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## Food Production in the African Sahel: Short-Term Relief, Long-Term Problems

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A Research Paper

Author/Production Officer

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Food Production in the African Sahel: Short-Term Relief, Long- Term Problems	25 <b>X</b> 1
Summary	
Information available as of 1 March 1987 was used in this report.	
The roughly 100 million people who live in the African Sahel and the Horn of Africa are among the poorest in the world. The eight countries in the regionMauritania, Mali, Burkina, Niger, Chad, Sudan, Ethiopia, and Somaliahave precarious economies and governments prone to political instability. The severe drought that covered portions of all eight countries during the first half of the 1980s dealt a heavy blow to the economic, social, demographic, and political fabric of the region and led to famine conditions and widespread loss of life. Recent improvements in rainfall have resulted in some relief from the worst immediate effects of the drought, but the longer term outlook for the region's food balance remains grim.	25X1
Rainfall remains the key factor that will determine the region's general well-being over the rest of the decade. Analysis of historical weather data indicates that weather patterns over the next five years are likely to fall within a clear range: The best bet is for rainfall to stabilize somewhat around recent levels.	
There is also a good chance that rainfall may continue the downward trend of the last 25 years.	
There is a small chance that the recent rains could indicate a return to a wet period like the early 1960s.	
While there is some disagreement among climatologists on the trend in Africa's climate, the majority agree with the most likely projection that precipitation rates for the next few years will closely follow the trend of the early 1980s.	25 <b>X</b> 1
Given this climate outlook, estimates indicate that prospects for improving food availability through domestic grain production are bleak. Unless weather conditions during 1986-90 come close to the best of recent yearsa highly unlikely event-per capita output of grain will most likely decline from the low 1981-85 levels, continuing a general trend of the last 25 years. Although there may be some modest gains in total grain production, they will be outstripped by the region's rapid population growth.	25X1
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There is little chance, then, that the region can avoid increased grain import requirements. Most of those imports would have to be provided through various assistance programs, because the region already spends about one-fourth of its meager export earnings on grain imports. Annual regional needs by 1990 could run 50 percent or more above the 2.2 million metric tons per year average of 1981-85 just to maintain recent per capita consumption levels; the cost at world market prices would exceed \$1 billion. In the best case, four of the countries--Mauritania, Mali, Ethiopia, and Somalia -- would still need substantial increases in grain imports just to keep per capita grain consumption stable. Even with the increases, Ethiopia and Mali would have no hope of meeting the minimum nutritional standard consumption levels established by the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) of the United Nations. In the other cases examined, which are much more likely, all eight countries would need increased grain imports to maintain per capita consumption, and most increases would be substantial.

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This means that financial pressures will continue to be severe and conditions fostering political instability will probably intensify. The grain import bill is already so large-about \$475 million annually during 1981-85--that it sharply limits the impact of foreign trade on economic development in the region. Moreover, continued food shortages and drought-induced crop failures are likely to force more migration into the already overcrowded cities and across international borders, encouraging both domestic unrest and the risk of conflict between countries in the region.

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The West will face large and probably rising requests for food aid to the region as 1990 approaches. If rainfall levels fall in the likely range, there may be little the countries themselves can do in the short run to avoid a return to famine conditions, at least in regions that are on the fringe of adequate rainfall and are difficult to reach with limited grain surpluses possibly available from other parts of a given country. In fact, the primitive transportation and communication infrastructure in the region makes it likely that pockets of serious food shortages will arise and go undetected by authorities for some time, sharply raising the risk of starvation. Western logistic aid, therefore, will also be a continuing need in the region.

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The only longer term hope is policy adjustments needed to induce improvement in the primitive level of the region's agrotechnology, which would raise regional grain production and limit import needs. The West is in an excellent position to

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provide this agrotechnical assistance, despite the vagaries of climate and limited arable land available. Much technology is readily available or could be easily tailored to the conditions of the region. Such a program would also sharply contrast with Moscow's failure to provide such agricultural assistance because of its own limitations in the agricultural arena. Western pressure on local governments to make the policy environment more supportive of improved agrotechnology would be a critical adjunct to such an aid program.	.1

