

16



Directorate of
Intelligence

~~Secret~~



25X1

Moscow's Fisheries Development Program in the Non-Communist Third World: The New Offensive



25X1

A Research Paper

~~Secret~~

GI 86-10039
June 1986

372

Page Denied



**Directorate of
Intelligence**

Secret

25X1

Moscow's Fisheries Development Program in the Non-Communist Third World: The New Offensive

25X1

A Research Paper

This paper was prepared by Office
of Global Issues, and Office of Soviet
Analysis.

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

Reverse Blank

Secret

*GI 86-10039
June 1986*

Secret

25X1

**Moscow's Fisheries Development
Program in the
Non-Communist Third World:
The New Offensive**

25X1

Key Judgments

*Information available
as of 30 April 1986
was used in the report.*

The Soviets over the past year and a half have moved decisively to protect their extensive and profitable fishing interests in the non-Communist Third World. Successful initiatives include:

- The extension of Soviet fishing operations in the Pacific through an August 1985 licensing agreement with Kiribati, the first with a developing state in the South Pacific.
- A 25-percent increase in 1984 over previous total pledges in fisheries assistance to LDCs through provision of \$100 million in new aid that will expand shore facilities in Africa for use by the Soviet fleet.
- An agreement to install drydock facilities in Seychelles that could facilitate ship repairs in the Indian Ocean.
- The establishment of a joint-venture fishing company and installation of a drydock in Mauritania under a June 1985 agreement that will give the Soviet fishing fleet port rights all along the Atlantic coast of Africa.
- Resurrected talks with Indonesia on a joint fishing venture to replace an agreement that has not been used for 20 years.

Moscow is also working to gain additional fishing rights in the western Pacific, an area hitherto fished mostly by US and other Western fleets.

25X1

The new Soviet assistance brings LDC fisheries aid to more than half a billion dollars under a program that has grown steadily since it began in earnest in the late 1960s. Although this miniprogram represents only about an estimated 2 percent of total Soviet economic pledges to non-Communist LDCs, its impact has been extensive, profitable to Moscow, and highly cost effective in terms of financial outlays. For example, for less than \$10 million annually, the USSR has:

- Gained access to ports and fishing grounds for its fishing fleet in 44 less developed countries.
- Supported \$80-125 million a year in hard currency earnings from fish exports.
- Overcome fuel and services bottlenecks at home (where trawlers sometimes spend inordinate amounts of time in port because of congestion or diesel shortages) by using the resources of LDC ports for resupply.
- Supported its annual marine catch of 8-9 million metric tons with at least 2 million metric tons from LDC waters.
- Improved the domestic protein supply without the costly investment required for equivalent results from farm production.

25X1

Secret



25X1

Research activity to catalog seabed resources also has provided valuable economic information about the coastal and territorial waters of 30 countries under the fisheries aid program.

25X1

Despite its small size, the Kremlin's fishing program has reached more LDCs than any other form of Soviet development aid (outside technical services and training). It is the only significant Soviet economic effort in six countries and Moscow's only extensive program in Africa. In recent years, the USSR has branched out in its search for new fishing clients; in addition to the recent agreements, it also has offered facilities to Burma, Cape Verde, the Comoros, Uruguay, and six island nations in the western Pacific.

25X1

In our judgment, the program has not served Moscow's fishing aid customers nearly as well.

25X1

it has failed to develop viable fishing industries in LDCs and has not helped LDCs remedy their pressing food needs. LDC complaints have centered around:

25X1

- Soviet failure to meet contract obligations to construct promised shore facilities or train local personnel.
- Harmful Soviet fishing practices that reduce availability of fish to local fleets.
- Fish shortages caused by not delivering promised amounts of fish or delivering less desirable varieties.

25X1

In spite of Moscow's well-known penchant for not honoring fishing pacts, LDCs continue to deal with Moscow for political reasons, for short-term gains in the form of licensing fees, and because they lack alternative financing for fisheries development. Nonetheless, we believe that Western aid and private-sector investments in LDC fleet and shore facilities, training programs, and patrol capabilities could persuade even some of Moscow's hardline LDC fisheries clients—such as Angola and Mozambique—to reduce, or even eliminate, Soviet fishing programs. Some major fishing countries, such as Japan and Spain, have already begun to put together commercial fishing packages that contain attractive development benefits such as the construction of shore facilities and training. The United States is also exploring a regional fisheries program for the Southern and western Pacific.

25X1

Secret

Contents

	<i>Page</i>
Key Judgments	iii
The Soviet Fishing Fleet: Wide Ranging and Profitable	1
The Fisheries Aid Program: Entree at Bargain Prices	1
Joint Ventures: An Effective Instrument	2
An Outreach Program for the 1980s	4
Dissatisfaction With the Aid Program	7
Why LDCs Accept Soviet Fisheries Aid	8
Outlook	8
Appendix	
USSR: Assistance to Fishing Industries in LDCs, 1959-31 December 1985	11

Secret

25X1

**Moscow's Fisheries Development
Program in the
Non-Communist Third World:
The New Offensive**

25X1

**The Soviet Fishing Fleet:
Wide Ranging and Profitable**

The Soviet Union has one of the world's most active fishing industries. It is a significant earner of hard currency as well as a source of food for the USSR's population. Soviet exports of fish products have averaged about \$250 million annually since 1975, and reached \$360 million in 1983, with at least one-third of these exports going to hard currency customers.

In recent years, the USSR's annual ocean catch has averaged about 8-9 million metric tons, second only to that of Japan, according to UN statistics. The Soviet catch peaked at 9.4 million tons in 1976 and fell steadily until 1978 as 200-mile exclusive economic zones (EEZs) came into force for most countries. Anticipating establishment of these zones, Moscow had begun in the early 1970s to revise traditional fishing practices by concluding agreements to fish LDC waters (which contain two-thirds of the world's fish resources). This process accelerated after the United States, Canada, and European countries excluded the USSR from some of its most important fishing grounds in 1977. In the 1980s the catch from LDC waters has nearly offset earlier losses elsewhere.

**The Fisheries Aid Program:
Entree at Bargain Prices**

The fisheries aid program was Moscow's earliest means to gain entree to LDC ports and servicing facilities. Since its first extension of fisheries credit to Guinea in 1959, the USSR has used this cost-effective program to gain a presence in the fishing sector of 44 non-Communist LDCs (tables 1 and 2). By 1986 the USSR had pledged more than \$500 million in fisheries aid and proposed 24 joint ventures, of which 12 have become operational (table 3). In 1985 about 1,000 Soviet fisheries personnel were providing technical services to LDCs, and more than 750 LDC trainees were studying fishing in the USSR.

