

Page Denied

Next 1 Page(s) In Document Denied

The New York Times _____
 The Los Angeles Times _____
 The Wall Street Journal _____
 The Washington Times _____
 USA Today _____
 Associated Press _____
 UPI _____
 Reuter _____
N.Y. TIMES NEWS SERVICE
 Date 21 JAN 1993

IRAQ IS MORE IMPORTANT TO AMERICA THAN MIDDLE-CLASS TAX RATES

By FLORA LEWIS

Copyright 1993 Flora Lewis

World rights. (800)

(Distributed by New York Times Special Features) =

Inauguration Day Jan. 20, 1993 saw the United States wallowing in "leadership" grandstanding, making gestures to show the world it cannot act without Washington and that America can act when it chooses.

As President-elect, Bill Clinton went along with George Bush's foreign-policy decisions without a grumble.

Now, the decisions are up to him.

This comes at a time when the ambiguous view of America as "the world's lone superpower" is wearing thin. The United States needs to know and the rest of the world is waiting anxiously to hear exactly what role it intends to play.

Case-by-case responses are not enough. They are ineffective. The Western allies are getting uneasy.

Bush's last-stretch activism in Somalia, Iraq and Bosnia has left Clinton with a pile of unfinished operations for which he must take responsibility, regardless of his pledge to concentrate on domestic affairs.

Clinton can't start from scratch on these urgent issues, but neither can he just plod on. He needs to develop guidelines to bring some coherence into the flailing effort to show America can use its power soberly and wisely.

Bush's series of January raids on Iraq were a particularly mindless example of acting for the sake of being seen as doing something. Any military value was minimal.

Indeed, Washington announced that the main purpose was to send a political message. Bush declared: "Let's hope the message gets through loud and clear."

Did Bush intend Tomahawk missiles as a high-tech version of carrier pigeons?

Days before taking office, Clinton had already made a gaffe, suggesting he could restore "normal" relations with a newly reformed Saddam Hussein. Clinton's error was then aggravated by his brief effort to deny he ever said it - a fuzzy attempt at recoup by

CONTINUED

9.

''clarification.''

Clinton was on the right track, however, saying he was not obsessed with personalities. The cult of personality in America has done its part to strengthen Saddam.

The Iraqi dictator has been able to do all he can to set himself up as the great, undefeatable challenger of the mighty West. Washington's focus has only enhanced his claim.

But Clinton should have said his policy on Iraq would respond to changes in Iraq's behavior, whoever leads.

There is no reason to think Saddam is capable of any real reform. For one thing, he has too much at stake now in maintaining his position. He can't let go or cavil. Saddam's game is life or death.

A recent statement by Gen. Colin Powell was right. Powell said large military operations require a political goal as a measure of success; a message to the deaf is hardly a valid one.

There are political ways to convey political messages — support for the coalition of Iraqi opposition, for example. These ways are still almost completely ignored by Western leaders.

The military message gets through when it responds to military provocation — for example, chasing Iraqi force out of Kuwait or enforcing the no-fly zone.

There are also military ways to contradict a rhetorical message: by inaction.

Again and again, the world has been told to expect imminent action enforcing the no-fly zone over Bosnia and sanctions against Yugoslavia. Threats sometimes work, but not when they are repeated too many times and nothing happens.

The sudden conversion of Serbia's Slobodan Milosevic to insist on acceptance of the Geneva plan for a nearly dismantled Bosnia reflects more the power of world opinion than any trembling at the thought of U.N. force.

The Serbs do feel they've been unfairly singled out for opprobrium because they've been no good at public relations. They ask why doesn't anybody complain that the Croatian regular army is fighting Muslims in Herzegovina and its planes routinely violate the no-fly zone.

But if anything, Belgrade's attempt to put its public face together may signal a pause to the fighting in Bosnia, not a solution. That will still require an active policy to prevent a spread of the war to Kosovo, Macedonia and beyond, and its renewal in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Former CIA director William Colby has said the United States should arm the Bosnians or quit the area — two ways to ensure plenty more fighting. It is also a way to say the United States renounces any interest in the affairs of Europe beyond NATO. That would be devastating and invite greater disasters.