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Food Production in the African Sahel: Short-Term Relief, Long- Term Problems	25X
Introduction	
The countries of the African Sahel and the Horn of Africa are among the poorest in the world. The vast majority of their 100 million people are essentially subsistence farmers whose meager existence is annually subject to the vagaries of the weather. An extended drought that covered most of the first half of this decade decimated crops in large portions of the region, leading to large-scale famine, mass migrations across international borders, increased political instability, and the need for massive external food aid. Despite improvements triggered by greater rainfall since 1985, the longer term outlook for the region's food balance remains grim, and large quantities of food aid will continue to be needed to stave off episodes of mass starvation and political instability.	25X1
Rainfall Barely Adequate for Agriculture	
Given the low level of agrotechnology in the region, rainfall is the key weather factor that determines the level of agricultural output in the Sahel and the Horn (appendix A). The agricultural areas of the eight countries included in this study—Mali, Burkina, Niger, Chad, Sudan, Ethiopia, and Somalia—are situated in a narrow transitional climatic zone between the Sahara Desert on the north and tropical forest on the south. Total annual precipitation varies widely from year to year, but, as a general rule, most of the land receives less rainfall than the 400 millimeters (mm) per year needed for nonirrigated agriculture to be successful.	25X1
The western and central portions of the Sahel are characterized by natural grassland, nomadic herding, and rain-fed agriculture, with most rainfall occurring from July to September. There is very little water storage in this part of Africa, and, when the rains fail, cattle either die in large numbers or are driven southward in search of better grazing land and water. In the latter case, their numbers—combined with indigenous herds—often exceed the carrying capacity of the land, causing great damage to ecosystems and jeopardizing future feed resources. Most crops are produced at the subsistence level, and farmers obtain very low yields even in good years. Often the farmers carry little or no surplus from year to year, and the lack of a well-developed infrastructure—roads, motorized vehicles, and communication facilities—limits the amount of food that can be moved from surplus to deficit areas. The danger of famine arises	

quickly when the rains fail, yet indications of an impending famine may <u>go undetecte</u>d by governments and relief agencies for some time. 25X1 Farther east, in the Horn, rainfall occurs in two seasons in most of Ethiopia and in parts of Somalia. Small amounts of precipitation fall in the spring--triggered by wind circulation from the Indian Ocean--but the major rains occur in the summer months. Ethiopia's large population--about 44 million people--and primitive agricultural techniques offset much of the food production advantage this region has, and generally the food balance is as precarious here as in the western and central parts of the Sahel. 25X1 The Recent Drought in Historical Perspective The recent drought in the eight countries along the southern fringe of the Sahara Desert has been the worst in this century. The drought, which has plagued most of the region since the late 1960s, was particularly intense during the period 1980-84. In fact, the United Nations has designated these countries as having the most serious food problems in Africa. Although recent rains have brought some relief, precipitation levels continue to be well below the long-term average and barely above the 400-mm annual rainfall requirement of many nonirrigated crops. Although this downward trend is unprecedented in duration and magnitude during this century, similar droughts have occurred periodically in this region since the early 1700s. The historical evidence indicates that similar episodes occurred in the 1740s and 1750s, 1820s and 1830s, and more recently in 1910-20. 25X1 From a geographical perspective, drought in this region is not a localized phenomenon. Since the 1970s, its occurrence has been persistent and widespread across the eight countries included in this study. The line (isohyet) (1) representing the occurrence of 400 mm of precipitation moved southward an average of 85 kilometers (km) across the entire continent from 1966 to 1975, and 150 km in the period 1976-85 25X1 southward movement of the 400-mm isohyet essentially eliminated large agricultural areas from productive use. Also, there has been a marked decrease in annual precipitation in the agricultural areas nearer the southern fringes of the region where rainfall is generally more abundant. The agricultural areas of Mali, Niger, and Chad were especially hard hit in the 1966-75 period 25X1 . Annual rainfall in these countries decreased 70 to 80 percent. The 1976-85 period saw a worsening and an expansion of the drought into Sudan, with more agricultural areas experiencing less than the minimum precipitation necessary to grow crops. 25X1

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Impact of Drought on Grain Production and Import Needs

The food balance in the region has clearly worsened since the mid-1960s. The decrease in precipitation since then has contributed to a general reduction of grain yields in most of the eight countries. Generally, yield declines have matched precipitation shortfalls, except in Burkina and Ethiopia where yields have been increasing even with decreasing precipitation. In these two countries, other factors, such as increased use of fertilizers, have helped offset the effects of decreasing precipitation. Also, disease control measures in Burkina have allowed fertile river valley land to be brought into production.

