



Directorate of
Intelligence

~~Top Secret~~

25X1

62

C/TWA/SOVA

Afghanistan Situation Report

25X1

9 April 1985

~~Top Secret~~

NESA M 85-10068CX
SOVA M 85-10068CX

9 April 1985

25X1

Copy 062

Page Denied


S E C R E T

MSGNO 28 (MIIR) *05/02/85* *03:15:50.6.3*
ZCZC 08:14:20Z (MI)

25X1

SECRET

MILITARY




85 7185076 MSR

NC 7185076

TOR: 020635Z MAY 85

RR RUEAIIA
 DE RUEKJCS #4280 1220635
 ZNY SSSSS
 R 020635Z MAY 85
 FM JCS WASHINGTON DC
 INFO RUEADWD/OCSA WASHINGTON DC
 RUENAAA/CNO WASHINGTON DC
 RUEAHQA/CSAF WASHINGTON DC
 RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
 RUEHC /SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC
 RUEAMCC/CMC CC WASHINGTON DC
 RUETIAH/DIRNSA FT GEORGE G MEADE MD
 RUEACMC/CMC WASHINGTON DC
 RUCJACC/USCINCCENT MACDILL AFB FL
 RUEALGX/SAFE
 R 020612Z MAY 85
 FM DIAL CANBERRA AS
 TO RUEKJCS/DIA WASHINGTON DC//RTS-2B/DB-1E/JSI-2C/DE-1//
 INFO RUHQHQA/USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
 RUHQHQA/COMIPAC HONOLULU HI
 RUHHHMA/CDRUSAITIC-PAC FT SHAFTER HI
 RUCLAKA/CDR4THPSYOPGP FT BRAGG NC
 RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD
 RUHHHMA/CDRWESTCOM FT SHAFTER HI
 RUADJHA/CDR500THMIGP CP ZAMA JA
 RUCQVAB/USCINCPAC INTEL OPS CEN MACDILL AFB FL
 RUHVAAA/COMJSOC HICKAM AFB HI
 RUHVAAA/HQPACAF HICKAM AFB HI//IN//
 RHHMBRA/CINCPACFLT PEARL HARBOR HI//N2//
 RUEOAJC/NAVOPINTCEN SUITLAND MD
 BT
 EZ1:
 S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 CANBERRA AS 04280
 SECRET NOFORN PORTIONS REL AS
 EZ2:



25X1

S E C R E T

S E C R E T

PAGE 0005

[Redacted]

25X1

COUNTRY: (U) SOVIET UNION (UR), AFGHANISTAN (AF)

SUBJ: [Redacted]/SOVIET SELF CRITICISM

25X1

IDENTIFIES PROBLEMS IN AFGHANISTAN (U)

WARNING: (U) THIS IS AN INFO REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTEL. (U)

DOI: (U) 850416

REQS: (U) T-2C2-21880; U-UPH-43054; C-SA3-40498;

T-XXX-42015

[Redacted]

25X1

SUMMARY: (S REL AS) RECENT ARTICLES IN SOVIET PROFESSIONAL MILITARY JOURNALS INDICATE PROBLEMS BEING EXPERIENCED BY THE SOVIET ARMY IN AFGHANISTAN. THE PROBLEMS HIGHLIGHTED BY THE AUTHORS OF THE ARTICLES, SOVIET GENERALS, INCLUDE POOR TROOP MANAGEMENT, THE FAILURE TO GAIN ACCURATE AND TIMELY TACTICAL INTEL, THE LACK OF COMBAT AGGRESSIVENESS, AND A INABILITY TO REACT TO CHANGING COMBAT CONDITIONS.