The farewell of former Vice President Dan Quayle was a call for an armed U.S. space program, not only to gain a Star Wars-type missile defense but to get offensive control of the ''high frontier.'' That would signal U.S. desire for global hegemony, for which Americans have neither the means nor the will, nor should they.

This business of America being the world's only superpower has to be sorted out. Clearly, having either too much or too little power is both absurd and dangerous.

CONTINUED

3.

America is needed in the world. It must have partners. But it must define goals and consider realistic action.

Clinton can't start on this too soon. It's more important than middle-class tax rates with more potential for impact on America's economic health.

-0-

Copyright 1993 Flora Lewis

Distributed by New York Times Special Features/Syndication Sales

A New C.I.A., Without Gates

The Washington Post _____
 The New York Times A 25
 The Washington Times _____
 The Wall Street Journal _____
 The Christian Science Monitor _____
 New York Daily News _____
 USA Today _____
 The Chicago Tribune _____

Date 13 SEPT 1991

By Flora Lewis

No matter how the K.G.B. is disassembled, Moscow will retain an active military and political espionage service. And the U.S. still needs an effective, comprehensive intelligence service. But the K.G.B. and C.I.A. have largely kept each other in business as justification for much of their activities. As Communism and the Soviet state structure crumble and as secrets of Eastern European spy networks are disclosed, it has become increasingly evident that none brought their own side that much advantage.

So the U.S. should think carefully before stumbling on with the C.I.A. as it exists. There is an opportunity for a fundamental review of what the C.I.A. can and cannot do well, what it should and should not do.

The Congress is preparing the wrong questions for President Bush's nominee to head the agency, Robert Gates. Whatever his role in the Iran-contra debacle, an especially flamboyant but not atypical clandestine caper, Mr. Gates is steeped in the traditional C.I.A. approach.

Weirdly, he is credited for being right in insisting that Mikhail Gorbachev's attempt at reform would not change the Soviet Union and that the U.S. should not take it seriously. True, Mr. Gorbachev failed in his original intention of strengthening the Soviet Union and its Communist Party. But Mr. Gates failed to see the implications of Mr. Gorbachev's policies. He's old school — hardly a qualification to meet new needs.

He is not alone. An argument is building that the end of the cold war means the C.I.A. should be reinforced and expanded because there is a diffusion of threats to the U.S. without there being a No. 1 enemy. Recogniz-

ing the importance of economic challenge, advocates want a big effort to collect economic secrets from allies and friends as well as potential foes.

This is what Stansfield Turner, the former Director of Central Intelligence, says in the current issue of Foreign Affairs. Even Admiral Turner, who tried to clean things up at Langley, Va., clings to the idea that secrecy is the best way to collect and assess information, which, as he rightly says, brings power.

He calls for a "symbiotic relationship" between U.S. intelligence and business, and a willingness, throughout the Government at least, to provide a "cover" for spies. "All agencies should be instructed that human spying is a Presidentially and Congressionally authorized activity and they should have a role in it," he writes. Shades of the K.G.B.!

In the search for new missions, do spooks think they can beat out America's competitors when what is needed is energetic, persistent marketing, long-term investment planning and labor-management cooperation on steady, first-quality production?

Mr. Turner grants major C.I.A. failures: not understanding signs of the invasion of Kuwait, the unpopularity of the Shah and the rise of the Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, the electoral defeat of the Sandinistas in Nicaragua and, above all, the decay of the Soviet economy. These are good examples of things that went wrong, not to speak of the harm done to U.S. interests in justifying protection of Gen. Manuel Antonio Noriega for a long time. But alert reporters, diplomats and travelers could and did notice the relevant facts in the cases he cites.

Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan has proposed eliminating the agency, separating technical from political intelligence and putting the latter under the State Department. There are two drawbacks to this approach. One is that when responsibility for policy and critical information are com-

CONTINUED

bined, established policy tends to force production of the information that supports its case. The second is that diversity is suppressed.

Rather, the C.I.A. should be retained as a technical and analytical service, drastically limiting reliance on secrecy except in such obvious matters as trying to infiltrate terrorist groups, and with a better sense of real U.S. interests in the world. The former deputy director, Bobby Inman, is a professional who would understand this. The directorship is not a job for a swashbuckler like the late, disastrous William Casey or Robert Gates.