Table 1 *Million US \$*
**USSR: Fisheries Aid to Non-Communist
LDCs, by Year**

Total	516
1959-74	204
1975	63
1976	7
1977	16
1978	NEGL
1979	41
1980	58
1981	21
1982	10
1983	NEGL
1984	96
1985	0

25X1

25X1

At the same time, expenditures on this program have been very modest. According to our data, only about \$10 million in aid flows annually to LDCs under Soviet fishing aid agreements (less than 1 percent of total Soviet aid disbursements to non-Communist LDCs). Moscow probably also has paid another \$10 million annually in recent years for licensing fees and the use of drydock facilities. In contrast, the returns from the fishing aid program are enormous:

25X1

- The Soviet catch from coastal waters bordering exclusively on LDCs accounts for about one-third of Moscow's recorded marine catch, according to UN statistics (see figure 1).
- The minimum allowable catch from the territorial waters of only six African countries (Angola, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Mauritania, Mozambique, and Sierra Leone) was valued at about \$300 million at

25X1

Secret

Secret

Table 2
Soviet Assistance to Non-Communist LDCs
for Fisheries Development, 1959—December 1985^a

Million US \$

	Extended	Drawn		Extended	Drawn
Total	516	247			
North Africa	36	9	East Asia	17	15
Algeria	4	4	Indonesia	15	15
Mauritania	29	5	Malaysia	2	0
Morocco	3	0	Europe	1	0
Sub-Saharan Africa	242	76	Portugal	1	0
Angola	61	10	Latin America	32	7
Benin	1	1	Argentina	5	0
Cape Verde	5	1	Chile ^b	10	0
Equatorial Guinea ^b	1	0	Nicaragua	15	5
Gambia, The ^b	2	NEGL	Peru	2	2
Ghana	14	3	South Asia	24	21
Guinea	37	10	Bangladesh	15	15
Guinea-Bissau	11	8	India	2	2
Kenya	2	0	Maldives ^b	NEGL	0
Liberia	NEGL	NEGL	Pakistan	4	4
Mauritius ^b	5	2	Sri Lanka	3	0
Mozambique	24	24	Middle East	164	119
Senegal	4	4	Egypt	16	2
Seychelles	20	NEGL	Iran	9	8
Sierra Leone	7	7	Iraq	25	25
Somalia ^b	47	5	North Yemen	15	12
Sudan ^b	NEGL	0	South Yemen	99	72
Tanzania	1	1			

^a In the case of joint ventures, only grants and credits for financing Soviet equipment and partner country equity shares are included; costs of training and Soviet advisers are excluded.

^b Program discontinued.

[]

25X1

average prices for the USSR's African catch in 1984. Soviet underreporting of catches and poaching could double this value, according to many fishing experts. At least \$1 billion worth of fish is caught every year by the Soviets off LDC coasts.

- Through sales to West European customers, Moscow earns at least \$100 million in hard currency annually on the catch we estimate comes from LDC waters.

These factors make the USSR's fisheries aid effort the most profitable economic aid program in the world. []

25X1

Joint Ventures: An Effective Instrument

The Soviet fishing program in the non-Communist Third World has evolved from a search for logistic support in the 1960s, through a focus in the early 1970s on obtaining licensing agreements, to its current multifaceted format that uses aid, licensing fees,

Secret


Table 3
Soviet Joint Fishing Ventures in LDCs

Venture/Location	Founded	Comments
Cofistraco (Cameroon)	1979	Minority interest owned by Sovhispan, Iberles. Activities include fishing in West Africa, marketing of fish, import of Spanish commodities.
Ecopesca (Equatorial Guinea)	1973	49-percent Sovrybflot ownership. Activities include fishing in Guinean waters and marketing of fish.
Estrela do Mar (Guinea-Bissau)	1975	49-percent Sovrybflot ownership. Activities include fishing in the Atlantic and marketing of fish. In 1985, opened branch office in Dakar, Senegal, to market fish in Western Europe.
Fransov (France)	1976	50-percent Sovrybflot, 32-percent Interagra ownership. Activities include representing Soviet fishing interests in West Africa; fishing, processing and marketing of fish; and providing technical services for the Soviet fishing fleet. Holds 20-percent interest in Sierra Fishing Company.
Marissco (Singapore)	1976	49-percent Sovrybflot ownership. A purely commercial company involved in the import, processing, and marketing of fish. Provides technical services for the Soviet Pacific fishing fleet.
Mausov (Mauritania)	1984	49-percent Sovrybflot ownership, 40-percent Mauritanian Government ownership, and 11-percent private ownership.
Mosopesca (Mozambique)	1979	49-percent Sovrybflot ownership. Activities include exploitation of fish and shrimp resources in Mozambique.
Rafidain (Iraq)	1976	49-percent Sovrybflot ownership. Activities include fishing in the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean.
Sierra Fishing Co. (Sierra Leone)	1976	20-percent Fransov ownership. Activities include fishing in Sierra Leone's waters, processing and marketing of fish.
Somalfish (Somalia)	1973	49-percent Sovrybflot ownership. Activities included fishing in Gulf of Aden and Indian Ocean and marketing of fish. Dissolved in 1977.
Sovhispan (Canary Islands)	1971	50-percent Sovrybflot ownership. Activities include fishing in Africa and Latin America, marketing of fish products, and technical services for the Soviet fleet. Subsidiaries: Pesconsa (fishing), Iberles (import/export), Sovimex (construction). Sovhispan and Iberles hold minority interest in Cofistraco, a Cameroonian venture. Provides re-provisioning services to the Soviet fleet.
Sov Inca (Peru)		Provides services for Soviet fishing fleet.

25X1

Secret

Figure 1
USSR: The Marine Catch^a



^a Excludes catch from inland waters.

