




Director of
Central
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Zimbabwe—The Next Six Months

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Interagency Intelligence Memorandum

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22 April 1980

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ZIMBABWE—THE NEXT SIX MONTHS

Information as of 17 April 1980 was
used in the preparation of this paper.

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PREFACE

Zimbabwe became independent on 18 April 1980, six weeks after the surprise election of Robert Mugabe was announced. In this period, Mugabe has revealed some of the outlines of the policies he intends to pursue, but they are too few and too uncertain to permit firm conclusions about the direction his government will take. Hence, the following study covers only a short period and is, necessarily, tentative.

// A longer term assessment is scheduled for later this year.

This memorandum was prepared under the auspices of the National Intelligence Officer for Africa with contributions from the Bureau of Intelligence and Research of the Department of State, the Defense Intelligence Agency, and the Central Intelligence Agency. It has been coordinated with Intelligence Community representatives at the working level. //

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Zimbabwe as Transportation Hub of Southern Africa



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KEY JUDGMENTS

Over the next six months, the prospects for internal stability and moderate economic growth in Zimbabwe are good. During that time Prime Minister Mugabe will pursue a course of moderation. He eventually may try to change that course, in view of his self-avowed Marxism. But for the near future, at least, he believes that Zimbabwe's interests and his own would be best served by continuing to build on the existing capitalist structure:

- Mugabe's election landslide and radical credentials have given him time in terms of meeting black demands for change.
- His conciliatory posture toward his former adversaries and his moderate economic policies have reassured the whites, South Africa, and foreign aid donors and investors.

In spite of this general optimism, Zimbabwe and Mugabe face a number of serious problems and pitfalls—these are not likely, however, to upset the new regime over the next six months:

- Zimbabwe has inherited a war-ravaged country, racial and ethnic bitterness, three still-independent armies, and some 1 million refugees and displaced persons. The integration of the armies is the first and perhaps most difficult order of business.
- Mugabe's substantial popular support affords him considerable margin to deal with his potential adversaries. But these supporters also are likely, before long, to demand economic and social change. Militants in Mugabe's own highly factionalized party, the Zimbabwe African National Union, will press for vindication of and rewards for their long years of fighting. They could curtail Mugabe's freedom of action and drive him to pursue more radical policies than he has indicated he wants to at present.
- Mugabe's former "partner," Joshua Nkomo, with a sizable army and an important minority ethnic base of support, is now only a junior partner in the government. If his ambitions or the interests of his followers are ignored, he might try to undermine the Mugabe regime.

Mugabe is under pressure to join a proposed counterconstellation of black southern African states opposed to the constellation advocated by South Africa, and to support the anti-South African liberation

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movements. But he recognizes Zimbabwe's economic dependence on Pretoria and is unlikely soon to cut those links or permit anti-South African guerrillas to have bases in Zimbabwe.

Mugabe is deeply suspicious of Moscow, which had backed Nkomo. The Soviets will try to recoup, either through offering arms to Zimbabwe or, over the longer run, through their ties with Nkomo's military leaders whom they have trained. China, which had close ties to ZANU, is unlikely to play a significant role, nor are other Communist powers.

The West has significant interests in Zimbabwe and good prospects for assisting and enhancing its relations with the new country. Zimbabwe is important to the United States because of its mineral resources and its potential regional influence. Although the West is providing substantial economic aid at present, if Mugabe believed that it were not sufficiently supportive, he would turn elsewhere for major assistance.

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DISCUSSION

INTERNAL DYNAMICS

1. The startling victory of the Zimbabwe African National Union in the late February election represented a clear-cut mandate for change. ZANU's leader, Robert Mugabe, is a self-professed Marxist, and ZANU is the most radical of the country's black parties. Its army was the major guerrilla force during the war. ZANU's unambiguous victory—winning over 63 percent of the black vote and 57 of the 80 black seats in the 100-member Parliament (the other 20 are reserved for whites)—gave Mugabe considerable license to press for change.

2. Since his victory, Mugabe has been conciliatory to his enemies (including South Africa), moderate in his statements of goals, and has won the tentative acceptance of the white community.

