



Directorate of Intelligence

~~Top Secret~~

Afghanistan Situation Report

25X1

23 October 1984


~~Top Secret~~

NESA M 84-10291CX
SOVA M 84-10185CX

23 October 1984


25X1

Page Denied



AFGHANISTAN SITUATION REPORT

CONTENTS



25X1


IN BRIEF

2

PERSPECTIVES

AFGHANISTAN IN SEPTEMBER


3

Insurgents maintained intense pressure on Soviet and Afghan forces. The Soviets responded with offensives in many parts of the country. 

25X1

AFGHAN OPIUM PRODUCTION

7

Opium production--120-180 tons this year--is likely to increase. Military operations have had little impact on poppy growing, and unsettled conditions increase incentives for producing opium. 




25X1
25X1

23 October 1984
NESA M 84-10291CX
SOVA M 84-10185CX



25X1



ILLEGIB



ILLEGIB


This document is prepared weekly by the Office of Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis and the Office of Soviet Analysis.



ILLEG 25X1
25X1



ILLEGIB




ILLEGIB

**23 October 1984
NESA M 84-10291CX
SOVA M 84-10185CX**

ILLEGIB




25X1




800084 1-84

23 October 1984
 NESA M 84-10291CX
 SOVA M 84-10185CX

Page Denied



ILLEGIB




25X1

IN BRIEF

-- The captured French journalist, Jacques Abouchar, has been sentenced to 18 years in prison. French officials believe that Abouchar will be released after serving several months.

25X1




25X1

-- Islamabad is concerned that KHAD is cultivating links to major Pakistani opposition parties in an effort to unite the left against Zia for the election scheduled to be held by March. Rivalries among opposition Pakistani parties, however, make unity unlikely.

ILLEGIB

25X1
ILLEGIB



ILLEGIB

23 October 1984
NESA M 84-10291CX
SOVA M 84-10185CX

ILLEGIB




25X1



PERSPECTIVE

AFGHANISTAN IN SEPTEMBER



25X1



25X1

The insurgents maintained intense pressure on Soviet and Afghan forces in many areas of Afghanistan in September. They were especially active in Kabul where they demonstrated strength and resiliency by launching their most effective series of coordinated attacks since last year. Insurgent aggressiveness is probably aimed at foiling Soviet attempts to seize the initiative in the war. Soviet and Afghan forces responded to the insurgent pressure with offensives of their own.



25X1
25X1

Insurgent Activity

Attacks on Convoys

Resistance strikes on Soviet and Afghan convoys showed no signs of abating in September. US Embassy sources report that guerrillas continue in strike convoys along the Salang-Kabul road and in Lowgar Province. The Soviets also failed to secure the route between Kabul and Gardez adequately to guarantee the movement of military columns dispatched to assist Afghan units in Paktia Province. Soviet and Afghan travel between Kabul and Qandahar, already hazardous, became even more difficult, and fighting in Qandahar City occurred almost every night.




25X1

The Panjsher Valley

The insurgents rebounded from blows struck by the Soviets in their spring offensive and, according to US Embassy sources, reestablished a position in the the upper portion of the Panjsher Valley by early September. They also continued their hit-and-run attacks against selected outposts in the valley.

cooperation between Panjsher commander Masood's forces and rival forces loyal to Gulbuddin in both the valley and Badakhshan has improved.



25X1
25X1


25X1

23 October 1984
NESA M 84-10291CX
SOVA M 84-10185CX




25X1




The Soviets and the regime have been no more successful in resettling the valley than they were in consolidating their military control of the region. According to US Embassy sources, the regime wants to settle refugees near army encampments to serve as a buffer between regime and Soviet forces and the insurgents. The few refugees the regime has been able to move to the valley, however, try to live as far from the military outposts as possible. 

25X1

25X1




Kabul

The regime's control of its capital city deteriorated dramatically in September. According to US Embassy sources, fighting occurred nightly despite Soviet and Afghan efforts to improve security. 

25X1

25X1

 mid-level Afghan officials openly admitted not only that the regime has little or no control of the Afghan countryside, but that Soviet and regime forces will be more challenged in the future to maintain security in the Kabul area in the face of increased insurgent attacks. Examples of insurgent activity in the capital area include:

-- Ariana Airline's DC-10 had to make an emergency landing at Kabul International Airport on 21 September after being hit, probably by a heat-seeking missile.