*Flora Lewis is Senior Columnist of
The New York Times.*

Cut the Saudis Down to Size

The Washington Post _____
 The New York Times A 27
 The Washington Times _____
 The Wall Street Journal _____
 The Christian Science Monitor _____
 New York Daily News _____
 USA Today _____
 The Chicago Tribune _____

Date 19 July 1991

By Flora Lewis

The gulf war isn't over. The U.S. is making noises about bombing, not elusive nuclear targets but command centers if Baghdad doesn't disclose all nuclear facilities. And, leaving Iraq, Americans will join a force in Turkey to ward off another Baghdad offensive against the Kurds. The reason for continued confrontation is that Saddam Hussein remains in power. What is murky is waffling U.S. policy and ambivalence about him.

Having returned Kuwait to its rulers, the U.S. leaves them to behave as arrogantly as they please, as though the war was fought to save the gulf for autocracy. The Administration wouldn't put it like that, but it has ceded to Saudi Arabia an influence on American policy that blocks the pur-

Washington gives them too much leverage.

suit of American purpose.

This is done in the name of "stability," the new holy word of foreign affairs. What the Saudis want is the status quo, which is not the same as stability and assures further violent upheaval sooner or later as repressed desires for change accumulate.

The Saudi royal family does not approve of upsetting governments or making room for democracy. While some 5,000 family members hold varying degrees of power and have many rivalries and disputes, they all agree on that. There should be no challenge to family rule, and challenges to other Arab absolutists could prove infectious.

The U.S. went along with the Saudi view that it is better to leave Saddam Hussein in power than risk a rebellion that might destroy the Baath regime. The participants in the summit meeting in London called for open and democratic elections and suggested that

Flora Lewis is Senior Columnist of The New York Times.

sanctions would stay until Mr. Hussein went. But Washington and Riyadh prefer a new strongman; they fear a weakened central power in Baghdad.

That is why Shiites and Kurds were left to be massacred, and Mr. Hussein was left with his still impressive force. It is why, despite Gen. H. Norman Schwarzkopf's misgivings, the U.S. signed the first cease-fire in military history that in effect applied only to the victorious forces, not to defeated.

Saudi fears of Iran and Iranian-style Islamic militancy are intense. The U.S. has let them override other concerns, despite the active Saudi role in promoting Islamic militants against regimes with which Riyadh has good relations. Riyadh finances fundamentalist movements in Algeria, Tunisia, Jordan, Israeli-occupied territories, which all backed Iraq in the war, and many other countries.

The important difference to the Saudis is not so much whether the people are Shiites or Sunnis but whether they are republican and anti-Saudi or not. The official argument is that some members of the royal family have favorite protégés in various places and can't be stopped from giving lavish support, regardless of the kingdom's formal position on fomenting trouble among Arabs.

Inside the kingdom, the aggressive religious police are steadily gaining power. They are parallel but separate from the regular police and do not take orders from the Government. Half the curriculum in universities is devoted to religious studies, and many upper-class people send their children to school in Bahrain, which has secular education, or farther away if they can afford it.

Still, the U.S. accepts Saudi judgments on gulf politics as gospel, and virtually identifies American interest with Saudi interest. As an oil man, President Bush sees their point. The Saudi Arabian Ambassador, Prince Bandar bin Sultan, a nephew of King Fahd, has special access to President Bush and top White House and Cabinet officials. In his book "The Commanders," Bob Woodward gives vivid reports of the urbane 42-year-old ambassador's part in pushing the U.S. into the huge gulf deployment and pushing King Fahd into accepting it.

It is in our long-term interest that changes in the world's greatest oil reserve occur peacefully and, if possible, democratically. The short-term urgency is to get rid of Saddam Hussein. Saudi concerns are different and must not obsess U.S. policy. □

Here We Go Again — Arming the Mideast

By Flora Lewis

Momentum for a new arms race in the Middle East is already building. As Yuli Vorontsov, the Soviet Ambassador to the United Nations points out, everybody was so awed by America's high-tech weapons in the gulf war that every country in the Middle East is clamoring for something similar.