TEXT: (AS - S REL US) REF: A4/5/95

QUOTE:

1. (S) A REVIEW OF RECENT CRITICAL ARTICLES IN SOVIET PROFESSIONAL MILITARY JOURNALS, SUCH AS "MILITARY HERALD", HAS PROVIDED AN INSIGHT INTO PROBLEMS WHICH ARE BEING EXPERIENCED BY THE SOVIET ARMY IN AFGHANISTAN. THE THREE PROBLEM AREAS WHICH ARE DISCUSSED HAVE RISEN TO PROMINENCE IN AFGHANISTAN BUT COULD REASONABLY BE EXPECTED TO EXIST THROUGHOUT THE SOVIET ARMY. THE AUTHORS OF THE ARTICLES ARE SOVIET ARMY AND AIRBORNE GENERALS.
2. (S) THE FIRST MAJOR PROBLEM AREA WHICH HAS BEEN IDENTIFIED IS THAT OF TROOP MANAGEMENT. WE BELIEVE THAT DEPLOYMENT TO AFGHANISTAN HIGHLIGHTS THE PROBLEMS WHICH ARE PRECEIVED TO HAMPER THE EFFECTIVENESS OF A LARGE PROPORTION OF SOVIET ARMY UNITS. THESE INCLUDE DERELICTION OF DUTY BY OFFICERS; BLACK MARKETEERING; ALCOHOLISM; DRUG ABUSE; ETHNIC TENSIONS; AND BRUTAL DISCIPLINE. SOVIET WRITERS HAVE EMPHASISED THE NEED FOR SOVIET OFFICERS TO COUNTERACT THESE PROBLEMS BY "MIXING" WITH THEIR SUBORDINATES AND GETTING TO KNOW THEIR MEN. THE SOLUTION IS SEEN TO EXIST AT OFFICER LEVEL BECAUSE OFFICERS ARE HELD HIGHLY ACCOUNTABLE FOR THE PERFORMANCE OF THEIR TROOPS. IN ADDITION TO THIS, THE FACT THAT THE VAST MAJORITY OF SOVIET SOLDIERS ARE TWO-YEAR CONSCRIPTS LEADS TO THE EXPECTATION THAT PROFESSIONAL CONTINUITY WILL BE MAINTAINED AT OFFICER AND SENIOR NCO LEVEL. THE

S E C R E T

S E C R E T

PAGE 0006

SOLUTION MAY ALSO BE SEEN TO EXIST AT OFFICER LEVEL BECAUSE THE POOR PERFORMANCE OF THE OFFICER CORPS IS PERCEIVED TO FORM A LARGE PROPORTION OF THE PROBLEM. THE SOVIET ASSESSMENT THAT WEAKNESSES EXIST IN THE LEADERSHIP DISPLAYED BY OFFICERS HAS GIVEN IMPETUS TO IMPROVE OVERALL OFFICER CORPS STANDARDS.

3. (S) THE SECOND MAJOR PROBLEM AREA WHICH HAS BEEN IDENTIFIED IN THE SOVIET ARTICLES IS THAT OF THE FAILURE TO GAIN ACCURATE AND TIMELY TACTICAL INTELLIGENCE. SUGGESTIONS TO REDRESS THIS PROBLEM INCLUDE, ESTABLISHING SPECIFIC TASKS FOR RECONNAISSANCE AS FAR IN ADVANCE AS POSSIBLE; THE EMPLOYMENT OF FOOT PATROLS TO GAIN INTELLIGENCE IN MOUNTAINOUS AREAS AND THE REQUIREMENT FOR THE MAINTENANCE OF CONTINUOUS COMMUNICATIONS WITH RECONNAISSANCE UNITS. ANOTHER MAJOR ARGUMENT WHICH IS MADE IN THE ARTICLES IS THAT COMMANDERS MUST MAKE INCREASED UTILIZATION OF ORGANIC-TO-UNIT RECONNAISSANCE ASSETS. THE AUTHORS COMPLAIN THAT SOVIET BATTALION COMMANDERS RELY TOO

NNNN

NNDD

S E C R E T

S E C R E T N O F O R N

SECRET NOFORN PORTIONS REL AS

EZ2:

[Redacted]

25X1

COUNTRY: (U) SOVIET UNION (UR), AFGHANISTAN (AF)

SUBJ: [Redacted] SOVIET SELF CRITICISM

25X1

HEAVILY UPON INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT FROM OTHER UNITS RATHER THAN MAKING USE OF THEIR OWN RESOURCES.