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Reduction of grain area over the last 25 years in Ethiopia—as a result of the elimination of less productive land in favor of more intensive use of fertilizers on better land—has nevertheless kept production there from rising substantially. In most countries, yield reductions have been offset by steep increases in area planted to grain—despite the southward movement of the 400—mm precipitation isohyet—resulting in a net increase in the total amount of grain produced by the eight countries in the last 25 years. However, much of the new area planted is of marginal quality. Moreover, per capita grain production, a good indicator of import and aid needs, has decreased steadily since the 1960s in many of the countries because of the high population growth rate—an average of 3 percent per year.

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The Population Problem

The population of the eight countries surveyed in this report is large and growing rapidly--particularly considering the paucity of arable land. Total population in the region increased from about 51 million in 1960 to about 98 million in 1985--a near doubling in 25 years. Projected annual growth rates for the 1980-2000 period vary from 2.4 percent in Burkina and Somalia to 3.3 percent in Niger. Using these growth rates, the total population of the region is projected to reach 113 million by 1990.

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The amount of arable land available to the growing population is comparatively limited. The total area of the region is slightly larger than that of the United States, including Alaska. In the United States about 20 percent of the land area is arable, but only about 4 percent of this part of Africa can be cultivated. This means that the region's average population

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25X1 density of about 2.5 persons per hectare of arable land is twice that of the United States. The population of the eight countries is widely but unevenly spread across the African continent, with Ethiopia and Sudan accounting for more than one-half of both the total population and arable land. 25X1 As a result of the intensified drought during the 1980-85 period, total grain imports--provided either commercially or as aid--for the eight countries tripled from 1.3 million metric tons in 1980-81 to 4 million tons in 1984/85. Over the 1980-85 period, food aid on average accounted for about two-thirds of total grain imported. In the 1984/85 market year (MY), (2) following the 1984 drought, about 70 percent of the total grain imported by the eight countries consisted of aid from donor countries. The high proportion of food aid in grain imports obviously reflects both the large need and the very limited ability of these countries to pay full commercial prices for food imports. 25X1 An improvement in the 1985 rainy season considerably diminished import and aid needs for the 1985/86 MY. Following good grain harvests in 1985, Burkina, Chad, Mali, Niger, and Sudan had local surpluses of grain. Estimates of the 1986 grain crops are generally excellent, although a locust and grasshopper infestation threatened to reduce somewhat the 1986 grain crop across the African continent. Preliminary estimates indicate a grain crop approaching 17 million tons -- the best harvest to date for the eight countries, and nearly 1 million tons higher than 1985. Nevertheless, many of the countries still need external assistance to support the procurement, storage, and internal distribution to deficit areas. 25X1 The Level of Agrotechnology Agriculture in the Sahel and the Horn is generally at the subsistence level, with cultivation done mostly with hand tools and with a minimum of inputs. The use of mechanical traction--25X1 practically nonexistent for production of staple crops--suffers from a lack of capital investment, high fuel costs, and untrained manpower. Animal power is utilized extensively only in Ethiopia and is just beginning to be exploited in the other countries. Grain yields in the belt of countries stretching from Mauritania to Somalia are among the lowest in the world. In the eight countries surveyed, grain yields for 1981-85 ranged from

less than 400 kg/ha in Chad and Niger to approximately 1,100 kg/ha in Ethiopia. These yields are one-sixth to one-half the world's average grain yields. The low productivity cannot be entirely explained by the harsh climate. The low level of agricultural development in the Sahel and the Horn-typified by the lack of fertilizers, mechanization, and technical know-how at the peasant farm level--also plays a major role.

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Development of higher yielding varieties of cereal crops that can thrive in the harsh environment lags far behind plant breeding work in other developing regions of the world. Consequently, it may be at least 10 years before improved varieties of millet and sorghum could be made available to Sahelian farmers on a large scale.

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Fertilizer is used mostly for cash crops in the eight countries, and application rates—averaging less than 1.0 kg/ha per year—are among the lowest in the world. In comparison, the world average is about 30 kg/ha and the US average is about 100 kg/ha. Staple cereals, such as millet and sorghum, are grown with little fertilizer, because of its high cost.

