



**Director of  
Central  
Intelligence**

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# **Zambia: Kaunda's Political Prospects**

**Interagency Intelligence Memorandum**

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## ZAMBIA: KAUNDA'S POLITICAL PROSPECTS

Information as of 10 February 1981 was  
used in the preparation of this Memorandum.

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## KEY JUDGMENTS

The outlook for Zambia over the next two or three years is for continued political decay. President Kenneth Kaunda's political grip is slipping, and he seems incapable of ameliorating the problems that have given rise to mounting domestic dissatisfaction with his regime:

- Zambia's economy is stagnant, inflation and unemployment are high, and the population suffers periodic shortages of even basic commodities.
- Amid widespread corruption, wealth and power are increasingly concentrated within a narrow urban elite despite socialist policies intended to create an egalitarian society.
- Throughout Zambian society, economic distress has aggravated tribal and regional rivalries.
- Although there is no organized political opposition, labor leaders as well as many members of the middle class and the educated younger generation are fed up with Kaunda's economic policies and the mismanagement they have spawned.
- Within the armed forces, low pay and poor housing have fueled discontent among the lower ranks, while senior officers, disgruntled about Zambia's military weakness, chafe at political interference.

Kaunda's room for maneuver is severely limited by Zambia's susceptibility to outside economic forces and by the delicately balanced political system he has developed over the years.

On balance, however, we believe there is at least an even chance that Kaunda will remain in office for the next year, and he may even retain sufficient strength to win the national election scheduled for 1983. His most formidable challenge would come if elements in the military were to join with civilian opponents of the regime in a well-organized attempt to remove him from power. The most likely candidates to lead such a move would be influential members of the large

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and aggressive Bemba tribe, especially middle-level military officers and the leaders of organized labor, business, and the professions.


Kaunda continues to depend on Western economic assistance and wants to promote peaceful solutions to southern Africa's problems, especially the Namibian situation. But as his position erodes he is likely to respond in ways that strain these relations. He probably will not resort to brutal repression to fend off his adversaries, but his rule is apt to become more authoritarian and arbitrary. Although we do not believe he will break with the West, in periods of stress he will be tempted as in the past to make the United States and the West scapegoats for his problems, especially those relating to the economy and the South African threat. He will also broaden his still-tentative relations with the Soviet Union and its allies to shore up his military, security services, and party structure.

Although Zambia probably has not abandoned its policy of diversifying the acquisition of arms and training for its armed forces, the 1979 arms agreement with the Soviets is part of an expanding military relationship with Moscow. The new Soviet weaponry and accompanying military advisers and technicians, however, will not appreciably increase Zambian capabilities. The Soviet involvement, moreover, may aggravate the threat from South Africa, which could exert considerable economic and military pressure on Zambia if Pretoria perceived its interests seriously jeopardized by an abrupt shift toward the Soviets.

If within the next year or two Kaunda were unexpectedly removed from the scene by natural causes, he would most likely be succeeded by one of his proteges in the ruling party. In this case Zambia's domestic and foreign policies would be unlikely to change appreciably. Political deterioration would quicken, however, increasing the temptation for members of the younger political generation to make a bid for power.

A successful civilian or military coup could unleash repressed popular demands that would make the country extremely difficult to rule. A government led by Kaunda's civilian critics would encourage private enterprise and Western assistance, but it probably would be unstable and crippled by infighting. It would inherit serious socio-economic problems. A regime in which the military predominated would encounter similar difficulties. Although it might attempt to impose order through repression, military discipline would erode further as the armed forces assumed unaccustomed political burdens. Policy under military rule would be less predictable than under civilian rule. Moreover, fresh coup attempts might arise from unexpected quarters,

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such as junior officers or enlisted men. Prolonged instability could encourage the emergence of radical elements.

No matter what its political coloration, a post-Kaunda government would continue exporting key minerals to the West, but serious internal disorder would jeopardize mining operations and transportation routes.



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## DISCUSSION

**The Kaunda Regime**

1. Kenneth David Kaunda has been the dominant figure in Zambia since before independence in 1964. The principal architect of the political system, he remains the key decisionmaker, arbiter, and manipulator of Zambian affairs. Despite growing economic and political discontent, many Zambians still consider Kaunda indispensable for continued stability and unity. (See biographic sketch in figure 1.)

2. An emotional, moralistic man of modest education but keen intelligence, the President governs by balancing power and positions among competing tribal and regional interests. Over the years, this policy has reduced the influence of the Bemba, Zambia's largest ethnic grouping. (See map of ethnic distribution, figure 2.) Kaunda's lack of a strong tribal identification

has always been one of his main assets, enabling him to stand above ethnic rivalries while using them to focus power toward himself. Moreover, he has gradually eliminated his chief rivals—who generally represented important tribal interests—by banning opposition parties and instituting a one-party state.

3. Kaunda's durability owes much to his personal style, which combines compromise with coercion. He prefers to exercise his considerable persuasive powers to achieve consensus, but he reserves for himself the final decision on major policy questions. A wide range of criticism in the Parliament and the press is tolerated so long as the President himself is not directly challenged. Since Kaunda is acutely sensitive to criticism, however, anyone suspected of disloyalty becomes subject to public verbal abuse and the threat at least of detention.