The Soviet Union is concerned about U.S. plans to deliver important new weapons to its allies — the Arab nations as well as Israel — and doubtless Mikhail Gorbachev brought it up with Secretary of State James Baker in their Moscow meeting. Mr. Vorontsov says Moscow favors a club of arms suppliers to prevent the kind of unrestrained buildup that made Iraq such a menace.

Saddam Hussein's Iraq was a Frankenstein monster, created by oil revenues, competition for the lucrative weapons market and political rivalry. It could happen again, if not in Iraq then in some neighboring, unstable regimes. Nobody can guarantee that today's friend won't become tomorrow's enemy.

There is a common interest — between East and West, Arabs and Israelis and among regional players — to head off a new capacity for aggression and vast new arms expenditures that undermine the development of civil societies. The international coalition against Iraq is likely to remain intact until there is assurance that Iraq's stocks of chemical, biological and nuclear weapons materials have been destroyed. Soviet officials say Iraq has a lot more Scuds than it used, maybe hundreds more, and these also must be found and destroyed.

But the longer term goal of security can be compromised by renewing the regional arms race. The tangle of national and economic interests is creating intense pressures to override the common interest.

Mr. Vorontsov claims Moscow is determined not to revive old habits. He says it has refused Syria's plea for better and more weapons and parity with Israel, though it continues to provide parts to resupply existing

Flora Lewis is senior columnist of The New York Times.

Syrian forces. He says he is confident his Government will resist the desires of its own military-industrial complex for larger sales.

But Middle East arms control is going to be a lot harder than arms control in Europe. Israel argues, effectively, that its survival depends on keeping well ahead of its enemies. Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Iran can show that the gulf war proved their need for truly modern defenses. The U.S. says it wants to maintain "balance," but it always seeks it at a higher level.

It isn't politically possible, and would certainly be undesirable, to establish big American bases in the gulf as the Pentagon once hoped. But the U.S. military can point to the difficulty and danger of relying on shipping equipment after a crisis starts.

The compromise tempting Washington is "prepositioning," which means to sell the Saudis and gulf emirates more arms than they can manage themselves to serve as stock-

The Soviets have a better idea.

piles if American forces should have to return. The Russians say this is "old thinking," a reflex rather than a search for security based on an international agreement among leading arms suppliers.

The U.S. as yet has no initiative to propose. The Soviets are thinking of an approach that would distinguish between defensive and offensive arms, worked out initially among the five permanent members of the Security Council. Other suppliers, such as Germany, Argentina, Brazil and perhaps Switzerland and Sweden, would have to be brought in. But the Soviets argue that would be much easier if the Big Five set an example.

The simplicity of the idea should not mask the difficulty of the task. But it is urgent and specific and would be lost if utopian notions of disarmament were allowed to block concrete proposals. Moscow seems to be willing. Washington must avoid hasty commitments to allies and come up with a plan. □

The Washington Post _____
The New York Times A 23
The Washington Times _____
The Wall Street Journal _____
The Christian Science Monitor _____
New York Daily News _____
USA Today _____
The Chicago Tribune _____

Date 21 MAR 1991

Running Scared

Every country in the East has its own post-Communist problems. But they all share the discovery that things had gotten much worse than anyone realized.

Dismantling Communist structures has aggravated economic and social difficulties, demolishing old forms of organization and authority without yet being able to replace them. But the extent of collapse revealed how shaky it all was, how much was stripped away, left to rot from within, emptied of resources.

An American with senior government experience remarked recently that it was a massive intelligence failure by the West. He was referring particularly to East Germany, which had been considered the one relatively successful Communist economy, and it too turned out to be a sump pit.

It is hard to fault intelligence, though. There weren't secrets to steal. The leaders didn't know themselves. The most carefully planned, informant-ridden, intrusive regimes knew far less about their own societies than the casual, variegated West does about itself.

Then what were we so worried about? Why did the free world feel so threatened, not only by the Soviet arsenal but also by subversion?

A Western cold-war conspiracy to fight what seemed imminent danger is coming to light in Europe. It is already rocking the Italian Government and will touch many others. There was, it is revealed, an organized underground, provided with hidden arms depots, prepared to launch guerrilla wars and resistance in the event of invasion from the East or overthrow of democratic governments from within.