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Only a very small percentage of crop land in these countries is irrigated. As in the use of fertilizer, irrigation resources are devoted mostly to cash crops. It is estimated that Africa has less than one-twentieth the irrigated land of Asia. Nevertheless, cultivating land along river valleys in the region--for example, the Niger, Chari, and Nile Rivers--could provide an additional 2 million ha of agricultural land. However, infestations of tsetse fly, the carrier of sleeping sickness that affects both humans and cattle, presently discourage cultivation of large tracts of fertile land along the rivers.

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Improving the Food Balance: A Long-Term Process

Despite improvement in agricultural production in 1985 and 1986 as a result of more abundant rainfall—although well below the long-term norms—the countries in the Sahel and the Horn probably will remain well short of food self-sufficiency. Even sustainable improvements in the food balance will be difficult to achieve. The drought of the 1970s and 1980s is but one of the factors that have contributed to the deterioration of the region's ability to feed itself. Two other major factors, largely resulting from failed government policies, are:

--The rapidly expanding populations. As highlighted earlier, population growth rates in the eight countries--3 percent on the average--are among the highest in the world.

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Moreover, with a population disproportionately made up of children who will be in their reproductive prime in the next five to 10 years, the growth rates will remain high unless effective birth control policies are instituted.

--The slow rate of improvement in applied agrotechnology. Increases in agricultural productivity in the region as a result of the introduction of new technology have generally lagged behind those in the rest of the world; the growth rate in agricultural output in the region has actually declined over the last 20 years.

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The green revolution that dramatically increased agricultural production and brought food self-sufficiency to countries like India and China -- whose food balances were very precarious 20 to 30 years ago--has had little impact on the LDCs of Africa. The essential conditions that brought about the green revolution in Asia--availability of irrigated lands, major improvements in high-yield crop varieties, market accessibility through good transportation networks, and presence of a social infrastructure and educational systems favorable for the development and dissemination of technology--remain distant goals for the eight countries. Agricultural improvements in the region are made even more difficult by turbulent internal political situations and pursuit of short-term goals that have favored industrialization--limited as it is--at the expense of agricultural development, city dwellers at the expense of farmers, and sectarian gains at the expense of national unity.

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The Climate Outlook to 1990

There is some disagreement among climatologists on the trend in Africa's climate. The decrease in precipitation over the last 25 years is seen by some climatologists as heralding a climate change, characterized by a lower precipitation regime than that experienced over the last 50 or so years. The majority of climatologists believes that the present situation is still within the realm of the climate that Africa has been experiencing for at least the last 250 years; at a minimum, two other similar drought episodes have been experienced over this time period. During the next 10 to 20 years, a climate prediction consistent with this latter view could see a return to a higher precipitation regime as the most likely turn of events. Indeed, some climatologists who favor this view believe that the increased rains of 1985 were the beginning of such an upturn.

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Because of these uncertainties, this study developes three weather scenarios for the 1986-90 period that seem to be reasonable descriptions of the range of possible weather patterns and their likelihoods. These scenarios allow this study to assess the likely range of grain production and imports--including aid-that will be needed during the period if nothing else changes:

- --Most likely rainfall scenario is an extrapolation into the future that gives greater weight to the most recent trend in rainfall.
- --Worst case scenario is a continuation of the downward trend in precipitation experienced during the last 25 years in the region.
- --Best case scenario is a return to the weather of 1961-65, the wettest of the last 25 years.

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This study uses historical data to compute annual average precipitation levels for 1986-90 consistent with each scenario. Under the most likely scenario, precipitation will probably average 432 mm annually over the region for the next five years, a slight decrease from the 444-mm yearly average experienced during 1981-85 and well below the long-term (1921-85) average of 561 mm. This projection of a slightly drier climate on average during the rest of the decade than during 1981-85 is based on the influence of the dramatic drop in rainfall especially during the last 10 to 15 years. Moreover, studies show that rainfall patterns tend to closely follow trends of the immediate past.

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Under the worst case scenario—a continuation of the downward trend of precipitation of the last 25 years—an average regional precipitation decrease of about 23 mm, or 421 mm for the 1986—90 period, is estimated. Calculations for the best case scenario show an annual regional precipitation average of 601 mm, a dramatic increase from the 1981—85 average of 444 mm.