3. Notwithstanding his desire for change over the long term, Mugabe is pursuing the politics of conciliation for a variety of reasons:

- The whites retain the economic and military power to undermine Mugabe's policies. A radical tack could well precipitate a white exodus and, possibly, an attempted coup.
- Rhodesia's long and bitter guerrilla struggle and consequent civil upheaval; racial, tribal, party, personal, and ideological enmities; and years of international isolation imperil the new and fragile political order and make even gradual social reconstruction a daunting task.
- The existence of three independent armies (plus the auxiliaries of Ndabaningi Sithole and those of

Robert Mugabe: A Profile

Robert Mugabe is intent on establishing a socialist society in Zimbabwe, free of racial discrimination. As a political activist in the early 1960s, he became convinced that whites would never peacefully concede political power or equal social status to blacks. His recent conciliatory statements are a pragmatic response to the need for white participation.

Mugabe's African identity has been modified by his quest for respect in Rhodesian society. Born 56 years ago, he was raised at a Catholic mission near Salisbury. He accepted many of the missionaries' ideas and taught in Rhodesian, Zambian, and Ghanaian schools for 20 years. He holds several university degrees. He perceives a common thread of social responsibility in African, Christian, and Marxist value systems.

Personally reserved and austere, Mugabe is an intellectual who needs to act in pursuit of his goals. After his release from a decade of detention for nationalist activities, Mugabe became the chief spokesman for ZANU in 1976. But his election as the leader of the party identified with the Shona-speaking majority (a cluster of politically separate tribes) does not give him a mandate to dictate policy. He must cope with Shona traditions of consensual decisionmaking and party factions based on personal and subtribal relationships. He has tried to remain aloof from factional infighting, but in his new role he will have to maneuver adroitly to achieve party and national unity.



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former Prime Minister Bishop Muzorewa and the large number of weapons in private hands) constitutes a serious threat to law and order.

— International, principally Western and South African, support is necessary if Zimbabwe is to receive the extensive economic aid and investment it requires for reconstruction and an expanding economy that can provide jobs and revenues.

4. Mugabe's moderate statements and actions are designed, therefore, principally to maintain stability and to allow him to consolidate his grip on power. But, at the same time, he appears to recognize that Zimbabwe's interests—and his own—would be served best by building on the existing, well-developed economic base. Mugabe is well aware of the economic shambles in Mozambique and other African countries brought about by hasty efforts at radical change. Whatever Mugabe's own intentions may be—and we are far from certain what they are—he must take account of Zimbabwe's unsettled conditions and his own still unconsolidated leadership, both of the country and his own party.

5. In any case, Mugabe's apparent popularity with the majority Shona peoples (roughly 70 percent of the population) and his radical credentials have enabled him to pursue a moderate course without fear of an immediate black backlash. Moreover, there is a strong conservative strain in Zimbabwean society, especially among urban blacks. Mugabe's principal actions so far have been:

— To appoint prominent whites as Ministers of Agriculture and of Commerce and Industry, and an able, moderate black to Economic Planning and Development—thus signaling to white farmers, businessmen, and civil servants that their property, investments, pensions, and jobs are safe.

— To ask the former Rhodesian military commander, Lt. General Peter Walls, to stay on to oversee the integration of the guerrilla and white forces into a single army, and the British to help train it. These actions are aimed at overcoming the whites' fears for their security and placating the white officer corps and Pretoria.

Zimbabwe's Cabinet Members

<u>Position</u>	<u>Name</u>	<u>Party</u>
Prime Minister and Minister of Defense	Robert Mugabe	ZANU
Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs	Simon Muzenda	ZANU
Minister of State	Emmerson Munangagwa	ZANU
Home Affairs	Joshua Nkomo	ZAPU
Economic Development and Planning	Bernard Chidzero	ZANU
Manpower Planning and Development	Edgar Tekere	ZANU
Finance	Enos Nkala	ZANU
Justice and Constitutional Affairs	Simbi Mubako	ZANU
Public Service	Richard Hove	ZANU
Labor and Social Welfare	Kumbirai Kangai	ZANU
Transport and Power	Earnest Kadungure	ZANU
Local Government and Housing	Eddison Zvobgo	ZANU
Lands, Resettlement, and Rural Development	Sydney Sekeramayi	ZANU
Commerce and Industry	David Smith	Rhodesian Front
Agriculture	Dennis Norman	
Information and Tourism	Nathan Shamuyarira	ZANU
Natural Resources and Water Development	Joseph Msika	ZAPU
Education and Culture	Dzingai Mutumbuka	ZANU
Health	Dr. Herbert Ushewokunze	ZANU
Public Works	Clement Muchachi	ZAPU
Posts and Communications	George Silundika	ZAPU
Mines	Maurice Nyagumbo	ZANU
Youth, Sport, and Recreation	Teurai Nhongo	ZANU