4. (S) WE BELIEVE THAT THE SOVIET ARMY IS LEARNING THE HARD WAY THAT ARMoured COLUMNS AND HELICOPTER GUNSHIPS ARE INCAPABLE OF COLLECTING THE TACTICAL INTELLIGENCE REQUIRED FOR THE SUPPRESSION OF MUJAHIDEEN GUERILLA TACTICS. THIS DOES NOT MEAN, HOWEVER, THAT THE TACTICAL INTELLIGENCE GAP IS PERCEIVED AS EXISTING ONLY IN AFGHANISTAN. ARTICLES HAVE SPECIFICALLY MENTIONED THE REQUIREMENTS FOR IMPROVEMENTS IN TACTICAL INTELLIGENCE TO COUNTERACT DEVELOPMENTS IN NEW TECHNOLOGY WEAPONS SYSTEMS POSSESSED BY FOREIGN ARMIES.

5. (S) THE THIRD MAJOR PROBLEM IS CLOSELY RELATED TO THE SOVIET DOCTRINE THAT A UNIT'S COMBAT EFFECTIVENESS IS DEPENDENT UPON ITS AGGRESSIVENESS AND UPON ITS ABILITY TO REACT TO CHANGING CIRCUMSTANCES IN COMBAT. WE BELIEVE THAT WITH THE EXCEPTION OF SOVIET AIRBORNE AND SPETSNAZ TROOPS, THE COMBAT RECORD OF SOVIET TROOPS IN AFGHANISTAN HAS DISAPPOINTED THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP. SOVIET JOURNAL ARTICLES HAVE CRITICIZED COMMANDERS FOR DISPLAYING A LACK OF AGGRESSION AND INITIATIVE. THESE ARTICLES HAVE ALSO CALLED FOR COMMANDERS TO BE UNAFRAID TO TAKE CALCULATED RISKS TO CONDUCT AND WIN AGGRESSIVE COMBAT OPERATIONS. THE NECESSITY FOR FLEXIBILITY IN PLANNING IS ALSO STRESSED. THIS IS WORTHY OF SPECIAL NOTE AS SOVIET MILITARY DOCTRINE IN THE PAST HAS GENERALLY DOWNPLAYED THE IMPORTANCE OF FLEXIBILITY IN FAVOR OF UNQUESTIONING OBEDIENCE TO ORDERS.

6. (S) WE BELIEVE THAT TWO FACTORS HAVE HINDERED THE AGGRESSIVENESS AND INITIATIVE OF SOVIET UNITS IN AFGHANISTAN. THE FIRST OF THESE IS THE ECONOMY OF FORCE APPROACH TO THE WAR WHICH HAS BEEN FOLLOWED IN AN EFFORT TO KEEP PERSONNEL AND MATERIAL COSTS DOWN. THE SECOND OF THESE IS THE REPEATED AND PROLONGED VISITS BY SENIOR SOVIET OFFICERS TO AFGHANISTAN WHICH HAVE LED TO A HESITANCY TO MAKE DECISIONS AMONGST LOWER LEVEL COMMANDERS.

7. (S) WE BELIEVE THAT SOVIET ARMY DOCTRINE IS UNDERGOING DEVELOPMENT THROUGH SELF-CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF ITS OWN PROBLEMS. SUCH PROBLEMS AND THEIR SOLUTIONS ARE RELEVANT TO THE ENTIRE SOVIET ARMY, BUT HAVE BECOME ACUTE IN AFGHANISTAN WHERE SHORTCOMINGS ARE LESS EASILY CONCEALED. THIS IS AN EXAMPLE OF THE SOVIET USE OF AFGHANISTAN

S E C R E T N O F O R N



S E C R E T N O F O R N

AS A TEST-BED FOR WEAPONS AND MILITARY DOCTRINE.