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This study also uses the historical record to estimate rough probabilities of occurrence for each of the weather patterns examined. Assuming no climate change, a precipitation regime at or better than the most likely scenario has a 50-percent probability of occurrence. A rainfall regime like the worst case scenario--or lower--has about a 40-percent chance of happening and a regime approaching the best case scenario--or better--has less than a 1-percent chance of occurring. Annual precipitation for individual countries was estimated by regression from the regional precipitation estimates. (3)

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Grain	Production	Possibilities

Using rainfall assumptions, yield equations, and projections of area planted, this study estimates future grain production in each country in the region for the remainder of the decade. Per capita grain production was then estimated using population projections. In general, these estimates indicate that prospects for improving the availability of food through domestic grain production are bleak. Unless weather conditions during 1986-90 come close to the best case scenario—a highly unlikely event—per capita output of grain will most likely decline from the 1981-85 levels as a result of the region's rapidly growing population. Estimates show this to be the case even though trendline increases in land under cultivation show some increases in grain production overall.

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Compared with the annual average of 13.3 million tons for 1981-85, average annual grain production for the region in 1986-90 will be:

- --About 14.2 million tons in the worst case weather scenario--about 1 million tons above the 1981-85 production average.
- --About 14.6 million tons, or roughly a 10-percent increase over the 1981-85 average, if the most likely case scenario prevails.
- --Approximately 17.9 million tons yearly production--or about a 35-percent increase over the 1981-85 level--under the best case scenario.

Even in the very unlikely best case, average per capita grain production for the region would reach only about 167 kilograms (kg) /year--17 percent above the low 1981-85 average but still about 14 percent below the level needed to meet recommended minimum nutritional standards.

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Projected Grain Import Requirements

Because per capita grain production probably will generally be insufficient to meet total food needs of the region for the remainder of the decade, this study attempts to estimate the requirement for food imports and aid for each of the countries for the period. Recognizing that no single designator was available to measure grain needs, grain import/aid requirements on the basis of two different grain need concepts were projected:

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- --Status quo nutritional level. This gives grain supplies required to maintain per capita grain consumption at the average 1981-85 levels.
- --Minimum nutritional standard. This gives grain supplies required to meet the recommended minimum standard.

These need standards allowed calculations of a range of import requirements for each country during 1986-90.

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Self-Sufficiency Not in the Cards

Even if the Sahel and the Horn experience the best weather it is realistic to expect--the very unlikely best case scenario-it is estimated that the region would still require an average of about 1.1 million tons per year in imports to maintain food supplies at recent levels of per capita consumption, and about 3.9 million tons of grain to meet the recommended minimum standard. Niger, Chad, Burkina, and Sudan would produce -- on the average--sufficient grain to maintain recent nutritional levels and, except for Chad, would also meet the minimum. Ethiopia, Somolia, Mauritania, and Mali, on the average, would all experience production shortfalls and require imports to maintain consumption at the 1981-85 average level. On the basis of recent economic trends, it is estimated that 50 to 75 percent of the required grain--0.5-0.8 million tons of the required 1.1 million tons of grain per year--would have to be provided as aid, compared with 1.4 million tons supplied by donors on average during 1981-85.

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Import Needs Likely To Increase Substantially

It is more likely that weather conditions during the rest of this decade will be slightly drier than the 1981-85 average--the most likely scenario. In this case, all eight countries probably will require yearly grain imports totaling about 3.3 million tons, or 50 percent more than the 1981-85 average, to maintain the status quo per capita consumption. Assuming no improvements in the countries' ability to buy grain on the open market, approximately 1.7-2.5 million tons of the 3.3 million tons required would have to be provided by donor countries. According to this estimate, the hardest hit would be Sudan, with an import need of almost 1 million tons yearly--400,000 tons above the 1981-85 average. Others with large import needs under this scenario include Ethiopia, Somalia, and Mali. For the group to meet the recommended minimum nutritional standards under this scenario, imports of about 6.3 million tons per year would be needed--triple the average imports during the 1981-85 period.