[Redacted]

309073 5-86

and the establishment of joint ventures with partners reluctant to commit resources without equity participation. This flexible approach responds to guidelines set by a special commission formed by the Soviet Minister of Fisheries in the mid-1970s to study the problems posed by 200-mile EEZs, [Redacted]

The USSR has preferred licensing agreements as the most direct way to gain access to LDC resources without a potentially burdensome commitment to upgrade local fishing sectors, [Redacted]

[Redacted] Under these arrangements, the USSR pays a flat fee based on the size of the catch. But where necessary, it enters joint ventures with countries (such as Argentina and Mauritania) where tight governmental restrictions on foreign fishing make licensing arrangements illegal, or where the LDC partner insists on capital investments. In contrast, most LDCs prefer joint ventures or aid in the belief that they will be able to develop their local industries. [Redacted]

A review of Soviet agreements shows that the usual joint-venture arrangement provides for 51-percent ownership by local interests and 49 percent by Sovrybflot, the Soviet foreign trade entity under the Soviet Fisheries Ministry that handles foreign fisheries matters. Moscow provides capital in the form of trawlers, port development, processing facilities, and training, while the LDC provides port access and repays its share of the initial capital investment with profits from the venture. Since the late 1970s, Moscow has generally provided concessionary aid (which requires the highest degree of financial commitment) only to longtime partners who show signs of abrogating fishing agreements. In 1985, however, Moscow again began using aid offers to attract new clients in the Western Pacific. [Redacted]

25X1

According to our data, the Soviets have signed joint fishing venture agreements with 24 countries, although up to now only 12 joint companies have actually been formed. One of the most active has been the joint venture with Spanish companies (Sovhispan) founded in 1971 to provide goods and services for the Soviet Atlantic fishing fleet. Moscow owns majority shares in Sovhispan and directs its operations. Sovhispan has been a convenient tool for the Soviets in negotiating fishing agreements with LDCs. For example, Sovhispan (rather than Sovrybflot) represents Soviet interests in the USSR's joint venture with Cameroon, has negotiated with Angola and Kenya concerning fishing agreements, and may negotiate future agreements in Latin America on Moscow's behalf, [Redacted] Similarly, the Soviet-French joint venture Fransov, in which Moscow is also the major stockholder, has been used in Sierra Leone and Tunisia. [Redacted]

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

An Outreach Program for the 1980s

Moscow's current strategy combines aid offers to new LDC recipients with offers of substantial new aid to old customers to keep their interest (table 4). Moscow's most recent targets have been the microstates of the southwest Pacific, where Soviet persistence recently paid off with a licensing agreement with Kiribati, according to the local press. This small island

25X1

25X1

Secret

Secret

The Early Years: Logistics Paramount

The Soviet fisheries program of the 1960s emphasized bunkering agreements to support fishing activities in distant waters. The first agreement was signed with Guinea in 1959 for onshore storage facilities. It was followed by aid to 17 other African countries as Moscow moved into the rich sardine grounds in the South Atlantic. Thereafter, the USSR shifted attention to the maritime nations along the Indian Ocean and to Latin American countries in the Southern Hemisphere. For most countries, Soviet assistance agreements provided for improved port facilities for cargo handling, storage of goods, refrigeration, and ship repairs; trawlers; research; and technical assistance and training for LDC crews. In return, the USSR gained worldwide access to shore facilities for its fleet and was able to repair and refuel vessels, transfer crews, and process some of the catch on-shore. [redacted]

Although few ports around the world deny Soviet ships access for fueling and provisioning, spacious anchorages and well-equipped facilities are needed to service Soviet trawler and factory ship fleets that often number 100 or more. By the early 1970s, the Soviets had fisheries agreements that entitled them to bunkering and transshipment points in almost every area fished by their vessels. [redacted]

nation is the first to respond to a number of Soviet offers of fisheries assistance to countries of the western Pacific and Indian Ocean. The one-year renewable agreement with Kiribati allows the Soviets to fish for tuna (Moscow's first such venture), using tuna boats built recently in Poland, but does not provide port rights for refueling or reprovisioning. Moscow agreed to pay \$1.7 million for one year's fishing rights, at least 10 percent of Kiribati's budget for 1985. According to US Embassy reporting, the prospects for Soviet agreements with Vanuatu and Western Samoa have improved since the accord with Kiribati was signed. Fiji, the Solomon Islands, Tonga,

and Tuvalu reportedly also are reconsidering Moscow's overtures (despite previously rejecting Soviet fisheries offers), in the wake of the Kiribati agreement. [redacted]

The Soviet Union's interest in the rich southeastern Pacific fishing grounds off Latin America and in Antarctic krill reserves has also led Moscow to pursue fishing agreements in Latin America with renewed vigor in the past two years. In Argentina, where the Soviets had an inactive agreement dating from 1974, Moscow has negotiated intensely for the formation of a joint venture to exploit Antarctic krill. In Peru, where the Soviets have access to shore facilities they built at Paita in the 1970s, energetic lobbying by Moscow to maintain its presence in Peruvian waters has increasingly come under attack by domestic fishing interests, according to the local press. The Soviet fleet off Peru currently is operating under a short-term licensing agreement because the new Garcia government is undecided about renewing a fishing agreement that, in effect, allows Moscow unlimited access to Peru's resources because of Lima's inability to police its waters. According to US Embassy reporting, Moscow also has:

- Extended a \$10 million credit to Nicaragua to build a fishing port at San Juan del Sur for the Soviet Pacific fishing fleet.
- Signed an agreement with Panama for bunkering rights in Vacamonte.
- Obtained short-term licenses in Colombia through Pescaconsa, Sovhispan's fishing subsidiary.
- Made offers of fisheries aid to Brazil and Ecuador in 1983, and to Uruguay in 1984. [redacted]

While the USSR pursued its aggressive campaign in the southwestern Pacific and Latin America, it also continued its contacts in Africa. In the 1980s the USSR has signed new fisheries aid agreements with Angola, Guinea, Madagascar, and Seychelles; renewed agreements with Mozambique and Sierra Leone; and conducted a coastal survey for Liberia, [redacted] It has made offers to Cape Verde, Congo and Mauritius for the renewal of

Secret

Table 4
USSR: Status of Fishing Programs in Non-Communist LDCs

Valid Agreements		Canceled Agreements	Outstanding Offers
Algeria ^a	Maldives ^a	Chile	Brazil
Angola ^b	Mauritania ^b	Equatorial Guinea	Burma
Argentina ^b	Mexico ^b	Jamaica	Cape Verde
Bangladesh	Morocco ^b	Mauritius	Comoros
Benin ^b	Mozambique ^b	Somalia	Congo
Cameroon ^b	Nicaragua ^b		Costa Rica
Egypt ^b	North Yemen		Cyprus
Gambia, The ^a	Pakistan		Ecuador
Ghana ^b	Peru		Equatorial Guinea
Guinea ^b	Portugal		Fiji
Guinea-Bissau ^b	Senegal		Kenya
Guyana ^b	Seychelles		Madagascar
India	Sierra Leone ^b		Mauritius
Indonesia ^a	Singapore ^b		Papua-New Guinea
Iran	Spain ^b		Solomon Islands
Iraq ^b	Sri Lanka ^b		Tonga
Kiribati	Sudan		Tuvalu
Liberia ^a	Tanzania ^a		Uruguay
Malaysia ^b	Tunisia		Vanuatu
			Western Samoa

[Redacted]

^b Joint ventures.

