West European interest in the Horn stems primarily from the region's geographic location. The Horn lies adjacent to Western Europe's major sources of oil and controls access to the Suez Canal and thus to the Mediterranean. The West Europeans also have significant trade and aid ties with all of the Horn countries, primarily through the European Community's Lome Convention system of trade and economic assistance to former colonies.

77. There are bilateral political interests such as France's relations with Djibouti. There has also been a recent increase in French cooperation with Sudan against the Libyan presence in Chad. In addition, Italy has been a major supplier of military aid to Somalia. A final example is the West German desire to aid Somalia after the 1977 rescue of the hijacked Lufthansa jet at Mogadishu.

78. In general, however, the West Europeans have been cautious in dealing with Somalia. They are wary of the impact of closer ties on their relations with other African states because of Mogadishu's violation of the OAU principle of the inviolability of African borders. They realize that Ethiopia is the major regional state and look toward the day when it may become disenchanted with the Soviets.

79. West Europeans seek a reduction of Soviet influence in the Horn, and most believe their main asset is influence based on economic, cultural, and political ties. All of the principal West European states have over the past year sought to defuse one or the other of the conflicts in the Horn.

##### B. Arabs

80. There is a close interrelationship between events in the Horn of Africa and the Arab world. Sudan, Somalia, and Djibouti are members of the Arab League. In recent years the policies of the principal Arab actors in the Horn of Africa—Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Libya, Iraq, and South Yemen—have reflected to a large extent the rift between the conservative Arab states and their radical opponents.

81. Egyptian President Sadat sees the actions of the radical states as part of a larger effort directed by the Soviet Union to depose the Sudanese Government and thereby isolate Egypt. The Saudis perceive the Soviet presence in Ethiopia as part of an effort by Moscow to encircle the Persian Gulf oilfields and fear that the Mengistu regime will join with South Yemen against them.

82. Although Egypt has given military aid to Somalia (and in turn has received limited Somali support for Sadat's Middle East policies), the Egyptians prefer to avoid large-scale military involvement in the Horn. In recent months, Cairo has tried to ease tensions with Ethiopia, hoping to weaken Ethiopian reliance on Moscow.

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83. Despite their opposition to the Mengistu regime in Ethiopia, the Saudis are discouraged with the Eritrean groups' lack of unity and have ended significant aid to them. Saudi policy toward Somalia has been ambivalent. Jidda has continued to give limited economic aid to Mogadishu and has refused requests for military aid because of Siad's public support for Egypt and his refusal to stress Islamic values and downplay his socialist ideology.

84. In general, the Egyptians and Saudis want the United States to strengthen Somalia militarily and politically to the point that it can withstand an Ethiopian invasion, but not to the point that it can cause trouble that would result in a larger Soviet-Cuban presence in the region.

85. Libyan activities in the region are motivated by Qadhafi's desire to weaken the influence of the superpowers, especially the United States, to undermine Egypt's regional position and to gain converts to his own politicized brand of Islam. Iraq also has long sought the elimination of the superpower presence in the Horn, but has been forced by the conflict with Iran and the need for support by conservative Arab states to moderate, at least temporarily, its criticism of Western presence in the region. The Marxist regime in South Yemen is committed to a policy of supporting revolutionary forces in the region.

86. Qadhafi's ability to influence events in the Horn has been limited. Libyan-backed efforts in 1975 and 1976 to depose the Nimeiri regime in Sudan failed, although Qadhafi's continued support for Sudanese dissidents remains a serious concern for Khartoum. Despite Qadhafi's limited aid to the Ethiopian regime, and his cutoff of aid to the Eritreans, Tripoli has failed to gain leverage in Addis Ababa. Nevertheless, Libya sides with Ethiopia against Somalia. Libya has given aid to Somali dissident organizations, and recently airlifted arms and supplies to the SSF. The Libyans are apparently encouraging the SSF to increase its activity within Somalia. Tripoli has also attempted to weaken French influence in Djibouti by providing the government with Soviet-made military equipment. In addition, Libya is trying to influence the Kenyan Government by bribing officials.

87. Iraq's need for Arab backing in the war with Iran has led Baghdad to reduce its criticism of Somali and Sudanese ties with the United States and support for Egypt. Iraq probably will try to maintain some

influence in the region by providing economic assistance to Somalia and Djibouti. Baghdad will also continue modest aid to the Eritrean rebels to bolster its credentials as an advocate of Arab liberation movements and to signal its displeasure with Soviet backing of Ethiopia.