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— To invite Joshua Nkomo to join his government as Home Minister and to choose three lesser ministers. Nkomo, Mugabe's former colleague in the Patriotic Front (PF), heads the Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU), the party which won 24 percent of the black votes and 20 seats in the election. This move is aimed at co-opting the sizable and important Ndebele-speaking minority (18 percent of the black population) and ZAPU's approximately 20,000-man army. This tribal division will remain a critical factor, and the Ndebele speakers will, much like the whites, be watchful of their stake in the new, Shona-dominated order.

— To appoint leaders of the several factions of his own party to the Cabinet.

6. Nkomo is undoubtedly frustrated in his role as junior partner, and he will look for opportunities—now limited—to expand his power or to replace Mugabe if the latter falters. There may still be some whites who would support an Nkomo bid for power.

7. Eventually Mugabe's greatest challenge will come from the black population and his own party. They will expect ZANU to honor its promises of land reform, jobs and higher wages, free public schools, and better housing and health care.

8. ZANU militants will expect to see results that vindicate the long years of fighting and ZANU's electoral victory. ZANU is, in effect, an amalgam of personal, subtribal, and ideological factions. Mugabe has maintained his leadership because he has been able to balance the various factions, and to maintain a consensus within and between the separate political and military wings of ZANU. ZANU's spectacular electoral victory has, moreover, raised Mugabe's stature in the party. Now, holding the premiership and Ministry of Defense, he will attempt to broaden his own powers. But it is too early to say that he will be able to contain ZANU's factionalism. If serious strains develop within ZANU, Mugabe's freedom to pursue his current policies would be severely curtailed.

9. Mugabe has begun to assert the symbols and some of the substance of black rule. For example, he has eliminated the use of South African news broadcasts on state-run radio and television networks, is preparing to Africanize the civil service and restructure the separate white and black systems of local government, and is streamlining the judicial system to permit Africans to appeal decisions from tribal courts to civil courts.



Joshua Nkomo

10. Notwithstanding these plans and promises to redistribute land and upgrade social services, we expect Mugabe to proceed cautiously, for the short term at least. He will move slowly because he wants to avoid disrupting essential services, to allow time for his appointees to learn and master the mechanisms of government, to reassure the whites, and to attract foreign capital and Western economic aid.

11. Mugabe has some room for maneuver, but he may not have it for long. The whites do not expect him to be as malleable as was Muzorewa, but each step that diminishes their perquisites will arouse the concern of the waverers and confirm the worst fears of unreconstructed white supremacists. At the same time, some black workers have already indicated their impatience and concern in a flurry of wildcat strikes for higher pay, protection of their pensions, and other benefits. And ZANU's radical elements reportedly are disturbed by Mugabe's moderate posture and gestures to accommodate Pretoria.

12. These contradictory pressures would be hard to resolve in ordinary circumstances. They may well get out of hand in the aftermath of a bitter war, persistent racism and white privilege, unleashed black expecta-

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tions, and the international pressures that may soon buffet Zimbabwe.

13. Mugabe's choices may not be so stark if he can somehow prepare the whites for change while persuading blacks to defer some of their demands. But, faced with a choice between maintaining a slightly amended status quo and making basic changes, Mugabe will favor change. He is committed to restructuring the system so that blacks get a far greater share of the economic and social benefits.

THE ECONOMY UNDER MUGABE

14. Zimbabwe will probably resume moderate economic growth (in the 3- to 5-percent range) during 1980, following five years of deepening recession. This optimistic forecast is based on the judgment that at least during the next six months economic as well as political self-interest will compel Mugabe to move slowly. His ability to walk the tightrope between maintaining white confidence and meeting black expectations may be significantly improved by the social and political dividends from an economic recovery; the availability of some land for immediate resettlement; and Western economic support and investment.