**President Kenneth Kaunda**

Figure 1

Kenneth Kaunda led Zambia to independence in 1964. Since then he has been the primary unifying factor in the country's highly tribalized society.

The son of an African Church of Scotland missionary and teacher, Kenneth David Kaunda was born on 28 April 1924 in Lubwa, Zambia. His parents came from Malawi and were members of the Tonga ethnic group, but the young Kaunda grew up among the Bemba people of Zambia's Northern Province. (He is one of the few Africans in Zambia who consider themselves Zambian rather than members of an ethnic group.) After receiving the equivalent of a seventh-grade education, and then qualifying as a teacher, he taught for several years at the Lubwa mission school, in the Copperbelt, and in Tanzania.

Kaunda became active in politics in 1949 when he joined various black nationalist groups lobbying for Zambian independence. At one point his political activities led to imprisonment for nine months. Upon release in 1960, he was elected President of the newly formed United National Independence Party (UNIP). During the early 1960s he campaigned in Zambia's mining towns by playing the guitar and singing freedom songs he composed; he still plays and sings for his countrymen. Although long Zambia's ruling party, the UNIP in 1973 was declared the sole political party, creating what Kaunda described as a "one-party participatory democracy" in Zambia.



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
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**Figure 2  
Language and Population  
Distribution**



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Linguistic Group	Percent of Black Population	Linguistic Group	Percent of Black Population
<input type="checkbox"/> Bemba Speakers	33.9	<input type="checkbox"/> Lunda/Luvale Speakers	10.4
Bemba	18.5	Luvale	2.3
Lala	3.1	Lunda	2.3
Ushi	2.2	Mbunda	1.4
Lamba	2.2	Luchazi	0.8
Bisa	2.0	Chokwe	0.6
Ngumbo	1.0	Ndembu	9.2
Lunda	0.8	<input type="checkbox"/> Lozi Speakers	9.2
Swaka	0.8	Lozi	5.5
Kabende	0.7	Nkoya	0.7
Tabwa	0.7	Kwandi	0.3
Chishinga	0.4	Koma	0.3
Unga	0.4	Totela	0.2
Lima	0.3	Simaa	0.2
Bwile	0.3	Subiya	0.1
Mukulu	0.2	Ndoundolu	0.1
Shila	0.1	5 minor groups	1.1
Luano	0.1	<input type="checkbox"/> Nyanja Speakers	17.1
Ambo	0.1	Ngoni	6.4
<input type="checkbox"/> Nyanja Speakers	17.1	Nsenga	5.1
Ngoni	6.4	Chewa	4.9
Nsenga	5.1	Kunda	0.5
Chewa	4.9	Chikunda	0.2
Kunda	0.5	<input type="checkbox"/> Tonga Speakers	15.2
Chikunda	0.2	Tonga	10.6
<input type="checkbox"/> Tonga Speakers	15.2	Lenje	1.9
Tonga	10.6	Ila	0.9
Lenje	1.9	Soli	0.8
Ila	0.9	Toka	0.3
Soli	0.8	Sala	0.3
Toka	0.3	Leya	0.2
Sala	0.3	Gowa	0.2
Leya	0.2	<input type="checkbox"/> Mambwe Speakers	5.1
Gowa	0.2	Mambwe	5.1
<input type="checkbox"/> Mambwe Speakers	5.1	Nyamwanga	1.6
Mambwe	5.1	Lungu	1.3
Nyamwanga	1.6	Iwa	0.4
Lungu	1.3	Tambo	0.2
Iwa	0.4	<input type="checkbox"/> Tumbuka Speakers	4.7
Tambo	0.2	Tumbuka	3.8
<input type="checkbox"/> Tumbuka Speakers	4.7	Senga	0.8
Tumbuka	3.8	Yombe	0.1
Senga	0.8	Other languages	4.4
Yombe	0.1	Kaonde	2.9
Other languages	4.4		
Kaonde	2.9		

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4. Kaunda espouses "Zambian humanism," a fuzzy philosophy that stresses the dignity of ordinary people and the need to subordinate tribal and class interests to a common Zambian identity. An eclectic blend of traditional African values, Christian principles, and utopian socialism, it exhorts Zambians to develop a system that is "man centered" and "nonexploitative." Humanism's ambiguity has allowed Kaunda to use the philosophy to attack or placate critics on both the left and the right. He also has used it to justify the government's acquisition of a controlling interest in major economic institutions so that, ideally, wealth and opportunity can be shared by all.

5. In fact, wealth and opportunity are concentrated within a narrow stratum of urban Zambians drawn chiefly from the top ranks of the party, government, and military and from the business and professional communities. The system that Kaunda has fashioned for balancing rival interests operates largely within this stratum, extending patronage relationships throughout the upper reaches of Zambia's society and institutions.