[Redacted]

25X1

25X1

Secret

fishing privileges that have lapsed over the past few years. The agreements with Angola and Guinea are notable for their large size—a total of \$75 million—and their broad scope. These agreements call for port construction, processing facilities, and development of artisanal and deep sea fishing—activities that we believe will enable Moscow to maintain its presence in the fishing industries of these countries after several years of squabbling over the terms of fishing agreements. [redacted]

Dissatisfaction With the Aid Program

Once an LDC has signed a Soviet fishing agreement, it often finds that the USSR falls far short on implementation. Complaints have surfaced in several areas.

Failure To Meet Contract Obligations. An almost universal criticism, according to US Embassy reporting, is that the Soviets do not provide the facilities and training promised under agreements:

- In Ghana, the USSR did not train Ghanaians to operate the trawlers provided them and pulled out of Ghana's industry when Accra ran short of cash to pay for Soviet experts and spare parts. Ghana's fleet was left crippled, according to Embassy reporting.
- A \$40 million project in Somalia to relocate nomads and to use them in developing a local fishing industry was a complete fiasco. The only beneficiaries were the Soviets who were allowed to fish Somalia's waters as part of the agreement. Somalia received no profits from the joint venture; its share went to pay the operating costs of the Soviets, who dominated the company. Cancellation of the agreement in 1977 was greeted with popular acclaim, with delighted Somalis brandishing placards reading, "Not only we but our fish in the ocean are protesting against the Soviets for ill treatment."
- In Guinea-Bissau, the government has complained that not one Guinean has been trained or even works on the ships provided to the joint Soviet-Guinean fishing company. Instead, Guinea-Bissau pays the Soviets \$1,500 a day to operate these vessels.

Similar complaints about not receiving promised equipment have come from Guinea, Morocco, and Mauritania. [redacted]

Harmful Fishing Practices. Soviet fishing practices often do substantial damage to the local industry, according to Western experts. The Soviets have been guilty of overfishing in Angola, Cameroon, Chile, Guinea, Mauritania, Morocco, Pakistan, and Peru. In Angola and Mozambique, fishermen are up in arms because the Soviets use a vacuum method on the seabed that has stripped the coastline of shellfish. In Sierra Leone, the Soviets have been observed using extrafine mesh nets that do not permit young fish to escape, fishing so close to shore that their trawlers destroy nets set out by local fishermen, and illegally fishing in the coastal spawning grounds. Soviet boats are known to poach even in the waters of countries where they have agreements, such as Angola, Mauritania, and Peru. [redacted]

Fish Shortages. The USSR's fish deliveries under quota agreements fail to meet even the most minimal LDC food production goals. Under typical fishing agreements, fish deliveries to LDCs generally comprise 8 to 15 percent of the total catch. Soviet trawlers often underreport their catch, reducing the amount of fish they must surrender for local consumption, according to a UN fisheries expert. Embassy and press reports detail the specifics of Soviet practices:

- Guinea-Bissau believes that the Soviets cheat by transferring most of their catch to processing ships at sea rather than bringing it into port. The quality of the fish the Soviets deliver often is poor, composed of undesirable varieties and badly preserved.
- Severe fish shortages have been reported in previously well-stocked markets in Angola, Equatorial Guinea, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, and Mozambique since fishing agreements were signed with the USSR.
- In Sierra Leone, the government may purchase additional quantities of fish from the joint venture, but it must pay in hard currency. In addition, most of the fish received from the venture has to be sold abroad to meet operating and amortization costs for the joint company.

These shortages have earned the Soviets much ill will among the local people. In Luanda, for example,

25X1

25X1

25X1

Secret

Red Herrings

Displaying increasing sensitivity to LDC accusations about fishing abuses, Moscow's fisheries ministry responded for the first time at a press conference in Sierra Leone in May 1984. The minister asserted that Moscow loses \$5-10 million a year in Sierra Leone because of the great distances its fleet must travel. He said the Soviets continued to honor the agreement because "We are of the opinion that we are providing help to the people of this country." [redacted]

dissatisfied Angolans marched on the local ministry of fishing to protest shortages caused by the Soviet agreements, [redacted]

Why LDCs Accept Soviet Fisheries Aid

Developing countries have a number of reasons for signing fishing agreements with the Soviet Union in spite of well-publicized evidence that such agreements may be detrimental to their industries in the long run. In our view, the most pressing is economic need. Fishing resources often represent an important source of food, employment, and revenue for the poorer LDCs. Although their coastal waters may contain rich fish resources, LDCs often lack both the means to exploit them efficiently and to protect them from poaching by other nations. To an LDC with few funding alternatives, the Soviet aid program appears to offer opportunities to develop this potentially important area. [redacted]

Politics play a role as well. Angola, Mozambique, and Nicaragua signed fishing agreements with Moscow shortly after the Soviets became their major military supplier because they believed the Soviets also would improve domestic fishing industries, [redacted]

[redacted] Now, in our view, these countries' dependence on the USSR for assistance in combating insurgencies makes it hard for them to resist Soviet pressures to conclude damaging fisheries agreements without outside help even though they are dissatisfied with Soviet efforts. Similarly, in Equatorial Guinea, the Marxist Macias regime continued a flawed agreement because of reliance on Soviet military aid. With

the overthrow of Macias, the agreement was allowed to expire, according to US Embassy reporting. [redacted]

To obtain an agreement, the Soviets sometimes court influential locals to lobby on their behalf, according to US Embassy sources:

- Sierra Leone's joint venture with the Soviets, the Sierra Fishing Company, is headed by Jamil Said Mohammed, a close friend of former President Siaka Stevens. Because of his influence, the USSR has been able to continue the agreement despite domestic protests.

- In Peru, the USSR circumvented the Peruvian Navy's opposition to Soviet fishing by setting up a joint venture with a private Peruvian company using Cuban officials to persuade the Fishing Minister, a senator, and a relative of the Foreign Minister to use their influence to bring about an agreement.