15. If Mugabe honors his promise to respect property and pension rights, it would greatly boost consumer and investor confidence and allow the economy to take full advantage of the end to the war and international sanctions. This upturn could restore up to the estimated 40,000 jobs lost by black wage earners since 1975. But unemployment will continue to be a serious problem. The number of jobseekers has probably increased by 250,000 in the last five years, and will grow with the demobilization of many of the guerrillas and the return from abroad of some 250,000 refugees.

16. If peace and order hold this year, Zimbabwe could attract \$100-200 million in Western private and public sources to finance economic recovery and social reform programs. The United Kingdom, West Germany, the United States, Denmark, the Netherlands, and the European Community have already pledged \$140 million in assistance so far this year and will provide more later.

17. Although new investors are remaining cautious until the intentions of the Mugabe government are clearer, foreign mining companies appear to be expanding their operations. For example, a subsidiary of a South African company reportedly approached the

Export-Import Bank in April for a \$20 million loan to purchase one of the largest American-made draglines for the Wankie coalfields. A British-owned company is proceeding with projects in platinum and gold with an eventual price tag of \$90 million. Although much of the financing for such projects will be raised in international capital markets, British, American, and Canadian companies can also draw on their estimated \$120 million in profits and dividends that have been blocked in local banks since 1965.


18. Meanwhile, another \$500-600 million could be generated or saved in 1980 by the elimination of the costs of circumventing trade sanctions and spot market oil purchases; reentry into markets lost during the UN trade embargo; continued buoyancy in gold and chrome prices; and reductions in defense spending and war-related economic subsidies. Much of this additional liquidity, however, would be absorbed by a projected \$600 million budget deficit in FY 1980-81 unless South Africa resumes budgetary assistance (suspended in March), which totaled an estimated \$500 million in 1979.

19. Mugabe, although he has been considered Zimbabwe's most radical black nationalist, appears from his early economic policy statements and his appointment of two white ministers to want to retain white skills, capital, and purchasing power. His initial land reform proposal would leave commercial agriculture—Zimbabwe's leading wage employer and foreign exchange earner—virtually intact. Mugabe also says he has no plans to nationalize local industry, although state participation in foreign-owned mining operations seems inevitable.

20. The availability for purchase of underworked white farmland gives Mugabe some immediate room for maneuver in satisfying African land hunger without seriously disrupting commercial agriculture. But over the longer run, the government will have to acquire at least some productive white farm holdings, since the Tribal Trust Lands (TTLs), where most Africans live, are 80-percent grazing land with at least four times the population density of neighboring white farm districts. This overcrowding will be further aggravated by the gradual influx of the hundreds of thousands of persons displaced by the war. Relieving the population pressure requires substantial inputs of capital, farm implements, fertilizer, seed, and technical services over a prolonged period to both resettle farm communities and subsistence farmers who remain in the TTLs.

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21. Nevertheless, during the next six months the government will probably be able to make some headway in land reform. Mugabe has announced plans to buy up over 4.3 million hectares of land—roughly one-fourth of white farm holdings—that were either abandoned during the war or are underutilized. About one-third will be immediately available for resettlement in the relatively fertile area southeast of Salisbury. The remaining two-thirds is in the dry southeast of the country and, although superior to adjacent tribal lands, is suitable for cultivation only if irrigated. The price tag for this largely idle white land will be \$100-150 million, with at least another \$50 million required to resettle black farm families.

22. Besides land reform, the new government has set other goals to improve black living conditions. These include:

- Increased funding of African education, health care, and housing.
- Higher minimum wages and improved working conditions for Zimbabwe's 900,000 black wage earners.
- More recruitment, training, and career advancement of blacks, especially in the civil service.
- Increased participation of black workers in management decisions made in the private sector.

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Probably only preliminary steps will be taken in these areas over the next six months.

23. Mugabe has so far announced only those economic changes that will not seriously disrupt the white-dominated, capitalist base of the economy. With Zimbabwe in the midst of a two-year drought, Mugabe probably will not risk seriously antagonizing white commercial farmers. If he is able to consolidate his hold on the government, Mugabe could change his course, especially if he felt that the white community and the West had not been sufficiently forthcoming in underwriting land and social reforms benefiting the black majority.