6. Even the single party, which constitutionally is supposed to be the supreme ruling body, falls within the embrace of this patronage network. The United National Independence Party (UNIP) is run by a 25-member Central Committee, which in turn is controlled by Kaunda and a handful of cronies who have been close to him for 20 years or more. Among them are Secretary of State for Defense and Security Grey Zulu, an Ngoni from the east; Reuben Kamanga, a Chewa, also from the east; and UNIP Secretary General Mainza Chona, a Tonga from the south. Preoccupied by their mutual distrust and comfortable with their long-held power, they have allowed the party to atrophy.

7. Never the mass party that Kaunda envisioned during the headier days of the struggle for independence, UNIP has lost considerable popular support during recent years. Local membership seems to be contingent upon the spoils—increasingly scarce—that party wardheelers in a particular area can deliver. Less than 5 percent of the population is now active in the party. UNIP's women's brigade and youth league are moribund, and the party has little following among students, businessmen, and professionals.

8. Like the party, the parliament seldom functions as conceived but rather serves largely as an instrument for Kaunda's rule. The 125-seat National Assembly has

little power; most of its members live in Lusaka and have only tenuous links with their constituencies. But its members are often extremely outspoken in criticizing the government and party during normal parliamentary debate. Such speeches usually get heavy play in the press and sometimes stimulate a corrective response from the leadership. Kaunda tacitly encourages the venting of frustrations in the parliamentary arena because it provides an outlet for dissent that he can control. Potentially divisive issues are usually discussed in informal, closed sessions. If the assembly seems on the verge of taking a position embarrassing to the government, as has happened with increasing frequency in recent years, Kaunda ordinarily will intervene, though usually at the last minute.

9. Unlike many other African leaders, Kaunda has not relied on the military to keep himself in power. But under the pressures of the Rhodesian war the security forces assumed greater importance on the political scene. Although the security forces have been basically apolitical, their leaders owe their positions to Kaunda and his cronies.

11. The 12,000-man Zambian National Police is capable of quelling minor disturbances of short duration but probably could not contend with widespread unrest. Popular dissatisfaction with the performance of the police has been growing in the last several years, stemming from a steadily rising crime rate, incidents of indiscipline, and corruption by police officials.

12. The Zambian National Defense Force (ZNDF) is an organization whose quality of training and leadership are low even in the African context. Made up of a 13,000-man Army, a 1,500-man Air Force, and a 5,000-man civic action militia, it has little prestige; morale is low and discipline poor. Military coup plotting has been inhibited by the realization that there

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are numerous informants in the ranks and by Kaunda's manipulation of tribal membership among officers and enlisted men.

13. The ZNDF's inability to control guerrillas operating from Zambian territory against Angola and Zaire has complicated relations with neighboring governments. More seriously, Zambia's military weakness has ill served Kaunda's commitment to ending white rule in southern Africa. His support for insurgents of the South-West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) fighting for control of Namibia has attracted numerous South African attacks against guerrilla camps in southwestern Zambia, where the South Africans operate from time to time with virtual impunity. Kaunda's active involvement in the Rhodesian struggle on the side of Joshua Nkomo's guerrillas left Zambia open to cross-border strikes, some of which destroyed economic targets and laid bare the country's extreme vulnerability to disruption of its supply lines.

#### Challenges and Responses

14. *Economic.* Economic problems are at the root of Zambia's political difficulties. During the Rhodesian war many Zambians complained that the economic and social costs of Kaunda's commitment to the guerrillas were too high, but most grudgingly accepted the sacrifice because they expected rapid improvement of their living standards once the war was over. Now that white-run Rhodesia has become black-ruled Zimbabwe, however, the long anticipated "peace dividend" has not materialized. Instead, the settlement in Zimbabwe has drawn into sharper focus the worsening state of Zambia's economy while removing the main excuse for the government's inability to improve the situation.

15. The mining sector predominates in Zambia's economy, overshadowing agriculture not only in producing revenues but in shaping the general structure of the economy and society. About 40 percent of the people live in cities and towns, almost all of them concentrated in a narrow corridor that follows the rail line running south from the mining centers in the Copperbelt through Lusaka to the border at Livingstone. (See foldout map, figure 3.) Most economic and social development has been restricted to this "line-of-rail" zone.

16. The economy is hostage to fluctuations in world prices for copper and cobalt, which account for 95 percent of total exports and nearly half of government revenue. Soft demand for these minerals, in combination with steadily rising import prices, has tended to keep Zambia's current account chronically in deficit, leading by the end of 1979 to accumulated debts of nearly \$1.8 billion to international organizations, foreign governments, and banks. (See table 1.)

17. An important element in the economic deterioration has been rising energy costs. Nearly \$104 million was spent on oil in 1979, more than 13 percent of total imports, and 1980's oil bill will be even larger, an estimated \$170 million. Lusaka hopes eventually to convert the mines and the railroads—the main consumers of imported oil—to hydroelectricity. But a conversion effort will be long and costly, and these sectors will have to continue using oil as their primary fuel at least through the 1980s.