There were different epic names for the operations — "Gladio" in Italy (manned by secret gladiators), "Rose in the Wind" in France, "Red Fleece" in Belgium. They were sometimes directed, but generally coordinated, by NATO with participation of the C.I.A. and British secret service.

Former C.I.A. Director William Colby has confirmed some of this in recent interviews with Italian journalists. They also reported that meetings of the clandestine groups were held as recently as a few weeks ago in Brussels, though several governments claim it all ended by the 80's.

The Italian Government has said there were 139 caches of clandestine arms, explosives and communications equipment of which 127 were recovered years ago. They haven't accounted for the rest.

But Rome has been scandalized because a junior judge in Venice, investigating the operations, has is-

sued a subpoena to the President of the Republic, Francesco Cossiga, who had served as Minister of Defense and Minister of Interior. Prime Minister Giulio Andreotti, who has been in most governments for the last 40 years, refused opposition demands for a parliamentary commission.

The suspicion in Italy, Belgium and other countries is that the groups were used for domestic political purposes, possibly even terrorism to justify government crackdowns and defense preparedness. We are just hearing the beginnings of this. Sweden and Spain were also affected. No doubt there were Communist offensive conspiracies. But the question now is why democracies felt so weak, or if these were counterplots to undermine democratic governments in the name of anti-Communism.

The "Red menace" was taken deadly seriously by many rational people. One reason perhaps was U.S. demobilization at the end of World War II when Europe was still ravaged and chaotic, while Stalin managed to conceal the weakness of the Soviet Union. He did expect to take

A Western cold-war conspiracy.

over most of Western Europe.

But his real weapon was ideological and intellectual. It is hard now to understand the Communist appeal in the postwar period. The Communists had the allure of early and vigorous anti-Fascism when many had ignored the Nazis or collaborated.

They promised a brave new world after the horrors of the Depression and war, with a moral vision of justice. They preached that money, not Moscow, was the root of all evil, and the frenetic crusade against Moscow only seemed to confirm their argument. Jean-Pierre Chevenement, now French Defense Minister, was among the many who responded proudly, "I am anti-anti-Communism."

All that is gone, dust, like medieval disputes about the sex of angels. What is left? Just money, material well-being? It was never enough, and it isn't the reason the West won the long struggle so dramatically. Freedom, consent were the bulwarks, and they proved their strength. When they are undermined, it is from within. The things we do running scared are what hurt us most. □

The Washington Post _____
 The New York Times A 29
 The Washington Times _____
 The Wall Street Journal _____
 The Christian Science Monitor _____
 New York Daily News _____
 USA Today _____
 The Chicago Tribune _____

Date 14 NOV 1990

FOREIGN AFFAIRS

Flora Lewis

Plug In To Moscow

PARIS

Assorted hints have come from Moscow that the Soviets are willing to supply intelligence about Iraq. This could be of critical importance. Long and intimate involvement with the Iraqi military and police establishments, from the top well on down, gave Moscow information unavailable anywhere else.

It is a reflection of the astonishing, still quite incomplete shift in Soviet-American relations that Washington has reacted coolly. There are some valid reasons for caution.

For one thing, there has been an energetic K.G.B. campaign for nearly a year now to prettify a deservedly ugly image at home and abroad. "They want to convince us that not even the K.G.B. is still our enemy, but they are still very busy in the U.S.," a retired C.I.A. official said.

It isn't clear if the hints are just public relations, or more serious than such on-the-record statements might suggest. Last week Vladimir Kryuchkov, the K.G.B. chairman, received an Associated Press delegation and said, "I am convinced that we could really tell each other [the C.I.A.] something valuable."

Now, Gen. Mikhail Moiseyev, chief of the Soviet General Staff, tells American newsmen that he is giving details about Soviet-made weapons used by the Iraqis to the U.S. Embassy, but admits that the C.I.A. already knows most of it. Neither he nor Mr. Kryuchkov indicated if there were any terms for the proffered help, but they complained that Washington hasn't signaled much interest.

Washington's view is that there is still a long way to go before the U.S. is ready to exchange secrets, as it does with allies. But it is ready to receive what is provided, preferably through America's Moscow Embassy rather than in leaky Washington.