COMMENTS: (S REL AS) ASSESSMENTS BY LOCAL ANALYSTS INDICATE A POSSIBLE SHIFT IN SOVIET STRATEGY. SOME REPORTING HAS INDICATED A POSSIBILITY THAT THE SOVIET ARMY MAY DRASTICALLY INCREASE ITS STRENGTH, PERHAPS TO THE LEVEL OF THE HALF MILLION MEN ESTIMATED TO BE REQUIRED TO PACIFY AFGHANISTAN. LOCAL ANALYSTS BELIEVE THAT THE AFORETO MENTIONED OPTION IS UNLIKELY, HOWEVER.



25X1

PROJ: (U) N/A
COLL: (U) NONE
INSTR: (U) U.S. NO
PREP: (U) 
APPR: (U) 
EVAL: (U) YES, REL TO: AUSTRALIA
ENCL: (U) NONE
DISEM: (U) N/A
WARNING: NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS.
NNNN

25X1

NNDD

S E C R E T N O F O R N


TOP SECRET



25X1

AFGHANISTAN SITUATION REPORT

CONTENTS



1 25X1

1

AN AFGHAN BUSINESSMAN'S VIEW OF THE WAR



2 25X1

Despite disruptions and high costs caused by the war, businessmen involved in foreign trade make profits because of Soviet and regime tolerance for business that brings in hard currency.



25X1

IN BRIEF

3


PERSPECTIVE

AFGHANISTAN: NEW EMPHASIS ON OLD MILITARY PROBLEMS



4 25X1

Recent articles in the Soviet Military Herald by senior officers who have been closely associated with the Afghan war illuminate Soviet perceptions for improving troop effectiveness--both in Afghanistan and forcewide--by addressing the important topics of troop management, tactical intelligence, and aggressive approaches to combat operations.



25X1




TOP SECRET



25X1

This document is prepared weekly by the Office of Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis and the Office of Soviet Analysis.



25X1


25X1



25X1

TOP SECRET

25X1



800016 (545424) 10-83



9 April 1985
NEVA M 85-10068CX
SOVA M 85-10068CX

25X1

Page Denied

TOP SECRET

[Redacted]

25X1

[Redacted]

25X1

AN AFGHAN BUSINESSMAN'S VIEW OF THE WAR

[Redacted]

25X1

An Afghan owner of a raisin processing plant in Kabul recently told a US Embassy official how difficult it was becoming to run his business. Loss of manpower and insecure transportation have cut production and required the businessman to buy his grapes from farms near Kabul at about six times the pre-war price. The source said, however, that the business remains extremely profitable.

[Redacted]

25X1

Comment: We believe the Soviets allow, and possibly encourage, some private entrepreneurs to continue their operations because of the hard currency they bring into the country. According to government statistics, dried fruits are the second largest export, and one of the largest sources of foreign exchange.

[Redacted]

25X1

IN BRIEF

-- Sources of the US Embassy in Kabul report that on 30 March insurgents attacked a large convoy near the Salang Tunnel and destroyed 33 vehicles.

[Redacted]

25X1

25X1

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

9 April 1985
NESA M 85-10068CX
SOVA M 85-10068CX

25X1

TOP SECRET

[Redacted] 25X1

[Redacted] 25X1


-- Saudi Arabia awarded Abdul Rasul Sayyaf, leader of the Afghan Resistance Fundamentalist Alliance, the King Faisal International Award for Service to Islam on 2 April. Sayyaf's selection constitutes an endorsement of the Saudi's preferred mujahedin leader and reaffirms their support for the Afghan freedom fighters. [Redacted] 25X1

-- The Pakistani foreign ministry told US officials on 3 April that no airstrikes from Afghanistan on Pakistani territory have taken place since 19 March. Two overflights were observed, according to the ministry. [Redacted] 25X1

[Redacted]

9 April 1985
NESA M 85-10068CX
SOVA M 85-10068CX

25X1


TOP SECRET

25X1


PERSPECTIVE**AFGHANISTAN: NEW EMPHASIS ON OLD MILITARY PROBLEMS**

25X1

25X1



Recent articles in **Military Herald**--professional journal of Soviet Ground Forces--provide insight into problems the Soviets are experiencing and lessons they are learning in Afghanistan. In particular, several articles by senior officers who have been closely associated with the Afghan war illuminate Soviet perceptions on the important topics of troop management, tactical intelligence, and an aggressive approach to combat operations. These issues have relevance to Soviet forces as a whole, but are particularly acute in Afghanistan where shortcomings are less easily concealed and have more serious consequences. Among the solutions the senior officers propose are closer ties between officers and their men, more reconnaissance at the battalion level and below, and more aggressiveness on the part of unit commanders.