18. Transportation bottlenecks have also been an economic stumblingblock. Routes through Angola and Zaire are now generally closed, forcing most traffic to go via Tanzania (50 percent) and via Zimbabwe to South Africa (41 percent). Transportation problems



Table 1

Zambia: Current Accounts						
	Million US \$					
	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980 <sup>a</sup>
Exports, f.o.b.	803	1,029	897	815	1,444	1,510
Imports, f.o.b.	947	668	683	610	756	1,100
Trade balance	-144	361	214	205	688	410
Net services and transfers <sup>b</sup>	-581	-493	-446	-469	-533	-810
Balance	-725	-132	-232	-264	155	-400

<sup>a</sup> Estimated.

<sup>b</sup> Mainly transportation and insurance costs.

Figure 3





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have contributed to shortages of essential imports—food in particular—and to backups of copper exports. Substantial improvement in the dependability and capability of the transportation system will require time, heavy foreign assistance, and the cooperation of neighboring states.

19. Food shortages have also been a persistent problem. Although the government has repeatedly called for expanding agricultural output, the gap between domestic demand and supply continues to widen. Demand for maize, the main staple, runs about 720,000 metric tons annually, but output fell from 693,000 tons in 1977 to only 337,000 tons in 1979. Production in 1980 once again fell far short of demand. Zambia has had to import maize from South Africa and elsewhere to cover these deficits. Although poor weather periodically affects production, government policies have had a greater impact on output. To keep urban food prices down, the government purchasing board pays low prices to farmers, leaving them little or no incentive to expand production.

20. The Zambian economy at independence was dominated by foreign-owned firms, but since 1968 Kaunda has extended state control of all sectors except agriculture and construction. The government now owns the large enterprises and conducts their business through so-called “parastatals” that were formed when private firms in such areas as mining, manufacturing, and commerce were nationalized. Over half the gross domestic product (GDP) originates in the “parastatals,” which employ 37 percent of the labor force in the modern sector. Plagued by inept management, political interference, chronic shortages of foreign exchange, and poor pricing policies, their substantial deficits have had to be covered by the national budget.

21. The cumulative impact of these problems has been devastating. Since 1975 real GDP has declined by about 1 percent annually. Figures for 1980 are expected to show 20-percent inflation, and about one-third of the labor force in the modern sector is unemployed. Per capita GDP in Zambia is higher than for Africa as a whole, but poor economic performance, combined with a 3-percent annual population growth rate, has left the Zambian economy worse off now than at the time of independence. (See economic indicators in figure 4.)

22. There is little hope for an early reversal of the economic deterioration. Copper is generally expected

to be in surplus on the world market in 1981. This, combined with the slow recovery from the current worldwide recession, will keep copper demands low and prices depressed. The outlook for copper beyond 1981 is somewhat brighter, but not enough to solve Zambia's economic problems.

23. In 1980, virtually unchecked import spending nearly exhausted foreign reserves, and foreign payment arrears soared to \$600 million. Import restrictions imposed in 1978 as part of an International Monetary Fund agreement were allowed to lapse. At the same time, shortages of investment in capital equipment have been a drag on overall growth and an impediment to refurbishing the mines. In an effort to keep costs down, Kaunda has directed that imports be purchased from the cheapest and closest sources, even if it means increasing reliance upon South Africa.

24. The government has taken limited steps to improve the performance of “parastatals.” Corporate planning, new accounting procedures, and cost reduction measures have been introduced, and some price controls have been adjusted to make them more rational. Kaunda, however, will resist drastic changes in his approach to the public sector. Not only is he ideologically wedded to state control of major enterprises, but imposition of harsh remedies within the “parastatals” would undermine his political support. Jobs and contracts with them are important plums with which the President and his inner circle reward loyalists and co-opt potential opponents. Kaunda can ill afford to strike deeply at the system of middle-class welfare that sustains him politically, so he is more likely to scold and exhort than undertake bold action.

25. Kaunda is reluctant to address the real causes of the food problem because sharp increases in agricultural prices and a significant diversion of resources to the countryside would cut severely into his support in the urban areas. The rural areas wield little influence, so perennial announcements of new agricultural programs have led to little substantive action. Nevertheless, in response to IMF pressures, prices have been raised 30 to 50 percent for maize, and the 1981 budget proposes to cut food subsidies 40 percent. These measures, which involve considerable political risk, would not solve Zambia's food problem. The President also has been promoting Operation Food Production, a vague plan that involves beefing up state farms and organizing cooperatives. Greater government intervention would subject agriculture to the same inefficient


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
**Figure 4**

**Zambian Economic Indicators**


**Real Growth of Gross Domestic Product**  
Percent




**Inflation**  
Percent




**Refined Copper Production**  
Thousand Tons




**Cobalt Production**  
Tons



**Composition of Real Gross Domestic Product, 1979**  
Percent



**Composition of Export Revenues, 1979**  
Percent



<sup>a</sup> Estimated.

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cies and mismanagement that Zambian socialism has imposed on the industrial and commercial sectors.

26. If Zambia is to stand any chance of stabilizing its economy, it must reach an agreement on an extended fund facility with the IMF. The financial discipline and ensuing credits provided under this three-year agreement would somewhat strengthen Zambia's poor credit rating and prevent cutoffs of essential imports. While the 1981 budget responds in part to the austerity measures that the IMF requires, negotiations on this agreement will be difficult.

