

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

ROUTING SLIP

TO:		ACTION	INFO	DATE	INITIAL
1	DCI				
2	DDCI				
3	EXDIR		X		
4	D/ICS		X		
5	DDI	X			
6	DDA		X (Info & Pass to		
7	DDO		D/OIT, please)		
8	DDS&T				
9	Chm/NIC	X			
10	GC				
11	IG				
12	Compt				
13	D/OCA				
14	D/PAO				
15	D/PERS				
16	D/Ex Staff				
17	NIO/WARNING		X		
18	D/CPAS/DI		X		
19	EA/DCI		X		
20	D/NIESO		X		
21					
22	ER		X		

SUSPENSE noon (22 Jul '88)
Date

Remarks To 5 & 9: Please advise ES of your concurrence or recommended changes.

Executive Secretary

13 Jul '88

Date

3637 (10-81)

**MEMORANDUM
OF CALL**

Previous editions usable

TO: _____

YOU WERE CALLED BY _____ VISITED BY _____

OF (Organiza _____)

Asst NIO for Warning

PLEASE PHONE FTS AUTOVON

WILL CALL AGAIN IS WAITING TO SEE YOU

RETURNED YOUR CALL WISHES AN APPOINTMENT

MESSAGE

STAT _____ will respond separately regarding NSDD 95 revision. Info copy will be provided to ER.

Call if you have any questions.

RECEIVED BY STAT _____	DATE 7-21-88	TIME 9:31
---------------------------	-----------------	--------------

63-110 NSN 7540-00-634-4018 **STANDARD FORM 63 (Rev. 8-81)**
 *U.S.GPO:1986-0-491-247/20034 Prescribed by GSA
 FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

OFFICE OF CURRENT PRODUCTION AND
ANALYTICAL SUPPORT

From the Desk of
the Director

18 July 1988

NOTE FOR: *Executive Secretary*

VIA: *DDI*

SUBJECT: *Proposed NSDD on National Security
Information and Situation Management
System*

STAT

*I concur with the proposed NSDD. I had attended
a meeting on the initial draft and signed off on
the final draft. This looks good to me.*

STAT

Attachment:
TS-0103/88, Copy 6, 12 July 1988



Directorate of Intelligence

Page Denied

~~TOP SECRET~~

ER TS0103 88

Copy _____ of _____

No. 90582

COPY DRAFT

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL INFORMATION

Notice

The attached document contains classified National Security Council Information. It is to be read and discussed only by persons authorized by law.

Your signature acknowledges you are such a person and you promise you will show or discuss information contained in the document only with persons who are authorized by law to have access to this document.

Persons handling this document acknowledge he or she knows and understands the security law relating thereto and will cooperate fully with any lawful investigation by the United States Government into any unauthorized disclosure of classified information contained herein.

Access List

DATE	NAME	DATE	NAME
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____

~~TOP SECRET~~

TOP SECRET**TOP SECRET**NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20508System II
90582

July 12, 1988

MEMORANDUM FOR DISTRIBUTION**SUBJECT: Proposed NSDD on NSI&SMS (C)**

A proposed National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) on the National Security Information and Situation Management System (NSI&SMS) is attached at Tab B for your final review and concurrence. (C)

The NSC appreciates the timely comments on an earlier draft. We have incorporated many of the suggestions into the proposed NSDD text. The issue of most central concern was budgeting for the NSI&SMS. We worked to incorporate language reassuring participants that there would be no budgetary surprises or imposition of unreasonable burdens, and that system operations and procurement would flow from user-expressed requirements following interagency deliberation. We also clarified the relationship of the Crisis Management Working Group (CMWG) to Continuity of Government and emergency preparedness and response programs. Finally, we spelled out the role of the Steering Group in relation to the NSC process currently outlined in NSDD 276. (TS)

This proposed directive is, to a great extent, the product of interagency discussions within the CMWG (current membership at Tab C). The focus and emphasis of the proposed directive comes from canvassing their input prior to the draft first circulated. Some agencies' suggestions were too specific to incorporate into the NSDD text itself, but point out projects and issues that will remain of ongoing concern to the CMWG and its subgroups. (S)

We would appreciate your comments and concurrence on the attached draft by July 22, 1988 in order to expedite the forwarding of a package for consideration by the President. (C)

Paul Schott Stevens
Paul Schott Stevens
Executive Secretary

Attachments

Tab A List of Addressees
Tab B Draft NSI&SMS NSDD
Tab C Current CMWG Membership

TOP SECRET

Declassify on: OADR

ER TS0103 88

Copy 8 of 9**TOP SECRET**

Page Denied

Next 3 Page(s) In Document Denied

TOP SECRET**DRAFT**TOP SECRETSYSTEM II
90582THE NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION AND SITUATION MANAGEMENT
SYSTEM (NSI&SMS) (C)