THE MILITARY

24. One of Mugabe's most urgent tasks is to establish government control over an armed population—including almost 100,000 uneasy and, for the most part, idle guerrillas, security forces, paramilitary groups, and other Zimbabweans who are located throughout the country and in Mozambique and Zambia.¹ Failure to accomplish this quickly risks upheaval and a resumption of hostilities. If and when it is done—and there are many pitfalls—Zimbabwe's leader can then turn to the longer run issue of reorganizing the military as a bona fide defense force.

25. Mugabe's plans for integrating the two guerrilla armies with the former government's security forces are unclear and probably unformed. It may be presumed that the white-led Rhodesian Security Forces (RSF) will provide the core around which the new unified military establishment will be formed. But there are limits on the speed and extent to which the integration can take place. The 13,000- to 15,000-man RSF (including air elements) cannot be rapidly expanded to absorb all the guerrillas without exceeding the capacities of trained personnel and physical wherewithal, overburdening the economy, and frightening whites.

26. Integrating all the guerrillas with the RSF would create a force well beyond the security needs and financial means of the country. Therefore, several stopgap measures will probably be taken in combina-

tion by the new government. Some "surplus" forces could be:

- *Demobilized.* But, in view of other demands on the economy, perhaps only a few thousand combatants can be returned immediately to civilian life.
- *Directed toward civic action.* Guerrillas could be returned to their former rural areas of operations to help repair war damage, reintroduce basic services, and build an economic infrastructure.
- *Assigned to paramilitary service.* For example, they could serve as border patrols in remote areas, where they would not worry skittish whites.
- *Placed in reserve units.* This would reduce the service obligation of the current white reservists.

27. The role and organization of the new Zimbabwean Army will reflect Mugabe's need to accommodate conflicting political pressures—from the whites, Nkomo's former army, and Mugabe's own military commanders. The chain of command is likely to extend from Mugabe, as Defense Minister, through General Walls and his guerrilla counterparts to field commanders and their troops. Reportedly, these three men will form a joint collegial command with Walls as chairman. We expect Mugabe eventually to assert more direct authority over the military.

28. A fundamental difficulty in integrating the three forces is their different structures. ZAPU's conventionally trained units could be more easily integrated with the RSF, but ZANU has been trained and organized as a guerrilla force.

29. Mugabe will eliminate certain RSF units, such as the counterinsurgency Selous scouts. Any change in the RSF, however, may have to be made carefully because of the whites' feeling that their security and the country's economic stability depend on a reliable security force.

30. The primary immediate role most likely to be assigned to Zimbabwe's new military will be the maintenance of internal security, for example, against recalcitrant guerrillas. Mugabe will continue to rely on trusted ZANU elements for his own security, while looking to General Walls to establish the necessary organizational framework for maintaining internal order, defending the borders, and for integrating the government and guerrilla forces.

¹ Rhodesian Security Forces	13,000-15,000
Rhodesian Paramilitary	12,000
Rhodesian Auxiliaries	16,000
ZANU	21,000-23,000
ZAPU	19,000-23,000
Police	8,000
Total	89,000-97,000

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Peter Walls

31. The borders adjacent to Botswana and South Africa will also probably be monitored by the new Army. An effective border patrol is important now because of potential insurgent activities by the African National Congress and Pan Africanist Congress against South Africa. Mugabe has announced he will support these organizations politically and diplomatically, but not militarily.

32. Mugabe probably perceives South Africa as the primary threat to Zimbabwe. Eventually, he will need to procure air defense systems, armor, artillery, and both fixed-wing and rotary aircraft. Because the United Kingdom will assist in a military training program, it and other Western states will be looked to initially as primary sources for arms. Failure by the West to respond satisfactorily would prompt Mugabe to seek assistance elsewhere.

33. Joshua Nkomo may have no alternative to integrating his ZAPU forces quickly, but he may insist that his five conventionally trained battalions be kept intact. Nkomo's concerns have some basis in the probable ethnic composition of a new security force. The Shonas, who are a majority in ZANU, are also predominant in the RSF; whereas Nkomo's force is predominantly Ndebele. He probably believes his

forces represent his only real leverage against Mugabe for political gains in the future. A confrontation between Mugabe and Nkomo could jeopardize integration. Mugabe will have to work hard to keep Nkomo's cooperation by convincing him that ZAPU will be treated fairly.