27. *Social.* Notwithstanding Kaunda's egalitarian principles, he has failed to narrow the gap between the rich and the poor. In fact, his policies have fostered a privileged elite among bureaucrats and salaried workers while neglecting subsistence farmers and the urban poor.

28. In this environment, corruption pervades all levels of the party, government, state-owned enterprises, and the civil service—except apparently the presidency itself. Although corruption has been a fact of life in Zambia for many years, it now appears to be worse than ever.

29. Kaunda is aware of the extent of corruption but he is loath to move against friends and trusted political allies. He realizes that no senior official would submit quietly to prosecution and that scrutiny of one would reveal the involvement of others. Moreover, Kaunda knows that a thorough housecleaning would ultimately jeopardize his own position because he could hardly escape responsibility for the actions of his closest associates. Since the corruption is largely a product of the system he has created, there is little prospect for change while he remains in power.

30. *Political.* Opposition to Kaunda does not appear to be well organized, but dissatisfaction with his regime is growing. The most articulate criticism comes from the technocrats, bureaucrats, and Western-oriented businessmen in their thirties and forties eager for a share of power and better educated and more sophisticated than the older generation that has run the country since independence. Less concerned than the older generation about liberation movements and ideology and primarily interested in economic development, they resent the restrictions of one-party rule and the government's mishandling of the economy.

31. Several members of this urban elite formerly worked in the government or party. Recent "dropouts" include Kaunda's former principal foreign policy adviser, Mark Chona, and the former Minister of Agriculture, Alexander Chikwanda. Although neither has been critical of the President directly, both grew upset because Kaunda no longer listened to their advice. Their departures have isolated Kaunda more than ever, making him even more dependent on loyal but uncritical party stalwarts. Other highly qualified technocrats still in the government are disillusioned with the regime, but in a declining economy their chances for lucrative outside employment are shrinking.

32. Kaunda clearly recognizes the dropouts and the rest of the nongovernmental urban elite as a potential source of opposition. In the immediate aftermath of the Liberian coup he lashed out at five of the ablest members of this group, calling them "traitors" and "enemies of the state." One of his main targets, Elias Chipimo, then chairman of the Standard Bank and a former Zambian High Commissioner in London, had suggested that a multiparty political system would be more amenable to peaceful political change than a one-party state. For Kaunda, that was clearly beyond the bounds of acceptable criticism. His accusations were undoubtedly viewed as paranoid and heavy-handed by the very professionals and former colleagues whose support the government needs in meeting the problems ahead.

33. Chipimo and several other prominent Zambians were arrested in October 1980 in connection with what Kaunda described as a coup plot against his regime. The plot supposedly also involved Zairian exiles (ex-Katangan gendarmes) and a few dissident Zambian military officers. The arrests and detentions made in response to the alleged plot will deter further antiregime activities for the time being, but restiveness within the nongovernmental elite probably has been heightened.

34. Another source of opposition to the Kaunda regime is organized labor, which has long pressed its interests with considerable success. The Zambian Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU) represents about 250,000 of the country's 400,000 wage earners and could severely disrupt the economy. This is especially true of the Mineworkers Union, whose members are predominantly Bembas. Tensions between labor and



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the government reached serious proportions early in 1981 when striking mineworkers shut down operations in the Copperbelt for several days and hardcore picketers clashed with police. The mineworkers—joined by a few other unions—were protesting Kaunda's suspension of 17 labor leaders from the UNIP for opposing the party's plan to assume additional authority at the local level. Among those suspended was ZCTU Chairman Frederick Chiluba, an outspoken critic of the government's policies and its corruption, inefficiency, and mismanagement.

35. The immediate crisis has been eased by a face-saving compromise, but future confrontations seem inevitable. In view of Zambia's economic straits, the government cannot afford to grant the generous wage hikes—30 percent or more in some industries—that union militants are demanding. Even more serious, Chiluba and other labor leaders are expanding their demands beyond bread-and-butter issues to the broader political field. They not only want the right to bargain collectively in both the private and public sectors, but are now pressing for a role in setting national economic priorities. Kaunda, who has carefully guarded his prerogatives in the past, is unlikely to grant such concessions.

36. Chiluba seems determined to promote far-reaching changes and would like to see Kaunda replaced. He wants to temper Kaunda's socialist policies by reducing the size of the public sector and relying more heavily on private enterprise. Although Chiluba has never publicly expressed political aspirations, Kaunda and other party leaders view him as ambitious and irresponsible. They are aware that, as a Bemba, Chiluba is regarded by many Zambians as the heir to dissident Bemba leader Simon Kapwepwe (formerly Vice President), who died early in 1980.

37. Tribalism is a major potential source of unrest. Kaunda tirelessly exhorts Zambians to put aside tribal animosities and to think in terms of "One Zambia, One Nation." But his system of tribal balancing has institutionalized the very divisive forces he hopes to overcome. Moreover, prospects are for an intensification of ethnic competition as the economy deteriorates, inequalities worsen, and government spoils become less available.

38. Sharpened tribal rivalries will probably take the form of renewed Bemba assertiveness and counteractions by non-Bembas who fear Bemba domination.