- In Mauritania, the USSR joined forces with a Soviet-trained Mauritanian to get the joint fishing venture Mausov in operation in 1984. The joint venture had been in the planning stage for more than 10 years. [redacted]

Outlook

Moscow's recent successes in the southwestern Pacific have given it entree into an area where it traditionally has had no presence. Moscow has been able to capitalize on the resentment of island nations over American disregard for their jurisdiction over migratory species, such as tuna, in their exclusive economic zones to encourage the island governments to review their policies excluding Soviet fishing in the area. Increasing economic problems and declining aid contributions from traditional donors also attract these countries to Soviet offers. A Soviet fishing presence in the 14.5 million square kilometers of territory presently claimed by these island states would end the Western monopoly in the area, and could be detrimental to the security of US naval forces [redacted]

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1


25X1

25X1

25X1

Secret

Secret



known Soviet violations and the general dissatisfaction of most recipients with the program. For example, Guinea, which has criticized its fishing agreement with the Soviets and has sought Western aid and investment, was forced to renew its agreement with Moscow in July 1984 because no Western donors responded to a US agribusiness task force estimate in 1983 that Guinea's fishing industry could be properly established for a modest \$4 million. The new Soviet agreement involves new aid commitments and a much larger Soviet presence in Guinea's fishing industry. In the case of Kiribati, Moscow's high bid for licensing arrangements, about \$1.7 million for one year, exceeded aid or commercial offers from any other source. Nonetheless, in our judgment, because of persistent complaints about Soviet programs, fisheries clients could be weaned from Soviet fishing programs with Western assistance and investment. [redacted]

25X1

25X1

In many cases, Western fishing fleets have also acted irresponsibly by depleting local fish stocks, underreporting their catches, and failing to provide assistance to develop local fleets. According to Western fishing experts, foreign fishing in LDC waters should be accompanied by a measured development of LDC capabilities through conservation, training, and the provision of modern trawlers, fishing gear, and preserving and storage facilities ashore. These goals appear to be achievable through private organizations by the formation of joint ventures that provide the necessary technology and training in the course of their operations. [redacted]

25X1

For Moscow, access to LDC waters and ports will continue to be the most critical element in maintaining and expanding the Soviet fishing industry, according to Western experts. Until now, the USSR's richest fishing grounds have been the northwest Pacific and northeast Atlantic; in these areas, fishing operations have reached capacity. The UN Food and Agricultural Organization estimates that the greatest unexploited fish resources lie in the west Indian Ocean and the Southern Hemisphere, including the Antarctic. Moscow is expanding its use of fisheries aid programs to acquire bunkering and fishing rights to exploit these waters through an aggressive program of offers to Latin American and western Pacific countries, while maintaining its program in Africa. [redacted]

25X1

In our judgment, as long as Western countries remain indifferent to the development of viable fishing and conservation programs in the Third World, LDCs will continue to sign agreements with Moscow in spite of

Secret

Appendix

**USSR: Assistance to Fishing Industries
in LDCs, 1959-31 December 1985**

Country	Year	Agreements and Protocols	Remarks	Value (million US \$)
North Africa				
Algeria	1968	Protocol under October 1963 line of credit: provides 18 trawlers, port construction, and oceanographic research assistance.	Agreement expired in 1969. Exchange of experts discussed by bilateral economic commission in 1968-69.	4.5
Mauritania	1973	Grant for oceanographic research laboratory at Nouadhibou; staff of 25 provided free until locals are trained.	Laboratory completed.	5.0
		Five-year agreement modifiable at one-year intervals gives Soviets fishing rights within a 30-mile limit; number, size, and type of craft specified in the agreement. A mandatory percentage of catch is to be processed at the under-utilized Nouadhibou facilities. In return, Soviets agree to provide technical assistance in fisheries research and pay undisclosed annual royalties.		
	1975	Protocol established joint fishing company under 1973 agreement: to include a fish-processing complex, 33 Soviet vessels, and 30,000 tons of fish annually for Mauritania. Two trawlers provided free of charge.		7.9
	1976	Protocol to 1973 agreement.		
	1978	Agreement renewed for five years with annual protocols.	After the coup of July 1978, agreement was canceled and new negotiations were begun to replace licensing system with a joint venture.	
	1981	Protocol to establish joint venture, Mausov: 60 percent owned by Mauritanian interests. Soviet vessels to fish Mauritanian waters in return for investment in processing complex and ship repair facility.	Mausov in operation, has licensed 46 Soviet vessels. Mauritania receives nearly \$35 million per year from the venture.	16.0
	1983	Agreement revised.		
	1985	Agreement signed for floating drydock.	In September 1985, the Soviets began to move a floating drydock and 200 technicians to Nouadhibou port to service Soviet fishing vessels.	

Secret

Secret

**USSR: Assistance to Fishing Industries
in LDCs, 1959-31 December 1985 (continued)**

Country	Year	Agreements and Protocols	Remarks	Value (million US \$)
Morocco	1966	Credit for fishing boats.		3.1
	1973	Under United Nations Development Program, Food and Agricultural Organization: fisheries research on Soviet vessels, training in USSR, and creation of training center in Morocco. Joint company to be organized to operate leased Soviet vessels in Moroccan coastal waters and to construct and operate a fish-processing plant and refrigeration warehouse.	Processing plant not built.	
	1978	Agreement for joint companies, import of surplus Moroccan fish, assistance in organizing Moroccan maritime personnel, aid in cannery and export operation, and fisheries studies on Soviet-supplied research vessels. For five-year period.	No joint venture formed.	
	1984	Protocol on cooperation in fishing.		
	1985	General protocol on forming a number of small joint fishing and processing ventures with equal joint ownership and an increase in annual 6-year fishing scholarships to 55. Moscow also proposed formation of joint venture similar to the one with Mauritania.		
Tunisia	1976	Agreement for joint Tunisian, French, and Soviet company to develop Tunisian industry and protocol for continued fisheries research and Soviet assistance.	No activity noted.	
Sub-Saharan Africa				
Angola	1976	Agreement on joint fishing venture including: Marine survey. Survey and development of national fishing industry. Modernization of fish-processing enterprises. Provision of vessels and training. In return, Soviets received exclusive fishing rights within Angola's 200-mile zone, plus facilities for anchorage, repair, provisioning, and unloading.	In 1978, Moscow donated four fishing boats and two trawlers to be manned by Soviet crews. Cooperation continues in fleet formation, development of port infrastructure, and training.	
	1977	Grant—fisheries aid. Protocol to provide: 30,000 tons of fish to Angola per year. 10 additional trawlers and technical services.		0.5 10.0