25X1


Background

Over the past several years, articles on combat operations in mountainous regions have appeared more frequently in **Military Herald**, with many specifically referring to problems experienced and lessons learned during "training" in Afghanistan. Most of the articles that refer specifically to Soviet forces in Afghanistan have dealt with Soviet airborne troops, but other articles also appear to draw on Soviet experience gained in the war.



25X1

Problems of Troop Management*

 the Soviet military press-- have noted problems in troop management in Afghanistan which are also typical of those experienced by Soviet units elsewhere: dereliction of duty and lack of

25X1

*Troop management encompasses all activities of commanders and staffs directed toward the accomplishment of a unit's mission both in combat and in the development and maintenance of training standards, readiness, discipline, and morale.



25X1

9 April 1985
 NESA M 85-10068CX
 SOVA M 85-10068CX

25X1



TOP SECRET

25X1

professional competence by officers; black marketeering by officers and soldiers; poor and sometimes brutal relationships between officers and soldiers, between sergeants and soldiers, and between senior and junior enlisted men; alcoholism in all ranks; and ethnic tensions. [REDACTED]

25X1

Soviet efforts to solve such problems concentrate on the officer corps, both because the commander is held accountable for the actions of his subordinates and because, to a considerable extent, the officer corps is a major part of the problem. The Soviets emphasize the importance of individual work by commanders with subordinates. [REDACTED]

25X1

An article by Army General D. Sukhorukhov, Commanding General of the Airborne Forces (VDV), in the October 1984 issue of **Military Herald** emphasized the need for commanders to "mix" with their troops--in the field and in garrison--in order to develop personal relationships. The article, directed specifically at junior officers, cites three VDV officers who served with distinction in Afghanistan and who had excellent relations with their troops. Successful leadership principles which Sukhorukhov recommends to others include leading by example; paying attention to strengths, weaknesses, problems, personal background, and interests of each soldier; and supporting subordinates and considering their suggestions. [REDACTED]

25X1

Sukhorukhov's views reflect longstanding "prescriptions," but his emphasis on Afghanistan is significant. Reality--both in Afghanistan and elsewhere--indicates that not all VDV officers (let alone all Soviet army officers) measure up to Sukhorukhov's precepts. Combat experience in Afghanistan probably has highlighted weaknesses in Soviet junior and mid-level leadership and given impetus to efforts to improve the Soviet officer corps forcewide. [REDACTED]

25X1

Problems in Tactical Intelligence

One of the most serious and persistent problems for the Soviets in Afghanistan has been tactical intelligence. They repeatedly have been frustrated in attempts to locate elusive insurgent forces in a sufficiently accurate and timely manner to engage the

9 April 1985
 NESAM 85-10068CX
 SOVA M 85-10068CX

25X1

TOP SECRET

25X1

insurgents. [REDACTED]

25X1

25X1

Articles in the October and December 1984 issues of **Military Herald** by Colonel General F. Gredasov and Army General A. Majorov addressed tactical intelligence from the perspective of their considerable experience in Afghanistan. Gredasov, associated with the Intelligence Directorate of the Soviet Ground Forces, was a frequent visitor to Afghanistan in the entourage of then-First Deputy Minister of Defense Sokolov during the 1979 to 1984 period when Sokolov oversaw the direction of the war. General Majorov, the First Deputy Commander in Chief of the Soviet Ground Forces, formerly was Chief of the Soviet Military Assistance Group in Kabul. [REDACTED]