34. Many white officers and NCOs will probably leave the military over the next six months. Their reasons will vary from the inability to adjust to the new realities of a black government to uncertainties over promotion, pay, training, leadership, and morale. The loss of their experience and expertise would delay training and impede integration.

35. Mugabe may have trouble gaining acceptance for the integration of forces by ZANU's rank and file, who are prone to follow their own military commanders and not the leadership of the party. ZANU's military arm is led by Rex Nhongo who, along with Edgar Tekere, ZANU's Secretary General (now Minister of Manpower Development and Planning), may not be favorably disposed toward full cooperation with the white-led Rhodesian Security Forces. Although both men are from minority subtribes of the Shona ethnic group, they are strong personalities whose disaffection could create problems during the integration process. But the Karanga, the largest subtribe of the Shona ethnic group and the largest element in the RSF and ZANU's army, would probably not support Tekere and Nhongo. Therefore Mugabe will probably be able to check opposition to integration from within ZANU in the immediate future.

REGIONAL IMPLICATIONS

36. Zimbabwe's independence brings southern Africa closer to the pan-African goal of continental black majority rule. Thus, it opens up a new, highly volatile—perhaps revolutionary—era in the region. At the same time, paradoxically, the end of the war in Rhodesia has signaled a retrenchment in the region, not only in Zimbabwe, but in Mozambique and Zambia as well, as all three seek to repair the economic damage and dislocations caused by the past five years of warfare. Namibia remains the most urgent question on the African liberation agenda, and we expect Zimbabwe's independence to produce pressures on both South Africa and SWAPO (Southwest African People's Union) to resolve this issue relatively soon.

37. Statements made on 1 April at the summit meeting in Lusaka of black southern African states seemed to acknowledge this ambiguity. The leaders

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expressed their customary hostility to South Africa, but also their intentions not to upset the vital economic links with Pretoria, upon which their economies depend. The nine agreed to work toward closer economic integration, however, to reduce their dependence on South Africa in a counterconstellation to Pretoria's own constellation, which seeks to expand its influence over its neighbors.

38. Neither side has serious prospects for success in the near term. Nor will the black southern Africans be able to disengage economically from South Africa. But the ideological commitment of many Africans to the liberation of South Africa—reinforced by the clamor from the Soviets and their clients and from exiled South African nationalists—often outweighs practical considerations and should not be underestimated.

39. In consequence, Zimbabwe will be buffeted by cross-pressures to maintain its links with Pretoria and to support a new Frontline² economic and political association. Mugabe's victory and Zimbabwe's proximity to South Africa will make him the cynosure for African nationalists in exile and for sympathizers outside the region. The two liberation groups—Pan Africanist Congress and the African National Congress—the OAU (Organization of African Unity), and states such as Nigeria and Tanzania will all expect Mugabe to support the cause.

40. However much he may sympathize with the South African liberation groups, Mugabe will try to avoid antagonizing Pretoria. Zimbabwe's economy depends heavily upon South African investment, trade, road and rail links, and port facilities. Economic dislocations in Mozambique will keep landlocked Zimbabwe dependent upon South African entrepot facilities for at least several years.

41. Mugabe has publicly sketched the outlines of an accommodation with Pretoria, based on mutual noninterference. He has promised to honor Zimbabwe's \$525 million debt, and has [redacted] to persuade Pretoria to resume the substantial financial subsidies that it had been providing Salisbury in recent years. Mugabe is likely to hold to these policies over the next six months, at least, notwithstanding his commitment to or pressures from other Africans to support South African liberation. Outside the region, Zimbabwe has joined the Commonwealth and applied

² The Frontline States are Angola, Botswana, Mozambique, Tanzania, and Zambia.

for membership in the Lome Convention³ as well as the OAU and UN.