Unhappiness among Bembas with the Kaunda regime is longstanding. Although the death of Kapwepwe has left them at least temporarily unable to organize effectively for political action, disgruntled Bembas would pose a serious challenge if they were to form an alliance with other dissidents in the labor movement, the urban elite, and the military.

39. *Military.* As in the rest of Zambian society, discontent within the military seems to be growing as part of the general economic malaise. Disgruntlement among junior officers and enlisted men is also rising because of low pay, poor housing, and the belief that much of the civilian and military hierarchy is corrupt and inept. Tribal tensions may have been aggravated by Kaunda's most recent shakeup of the military, particularly by the arrest of the Air Force Commander, a Bemba, in connection with the purported coup plot. Finally, many officers feel deeply frustrated by the ZNDF's inability to defend against South African incursions into southwestern Zambia, just as it could not prevent humiliating cross-border strikes during the Rhodesian war.

40. To offset Zambia's military weakness and sagging morale in the armed forces, Kaunda in 1979 concluded an arms deal with the Soviet Union that called for deliveries of MIG-21 jet fighters, SA-3 anti-aircraft missile systems, radars, other equipment, and related training. The value of this equipment, originally estimated at \$100 million, now appears to be considerably more. Much of the equipment has already arrived. The Soviet Union is now the largest foreign supplier of military materiel to Zambia. (See table 2.) Additional advisers will be needed to meet the peak demands of installing the new equipment and training Zambians to use it. They will join the 50 to 100 Soviet and perhaps some East German advisers and technicians who are already on the ground. As a result, the military presence of the Soviets and their allies could grow to several hundred.

41. Ironically, the Soviet arms deal has worked in directions contrary to what Kaunda intended. Some senior ZNDF officers, rather than being assuaged by prospects for sophisticated new equipment, resent what they regard as additional political interference in military affairs. Already unhappy with Grey Zulu because of his role in pushing the arms deal, and his access to the President, they complain that their advice to reject the Soviet offer was ignored. At lower levels of the ZNDF, some troops grumble that acquir-

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Table 2

	Estimated Value of Military Assistance to Zambia Agreements (A) and Deliveries (D)					
	Million US \$					
	1979		1980 (Preliminary)		Total 1954 to 1980	
	A	D	A	D	A	D
<b>Total Communist</b>	<b>108.2</b>	<b>20.0</b>	<b>50.4</b>	<b>187.0</b>	<b>258.8</b>	<b>297.8</b>
Bulgaria	—	—	8.0	—	8.0	—
China	3.2	9.0	NA	—	29.2	26.0
East Germany	—	—	15.0	1.0	11.0	2.0
Romania	—	—	17.0	2.0	15.0	2.0
USSR	105.0*	11.0	10.4	184.0	166.8	239.0
Yugoslavia	—	NEGL	—	—	28.8	28.8
<b>Total Non-Communist</b>	<b>14.7</b>	<b>0.3</b>	<b>33.5</b>	<b>3.5</b>	<b>172.1</b>	<b>125.7</b>
Belgium	—	—	—	—	0.2	0.2
Brazil	—	—	30.0	—	30.0	—
Canada	—	—	—	—	22.4	22.4
Egypt	—	—	—	—	0.5	0.5
Finland	0.7	0.3	—	—	1.0	0.6
France	—	—	—	—	NEGL	NEGL
West Germany	—	—	—	—	9.2	7.7
India	12.0	—	—	—	12.0	—
Iraq	2.0	—	—	2.0	2.0	2.0
Israel	—	—	—	—	NA	NA
Italy	—	—	3.5	1.5	47.8	45.3
Sweden	—	—	—	—	1.4	1.4
United Kingdom	—	—	—	—	45.6	45.6
<b>Grand Total</b>	<b>122.9</b>	<b>20.3</b>	<b>83.9</b>	<b>190.5</b>	<b>430.9</b>	<b>423.5</b>

NA = Not Available.

NEGL = Negligible.

\* Deliveries suggest this figure could be considerably higher.

ing Soviet equipment will divert resources that could otherwise alleviate pay and housing problems.

42. Beyond this failure to combat flagging morale, the new equipment is unlikely to raise Zambia's military capabilities appreciably and may in fact cause additional logistic problems by introducing novel items to an already motley inventory. Even with substantial Soviet Bloc assistance, a Zambian-run missile system and jet interceptor squadron are at least two years away from implementation. Furthermore, if Kaunda ordered these weapon systems deployed to the region bordering Namibia, he would raise—not lower—the threat of South African reaction.

43. Kaunda's gamble on Soviet arms has therefore increased his liabilities without winning immediate benefits. He may calculate, however, that, since Western arms aid has been disappointing to him, Zambia has no long-run choice but to look to the Soviets for further military assistance. His gloomy outlook for the region is shaped by more than the Namibian problem and the threat from South Africa. He sees Zambia surrounded by countries whose future stability is at best uncertain and whose problems could easily spill across the border.

44. It is far from certain that Zambia has abandoned its policy of diversifying its military benefactors—British, Chinese, Indian, and Yugoslav advis-

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ers are still in country. But the timing and scale of the recent arms agreement suggest that Kaunda intends to continue a substantial military relationship with Moscow despite his longstanding distrust of the Soviets and the economic strains that military modernization and expansion will impose.