Secret

Secret

Country	Year	Agreements and Protocols	Remarks	Value (million US \$)
Angola	1978	Grant of six fishing boats.		0.1
		Protocol on aid in training and constructing several fish processing plants.		
	1979	Grant of fisheries protection vessel.		0.1
		Protocol for joint fishing project, 1979-81, training of Angolans.		
1983	Grant of second fisheries protection vessel.		0.1	
1984	Fishing agreement to cover eight years. Soviets to establish fisheries complex with wharves, repair facilities, and cold storage complex on credit basis.	Angolans renegotiated agreement in 1985	50.0	
Benin	1977	Agreement probably includes construction of shore facilities and a joint venture.	No progress beyond research stage.	0.5
Cameroon	1979	Agreement to form joint venture, Cameroon Fishing and Trading Co. (Cofistraco).	Joint venture formed.	
Cape Verde	1979	Credit—expansion of port facilities.		5.3
Equatorial Guinea	1973	Soviets given fishing rights and use of Luba port facility; Soviets to provide fish and train Guinean personnel on Soviet trawlers. Joint venture, Ecompesca, formed.	Agreement allowed to lapse by Equatorial Guinea in 1979.	0.5
	1980	Agreement canceled.		
The Gambia	1973	Survey of local fisheries resources.	No implementation beyond initial survey.	0.1
	1975	Protocol to construct port facilities, provide fishing vessels and training.		2.0
Ghana	1960	Protocol to construct fishing complex at Tema, including processing and cold storage plants, shop to produce fishing gear, eight fishing boats.	Work suspended after 1966 coup, resumed in early 1970s. Drydock facilities completed by Ghana in 1967.	11.2
	1961	Credit—10 fishing trawlers.	Delivered.	2.8
	1963-64	Protocol to 1960 agreement for floating dock, training of 100 Ghanaians, equipment for fisheries school, and joint research.	Fisheries assistance continued as only program after the overthrow of N'Krumah.	
	1976	Protocol to increase Soviet participation in Ghanaian fisheries and to create a joint Soviet-Ghanaian company for production and processing of tuna.	No activity noted.	
Guinea	1959	Under a \$35 million line of credit a cold storage plant at Conakry.	Completed 1963; expanded 1968. Technical training provided.	2.3
	1962	Under a credit of \$13 million, port machinery, 10 fishing vessels, and cold storage plant.	Four seiners delivered in 1966. Soviet and Guinean personnel operate boats. Repair facilities under construction.	8.0
	1966	Authorized Soviets to fish in Guinea's EEZ in return for 60 three-year scholarships for study in the USSR; construction of dock and repair facilities at Conakry.	Soviets have fished Guinean waters but have not provided promised shore facilities and technical assistance.	

Secret

Secret

**USSR: Assistance to Fishing Industries
in LDCs, 1959-31 December 1985 (continued)**

Country	Year	Agreements and Protocols	Remarks	Value (million US \$)
Guinea	1969	Renewed the 1966 protocol and arranged for the lease of Soviet trawlers through June 1979.	Soviets to provide 50 percent of their catch to Guinea.	
	1973	Grant for oceanographic research center at Conakry.	Completed.	1.5
	1974	Protocol permanently assigned hydrographic vessel to Conakry and provided service and repair facilities for it.	Agreement expired in 1976. Short-term licensing of Soviet vessels until 1981.	
	1981	Fishing cooperation agreement. Soviets licensed to fish in Guinean waters for annual flat fee of \$0.8 million, to sell 10,000 tons of fish on Guinean market, to train Guineans in fisheries management, and to develop fishing industry.	Being implemented.	
	1984	Grant of 150 tons of fish. Agreement granting the Soviets fishing rights in return for fishing boats, a refrigerated warehouse, and an ice plant, supply of 10,000 tons of fish annually, training to Guineans, and rental fees to the government. Moscow has allocated \$2.2 million for fisheries development study.		0.2 25.0
Guinea-Bissau	1975	Agreement for joint commercial venture "Estrela do Mar," with Soviets supplying five refrigerated trawlers, and 90 percent of the personnel. Also, a 10-year agreement allowing five-year renewal for fisheries research, training, and technical assistance establishing fishing fleet and processing plants. Reciprocal rights granted Soviets for five boats. Technical services for cash.	Five boats delivered 1975; fish processing facilities completed 1980.	10.5
	1977	Protocol implementing cold storage plant at Bafata, port modernization, fisheries infrastructural development, transfer of four ships, and building repair docks.		
	1978	Renegotiated 1975 agreement for straight partnership with joint receipts after operating costs split two ways. Soviets to drop operating charges for ships.		
	1984	Grant of fish. Agreement revised. Soviet fishing restricted to coastal waters.		0.2
Kenya	1964	Under a \$44 million line of credit, USSR agreed to construct fish cannery and related facilities, training, and supply of vessels.	Training and supply of vessels in 1965-68.	2.0

Secret

Country	Year	Agreements and Protocols	Remarks	Value (million US \$)
Liberia	1981	Soviet research vessel conducted survey of Liberian waters.	Completed.	0.1
Mauritius	1970	Credit for two trawlers, marine equipment, and services of specialists. Renewable at three-year intervals.	About \$1 million worth of fishing gear delivered.	5.0
	1974	Accord signed in 1974 and renewed in 1976 calls for joint venture for research and supplying local markets with 60 tons of fish annually. Ten trainees to study in USSR each year.	Agreement allowed to lapse by Mauritius in 1980.	
Mozambique	1976	General fishing agreement includes a joint venture, technical assistance to fishing industry construction of refrigeration and port facilities, and leasing Soviet boats to Mozambican facilities.		
	1977	Protocol to 1976 credit agreement on training crews and constructing port facilities in return for 10 to 15 percent of catch and use of port facilities.	Agreement implemented.	5.0
	1979	Five-year agreement to form joint venture, Mosopesca. Soviets to provide four boats.	Joint venture Mosopesca formed; four boats delivered in 1980.	0.4
	1980	Agreement to provide repair facility at Maputo including floating drydock, workshop, and training center. Repair facilities to service Soviet fishing fleet.	Completed in 1982.	18.5
	1983	Protocol to supply three additional fishing boats to Mosopesca.	Deliveries completed in 1985.	0.3
	1984	Protocol to assist in setting up fishing cooperatives.		0.3
Senegal	1965	Agreement to develop fisheries; conduct research; construct tuna complex; provide 10 tuna boats, fishing equipment, and training.	Complex declared not feasible in 1966. Tuna boats delivered 1969-73.	4.4
	1968	Protocol for study of deep sea fish resources.	Completed.	
	1971	Protocol for joint fisheries survey and Soviet training program.	Senegal permits bunkering, crew change, and light repair under the 1965 agreement, but no fishing within territorial waters. Dakar reportedly finds the bunkering trade profitable enough to overlook 200-mile zone fishing violations.	
Seychelles	1978	Agreement for research, development of fishing industry, and training of Seychellois.	Research completed; two patrol boats provided as grant. In abeyance.	0.2
	1984	Agreement to construct two floating drydocks with total capacity of 800 tons to repair fishing boats and patrol craft at Victoria and Felicite Island under credit.	Seychelles reluctant to go ahead with the installation as part of current modernization effort.	20.0