EXTERNAL FACTORS

42. The Soviets, who had contributed heavily to Joshua Nkomo's ZAPU since the 1960s, were stunned by Robert Mugabe's clear-cut electoral victory. Despite ZAPU's participation in the government, the Soviets are unlikely to be able to capitalize on their link to ZAPU as long as Mugabe exercises a firm hold on power. For the moment, Moscow's goal is to recoup its position by portraying the Mugabe victory as a triumph for the entire Patriotic Front, and thus shared by Nkomo, and by emphasizing the need for continued ZANU-ZAPU cooperation. Over the longer term, the Soviets will try to reduce Western and Chinese influence in Zimbabwe.

43. Moscow hopes to establish a diplomatic presence in Salisbury. It will also probably attempt to build some bilateral links, most likely by offering scholarships, cultural and sport exchanges, and, perhaps, by trying to open avenues such as airline and news offices. Moscow has indicated its willingness to extend some military aid to the new Zimbabwean Government. Mugabe is suspicious of the Soviets, particularly because of their close relations with Nkomo, and will, for the time being, resist a close Soviet relationship. Moreover, too close an embrace could help trigger a white and South African reaction. Moscow is using its ties with the Frontline States to press for Mugabe's comradeship, and it hopes that he will come to see the utility of a Soviet link as a source of leverage on the West.

44. The Soviets are still counting on their special relationship with Nkomo and ZAPU's military arm to assure them continued influence, especially as the latter is folded into Zimbabwe's new security forces. Over the last three years, the Soviets and Cubans have trained an estimated 20,000 ZAPU recruits in Zambia, Angola, Ethiopia, Cuba, and the USSR. Many have received training in conventional tactics and weapons, and the Soviets probably hope that these individuals will help form the core of the new Zimbabwean military's noncommissioned and junior officer corps. Moscow has reportedly offered to provide training in the USSR for the first group of ZAPU officers scheduled to be integrated into the new security forces.

³ A preferential trade and aid arrangement between the European Common Market and almost 60 African, Caribbean, and Pacific developing countries.

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45. Although the Soviets may see their short-term opportunities in Zimbabwe as somewhat limited, they expect that Salisbury ultimately will join the Frontline States' struggle for the liberation of South Africa. The Soviets will be ready to provide military hardware and training.

46. Mugabe invited the USSR, Romania, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, and Albania to Zimbabwe's independence ceremonies. His failure to invite East Germany, Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia shows his resentment of the Soviets and their allies for their lack of direct support for ZANU and their close ties with Nkomo. Romania and Yugoslavia have had good relations with Mugabe and ZANU over the past few years, providing training, small arms, medicines, and other equipment. Mugabe has publicly stated his intention to maintain these relationships and will look to these two countries for continued support, which they are likely to provide in modest amounts.

47. In view of Mugabe's past links with China, Moscow is undoubtedly worried about an increased Chinese role. Beijing and Moscow have already traded accusations on who is trying to destabilize Zimbabwe. Moscow may be overly concerned—in the last year of the insurgency, the Chinese refused to increase aid to ZANU and have said they have little real leverage over Mugabe. Since last August, Beijing has supported British negotiating efforts. Even before the election the Chinese said they would not support Mugabe if he lost and decided to return to the bush. At the moment, in view of their limited resources, the Chinese apparently see their best option as encouraging regional stability in order to prevent an increase in Soviet influence.

48. Iraq has recently provided considerable assistance to Nkomo's ZAPU. We do not believe that Mugabe would be constrained from accepting direct aid, in spite of Baghdad's earlier partiality, particularly if it were offered in substantial quantities and shorn of Soviet ties, as has been Iraq's recent practice in the Third World. Saudi Arabia and other moderate Arab states are also likely to be approached for assistance.

49. Mugabe and other Zimbabwean nationalists have held the United Kingdom—and by association, much of the West—responsible for the country's unhappy history. Until the election, Mugabe regarded British efforts to solve the crisis as highly biased against ZANU. But he seems to be willing to put aside past grievances, now that the British have transferred

power to him. More important, Mugabe is looking to the West for aid and investment and appears to recognize its importance to Zimbabwe's economic development. For their parts, the United Kingdom and South Africa—with at least \$200 million and an estimated \$1 billion in investments, respectively, in Zimbabwe—have a stake in the peaceful development of the country. US investment in Zimbabwe amounts to approximately \$105 million. The importance of access to Zimbabwean chrome, gold, and other strategic minerals enhances Zimbabwe's significance to the West, as does its critical location and potential importance in the region.