88. South Yemen regards Ethiopia as an important socialist ally. Aden has provided Addis Ababa with military personnel and assistance and has also provided training, funds, and political support to Somali dissident groups.

### C. Africans

89. African states outside the Horn generally have had little interest in the region's disputes, preferring to focus on issues they see as more pressing such as minority rule in southern Africa. Limited African involvement in Horn conflicts has largely been restricted to OAU initiatives. In 1964, the OAU helped arrange a cease-fire between Ethiopia and Somalia following their first border war. In the mid-1970s the organization appointed an eight-nation "Good Offices" Committee, chaired by Nigeria, to suggest possible solutions. The Committee concluded in August 1980 that the dispute should be settled on the basis of Ethiopian sovereignty over the Ogaden. Moreover, the OAU has never recognized the Eritrean or Ogaden liberation groups.

## V. PROSPECTS AND IMPLICATIONS

90. Developments in the Horn will continue to be influenced by the interaction of local conflicts and superpower competition. Local rivalries will provide a continuing opportunity for involvement by the USSR and the United States and further involvement by either one would tend to intensify fears on the part of the other's ally and to strengthen the latter's dependency on its own superpower supporter. Soviet military assistance to Ethiopia will be an essential condition for the Ethiopian regime to withstand internal separatism. This assistance, by the same token, will be used by Somalia as justification for demanding military help from the West. But the possibility of superpower confrontation probably will lead the USSR to impose constraints on offensive Ethiopian action against Somalia.

91. The situation in the Horn will probably develop along the following lines over the next year or so. In the Ethiopian-Somali conflict Ethiopia will concen-

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trate on extending its control throughout the countryside in the Ogaden and along the ill-defined border. Primarily by increased support to the SSF, Mengistu will continue to apply pressure on Siad to reduce his involvement in the Ogaden. Siad, however, will continue at least discreet support to the WSLF.

92. Depending on developments in Sudanese mediation efforts, Mengistu may again give the signal for a military offensive in Eritrea. But such an offensive would not be militarily decisive and would not necessarily end Sudanese and other efforts to mediate. In neighboring Tigray, the prospects are for continued fighting with virtually no possibility of settlement.

93. Although military coup attempts are always possible—Siad is particularly vulnerable—we do not believe any of the five regimes in the Horn are likely to be overthrown in the course of this Estimate.

- In Somalia, Sudan, or Kenya, the removal of the present leader by natural causes or by lone assassination would probably result in the succession of a senior colleague with much the same pro-Western outlook, and the effects on the overall situation in the Horn would be limited.
- In Djibouti, however, Gouled's departure would raise greater uncertainties and might cause either Ethiopia or Somalia to intervene militarily to preempt the other.
- Most unsettling, for the region, would be the removal of Mengistu. Both the Eritreans and the Somalis would react by stepping up their military activities. Mengistu's removal would lead to a contest among factions in the Ethiopian military junta which could invite Soviet and Cuban involvement. In the end, however, Ethiopia would continue to be run by a military regime heavily dependent on the Soviets and Cubans.

94. While present US plans for defensive weapons to Somalia have been criticized by both Addis Ababa and Moscow, the provision of this kind of military aid—or additional economic aid—would only marginally increase the prospects for a higher level of fighting on the Ethiopian-Somali border or for a serious negative reaction by other states in the region. However, a US decision to provide Somalia with additional and more advanced weapons, which were perceived by Ethiopia as eroding its military advantage over Somalia, would evoke a sharp reaction in Addis Ababa.

Ethiopia might then decide to escalate military pressure on Somalia.

95. Somalia is anxious that US support be highly visible and has offered greatly increased access. Even with the currently projected level of US military presence in Somalia, terrorist action against Americans is possible. If increased numbers of US military personnel—particularly combat forces—were introduced, especially if coincident with stepped-up insurgent activity in the Ogaden, the likelihood of terrorist actions against Americans would increase significantly.

96. Should the United States significantly step up its military aid to Somalia, this would bring into question the US use of military facilities in Kenya. Nairobi would demand additional military aid, and might react by threatening to reconsider the US access agreement. If more US military aid to Somalia leads to increased fighting in the Ogaden, the spillover effects could weaken the Djibouti regime and might cause it to reevaluate US military access there.

97. The Ethiopian Government has accused the United States of supporting opposition elements and fears our support to the insurgencies. Evidence of almost any degree of US support to the insurgents would have serious consequences. The Ethiopians would almost certainly intensify military operations, leading to greater dependence on Moscow and Havana. In addition, Nimeiri, Moi, and Gouled would react negatively to such a US move.