**USSR: Assistance to Fishing Industries
in LDCs, 1959-31 December 1985 (continued)**

Country	Year	Agreements and Protocols	Remarks	Value (million US \$)
Sierra Leone	1976	Agreement provides for joint studies of fisheries resources, port construction, and a joint venture, Sierra Fishing Co.	Joint company formed and in operation.	7.0
	1977	Protocol for continued cooperation in constructing fishing harbors, training personnel, establishing facilities for maintenance and repair, and drawing up fisheries development plan and research program. Eighty scholarships established for study in USSR.	Quay constructed, equipment delivered, and marine training school established. Three fishing boats provided in 1980.	
	1978	Ten-year extension of 1976 agreement; annual protocols determine activities.		
Somalia	1963	In protocol to 1961 line of credit, USSR agreed to provide credits for equipment for constructing a fish cannery at Laas Qoray with annual capacity of 6 million cans a year.	Completed 1970.	4.8
	1975	Credit for fishing industry development (\$19 million), port and processing facilities (\$9 million), training center for 2,200 trainees, expansion of shipyard for fishing boats.	Suspended 1977.	28.0
	1975	Grant for fishing industry development and refugee resettlement.	Suspended in 1977.	14.0
Sudan	1961	Survey of fishing potential of Red Sea and Nile; fish cannery to be established at Jabal al Awliya.	Survey completed in 1964. Cannery feasibility reports prepared in 1965, but no subsequent activity.	0.4
Tanzania	1966	Protocol under \$20 million credit includes marine equipment and construction of fish drying and cold storage plants.	Marine equipment delivered. Cold storage and drying plants canceled.	0.9
	1982	Agreement to carry out fisheries research in Tanzanian waters.	Tanzania dissatisfied with inadequate reports that Soviets made available.	
East Asia				
Indonesia	1964	Agreement under a 1956 credit to provide trawlers and establish a fishing complex.	\$12.5 million worth of trawlers delivered; shipyard and oceanographic school completed.	15.1
Kiribati	1985	One-year licensing agreement permits 17 Soviet vessels to operate in Kiribati's EEZ until August 1986 for a fee of about \$1.7 million annually.	Fishing operations began in October, Kiribati has requested Soviets to submit a proposal for a detailed agreement involving shore facilities.	
Singapore	1975	Agreement for joint company to establish Singapore's first fully integrated seafood processing and storage complex and to provide local market with seafood and fishmeal.	The joint venture company, Marissco, processes and markets 65,000 tons of fish annually, mostly in Europe.	
Malaysia	1974	Agreement for Soviet fisheries assistance, port construction, and possible joint venture.	Not implemented.	1.5

Secret

Country	Year	Agreements and Protocols	Remarks	Value (million US \$)
Europe				
Portugal	1975	Agreement to provide Soviet equipment for fishing vessels and training of Portuguese personnel.		0.5
Spain	1971	Agreement to establish joint processing company, Sovhispan, Canary Islands.	Sovhispan in operation; it freezes, packs, and markets products caught by Soviet fleet in the South Atlantic.	
	1975	Agreement to set up joint fishing company, Pesconsa. Soviet interests represented by Sovhispan.		
Latin America				
Argentina	1974	Agreement for joint fisheries research, training, construction of fishing port, and joint fishing company.	Preliminary oceanographic studies completed.	5.0
	1980	Protocol providing for joint exploration of fishing resources south of the 46th parallel and the establishment of a joint venture to exploit krill.	Joint venture under discussion.	
Chile	1968	Following surveys, Soviets agreed to establish fishing port and crabmeat plant under a 1967 line of credit.	Suspended.	10.0
	1971	Agreement for development of fishing ports, training on Soviet vessels, technical school, and rental of Soviet fishing vessels.	Suspended.	
Colombia	1981	Cooperation between Colombian firm Impescol and Soviet firm Pesconsa to exploit Colombian fishing resources with Soviet vessels.	Possibility of formal joint venture.	
Guyana	1977	Agreement on technical assistance and training.	No activity noted.	
	1978	Protocol established joint company for catching, processing, and selling shellfish.		
Jamaica	1979	Agreement to provide USSR fishing rights in Jamaican waters in exchange for Soviet vessels, research and training, and establishment of a joint venture.	Jamaica canceled agreement in 1983 without implementation.	
Mexico	1978	Agreement on joint venture involving Soviet technical assistance to Mexico.	Negotiations on joint venture stalled.	
Nicaragua	1981	Agreement for cooperation in fishing. Soviets to provide training and technical assistance, and to establish fishing institute at Bluefields. Joint venture to be formed.	Joint venture under negotiation, fishing studies completed.	5.0

**USSR: Assistance to Fishing Industries
in LDCs, 1959-31 December 1985 (continued)**

Country	Year	Agreements and Protocols	Remarks	Value (million US \$)
	1982	Protocol providing for the construction of a repair facility at San Juan del Sur. Soviets to provide floating drydock and pier. They will pay Nicaragua \$0.2 million yearly for use of facility by Soviet tuna fleet.	Port development at San Juan del Sur may have been suspended.	10.0
	1984	Scientific protocol calls for study in commercialization of Pacific coast fishing grounds.		
	1985	Two-year economic protocol calls for Soviet technical assistance to fishing.	Under way.	
Panama	1982	Agreement to permit bunkering of Soviet fishing fleet at the port of Vacamonte.	Not yet implemented.	
Peru	1971	Agreement provides aid in constructing fisheries complex at Paita, training Peruvians at Soviet fisheries institutes, and establishing a joint fisheries research program. Allows trawlers and fish factory ships facilities at Peruvian ports and access to Peruvian waters. Agreement valid for 10 years, and renewable for three-year periods after 1981.	Commission on Soviet-Peruvian fisheries cooperation formed in 1972. First and second stage of Paita complex completed in 1975. Port equipment installed in 1976.	2.5
	1972	Protocol for port construction and training of 30 Peruvians on Soviet research vessel.		
	1976	Protocol for further research.		
	1983	Contracts with El Pacifico and Mercurio firms and Peruvian Government to permit Soviets to catch up to 55,000 tons of hake, saurel, and mackerel in Peruvian waters. Peru to receive 10 to 12 percent of catch.	Pacific Fishing Enterprise acting as intermediary for Sovrybflot, and leased Soviet trawlers to fish territorial waters. Studies by Soviet research vessels began October 1984.	
	1984	Contract permitting Soviet catch of up to 200,000 metric tons. Peru to receive 5 to 12 percent of catch.		
	1985	Temporary agreement signed extending 1984 contract for Soviet trawlers to operate off Peruvian coast for 3 to 4 months in return for 15 percent of the catch.		
Middle East				
Egypt	1964	Agreement included Soviet ships for deep sea fishing and research, technical training, and assistance in developing fishing center on the Red Sea.	Three-year fish survey in south Mediterranean completed 1970.	15.0
	1967	Number of Egyptians training in USSR increased from 200 to 300.		

