





Intelligence



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# Afghanistan Situation Report



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9 November 1982

**Top Secret**

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


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AFGHANISTAN SITUATION REPORT

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
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


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BORDER INFILTRATION CONTINUES UNHINDERED



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resistance caravans and personnel move freely across the Pakistani border about 30 miles east of Jalalabad, and insurgents believe the Soviets have given up trying to seal the border. The insurgents encountered no "butterfly" anti-personnel mines on trails and said they had not seen or heard of any Soviet helicopter minelaying operations along the border in 1982. Some local tribesmen reportedly have detained Westerners or informed Kabul of their crossing the border, but the tribes do not hinder insurgent passage.

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Comment: Sealing the border with Pakistan is probably impossible, and past Soviet attempts to reduce infiltration apparently failed because of



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the large number of routes available and the mountainous terrain. By the Soviets' own estimate, it would take nine divisions to garrison the Pakistan border alone. Moreover, any Soviet or Afghan units stationed on the border could easily become isolated from reinforcements and come under attack from insurgent groups.

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SOVIETS IMPROVING AFGHAN AIR FORCE



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[Redacted] the senior Soviet adviser to the Afghan Air Force directed that it establish six "command zones" to coordinate air support for Afghan ground units. The command zones are to be located in the west at Herat, in the southeast at Qandahar, in the east at Gardez and Kabul, and in the north at Baghlan and Mazar-i-Sharif. Each zone will be commanded by an experienced Afghan pilot.

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[Redacted] a new Afghan squadron of 20 MI-8 Hip transport helicopters was recently activated at Qandahar Airbase. A second new squadron of Hips will be formed at Shindand in January.

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Comment: Tactical coordination between Afghan air and ground forces has been poor, and Afghan units have often suffered losses because of inadequate or unresponsive air support. The new command zones are intended to improve cooperation by establishing formal liaison and communication channels for defined operational areas.

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[Redacted] Acquisition of two new Hip squadrons would improve the logistic support and air mobility of the Afghan forces.

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
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
IN BRIEF

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--According to relief officials, the influx of Afghan refugees to Pakistan is increasing, the result of widespread food shortages. The number may be as high as the 10,000 a month that immediately followed the 1979 Soviet invasion. (Press )

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
--Two Ariana pilots claim that Afghanistan has obtained landing rights in Luxembourg, but the Luxembourgers told the British that they were non-committal toward the Afghan request. 

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**Kābul**

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## PERSPECTIVE

The Insurgency in Kabul [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] 25X1

The Afghan Government is in no danger of losing control of Kabul, but recent attacks by the insurgents in and around the city underscore their ability to inflict embarrassing losses on the regime. Since the Soviet invasion, the level of insurgent activity in Kabul has waxed and waned, and its impact has been limited by a lack of weaponry and expertise, fear of Soviet reprisals, and the traditionally greater docility of an urban population. Despite these problems, insurgent operations late this summer demonstrate that the guerrillas can tie down Soviet and Afghan Government forces in the city's defense. [REDACTED]

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Insurgent Activities

Insurgent activities in Kabul predate the Soviet invasion and have included assassinations, hit-and-run attacks on Soviet and Afghan government installations, and mass demonstrations. [REDACTED] the assassination campaign has had the greatest impact. The insurgents have been killing about 10 to 15 Afghan Communist officials, and occasionally their family members, per month during the last several years. Afghan officials have been killed on the street, in cars and doorways, and at windows. The insurgents usually use pistols, sometimes with silencers, but occasionally strike with rifles and small explosives. The assassination campaign has forced many officials to send their families to the USSR. [REDACTED]

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The insurgents have also conducted an extensive hit-and-run campaign against Soviet and Afghan government installations. [REDACTED] the mujahideen set off a number of bombs in buildings that included the Ministries of Education and Interior, Kabul University, and an Afghan Communist Party district headquarters during 1981. They also fired rockets at the Soviet Embassy at least once and at an apartment complex used by Communist personnel at least twice. [REDACTED]

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During the second half of 1982, [REDACTED] the insurgents stepped up their campaign. 25X1

--In July, they sprayed government buildings several times with bullets and hit an important military compound with rockets.

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


--In August, they again brought the Soviet Embassy under fire with rockets and fired on vehicles near Kabul Airport.


--In September, they attacked the Soviet Embassy, Radio Afghanistan, the Soviet 40th Army Command Post, a hydroelectric station supplying Kabul with power, and several police stations.

--In October, they damaged several stories of Kabul's tallest building.

Soviet and regime forces reacted with largely unsuccessful sweeps around and through Kabul. 

Most of the insurgents operate out of bases around Kabul, such as Paghman. Security checks and conscription drives discourage permanent bases inside the city. Most assassination attempts take place at dusk because the obscurity and street traffic makes escape easier; most of the hit-and-run raids take place at night. 

#### Insurgent Limitations

The insurgents have failed to mount a challenge that directly threatens the Afghan Government's hold on Kabul. The Communists' extensive daytime security forces have discouraged insurgent activity and insured the normal functioning of the government. Kabul, in fact, is one of few Afghan cities where the insurgents cannot circulate openly during the day. The authorities can even organize major political gatherings. In March 1982, for example, the government held a Party conference, and the following month, the government organized a parade that lasted for 3 1/2 hours and had many participants. In both cases, heavy security prevented the insurgents from creating any major incidents. 

