




Intelligence



Afghanistan Situation Report



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5 October 1982



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


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AFGHANISTAN SITUATION REPORT

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
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
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
SOVIETS ACT POSITIVE TOWARD UN EFFORTS



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UN Secretary General Perez de Cuellar and his special representative for Afghanistan felt as a result of last month's visit to Moscow that the USSR wants continued UN efforts to solve the Afghanistan problem. UN officials who briefed the US UN mission on the visit said the Soviets were very positive toward the UN efforts. De Cuellar found the Soviets to be uncomfortable in Afghanistan and looking for a way out.

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Comment: According to UN officials, de Cuellar recognizes that the Soviets, in talking to him, might have exaggerated their appreciation of UN efforts. The Soviets presumably are seeking thereby to flatter and influence the Secretary General. Moscow may see such international efforts mainly as a way of staving off criticism for intransigence while trying to consolidate its military grip on Afghanistan. The Soviets probably would welcome any UN help to tamp down the problem without ending Communist rule in Kabul.

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IN BRIEF



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
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--A senior Soviet foreign ministry official for South Asia, who formerly was stationed in Kabul, claimed to the Canadian ambassador in Moscow that the internal situation in Afghanistan has improved...there is "better" government control, but the overall situation is "fluid" and arms and men continue to cross the Pakistan border.



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
--According to [redacted] who is now in Pakistan after almost a year in Kabul, no progress toward a political solution is possible in Kabul because neither the Afghan Communists nor the Soviets have any real authority in Afghanistan.



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PERSPECTIVE

The Economic Costs of Soviet Involvement in Afghanistan



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The growing economic costs of the Soviet involvement in Afghanistan--cumulatively at least \$10 billion--have so far been a small part of total Soviet military expenditures and are not yet a major drain on Soviet resources. Dislocations resulting from the involvement have probably not had a significant negative impact on civilian sectors of the economy. Moscow's likely perception of the costs of massive reinforcement, however, would constrain any decisions to launch an all-out campaign against the Mujahedin.



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Military Costs of the War

We estimate that during 1981 the Soviets spent about 500 million rubles (\$2.5 billion in dollar cost terms*)--slightly more than one percent of estimated Soviet defense expenditures--in direct support of their forces in Afghanistan. About one-third of this amount would have been incurred even if Soviet forces were not in Afghanistan. A slightly smaller amount (some 450 million rubles or \$2.25 billion) was spent in 1980.



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We estimate the replacement value of Soviet equipment destroyed during 1981 was at least 320 million rubles (\$550 million). Most of this amount represents Air Force equipment, particularly helicopters. The cost of replacing all Soviet helicopters destroyed in Afghanistan in 1981 would amount to 25 percent of the value of helicopters produced for the tactical air forces that year. By comparison, the cost of replacing Soviet Ground Forces equipment destroyed in 1981 amounts to 1 percent of the value of 1981 land armaments production.



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The Soviets have apparently not increased armaments production to replace equipment losses in Afghanistan. Current levels of production and inventories of all equipment of the types used in Afghanistan are more than adequate to cover these losses.



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*The dollar cost figures represent an estimate of what it would cost to procure, operate, and maintain an equivalent force of men and equipment in the United States.



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We are unable to estimate with much confidence either the total value of Soviet-supplied equipment in the hands of Afghan troops or the value of destroyed and damaged Afghan equipment that may have been replaced by the Soviets. We do know that the Afghan Government is paying for past Soviet aid with earnings from the sale of natural gas. Military goods shipped since December 1979, however, are thought to be in the form of grants and, in current prices, are estimated to have been worth nearly \$400 million in 1980 and over \$200 million in 1981. [redacted]

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The number of Soviet military personnel currently estimated to be in Afghanistan is about 100,000. This amounts to slightly less than 2 percent of total Soviet armed forces and about 4 percent of all ground and air forces--the main suppliers of Soviet manpower in Afghanistan. The contingent has grown by about 15,000 men since mid-1980. [redacted]

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Nonmilitary Costs

The nonmilitary costs are harder to quantify, but we judge that the intervention in Afghanistan has been more of an annoyance to the Soviets than an unacceptable burden. Military priorities have caused internal disruptions in such areas as transportation and construction. In the republics just north of Afghanistan, these disruptions may have been quite severe at the beginning of the intervention. Over time, however, the Soviets have been able to moderate some of these adverse effects. [redacted]

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The Soviets have attempted to relieve supply bottlenecks by building new and improving old transportation routes into Afghanistan. They have laid POL pipelines and completed construction of a bridge for railroad and vehicular traffic across the Amu Darya at the USSR-Afghan border. The road from the bridge to Kabul has been improved, and eventually a railroad may be built either to Kabul or to a logistics base. Because of the frequent attacks against the POL pipelines and the mining of the roads by the insurgents, the Soviets have not been able to eliminate the logistic bottlenecks. [redacted]

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The Soviets have been plagued for years by a shortage of railroad cars. Their involvement in Afghanistan and its requirement for rolling stock has only aggravated an already overtaxed system and has put the squeeze on some local economies. Alternative transport has not been able to take up all the slack. [redacted]

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Construction workers--always in short supply--have been diverted to projects in Afghanistan. While the number involved is thought to be small, this diversion puts lower priority projects in the USSR further behind schedule. [redacted]

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These disruptions, while annoying, are somewhat localized. They generate indirect costs that are impossible to calculate but apparently not severe enough to have an observable effect on the Soviet conduct of the war. [redacted]

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Outlook

If the Soviets continue to conduct the war as they have in the last three years, we can expect the fighting in Afghanistan to continue for a long time: the Mujahedin show no signs of weakness in their resolve and neither do the Soviets. The direct military cost to the Soviets of maintaining their position is at a manageable level, at least for the present. [redacted]

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The costs are growing, however. Although we have not assessed Soviet outlays for 1982, Soviet military activity through September has been higher than that for the same time frame for 1980 and 1981. The costs are no doubt higher as well, and enhanced insurgent effectiveness will likely increase Soviet equipment losses. The cumulative operational costs and equipment losses since the invasion began will probably total at least \$10 billion by the end of this year, not including the expenses and losses of the Afghan Army. [redacted]

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Moreover, Moscow's concern with the cost of the war likely inhibits its willingness to launch an all-out effort to seal Afghanistan's borders and defeat the Mujahedin. We estimate that such a campaign would require about a half million men, with no guarantee of ultimate success. The long-term economic costs of this option are probably more than the Soviets are willing to bear at present given the uncertain situation in Poland and the continuing rift with China. This is especially true if the Soviets do not see a quick end to the war even with a massive infusion of men and equipment. [redacted]

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