Country	Year	Agreements and Protocols	Remarks	Value (million US \$)
	1969	USSR agreed to train additional 100 Egyptians.		
	1971	Agreement to provide Egypt with 12,000 tons of fish annually, undertake a joint fisheries survey, and assist in developing Lake Nasser.	In 1971, Soviets train Egyptians in Atlantic fishing. Trawling equipment delivered, survey completed. USSR supplying fish at a highly favorable price.	1.5
	1972	Agreement on additional equipment, training, surveys, technical assistance, and construction of wharf on Red Sea.	Survey and training completed.	
	1973	Soviet ships to provide Egyptians fishing off African coast with fuel and fishing tackle and to deliver frozen fish to Alexandria.	Status of joint venture unknown since abrogation of friendship treaty in March 1976.	
	1975	Protocol on training and trawling equipment for deep sea operations.		
	1983	Protocol on cooperation in fishing. Soviets to supply Egypt with 26,000 tons of frozen fish in 1983 and to train Egyptians.	The sale of fishing boats and equipment to Egypt under discussion.	
Iran	1963	Agreement to develop Caspian Sea resources, including equipment for large fish hatchery, marine survey, and reclamation work.	First section of hatchery and cold storage plant completed 1969. Port equipment arrived periodically after 1968.	2.0
	1966	Agreement under a \$17 million trade credit to expand port and construct cold storage plant.	Completed.	2.7
	1969	Agreement for trawler and five seiners.	Delivered in late 1971.	3.0
	1971	Protocol for fisheries survey of Persian Gulf.		
	1973	Agreement for six additional fish hatcheries on the Caspian Sea.	Construction under way.	1.6
Iraq	1959	A 1959 credit agreement allocated unspecified aid for fisheries development.		
	1969	Agreement to establish a research center, processing and storage facilities, to improve ports, and to train Iraqis. Allowed Soviet fishing fleet to enter Iraqi ports. Soviets also to deliver 60 fishing vessels over a five-year period, to establish repair bases, and to aid development of fishing industry.	First of Soviet-built ships delivered in 1971, three more in 1972, and eight in 1973.	25.0
	1976	Protocol for joint Iraqi-Soviet fishing company, Rafidain, with capital of \$51 million headquartered in Al Basrah, to begin with five vessels. Protocol provided for sea shipping and building Iraq's tanker and fishing fleet.	Soviets delivered two 841-ton ships equipped for fishing, freezing, and canning in 1977.	

**USSR: Assistance to Fishing Industries
in LDCs, 1959-31 December 1985 (continued)**

Country	Year	Agreements and Protocols	Remarks	Value (million US \$)
	1978	Protocol on equipment for training centers. Soviets to plan development of fishing industry and give technical assistance to joint company.	Assistance ongoing.	
Kuwait	1965	Agreement on developing fisheries industry, including port and cold storage facilities and shipyard construction.	No activity noted.	
North Yemen	1964	Protocol covering two repair shops, seven fishing boats, processing facilities, and technical training.	Repair facility workshop and cold storage plant at Al Hudaydah completed; seven fishing boats delivered.	8.0
	1974	Protocol for expanding Al Hudaydah facilities.	Completed.	6.6
South Yemen	1969	Grant for fishing industry development included research, maritime equipment, a training center at Al Mukalla, and feasibility studies for canning and cold storage facilities. Three completely equipped seiners to be furnished by USSR.	Seiners, engine, and nets delivered in 1970. Training center established. Cannery design completed in 1971 and the Soviets agreed to supply an oil and flour unit. Surveys for cold storage plants completed.	
	1972	Protocol for Soviet supply of three additional fishing boats under 1969 grant described above.	Three fishing boats delivered under 1972 protocol.	
	1974	Agreement for creation of joint company, expansion of port facilities, and additional fishing vessels under an addition to 1972 line of credit.	Fishing port 17.8 established at Hujaj five trawlers valued at \$7.8 million delivered under a 1976 protocol—two medium-size trawlers delivered in December 1976 and three small vessels in March 1977. Soviets completed canning plant at Al Mukalla and a fish meal plant at Aden in August 1978.	17.8
	1979	Protocol on cooperation in fishing. Two research vessels to explore resources in Gulf of Aden; two shore-based scientific labs to be established; five Soviet trawlers to fish South Yemeni waters. South Yemen to receive 2,000 tons fish per year and two trawlers, whose catch to be sold on Yemeni market.	Projects being implemented.	35.0
	1980	Additional credit for facilities at fishing port in Aden.	Two wharves, a floating drydock, a central workshop, and production unit under construction.	40.0
Syria	1974	Fisheries development, Buhayrat al Asad (Al Asad Lake).		
South Asia				
Bangladesh	1972	Grant for 10 fishing boats, refrigeration facilities, a training center, and Soviet technicians.	Boats delivered. Cold storage plants and center completed.	15.0
India	1966	Deep sea fisheries assistance to include use of two Soviet trawlers and construction of shipyard.	Completed.	2.2

Secret

Country	Year	Agreements and Protocols	Remarks	Value (million US \$)
	1978	India asked Moscow for further assistance. Possibility of joint venture explored.	No agreement reached.	
Maldives	1976	Agreement for assistance to local fisheries and training aboard Soviet trawlers.	No activity noted.	0.1
Pakistan	1965	Agreement to supply trawlers.	Delivered.	1.6
	1968	Agreement for oceanographic research, design of a fishing port, and training of fishermen.	Soviet experts studied land facilities in 1968. In 1969, three Soviet trawlers began training fisheries personnel and conducting a two-year fishing survey.	2.0
Sri Lanka	1971	Agreement for technical training and establishment of training center, joint fisheries operations, and possible future purchase or rental of Soviet fishing vessels.	Oceanographic research began February 1972. Soviet technicians arrived in 1973 to assist in setting up training center. In 1977, 20 scholarships granted for training Sri Lankan personnel.	3.0


--

25X1

Secret

Figure 2
USSR: Fisheries Relations With Non-Communist LDCs, 1985

Valid agreement Agreement calls for joint venture Cancelled agreement Outstanding offer 200-nautical-mile maritime zone



707773 (145038) 5-86

25X1

Secret

Secret

Secret