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Risk of Famine Clear

If the weather follows the trend of the last 25 years—the worst case scenario—about 3.7 million tons of grain imports will be required yearly to maintain per capita consumption at the average level of the 1981-85 period. Approximately 2.5-3 million tons of the required 3.7 million tons would have to be supplied as aid. The major importers would be Sudan and Ethiopia. To meet the minimum standards, the eight countries would require a total of 6.7 million tons of grain imports per year, with Ethiopia's bulging population needing almost half this amount. Not only are these import volumes well beyond affordable levels, they also are substantially greater than any import levels reached to date. Moreover, these volumes would exceed the capacity of the region's very limited transportation system to move grain to areas of need. Consequently, there would be a real risk of a return to famine conditions in a number of countries.

Risks for the Region

Economic Outlook Grim

The countries of the Sahel and the Horn are clearly among the poorest in the world. Under the best of conditions, their economies are barely able to meet essential domestic needs and pay foreign obligations. Despite massive injections of international food aid, the cost of importing food has seriously increased the burden on the balance of payments of the countries and threatens their financial viability. The annual cost of grain imports rose on average from \$90 million in 1971-75 to \$475 million in 1981-85, absorbing almost half of the region's increase in export earnings. Consequently, the small but hard-won gains in foreign trade will do little to spur economic development in the region as long as 25 percent of earnings are devoted to grain imports.

Without additional international aid, the annual average cost of grain imports will approach \$700 million to hold nutritional levels stable under the most likely weather scenario. Countries faced with the highest costs would be Sudan, with more than \$200 million annually, and Ethiopia and Mali, with more than \$100 million each. If, however, the eight countries were to try to achieve the minimum nutritional standard, the average yearly cost of grain imports would be about \$1.2 billion--clearly well beyond what the region's economies can afford.

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Political and Social Problems Likely To Increase

On average, the food balance in the Sahel and the Horn is likely to worsen over the rest of the decade. Food shortages over the next five years will have the potential to further aggravate political and social problems for most of the eight countries:

- --The Governments of Mauritania, Chad, Mali, Sudan, and Niger could face greater risk of military coups. Indeed, drought and food shortages were among the root causes of coups in Mauritania and Niger in the recent past.
- --The Governments of Ethiopia, Somalia, and Burkina may not fall, but refugees fleeing famine in these countries could create political and economic problems and hardship for neighboring countries. Such migrations during famines are common in the region.
- --The opportunities for external subversion can be increased. In particular, the Libyans, who are already using humanitarian aid as a means to penetrate the western provinces of Sudan, can be expected to exploit the need for food to advance their penetration of Niger, Chad, and Mauritania, if the opportunity arises. Mauritania is likely to be the target of Moroccan, Algerian, and Soviet subversion as well.
- --More farmers are likely to be driven from their land, thus hastening the rural-to-urban migration, which is occurring in all of the countries. Such migrations place additional financial and managerial burdens on the political and economic institutions needed to manage agricultural problems, thus reducing chances for future agricultural improvement. Most governments in the region are still struggling to manage enlarged urban populations resulting from the current drought. Expanded urban populations fed by displaced subsistence farmers can become a breeding ground for political instability.

Implications for the West

The Western countries are likely to be asked to provide substantial food aid to the Sahel and the Horn for the remainder of the decade, and probably much longer. The chance of a dramatic increase in annual average rainfall during the next five years that could change this outlook is 1 in 100. Over the longer term, if the current population growth rate remains unchecked and the drier weather trend continues, import requirements could overload

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the region's primitive transport infrastructure, possibly resulting in widespread famine.	25X1
Much could be gained from Western agrotechnical assistance and encouragement of policies that favor increased domestic output. For example, seed companies are particularly well qualified to assist in the development of drought-resistant grain varieties. Agrotechnology is clearly an area where the West has a decided advantage over the Soviet Union. Emphasis on agrotechnical assistance from the West would contrast sharply with Moscow's general unwillingness and inability to provide agrotechnology to Third World countries. To make a program of technical assistance viable, the governments of the region would also need to provide low-cost credit to farmers for purchase of additional agricultural inputs. Past programs to introduce new agrotechnology into the region, however, have been largely ineffective because the governments have failed to provide such support to the farmers.	25X1
Support to the farmers.	∠5 <b>∧</b> I

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Country Perspectives on the Drought