This directive updates policy and guidelines for sustaining and improving the nation's crisis management capability in support of the President, the National Security Council (NSC), and the interagency community. It builds on the technical progress achieved since signature of NSDD 95 in May 1983, and codifies the oversight, coordination, and procedural dimensions of a National Security Information and Situation Management System (NSI&SMS), consistent with the NSC structure and process approved in NSDD 266 and NSDD 276. This directive supersedes NSDD 95. (S)

Background

NSDD 95 established a framework for national-level crisis management and for making critical technical and procedural enhancements to associated department and agency operations centers. This framework was termed the Crisis Information and Management System (CIMS) and was designed to sustain effective and uninterrupted crisis management by providing a means of recording and disseminating adequate and timely intelligence, information, analyses, and policy options in a form usable by top-level decision makers. This system was to include rigorous mechanisms for accessing, preserving and archiving historical data and associated decisions. It was also intended to ensure a coordinated flow of information from the White House and other CIMS operations centers to Continuity of Government (COG) elements to support, if required, an orderly, constitutional devolution of responsibilities in conditions of extreme crisis. (TS)

Implementation of NSDD 95, in conjunction with associated department and agency technical upgrades, significantly improved the nation's ability to respond to crises. The CHOSUN project, now referred to as the Secure Video Teleconferencing System (SVTS), created a secure, multi-media telecommunications system for exchanging information. The urgent focus of CIMS was on communications and coordination among principals in crises up through the prospect of nuclear attack. NSDD 95 has now established a foundation for further improving and codifying interagency coordination procedures. In addition, the opportunity to build on the existing SVTS infrastructure applies not only at the working levels of crisis operations but also across a spectrum of daily activities during peacetime. (S)

TOP SECRET

Declassify on: OADR

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRETTOP SECRET

2

A National Security Information and Situation Management System (NSI&SMS) is required to reap fully the broader benefits of the new technology and facilities that were introduced initially for top-level crisis management alone. This directive codifies a process incorporating improvements made to date and addresses the requirements for effective interagency coordination in the future. The principles and longer-term objectives of the NSI&SMS are outlined below. (U)

Policy Principles

The NSI&SMS is an interagency network of people, facilities, equipment, information resources, plans, policies and procedures designed to provide for: (1) support to national-level decision makers in monitoring national security situations and in considering, implementing, or reporting on any U.S. response; and (2) a rapid and continuous flow of information regarding national security situations across a spectrum from peacetime activity through reconstitution following nuclear attack. (S)

The purpose of the NSI&SMS is to continue supporting the national leadership with the best and most timely information possible, ensuring that the policy and decision making process will not be impaired by a lack of information, procedures for coordination, or secure communications and data transmission capabilities. To the maximum possible extent, the interagency process used to support decision-making during crisis situations shall involve the same trained personnel, reliable equipment, and familiar procedures approved for use on a daily basis. This principle applies to periods of international tension or crisis and, to the extent possible, to domestic emergencies, such as natural disasters, terrorism, or technological hazards, that may affect national security interests. (C)

Those responsible for operating, improving and modernizing the NSI&SMS shall seek to ensure interoperability among the family of Continuity of Government (COG) programs, the Nuclear Command and Control System (NCCS), National Security Emergency Preparedness (NSEP) plans, the National System for Emergency Coordination (NSEC) concept (as it may be implemented), and other key programs. In this sense, interoperability requires extensive interagency coordination to provide for essential elements of information, procedures, interactive systems, and other components necessary to support effectively national-level decision making. (TS)

TOP SECRET**TOP SECRET**

TOP SECRET**DRAFT**TOP SECRET

3

The continuous, effective operation of the NSI&SMS is crucial and requires each agency's understanding of its individual role in the interagency process. Enhancing the integration of existing operations and intelligence centers shall be achieved through measured improvements that have been identified as user requirements through the interagency process. Executive departments and agencies will budget for, procure, install, operate, and maintain compatible equipment and capabilities, and share appropriately the cost of system improvements that may be required to sustain acceptable levels of integration within the NSI&SMS. (S)

Implementation

Leadership and oversight of the NSI&SMS shall be provided by the NSC through the Crisis Management Working Group (CMWG), chaired by the NSC's Deputy Executive Secretary for Situation Support. The CMWG shall further develop the NSI&SMS and strengthen interagency capabilities and procedures for the collection, coordination, transmission, and dissemination of information in support of the President and the NSC interagency process. (C)