-- Insurgent rocket attacks on the city on 13 September were the heaviest in months.


-- On 24 September the resistance launched their most intense, prolonged, and concentrated series of coordinated assaults on the capital since August 1983, according to US Embassy sources. 


25X1

23 October 1984
NESA M 84-10291CX
SOVA M 84-10185CX

25X1






Meanwhile Kabul's electricity shortage is continuing; it is the worst in the city's history and has affected large areas. Embassy sources also report that although food supplies in Kabul remained generally good, many residents complain about the high prices of basic commodities. 

25X1

Border Fighting

The regime exhibited increased concern about insurgent infiltration from Pakistan and Iran in September. At the 14th plenum of the Afghan ruling party, President Babrak Karmal called on the Afghan armed forces to defend Afghanistan's borders and said the Politburo adopted a decision on closing its borders with Pakistan and Iran. On 20 September the regime protested to the Iranian charge in Kabul about two alleged Iranian border violations into Afghan territory, and Kabul's press continued to censure Iran for supporting insurgent activity in Afghanistan. 

25X1

Soviet and Regime Operations

The insurgents' activities provoked Soviet and Afghan operations aimed at alleviating resistance pressure against important cities, regime garrisons, and roads. Soviet and Afghan forces were also active in some border areas, trying to reduce insurgent infiltration into the country.



25X1

-- A large Soviet force deployed to Lowgar Province in an effort to stop frequent insurgent attacks on convoys, according to US Embassy sources.




25X1

-- US Embassy sources report that a large operation was in progress in the Ghazni area and combat again occurred in Paktia.

23 October 1984
NESA M 84-10291CX
SOVA M 84-10185CX

25X1



-- Soviet and Afghan units continued efforts to rout insurgents from Paghman, northwest of Kabul.

-- Hoping to protect the highway from Kabul through the Salang Pass, Soviet and Afghan aircraft bombed many villages in the Shomali area, north of the capital.

-- At least three new Soviet and Afghan border violations into Pakistan occurred in September. [Redacted]

25X1

Outlook

The insurgents are likely to sustain their high level of activity this fall, and we believe Soviet and Afghan operations will result in only temporary setbacks for the resistance. Insurgent morale generally remains high, and we believe cooperation among insurgent groups will improve, especially in areas where Soviet operations make a united guerrilla effort essential to the insurgents' survival. Masood will probably continue attempts to reorganize insurgents in the north and to coordinate more effective strikes against Soviet and regime targets. [Redacted]


25X1
25X1

The Soviets are likely to continue to emphasize efforts to halt declines in security in urban areas--particularly around Kabul--and along roads, and to curtail insurgent infiltration. They probably will continue to make small-scale force augmentations to sustain activity and improve security, but we see few indications that the Soviets will soon significantly increase their forces. [Redacted]

25X1

23 October 1984
NESA M 84-10291CX
SOVA M 84-10185CX

25X1



PERSPECTIVE

AFGHAN OPIUM PRODUCTION



25X1



25X1


Afghan opium production--estimated at 120 to 180 tons this year--is expected to increase. Military operations are having little impact on poppy growing, and unsettled conditions add to incentives for production of the lucrative, easily stored and transported commodity. Moreover, Soviet and Afghan demand is increasing, as is the demand of Pakistani networks which process the opium into heroin for international distribution. Opium earns several million dollars a year for Afghan producers.



25X1

Production

We estimate that Afghan farmers produced 120 to 180 tons of opium during the 1984 crop year, three times that of neighboring Pakistan.





25X1

**23 October 1984
NESA M 84-10291CX
SOVA M 84-10185CX**



25X1



25X1

In general, the Soviet invasion has had little impact on poppy cultivation and opium production. [redacted] the Soviets have deliberately destroyed crops in retaliation for insurgent activity, but [redacted] crop destruction associated with military operations has affected only a very small share of total land under cultivation. Moreover, most large Soviet operations have been along main roads or near important towns, not in remote opium-growing areas. [redacted] no indications of systematic poppy eradication. Reporting from Soviet defectors, however, indicates that the Soviets are worried about drug abuse among their enlisted troops. [redacted]

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

Fighting and relatively large population emigration from rural areas may have affected production in at least two areas:

-- The Konar Valley in Konarha Province, once a major poppy growing area, now produces less than 5 percent of the total estimated crop.