US INTERESTS

50. Apart from the importance of access to strategic minerals and a relatively modest, private investment, US interest in Zimbabwe is largely indirect. That is, the United States desires peace and stability in southern Africa both to enhance its own economic, diplomatic, and possibly strategic access to the region, and also to deny the Soviet Union opportunities for adventurism. Prolonged stability in Zimbabwe could provide a positive example to South Africa and facilitate the search for a peaceful settlement in Namibia.

51. Zimbabwe, rich in resources, already a transportation hub, and with a relatively highly diversified economy, stands to play an important role in southern Africa. It may come to exercise influence over its African neighbors, and, depending upon the character of that influence, the region could develop moderately and peaceably or move toward more radical economic experimentation and anti-Western external policies. Hence, Zimbabwe's importance to the United States resides not only in itself, but in its potential influence over the several nations that constitute the southern third of Africa.

CONTINGENCIES

52. A number of contingencies—for example, the assassination of Mugabe, or an outbreak of fighting among the guerrillas that escalated to widespread conflict—could occur over the next six months and upset the fragile political balance in Zimbabwe. Such events are possible, but not predictable. Some of the situations that might begin to develop during the near term, but probably not culminate until some time later, are considered below. Their impact would be substantial, would force a change in our assessments, and bear watching.

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53. *White Flight.* Few whites appear to have left Zimbabwe because of Mugabe's election, but many of those remaining may only be marking time. When, inevitably, Mugabe pushes for more jobs, higher wages, and expanded social services for blacks, the less adaptable whites may begin to leave. If Mugabe inaugurates programs that impinge more deeply on white perquisites and security—for example, workers' participation in management and accelerated Africanization of the security forces—a second wave may go. White emigration could begin to gather impetus. Not only would this hurt the favorable short-term economic prospects, upon which the judgments of this memorandum are based, but foreign (especially South African) investors and aid donors might conclude that their cautious optimism and support was misplaced, and they could begin to scale down their help.

54. *Nkomo Goes Into Opposition.* Nkomo reportedly is deeply depressed at his political eclipse and the stripping from his ministry of police intelligence and rural administration functions. He undoubtedly realizes that the longer Mugabe holds power, the firmer his grip on it is likely to become. Moreover, once Nkomo's army is demobilized or integrated, his recourse to armed force would be lessened. Although we doubt that he intends to make an armed bid for power at this time, he might seek to take advantage of Mugabe's problems and divisions within ZANU to forge an alliance with the whites and disenfranchised blacks. He might, therefore, seek to stall integration of his army, envisioning a need for such forces in an ambiguous political situation. Even the hint of such intentions would undermine Mugabe's current conciliatory policies, and could lead to civil war.

55. *Mugabe Turns to Moscow.* We have discussed elsewhere the possible consequences of Mugabe's disappointment if Western aid and investment do not bring immediate advantages to Zimbabwe's black population. Conversely, Mugabe will be alert to what he would perceive to be selling out Zimbabwe's independence by too great a dependency on the West and South Africa. Hence, possibly within the next six months, Mugabe may seek to demonstrate his independence of the West in some gesture to Moscow, both to placate his own radical wing and to be in a position eventually to obtain Soviet aid. Those who distrust Mugabe would find their doubts vindicated. An adverse Western reaction could, much like white disenchantment, become self-reinforcing and lead to hostility and a break, leaving Mugabe no option but to seek closer ties to Moscow.

56. *Deterioration in Zimbabwean-South African Relations.* Notwithstanding Mugabe's intention to avoid antagonizing South Africa, his sympathy for liberation groups and the pull exerted by the potential new regional counterconstellation—in which Zimbabwe would play an important role—could adversely affect relations between the two nations. Each side will be wary of the other and might misinterpret or exaggerate otherwise innocuous behavior. Pretoria has a number of ways to put pressure on Salisbury— withholding budgetary support or impeding the transport of Zimbabwean goods. If the ANC and PAC were to use or transit Zimbabwean territory for military purposes—even against Mugabe's wishes—Pretoria would not hesitate to mount punitive or "hot pursuit" expeditions against their bases.

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