The CMWG will report to the Policy Review Group (PRG). The PRG, as outlined in NSDD 276, is the senior sub-Cabinet level interagency group which is chaired by the Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. The PRG's primary responsibility is to review and make recommendations concerning national security policy developed through the day-to-day functioning of the interagency process. PRG recommendations are submitted for consideration of the National Security Planning Group or the National Security Council, as appropriate. (C)

The CMWG shall meet regularly. The CMWG chair shall establish a Steering Group to assist in developing and monitoring the CMWG agenda. The Steering Group shall be primarily comprised of senior representatives of Executive departments and agencies who regularly report to members of the PRG. Appropriate CMWG Steering Group members, in support of their PRG principals, shall meet at the outset of, or during, a situation when necessary to ensure effective information management and coordination among operations and intelligence centers. (S)

The CMWG shall be the principal interagency working group for coordination and consideration of national security policies concerning the integration and interoperability of COG programs. (TS)

TOP SECRET**TOP SECRET**

TOP SECRET**DRAFT****TOP SECRET**

4

The CMWG shall:

- Oversee formulation of policy relating to the NSI&SMS to ensure a system responsive to national needs; (S)
- Ensure that the national security-related emergency responsibilities assigned to individual departments and agencies under existing law, Presidential directive, executive order, and federal response plans are mutually compatible, and that appropriate procedures for interagency coordination are available and widely understood; (C)
- Ensure technical and operational capabilities are maintained and developed consistent with NSI&SMS objectives; (C)
- Ensure effective use of resources expended in establishing, operating, and modernizing the NSI&SMS; promoting interagency equipment compatibility; and recommending to the PRG priorities for those improvements that will enhance interagency information flow; (C)
- Ensure integration of the NSI&SMS with COG, NCCS, NSEP, and other interagency coordination systems related to national security, without compromising the integrity of compartmented information; (TS)
- Ensure that the NSI&SMS supports the Director of Central Intelligence in monitoring and transmitting information on the world situation in the context of operational requirements for early warning; (TS)
- Identify for key departments and agencies the essential elements of information required by the President during periods of extreme crisis, and ensure the capability to coordinate the flow of this information at the appropriate time among the White House, Washington-area operations and intelligence centers, and COG elements; (TS)
- Ensure that interoperable equipment and compatible procedures are established among relevant departments and agencies to support the COG effort; and (TS)
- Provide for regular exercising and testing of the NSI&SMS. (C)

TOP SECRET**TOP SECRET**

TOP SECRET**DRAFT**TOP SECRET

5

CMWG membership shall include representatives from Executive departments and agencies with responsibility relating to the national response to international incidents or domestic emergencies potentially affecting the national security of the United States. The CMWG may establish other subgroups as required. To the extent possible, the CMWG shall use already existing interagency committees to facilitate coordination and resolution of issues. (S)

Situation management at the national level requires close coordination and cooperation among Executive departments and agencies. As the supporting system, the NSI&SMS can only remain responsive to national situation management needs if the community actively participates and interacts in the evolution of this critical situation management system. Accordingly, each participating Executive department and agency shall:

- Designate a member to serve on the CMWG;
- Participate in exercises to improve and maintain the proficiency of situation management personnel and evaluate the responsiveness of the NSI&SMS; and
- Budget for, procure, manage, operate, and maintain equipment in its facilities in a manner consistent with NSI&SMS objectives and procedures. (C)

The Department of Defense, because of its close and continuing involvement with projects that comprise the infrastructure of the NSI&SMS, shall continue to act as the Executive Agent for:

- Architecture and systems engineering support, technical analyses, and preparation of cost estimates in response to CMWG-validated NSI&SMS requirements;
- Development of an NSI&SMS Master Plan to maintain an affordable and modern NSI&SMS focused on fully exploiting the capabilities of current equipment, and ensuring compatibility and interoperability among all NSI&SMS nodes and COG systems;
- Program management of SVTS, including: engineering, procurement, installation, configuration management, software control, and logistical support; assistance in developing and refining SVTS user procedures for CMWG review; and recommending cost-effective modifications to the current SVTS in response to requirements identified by the CMWG;

TOP SECRET**TOP SECRET**

TOP SECRET

DRAFT

TOP SECRET

6

- Security procedures and practices associated with the NSI&SMS and its elements, to ensure consistency with overall security requirements as may be determined by the CMWG; and
- Provision of resources and technical support to NSI&SMS elements in the White House complex.

(S)

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

Page Denied

Next 2 Page(s) In Document Denied