Mauritania

This sparsely populated country of only 1.9 million people until recently had a pastoral economy based on nomadic herding. Annual average grain production for 1981-85 amounted to only 50,000 tons, less than 1 percent of the total grain production of the eight countries. The prolonged drought conditions of the last 25 years desiccated the rangelands, causing a massive influx of nomads into urban centers and a gradual shift from a diet based on animal products to one based mainly on cereals. Declining rainfall levels in the agricultural and range areas of the south culminated in the worst drought of the century in 1984, when only 21,000 tons of grain were produced. The severe food shortage in 1984/85 was alleviated mostly by food aid--grain--that totaled 135,000 tons. The situation improved dramatically in 1985, when for the first time in 10 years rainfall approached normal levels in all regions of the country, resulting in a record grain production of 86,000 tons. Preliminary estimates of the 1986 grain crop indicate an excellent harvest approaching 100,000 tons, even after accounting for a 10-percent loss as a result of the grasshopper infestation. Nevertheless, Mauritania would have to import more than 180,000 tons of grain to meet its requirements in the MY 1986/87, half of which would have to be aid.

Mali

Mali annually produces 1 million tons of grain--mainly millet and rice--almost 8 percent of the grain output in the eight-country region. Although yields have not declined as dramatically as in some of the other countries, a rapid increase in population--from 4 million to 8 million in the last 25 years-has caused per capita grain production to decrease sharply from an average of 224 kg in 1961-65 to 135 kg in the 1981-85 period. Over the 1981-85 period, the decrease in per capita production necessitated average annual grain purchases of 209,000 tons and additional average yearly food aid of 116,000 tons.

Although above-normal rains and a near-record area planted to grain contributed to a record 1.4-million-ton grain crop in 1985, it is estimated that Mali needs to import 275,000 tons of grain in MY 1987 to compensate for local food shortages in the north. About 105,000 tons of the total will have to be furnished

as aid. Preliminary reports indicate that, overall, Mali has

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obtained a	a recor	d grain	crop o	f 1.8	million	tons i	in 198	6,
following	good r	ains and	d preve	ntive	measures	agair	st gr	asshopper

infestation. Nevertheless, the north is still plagued by grain

shortages caused by localized drought.

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## Burkina

Although precipitation has been decreasing overall in the last 25 years, grain yields in Burkina have been steadily increasing at a rate of about 11 kg/hectare (ha) per year. The improvement results from the use of better farming methods and irrigation countrywide. It also reflects increased output from the fertile, less-drought-prone southwest part of the country where major progress has been made in the eradication of rinderpest and tsetse fly. Nevertheless, the country suffers from localized droughts, especially in the northern and eastern regions, and from inadequate distribution networks that prevent surplus cereal production from reaching drought-stricken areas. For example, the food shortfalls in the drought-stricken northern and eastern regions in 1983 and 1984 could have been alleviated because overall grain production was probably adequate, but the surpluses elsewhere could not be moved to the deficit regions.

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Grain production in the 1960s and 1970s was sufficient to absorb the impact of the population growth on food requirements. The situation worsened, however, in the first half of this decade. Despite increasing yields, grain imports had to be increased nearly fourfold—from 65,000 tons in MY 1980/81 to 241,000 tons in MY 1984/85—to cover the domestic grain shortfall. Increased rainfall in 1985 gave temporary relief, and a record 1.6—million—ton crop greatly improved the food situation by yearend. Prospects for the 1986 grain crop were generally very favorable; only some areas in the north faced a poor harvest because of dry conditions and the grasshopper infestation. It is estimated that Burkina will need about 70,000 tons of additional imports and/or aid in MY 1987 to meet its requirements.

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## Niger

Using grain production as a measure, Niger has been another better-than-average agricultural performer over the long term, notwithstanding the decreasing precipitation levels since the 1960s. The area planted to grain reportedly has doubled over the last 25 years and output has increased by 80 percent. Sharply decreasing precipitation levels in the 1980s, however, reversed an improvement in yields that had taken place in the 1970s and that had brought Niger close to grain self-sufficiency. The 1984

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drought was especially severe, causing the lowest grain yields in nine years and the need to import record levels of grain in MY 1984/85. The return of the rains in the summer of 1985 resulted in overall good grain production, although several northern regions continued to suffer the effects of long-term drought. Although Niger's per capita grain production of 277 kg during the 1981-85 period was the highest of the eight countries surveyed, it was not sufficient to meet food requirements. Grain imports, including purchases and aid, averaged 155,000 tons annually during the period. Prospects were for an above-average grain crop in 1986, with only slight losses expected because of localized grasshopper infestations. It is estimated that Niger needs to import only about 18,000 tons of grain to meet its requirements in MY 1987, half of which to be provided as aid.