98. The Soviet attitude toward continued local conflict in the Horn is ambivalent. Overall, the Soviets would probably prefer:

- A political settlement of the Eritrean and Ogaden problems if the Soviet position in Ethiopia were not jeopardized and they could successfully portray themselves as peacemakers.
- Failing this, a manageable level of political tension and guerrilla fighting that would perpetuate Ethiopian dependence on Soviet military assistance, but would avoid a confrontation with the United States.
- Continued diplomatic tension between Somalia and Kenya which would complicate US relations with both.

99. Soviet policy in the Horn will continue to focus on Ethiopia as a key point from which to support its

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**Military Balance in the Horn of Africa**  
(Estimated Personnel Strengths and Major Equipment)

	Ethiopia	Somalia	Kenya	Djibouti <sup>a</sup>	Sudan
<b>Army</b>					
Personnel	240,000	50,000	12,000	3,100	54,000
Tanks	850	140	38	33	260
APCs	600	290	52	—	170
Armored Cars	195	25	22	11	270
Field Artillery	970	340	30	15	160
Air Defense Artillery	475	285	—	8	90
SAM Battalions	7	10	—	—	3
<b>Navy</b>					
Personnel	1,500	2,800	650	600	2,160
Missile Attack Boats	4	2	—	—	—
Patrol Boats	13	13	7	1	9
<b>Air Force</b>					
Personnel	3,500	1,000	2,600	900	3,000
Jet Fighters	135	46	24	18	31
Helicopters	50	—	26	5	25
Transports	30	13	12	5	10

<sup>a</sup> All forces shown in Djibouti are French. The embryonic Djiboutian Army has about 2,400 men and is equipped with some 20 armored vehicles.

**Selected Data on the Horn**

	Ethiopia	Somalia	Djibouti	Kenya	Sudan
Population in Millions (mid-1980)	29.8	4.0	.25	15.9	18.3
Gross National Product (current prices, in million US \$)	4,300	383	100	5,300	6,700
Per Capita Income (US \$)	135	100	453	339	366

broader goals in the region. The Soviets will continue to favor the creation of a civilian government and a Marxist-Leninist party to help ensure their long-term influence within Ethiopia. However, Moscow will not bring extensive pressure to bear on this issue, recognizing Ethiopian sensitivities and realizing that more important Soviet leverage for the future lies in other fields, particularly military assistance. Similarly, the Soviets will seek greater access to Ethiopian military facilities, but will not press Addis Ababa severely as long as they have access to Aden.

100. The Soviet presence in Ethiopia is intended to support Moscow's broader aspirations in the Horn and in the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf. The Soviets hope that at least one strongly pro-Soviet regime in the Horn will encourage more pro-Soviet, or at least neutralist, attitudes on the part of other regional states, particularly those that have close relations with the United States. Over the long term, Moscow intends

such a development to weaken Western influence in the Indian Ocean, particularly if Moscow can also promote the growth of pro-Soviet antiregime movements in the African states adjoining the Horn, and in the Gulf and Indian Ocean island states. Greater influence over, or relations with, the governments of the region will enable Moscow to reinforce its claim to a major role in Indian Ocean-Persian Gulf security arrangements and over the long term work toward a credible capability to threaten Western access to Gulf oil supplies.

101. The Soviet position in Ethiopia also offers Moscow a position from which to monitor and counter Western military activity in the area and to improve and expand Soviet naval and naval aviation capabilities. Ethiopia and South Yemen would become more valuable if the Soviet involvement there could be supplemented by a greater presence in one or more of the Indian Ocean island states. Moscow seems to be

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aiming for and if the Soviets are successful in undermining local support for any expansion of Western military facilities in the region.

102. The Soviets will also react to US moves in the area. A primary Soviet goal is to prevent the United States from exercising military access rights in the region and to undermine the evolving US relationships with Somalia, Kenya, and Djibouti. Among these, the Soviets perceive Somalia as the most vulnerable to outside pressures.

103. US military aid to Somalia—and for that matter Kenya—has been used by Moscow as evidence that

the United States is increasing tension in the region. At the same time, the Soviets continue to play on Addis Ababa's fears of a US-backed Somalia to improve their political and strategic position in Ethiopia. The Soviets will continue to support Ethiopian efforts to put military pressure on the Siad regime and would probably encourage greater efforts if the United States expanded its military access and aid to Somalia. We doubt, however, that they would encourage or approve an all-out invasion of Somalia by Ethiopia for fear that it would lead to the stationing of US combat forces in Somalia or even to a US-Soviet confrontation.

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