A distinction needs to be made between military and political intelligence. The former isn't hard to get from observation and regional sources and its use is only in case of war. But political intelligence could be decisive in preventing war, which requires real change in Baghdad.

Talk about negotiating with Saddam Hussein is an illusion. His threats to fight "to the last drop of [his people's] blood" and that he will destroy the whole region show how much he cares about his country. If he were French his motto would be Louis XV's "after me, the deluge."

Nor should the U.S. wish to devastate Iraq. Its benighted people are victims, not the perpetrators of the crisis. Apart from humane common sense, it would be geopolitical stupidity, similar to the mistake of indulging Mr. Hussein after the Iran-Iraq war.

The main objective, to prevent any tyrant from controlling over half the world's oil, remains valid and there would be no improvement if Iran or Syria succeeded because Mr. Hussein is made to fall. Outsiders cannot heal what ails the Arab states, but they can avoid creating new monsters with lopsided support.

The consequences of war are incalculable. One way to avoid it is to back off, a victory Mr. Hussein would be sure to exploit. A surprising article in the London newspaper *The Independent*, linked to the anniversary of World War II's Battle of Britain, showed where that reasoning leads.

Terry Coleman, the writer, went through the archives of British diplomacy from 1940 and condemns Winston Churchill for refusing to probe Hitler's secret peace offers. He cites a message through the British Embassy in Stockholm saying "The Führer feels responsible for the future of the white race" and would be willing to settle for "two economic units — continental Europe, which is Germany's, and the British Empire and America." That would have brought a hellish peace — for a while.

The other way to avoid war is to get rid of Mr. Hussein. It is what the embargo is really about, and he knows it. Talk of finding him an "escape hatch" or "saving face" because his demands are limited is the kind of talk Mr. Coleman thinks Churchill should have entertained in 1940. This time the world has organized against aggression, and its determination should inspire Iraqis.

The Washington Post _____
The New York Times A 23
The Washington Times _____
The Wall Street Journal _____
The Christian Science Monitor _____
New York Daily News _____
USA Today _____
The Chicago Tribune _____

Date 29 SEPT 1990

That is where the Soviets come in. Mr. Hussein has foiled many coup attempts, with brutal aftermaths, but the incentive to try again is much greater now and growing. Moscow knows a lot about who is who in the entourage, what might be possible. It has its own good reasons for wanting the crisis to end without a fight.

Washington should encourage the Soviets to pass along useful information, test what they are willing to provide, and assure that confidence will be repented. There is too much to lose without trying it. Mr. Hussein didn't give us time to get used to the idea of such cooperation, but it's vital. □

Handling Of Saddam Sets Tone For New Era

VENICE, Italy

The Security Council vote endorsing military enforcement of the U.N. blockade on Iraq was an impressive feat of diplomacy. It not only strengthened the international coalition against President Saddam Hussein; it blocked the temptation of American hawks to plunge into war.

The way the Persian Gulf crisis is resolved is going to have deep impact on world affairs for a long time. Instead of confirming the United States as leading partner of all who seek a peaceful world, going it alone could have reversed the remarkable consensus creating a new weapon for peace.

Participants at a meeting here of Aspen Institute Italia on "Economic Policies for a New Era: West-West and East-West" reflected widespread relief that the era probably will not start with a bang after all. The meeting was planned long ago, but everybody came preoccupied with Iraq, oil and the questions they provoked.

A major gain so far has been the advance in American-Soviet diplomatic cooperation. Paul Nitze, former U.S. arms negotiator, has called for using the momentum to speed up more far-reaching arms-reduction agreements. Nitze's careful proposals should weigh against the peculiar idea that the gulf threat makes further arms control and drastic restructuring of American forces undesirable. This crisis is in part a result of the global arms race, and should argue instead for a much sterner, broader attempt to block it everywhere.

The Soviets can make crucial contributions to help resolve the crisis. The efforts are delicate and might have to be discreet, but they are a new test. They concern intelligence. There are still several hundred Soviet military technicians in Iraq. They probably know where the hostages are. More important, Moscow knows all about Iraqi forces, air defenses, missiles, equipment, most of it Soviet-made. That information won't disarm Saddam Hussein, but it must gravely undermine his confidence if he has to suppose the United States has it.