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## Chad

The precipitation decrease during the last 25 years caused a decline of almost 40 percent in Chadian grain production from the early 1960s to the mid-1980s. The production shortfall coupled with a steep increase in population—from 3 million in 1960 to 5 million in 1985—reduced per capita grain production from 222 kg/year in 1961—65 to 93 kg/year in the 1981—85 period. The severity of the recent drought has caused the level of Lake Chad to drop perilously low, threatening fisheries and agricultural projects. Indeed, the 1984 drought was so severe that grain production was reduced to 260,000 tons, little more than half of average production. The prolonged drought also decimated livestock herds, causing many nomads to shift to a dietary mainstay of cereals, further increasing grain consumption requirements.

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Sudan

Despite decreasing precipitation and grain yields over the last 25 years, Sudan's grain production reportedly has increased

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from an average 1.6 million tons in 1961-65 to 2.9 million tons in 1981-85. The Sudanese were able to increase output by nearly tripling the area planted to grain during the period. Between the early 1960s and 1980 annual per capita grain production increased from 125 kg to 147 kg, a noteworthy achievement considering that the population increased almost 60 percent during the same period--from about 11.8 million to 18.7 million. However, a drastic decrease in precipitation in the 1980s and correspondingly low grain yields reversed the trend toward food self-sufficiency. Indeed, the 1984 drought, which cut normal grain production more than one-third, caused Sudan to import a record 1.2 million tons of grain in 1985, more than two times the 1984 level. In 1985 good rains and a record area planted to grain reversed the trend and resulted in a record 4.6-million-ton grain crop. The 1986 harvest apparently was good, mostly because of sufficient rains in the major millet and sorghum regions in the east. The insurgency in the southern areas of the country, however, is hampering grain distribution and causing local shortages. It is estimated that Sudan needs to import about 400,000 tons of grain, 75 percent through aid, to meet its requirements in MY 1987.

Ethiopia

Ethiopia's grain yields have been rising at an annual trend rate of almost 24 kg/ha over the last 25 years, despite the fact that precipitation levels have been decreasing. Nevertheless, reduction of grain area and steep population growth over the last 25 years have greatly reduced the per capita grain production. As the population increased from 21 million in 1961 to 43 million in 1985, per capita grain production fell from about 214 kg/year in 1961-65 to 135 kg/year in 1981-85. Average yields have risen primarily because of greater use of fertilizers. The tenfold increase in use of fertilizers—from less than 1 kg/ha in the 1960s to more than 10 kg/ha in the 1979-83 period—makes Ethiopia the largest user of mineral fertilizers among the countries included in this study. Higher average yields may also reflect the abandonment of less productive land as a result of internal strife or erosion.

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Severe drought, aggravated by civil war, lowered grain production in 1984 by 650,000 tons, compared with the previous five-year average. As a result, record grain purchases and aid were required to sustain the famine-stricken population. Near-normal rainfall in 1985 improved the situation somewhat, although the estimated 5.2-million-ton grain harvest still was not sufficient to meet the grain needs of the population. Estimates of 1986 grain crops indicate an above-average grain production of

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more than 6 million tons, about 1 million tons short of Ethiopia's needs. Carryover stocks from aid received in 1985 and	
1986, however, limit 1987 grain aid needs to less than 500,000	
tons at worst.	25 <b>X</b> 1
Somalia	
Somalia is not a large grain producer, its agricultural sector is based mainly on livestock. Somalia's average grain	
production450,000 tons for 1981-85represents only 3 percent	
of the total grain production of the eight countries of the region. Grain production and yields reportedly have increased	
during the last 10 years. The increase resulted mainly from the expansion of agriculture into fertile river basins in the south	
and the increased planting of corn, which produces higher yields	
than other grains.	25 <b>X</b> 1
Somalia has been heavily dependent on grain importsmost of it in the form of aidto meet its grain requirements. In the	
period 1981-85 it imported more than 40 percent of its annual	
average grain consumption of 760,000 tons. Even with a record 1985 harvest of 619,000 tons and the good harvest expected in	
1986, Somalia still will have to import about 175,000 tonsagain	25 <b>X</b> 1
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