45. *Foreign Relations.* The Soviets evidently hoped that the arms deal would give them substantial leverage in Zambia, a country that seems to have become more important to their quest for greater influence in southern Africa since their reverses in Zimbabwe. But Kaunda has turned down several requests to expand the Soviet diplomatic presence in Lusaka. More importantly, he has not responded to Soviet arm twisting on a number of international issues; for example, Zambia voted against the USSR on the second UN Afghanistan resolution in November 1980. Kaunda has also refused a Soviet request for sole use of remote airfields to train Zambian MIG-21 pilots.

46. Notwithstanding these disappointments, the Soviets will seek further opportunities for increasing their influence in Lusaka. Moscow aims to undermine not only Western influence but also that of China. The Soviets may seek to use Zambia for supporting anti-South African guerrilla movements. Manipulating the supply of southern African minerals of strategic importance to the West may also play a part in long-range Soviet thinking.

47. In concert with Soviet involvement, East Germany's role in Zambia has grown in recent years.

[redacted] East Germany has entered the military assistance field and is providing training programs for UNIP party organizers. Additionally, Kaunda is looking to East Germany for aid in developing the agricultural sector.

48. Kaunda in his relations with the Soviet Bloc will take into account his heavy dependence upon Western economic assistance. His refusal to abrogate the Soviet arms deal once the Rhodesian conflict had died down might have been in part an attempt to stimulate the West into stepping up the flow of aid. In any case this move has yielded few benefits, and Kaunda faces risks that closer identification with the Soviets and East Germans will provoke a reduction of Western aid and investment. Zambia receives about \$210 million in economic aid annually, mostly from the West, but from Eastern Europe, Saudi Arabia, and China as well.

US aid has been running at about \$35-40 million annually over the past three years. Almost all foreign investment comes from the West.

49. Within the region, Zambian relations with Zimbabwe have improved in recent months despite residual suspicions within Zimbabwe's ruling party stemming from Kaunda's past support for Joshua Nkomo, whose party fared second-best in the February 1980 elections there. Official relations are likely to remain correct as long as the Zambian Government avoids the impression of involvement in Zimbabwean internal affairs. Nonetheless, over the next several years Zambia risks slipping into Zimbabwe's economic orbit, reverting to the pattern shaped during the colonial era in which Lusaka was overshadowed by Salisbury.

50. Zambia faces unenviable choices in attempting to gain greater control over its economic destiny. Zambia is pursuing joint economic planning with the nine black states that are banded together in the Southern African Development Cooperation Conference. But, apart from the possibility of ultimately developing alternative transportation routes for those through South Africa, the chances of solidifying regional economic ties remain slight for the foreseeable future. Zambia is unlikely to experience economic recovery through closer association with its neighbors, or inside or outside the South African orbit. It continues to rely on South African rail and port links and will remain vulnerable to retaliation for its support for the Namibian dissidents (SWAPO) and insurgents targeted against the Pretoria regime itself.

51. Kaunda is unlikely to accept the economic and consequent political cost of cutting back ties with South Africa. At the same time, he can be expected as in the past to launch noisy propaganda campaigns that highlight the South African threat. These help to divert domestic attention from problems at home—albeit with diminishing effectiveness—while providing a backdrop for efforts to drum up international support. Diversionary tactics will probably be restricted to words and symbolic gestures, however.

52. In response to both internal and external pressures, Kaunda will probably be willing to continue pursuing a peaceful Namibian settlement. His personal commitment to the liberation cause and his image within African and international circles will not permit him to abandon SWAPO altogether or to di-

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verge widely from the other Frontline States,<sup>1</sup> but in private at least he will probably counsel patience and accommodation with South Africa to relieve Zambia of its Namibian burden.

53. Similarly, Kaunda will be unwilling to cut off support to South African guerrilla groups, but to the extent that Zambia's economy deteriorates and domestic grievances accumulate he will be under increasing pressure to restrict guerrilla activities so that trade and transport ties with South Africa will not be jeopardized.

**Outlook: Continued Decay**

54. Kaunda's grip on power is perceptibly slipping, and how long he can survive is unclear. Much depends on circumstances beyond his control. Rising world copper prices, for instance, would tend to lengthen his lease on political life, whereas falling prices would hasten his departure. Nonetheless, despite rising criticism, the 56-year-old Kaunda still seems to enjoy a reservoir of popular support and he suffers from no apparent health problems. On balance, therefore, we believe that there is at least an even chance that he will continue in office for another year, and he may even survive to win a fifth five-year term in 1983.

55. Kaunda will remain an embattled figure—as much a prisoner as the master of the system he has created.

[redacted] Kaunda is ill prepared to deal with Zambia's complex problems. As new problems arise or if things continue to go badly, he will resort to more repressive measures. He will lay blame on foreign or domestic conspirators or some combination of the two.

[redacted] he will exhort the populace with high-minded rhetoric. But particularly the younger and better educated elements of the Zambian population expect more of their government than promises and advice, and dissatisfaction with the Kaunda regime will continue to mount.