25X1

Gredasov's article deals with the necessity for units at battalion level and below to conduct reconnaissance effectively. He emphasizes the commander's (and staff's) responsibility to organize reconnaissance using all resources available. Specific suggestions include: establishing specific tasks for reconnaissance as far in advance as possible; conducting reconnaissance by foot patrols in mountainous regions in advance of units in vehicles; and maintaining constant communication with reconnaissance elements. [REDACTED]

25X1

General Majorov touches on some of the same themes in his article discussing factors which contribute to combat effectiveness. Majorov, citing Gredasov's article, notes that reconnaissance is the most complex and most important type of combat support. Majorov charges, however, that many Soviet battalion commanders tend to rely too heavily on intelligence support from other units rather than fully utilizing organic reconnaissance assets. Majorov criticizes commanders who complain of inadequate resources to conduct effective reconnaissance, and says that battalions should be able to accomplish their intelligence missions if commanders use their assets wisely. [REDACTED]

25X1

Inefficiencies of current Soviet tactical intelligence operations in Afghanistan may reinforce calls throughout the Soviet military for improved reconnaissance and provide some valuable--though

9 April 1985
 NESA M 85-10068CX
 SOVA M 85-10068CX

25X1

TOP SECRET

25X1

painful--lessons on how to do so. Soviet commanders probably recognize that tactical intelligence must be improved to cope with targeting problems in a more conventional war as well as in Afghanistan. Majorov specifically notes, for example, that developments in foreign armies, such as the use of precision-guided munitions and advanced fire-control and target acquisition systems, will demand more effective reconnaissance on the part of Soviet forces.

25X1

Aggressiveness in Combat

The ultimate measure of effectiveness of a military unit, its ability to close with and defeat an opposing force, depends to a considerable extent on the unit's aggressiveness and ability to react in a quickly changing combat situation. Aggressiveness and quick reaction, in turn, are largely functions of commander initiative and decisiveness at critical junctures in the battle.

25X1

The Soviet combat record in Afghanistan to date has been mixed. A recurring comment on Soviet forces in Afghanistan--both by the insurgents as well as by senior Soviet officers--has been the lack of aggressiveness by Soviet units in combat.

25X1

25X1

Lieutenant General V. Kostylev, the First Deputy Commander in Chief of the VDV, in a January 1985 Military Herald article, addresses the importance of combat activeness, decisiveness, and initiative on the part of units and commanders. His article is based, at least in part, on his experiences in Afghanistan in 1983 and 1984.

25X1

Kostylev sees the goal of officer training to be the development of tactical maturity--a maturity that will enable commanders at a given moment to cast aside a previous plan to deal with a new situation. Commanders, he argues, must at all times be unafraid to take calculated risks to conduct aggressive combat

9 April 1985
 NESA M 85-10068CX 25X1
 SOVA M 85-10068CX

TOP SECRET

25X1

[REDACTED]

operations. Kostylev notes the achievements of some VDV units and commanders in Afghanistan and elsewhere, but also admits that not all commanders and units measure up. [REDACTED]

25X1

Display of initiative and aggressiveness by commanders in Afghanistan may be hindered by two factors. First, the Soviets have pursued an economy of force approach to the war to keep down personnel and material costs. Commanders may, therefore, be more concerned with limiting losses than with inflicting maximum casualties on the insurgents. Second, the high level direction of the war--evident, for example, in repeated and prolonged visits to Afghanistan by senior Soviet military officers--would suggest that commanders at all levels probably perceive themselves to be on a "tight rein." [REDACTED]

25X1

Implications

The war in Afghanistan has highlighted longstanding problems and weaknesses in the Soviet military. Most of the problems are not unique to Soviet units in Afghanistan, to guerrilla war, or to wars in general, but the Afghan combat situation increases the penalties for failure. By exposing these deficiencies, the Soviet experience in Afghanistan will more clearly focus the attention of military leaders on the need for corrective action in the short term--to improve force effectiveness in Afghanistan--and in the long term--to improve forcewide preparations for all types of combat. [REDACTED]

25X1

[REDACTED]

9 April 1985
NESA M 85-10068CX
SOVA M 85-10068CX

25X1

Page Denied