-- Abandoned and unharvested grain fields in the Khowst Valley of Paktia Province suggest that production of opium may have declined in this area as well. [redacted]

25X1

Prices


Overproduction in Pakistan in the late 1970s, in response to prices of about \$200 per kilogram, drove prices down in both nations. Even at current prices of about \$70 per kilogram, however, Afghan farmers' profits are still probably several times those from wheat or cotton, the major competing cash crops. Moreover, opium is the only cash crop of many subsistence farmers and provides income for larger landowners when no other crop is mature. At the bazaar, opium prices of nearly \$200 per kilogram mean large earnings for Afghan merchants. [redacted]

25X1

23 October 1984
NESA M 84-10291CX
SOVA M 84-10185CX



25X1



Distribution

Opium not consumed locally is smuggled into Iran or sent to refineries concentrated on both sides of the Pakistani border near the Khyber Pass. Converted into heroin, it is distributed in Pakistan and internationally. Opium generates several million dollars per year in foreign currency for producers and dealers in Afghanistan's eastern provinces. [redacted]

25X1

[redacted] insurgent organizations are almost never directly involved in opium production and distribution.

25X1

[redacted] some insurgents who participated in the opium trade were executed by their organizations. The insurgency is, however, partially financed by taxes and contributions from civilians, and some of these funds undoubtedly come from growers and dealers. Moreover, some part-time resistance fighters are part-time opium farmers as well, and we know of no instance in which insurgents have attempted to prevent opium production. [redacted]

25X1

25X1

Outlook

The level of opium production in Afghanistan is likely to increase over the next few years unless the Afghan Government begins an opium eradication campaign, another drought strikes the productive eastern growing areas this season, or the Soviets move against opium producers and fields. Incentives for increased production include:

- Opium is the most valuable cash crop available to Afghan farmers. It is also easily stored and transported, and is imperishable, an important consideration during wartime.
- Anticipation of supply disruptions and price increases due to military operations at harvest time or eradication efforts in Pakistan encourage farmers to increase the size of their poppy crops.
- Demand for opium within Afghanistan is increasing. It is similar to currency and is used for bribes at checkpoints and border crossings. The Soviet soldiers' demand for drugs--albeit still at a low level--is growing rapidly. There is also some evidence of increased Afghan drug abuse.

23 October 1984
NESA M 84-10291CX
SOVA M 84-10185CX



25X1



ILLEGIB

-- Pakistan's trafficking networks, now moving larger amounts of heroin to Europe and the United States, need to be resupplied.



ILLEGIB

-- [redacted] more heroin laboratories and refineries are being located in Afghanistan and are likely to generate increased opium cultivation. [redacted]




ILLEGIB

25X1

25X1

ILLEGIB



ILLEGIB

23 October 1984
NESA M 84-10291CX
SOVA M 84-10185CX

ILLEGIB



25X1

AFGHAN OPIUM PRODUCTION

PROVINCE	ESTIMATED NUMBER OF POPPY FIELDS	ESTIMATED AREA GROWN TO POPPY (HECTARES)	ESTIMATED OPIUM PRODUCTION (METRIC TONS)
NORTHEAST			
KABUL	692	16	0.5
KAPISA	2716	65	1.9
KONARHA	4162	244	7.3
LAGHMAN	4695	175	5.2
LOWGAR	3299	432	12.9
NANGARHAR	32,498	2853	85.6
SUBTOTAL	47,964	3783	113.6
HELMAND VALLEY			
HELMAND	1631	125	3.7
ORUZGAN	409	65	1.9
SUBTOTAL	2040	187	5.7
OTHER AREAS			0-60
TOTAL	24,378	3970	120-180

Totals may not add due to rounding

25X1

23 October 1984
 NESA M 84-10291CX
 SOVA M 84-10185CX

25X1

Top Secret