Most important, no intelligence service anywhere has the KGB's intimate knowledge of Iraqi politics, especially rivalries and fault lines within the military and police establishments, some of them also organized by former Eastern European security services.

The one way to avoid war is for the Iraqis themselves to bring down their dictator. It is an illusion to think that outside pressure can induce Saddam to pull out of Kuwait and let his forces be neutralized. That would be failure, and he knows his own people would not let him survive a show of impotence. He would more likely sacrifice them. Moscow can get word to the right people.

The Washington Post _____
The New York Times _____
The Washington Times _____
The Wall Street Journal _____
The Christian Science Monitor _____
New York Daily News _____
USA Today _____
The Chicago Tribune _____

St. Louis Post-Dispatch p. 3B
Date 2 Sept. 1990

Before the gulf crisis, Prime Minister Ruud Lubbers of the Netherlands proposed technical aid to improve the Soviet oil industry as a way to help Eastern European democracies that will have to pay hard currency for these imports next year. West Europeans like the idea. The United States should support it. That would be yet another innovative example of cooperation for mutual and general benefit. It is a new era. The Soviets need help and they can contribute.

**FLORA
LEWIS**

Camarena Dispute Isn't Neighborly

MEXICO CITY

The message that President Carlos Salinas de Gortari wants to send the United States, he says, is that "Mexico is changing. We want to be in the international arena." For that, Mexico must have good U.S. relations, a new confidence to replace knee-jerk resentment arising from solid historical reasons and the inevitable weight of a colossus. And in many ways, that is developing.

Bush and Salinas have good personal rapport. High-level government contacts are being institutionalized. The 2,000-mile border is increasingly permeable, with more than 200 million legal crossings last year. Attitudes are evolving.

Still, the underlying reflex is deeply ingrained. Even Luis Alvarez, leader of the opposition National Action Party, PAN, betrays it when he denies charges of receiving campaign help from U.S. Republicans. "If I did, I'd be sitting in Los Pinos (the president's office) now," he said unwittingly revealing the automatic assumptions of America's power to influence everything here.

So it doesn't take a lot to provoke new anger. The case of Humberto Alvarez Machain has become a flash point, symbolizing Mexico's sense of fragile sovereignty and what it considers U.S. disdain. It threatens to poison the whole relation, although diplomats on both sides are eager to prevent that.

It is a nasty case. Alvarez is accused of participating in the torture death of a U.S. Drug Enforcement agent, Enrique Camarena Salazar, in 1985. On April 2, Alvarez was kidnapped and turned over to police in El Paso and now faces trial in California. Everyone here supposes the Drug Enforcement Agency was behind the abduction.

The outrage is such that Salinas would win unanimous applause if he expelled the DEA from Mexico in retribution. He doesn't want to do that. He hasn't decided whether to demand Alvarez back, which would challenge the U.S. judicial system, or wait for the trial and seek extradition. Mexican officials point out that 28 people have already been jailed in the Camarena murder case, and say the United States never asked them to arrest Alvarez.

There is no sympathy here for Alvarez, and Salinas said he ordered the Camarena investigation reopened. But other Mexicans argue the U.S. reaction to one agent's death is disproportionate when 300 Mexican police have been killed. They feel the kidnapping was a display of U.S. contempt for and disbelief in their effort, when America hasn't made any remarkable progress at home.

Salinas wants a new agreement on rules of alliance against traffickers. U.S. officials say the exchanges of intelligence have improved, but the Mexicans consider it one-sided. There will have to be much better, regularized cooperation or none.

The recent U.S. Supreme Court decision giving American courts jurisdiction over crimes against American citizens abroad worries the Mexicans. They admit their judicial system is racked with corruption but they see the ruling as legalizing aggressive disrespect for their sovereignty.

But Mexico must be shown that the United States considers it a willing partner even on such ugly cases, not just a back yard for us to clean up because we can't handle our own addiction.