56. If Kaunda within the next year or two were unexpectedly removed from the scene by natural causes, constitutional provisions for succession would probably be followed. UNIP's secretary general would become acting president for a three-month period so

<sup>1</sup> The Frontline States are Angola, Botswana, Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.

that a party national convention could choose a nominee who would be confirmed as president in a general election. Jockeying among top party leaders for the nomination would be intense, but the secretary general would have the advantage of incumbency. The current secretary general, Mainza Chona, may come into disfavor because of suspected plotting against Kaunda. Grey Zulu's star is rising and his loyalty to the President is unswerving. Indeed, Kaunda seems to have maneuvered him into a stronger position by creating for him the post of Secretary of State for Defense and Security, a position that gives Zulu considerable authority over military, police, and intelligence matters.

57. Zulu has been instrumental in developing closer relations with Communist states, but, even if he emerged as the party's choice to replace Kaunda, Zambia's domestic and foreign policies would probably remain essentially unchanged. Whichever of Kaunda's proteges became president would be boxed in by the system he inherited. Indeed, without Kaunda's personal appeal and acumen, Zambia's downward slide would probably accelerate. Kaunda's departure would hasten the day when a new political generation or the military makes a bid for power.

58. In the short run, if Kaunda were to leave the scene, or in the longer term, if he hangs on, serious challenges to the regime are likely to arise. The most formidable challenge to Kaunda or a UNIP successor would come if elements in the military joined with civilian opponents of the regime in a well-organized attempt to remove him from power. The most likely candidates to lead such a move would be influential members of the large and aggressive Bemba tribe, especially middle-level officers and leaders of organized labor, business, and the professions. Their chances for success would grow if they were able to ally with key members of other tribes.

59. An opposition of this sort would be extremely difficult to organize without attracting government countermeasures, but there are a few signs beyond the alleged plot last October that attempts to join forces may be in the offing. Disgruntled political critics, particularly Bembas, have been dropping hints that the Army should step in to clear up the nation's affairs. They may be finding an increasingly receptive audience in the officer corps. Although there is no indication that leaders of the Bemba-dominated labor movement are in direct contact with dissidents in the

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military, they would at least condone if not applaud the removal of Kaunda or his UNIP successor.

60. A civilian government led by Kaunda's critics would probably seek to dismantle the most onerous aspects of Zambian socialism and encourage private enterprise, efficiency, and Western investment. Perhaps it would even promise more open political participation. But overthrow of the Kaunda regime would unleash repressed demands which, coupled with Zambia's basic tribal and socioeconomic problems, would make the country extremely difficult to govern.

61. If elements within the military moved against the regime, they might call on some of the respected dropouts to help run the country. Even with civilian participation, however, a military government would be narrowly based and unstable. If it were perceived as a Bemba preserve, other groups could well coalesce in opposition. Moreover, amid the uncertainty of forcefully replacing one regime by another, military discipline might collapse altogether, inviting coup attempts by enlisted men or junior officers. At the very least, the lower ranks would assert demands for better pay and amenities.

#### Implications for the United States

62. While its importance to the West has declined with the end of the conflict in neighboring Zimbabwe, Zambia is still involved in matters that deeply concern Washington and its allies, particularly with regard to a Namibian settlement and limiting opportunities for the expansion of Soviet influence in the region. Zambia might also play a role in keeping Zimbabwe on a moderate and stable course. Moreover, it is an important supplier of copper to the West and accounts for some 10 percent of non-Communist production of cobalt, a strategic material with no adequate substitutes in certain critical industrial and defense applications.

63. Under Kaunda, Zambia has been relatively responsive to the West and a force for moderation in

the region. But, as Kaunda's position erodes, he is likely to respond in ways that strain these relations. He probably will not resort to brutal repression to fend off his adversaries, but his rule is apt to become more authoritarian and arbitrary. Although we do not believe he will break with the West, in periods of stress he will be tempted as in the past to make the United States and the West scapegoats for his problems, especially those relating to the economy and the South African threat. He will also broaden his still tentative relations with the Soviet Union and its allies to shore up his military, security services, and party structure.

64. Nonetheless, Zambia's basic interests are bound to a fundamentally conservative economic and social order and to Western-oriented trading patterns. We would not expect Kaunda to break completely with the West even if faced with a grave challenge to his political survival.

65. Although US-Zambian relations will be ambiguous and trying as Kaunda's situation continues to deteriorate, they could well become even more difficult if he were removed from power. Any likely successor would seek help from the West, but a post-Kaunda government would probably be unstable, crippled by infighting and unsatisfiable demands. The Soviets would not necessarily be able to broaden their foothold in these circumstances, but they might win greater influence through their access to the armed forces. Moscow would, of course, stand to gain considerably if—however unlikely—the Zambian Government were to come under the control of radical elements that might emerge from protracted instability. South Africa would not passively accept a shift toward radicalism in Zambia or substantial moves favorable to the Soviets.

66. Instability is the chief threat to Western access to Zambia's copper and cobalt supplies. Even a radical Zambian Government friendly to the Soviets would feel compelled to continue mineral exports to traditional markets, which are primarily Western, but serious disorder would jeopardize mining operations and transportation routes.

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