


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Directorate of Intelligence

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66 C/TWA/ASIA/SOVA



Afghanistan Situation Report



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13 May 1986

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AFGHANISTAN SITUATION REPORT




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
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FIVE-YEAR PLAN: UNREALISTIC EXPECTATIONS



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The Afghan Government's first five-year plan is overly optimistic, probably to help win support for the program's objectives.



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THE SOVIETS' MAN IN KABUL



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IN BRIEF

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
PERSPECTIVE

AFGHANISTAN IN APRIL



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The Afghan Army conducted a successful operation against the insurgents in Paktia Province, but Soviet and Afghan forces made less headway against the insurgency in Qandahar. When circumstances permit, the Soviets will continue to shift more combat responsibilities to the Afghan's military.




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
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FIVE-YEAR PLAN: UNREALISTIC EXPECTATIONS



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
The Afghan Government's Socio-Economic Development Plan for 1986-91--the regime's first five-year plan--calls for national income to increase by 25 percent, industrial production by 38 percent, and gross agricultural output by 14 to 16 percent. With Soviet

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assistance, the regime plans over 130 projects in various sectors of the economy. The government has identified land reform and the rebuilding of irrigation systems as key objectives. The plan calls for new housing construction and increased salaries for state employees.

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
COMMENT: The regime's plans for economic development are overly optimistic, given past performance. Even official government statistics--which probably are inflated--show that from 1978 to 1985, national income increased by only 4.9 percent, industrial output by 5 percent, and gross agricultural output by 7.3 percent. The counterinsurgency will continue to limit economic growth, and Soviet aid is unlikely to increase substantially over 1985 levels because of the USSR's domestic budgetary constraints. The rosy forecast and objectives highlighted probably are intended to help win support for the regime and to improve its international image.

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THE SOVIETS' MAN IN KABUL



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Najibullah has publicly stated that he will maintain close ties with the Soviet Union, and he pledged to defeat the guerrillas and implement social and economic reforms.

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
some factional fighting and arrests of both pro-Karmal demonstrators and members of the rival Khalqi faction, the new party chief has attempted to demonstrate unity within the regime. All members of the Politburo--including Khalqis--appeared together at a public ceremony last week. Moreover, Najibullah has conferred with Sayyed Mohammed Gulabzoi, Minister of the Interior and head of the Khalqi faction, and with officials from the National Defense. Najibullah also met with elders of the minority Hazara tribe--Prime Minister Soltan Ali Kestmand's ethnic group.

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COMMENT: Najibullah's pro-Soviet attitude, his



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


background in intelligence, and his Pashtun ethnicity probably made him an attractive leader in Moscow's eyes. His appointment, just as the peace talks in Geneva were about to begin, also may have been meant to give the impression of Soviet willingness to consider other leadership adjustments in Kabul. Although Najibullah will give priority to coopting the Pashtun tribes--the backbone of the resistance--and improving the government's security forces, his anti-Khalqi tendencies, if unchecked, could be counterproductive.




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


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-- Most residents of Uzbekistan and Kirgizia support the Soviet policy in Afghanistan despite mistrust of Soviet press coverage of the war and critical reports from returning veterans, according to the US Embassy in Moscow. Even the young and well-educated--whose suspicion of the Soviet press is strongest--feel that Soviet national security interests are at stake in Afghanistan.



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
-- Two Soviet diplomats in Kabul were executed in early 1986 for smuggling gold for the Afghan resistance, according to the US Embassy in Moscow and a Soviet dissident publication. The illegal




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
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operation evidently was uncovered during a customs inspection in Moscow. One of the officials was a former Minister of Justice in the Tadzhik Republic, and his alleged execution suggests the government intends to crack down on corruption among Soviet officials in Afghanistan. 

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
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
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
PERSPECTIVE

AFGHANISTAN IN APRIL




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During a three-week offensive in April, the Afghan Army overran two insurgent camps in Paktia Province and Pakistani



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Afghan Army Success in Paktia



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The Afghan Army's performance in the battles in Paktia suggests that it is making some progress. Although Soviet air and artillery support were critical to the outcome of the operations, Afghan Army troops sustained the offensive and evidently suffered few defections.



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The regime has heavily publicized its success in Paktia. It claimed destruction of vast amounts of arms and equipment cached in the hill complex at Zhawar and exaggerated insurgent casualties--Kabul said it killed 3,000 guerrillas and wounded another 4,000. The loss



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
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
of the guerrillas' complex--with communications and administrative facilities, workshops, and stockpiles-- was a clear set back for the guerrillas.



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The fighting in Qandahar evidently was stepped up by the guerrillas in response to Afghan regime and Soviet attacks this winter on base camps in Qandahar Province.

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[Redacted] the insurgents destroyed offices of the Afghan intelligence service in Qandahar on 2 April, and media accounts termed fighting in the city as intense during the month.

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
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The Soviets and the Afghan Government continued to prevent any major insurgent actions in Kabul, according to the US Embassy. Although the guerrillas almost certainly assigned high priority to disrupting the eighth anniversary celebrations of the Communist coup on 27 April, the defensive measures instituted by the regime in the capital apparently checked the insurgents' capabilities for sizable attacks.

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OUTLOOK

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The Paktia offensive probably was the prelude to heavier fighting this spring. The formula of Soviet air and artillery support for Afghan infantry seems to have worked recently, and the Soviets probably will use it again. We believe, however, that the Army will have to conduct several more successful operations to demonstrate that it is more than a weak extension of the Soviet Army. 

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The Afghan Army's successful offensive in Paktia may discourage the insurgents from establishing additional large support complexes and from forming more conventional-style combat units, in our view. But reliance on small and highly mobile units will limit the damage that the insurgents will be able to inflict in engagements. 

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