The mujahideen, moreover, have failed to create a mass opposition movement. Ruthless Soviet and Afghan Government tactics, which included firing into crowds, contained major demonstrations in February 1980. There have been no demonstrations of this magnitude since. When storekeepers tried to close their stores in protest in February 1981 and 1982, security forces forced them to stay open. The guerrillas also usually avoid firing persistently from any neighborhood, because Communist air and artillery retaliation would wreak havoc on civilians.



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The regime has balanced repressive measures with offers of good food supplies in Kabul. Several foreign observers, who have visited Kabul since the invasion, have noted diminishing hostility toward Soviet personnel, presumably because of growing resignation. Thus, time and the traditionally more compliant attitude of an urban population toward the authorities appear to be working against the insurgents in Kabul. [REDACTED]

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Limited weaponry and training have also hampered the insurgents. Rounds from RPG-7s and machine guns pass through walls without knocking them down. Their most common longer-range weapon, the 81mm mortar, has a range of only three kilometers, thereby discouraging attacks on targets surrounded by flat, open terrain. Most insurgents also have little knowledge of explosives. This inhibits what could be two very effective tactics--blowing up vehicles packed with explosives and destroying electric power pylons. [REDACTED]

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#### Insurgent Strengths

Several important factors, however, are working in favor of the insurgents in Kabul. They benefit from an extensive intelligence network. Informants in the Afghan Army and security services and civilians warn of impending military operations, pass on information about planned arrests, and provide details about the daily schedules of assassination targets. [REDACTED]

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The insurgents also profit from their movement's decentralization. All six major groups in Peshawar are active in the city, and scores of other bands, representing all ethnic groups, also take part. Moreover, all bands tend to operate in small units, which are highly compartmentalized. Accordingly, the capture of one insurgent will not usually lead to many other arrests. Similarly, even if an important insurgent leader is captured and his band destroyed, other bands will continue their independent operations. [REDACTED]

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Kabul's urban layout also helps the insurgents. There are few high-rise housing complexes along broad avenues--the easiest type of neighborhood to police--even in the newer areas. The insurgents can also find shelter in the densely populated "old city" and in the poorer suburbs, which have grown considerably since the Soviet invasion. [REDACTED]

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Finally, the insurgents benefit from the lackluster performance of Soviet and Afghan units, particularly at night. While the understaffed Afghan Army does maintain security in Kabul during the day, many of its units stay in the comparative safety of their posts at night. Similarly, while the Soviets conduct aggressive sweeps in and around Kabul during the day, they usually do not respond energetically to insurgent attacks at night, when their heavy military equipment is less useful. [redacted]

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### Prospects

Fear of Communist reprisals and the traditionally greater dependence of an urban population on the authorities will continue to hamper the insurgency. Better and more plentiful weapons and improved training would be helpful, however. In particular, the insurgents need more explosives, silencers, time-bombs, easily concealed submachineguns such as the 9-millimeter Sten gun, and better training in the use of explosives. [redacted]

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Despite important limitations, the insurgents probably will continue to score some successes in Kabul, which will help focus world attention on Afghanistan. The views of foreign diplomats who are based in Kabul are strongly influenced by the level of fighting in the capital. Equally important, insurgent activity in Kabul will continue to pin down Soviet and Afghan forces that are needed elsewhere. [redacted]

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Overall, the future of the insurgency in Kabul will depend largely on its success in the rest of the country. If the guerrilla movement in rural areas declined, Kabul's insurgents probably would become demoralized. But as long as the rural insurgency is going well, the urban guerrillas will remain active. [redacted]

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
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## KABUL CITY

Kabul has a population of more than one million. The Tajiks are the largest ethnic group. Pushtuns and Hazaras form large minorities, and all other groups are represented. These ethnic groups tend to congregate together but do not live in homogeneous neighborhoods. [REDACTED]

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Residential area of small houses on the outskirts of Kabul.

The city is surrounded by barren, treeless mountains on the west, south and east. There is a low ridge of hills north of Kabul. The Kabul river and a rocky ridge run through the city's center. The "old city" covers a relatively small area on the south bank, but has a large popula-

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tion; it consists of maze-like 1 and 2 story buildings with flat roofs. The modern, commercial center of Kabul is on the north bank; most of its buildings are made of concrete or stone and are 1 to 3 stories. The wealthy residential areas of Share-Naw, Sherpur, and Wazir Akbar Khan are north and west of downtown Kabul. Many foreigners, including Soviets and Afghan Communist officials, live in this well-policed area, which has broad, paved streets. The periphery of Kabul consists of middle and lower class housing. [redacted]

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


Apartment development near Kabul airport, where many Soviets and Afghan Communists live.

Kabul is the most industrialized area in Afghanistan; it has about two-thirds of the country's industrial establishments. These are scattered throughout the city. Kabul gets most of its electricity from the Naghlu hydroelectric complex, almost 50 km. east of the city, from the Kabul River, and from local diesel units.

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