Copyright 1990 New York Times News Service

The Washington Post _____
The New York Times _____
The Washington Times _____
The Wall Street Journal _____
The Christian Science Monitor _____
New York Daily News _____
USA Today _____
The Chicago Tribune _____
ST. LOUIS P-O 3 C
Date 17 MAY 90

**FLORA
LEWIS**

FOREIGN AFFAIRS

Flora Lewis

The Next Panama Crisis

WASHINGTON

The next Panama crisis is coming in exactly eight weeks. Under the treaty, the term of the American administrator of the Canal Company expires on Dec. 31. He must be replaced by a Panamanian. Further, the new head is to be nominated by the Government of Panama, appointed by the President of the United States and confirmed by the Senate.

That was the real, but unmentioned, importance of the flap over the recent failed attempt to oust Gen. Manuel Noriega. American indignation at defiance from the shrewd, corrupt little dictator turned a serious national interest into a preposterous personal vendetta, to the U.S. disadvantage.

Washington had already committed another in a long string of bumbles in handling Panama, and it went unnoticed. As the treaty provides, General Noriega had nominated a new administrator, his crony Carlos Duque. President Bush rejected him without even bothering to send it to the Senate.

But he went further, blocking a possible solution. There could have been a quiet arrangement, through mediators, to make sure General Noriega offered a man the U.S. would accept. He has been smart enough not to obstruct for a minute the functioning of the canal, which is 99 percent of why Panama matters to the U.S. and the rest of the world.

However, the U.S. said it would not accept anybody proposed by General Noriega. That puts Washington in the position of violating the treaty it signed, and the Panamanian strongman will doubtless make a noisy point of it, to the distress of all America's friends and treaty partners.

The ploy the U.S. intends to use is to appoint the Panamanian who is now No. 2 in the Canal Company as acting administrator. He is a highly respected engineer named Fernando Manfredo, fully capable of doing the job. But it isn't clear whether he will agree to put himself in the middle of the fight.

Washington will argue that choosing a Panamanian citizen fulfills the "spirit" of the treaty, and that it has a right to ignore the letter because the existing Government is not "legitimate." An acting administrator wouldn't be submitted for Senate approval.

This is a box the U.S. made for itself when it conferred the distinction of being America's current No. 1 bugaboo on General Noriega, as though he were the main reason for our interest in Panama. He's a crook, a drug dealer, a thoroughly nasty man once on the C.I.A. payroll, but that doesn't make him so exceptional. You don't hear the President of the United States calling for the ouster of the Prime Minister of the Bahamas or Honduran generals who are just as involved in drugs.

But we got hooked on General Noriega and launched amateurish schemes for not-so-covert action to show who is boss by proxy. Elliot Abrams, the rambunctious Assistant Secretary of State for Latin America in the Reagan Administration, cooked up the idea of a mini-coup in which the weak Panamanian President fired the General in early 1988.

The General immediately fired the President, whom he had installed in the first place, and the U.S. cut itself off from Panamanian authorities on grounds that the Government was then illegal. Gen. Fred Woerner, head of the U.S. Southern Command, understood the intricate problems that posed and the foolish inversion of U.S. priorities. He discreetly criticized the policy and was bounced for his sensible efforts to keep bad from getting worse.

We have the Joint Chiefs to thank that things didn't go on to disaster. Mr. Abrams's next script would have bundled opposition leaders into Quarry Heights, the U.S. headquarters, surrounded them with U.S. troops, and had them proclaim a government in exile on Panamanian territory.

The Washington Post _____
 The New York Times E 23
 The Washington Times _____
 The Wall Street Journal _____
 The Christian Science Monitor _____
 New York Daily News _____
 USA Today _____
 The Chicago Tribune _____

Date 5 Nov 1989

Adm. William Crowe, then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, put his foot down. Such folly would have endangered every U.S. base in the world. Further more, the Pentagon figured it could take three more U.S. divisions to deal with the possible consequences.

What bothered Admiral Crowe the most was that the U.S. was supposed to take all the risks while the opposition waited compliantly to be handed power. Those who argued that Washington should have made sure this year's bungled coup would work had no reason to believe General Noriega's rebellious henchmen would give way to civilians. More likely, the U.S. would have been saddled with a Noriega clone whom it had put in power.

The lesson is that flag-waving, posturing and cockamamie plots can't substitute for strategic thought and sound diplomacy. Instead of stirring American emotions, the Administration's responsibility is to make U.S. interests clear. Where Panama is concerned, that is the canal, first, second and third. Now we are left to face the real issue. It won't be easy.