



JUL 22 1982

Washington, D.C. 20530

Colonel George J. Mercurio  
Chairman  
SECOM Compartmentation Subcommittee  
Room BD 951, The Pentagon  
Washington, D.C. 20301

DOJ Review  
Completed.

SU: Review of Foreign Travel Policy

Dear Colonel Mercurio:

In response to Mr. Leidenheimer's memorandum SECOM-D-225, of June 28, 1982, and pursuant to the provisions of Director of Central Intelligence Directive (DCID) 1/20, "Security Policy Concerning Travel and Assignment of Personnel with Access to Sensitive Compartmented Information," it is the policy of the Department of Justice (DOJ), as stated in Department Order DOJ 2620.3, that any DOJ employee authorized access to Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI) notify the Director, Security Staff, when planning foreign travel, whether official or unofficial. This notification is to be made in writing, upon submission of which a determination is made concerning the necessity for a Defensive Security Briefing. While particular attention is paid to travel to, or through, Communist bloc countries, Defensive Security Briefings are provided on an "as-needed" basis to all SCI-cleared DOJ personnel.

A copy of the current DOJ Defensive Security Briefing is enclosed, for your convenience. In addition to this briefing, the SECOM "Study on Harassments and Provocations" is being incorporated into the Department's security program. Every individual receiving a Defensive Security Briefing also signs a statement certifying that he has read, and understands, the information contained in the briefing. The Defensive Security Briefing is conducted by a Special Security Center staff member who is prepared to provide any additional information required by the individual.

I have also enclosed a copy of the "Foreign Travel Clearance" package which has been circulated throughout the Department. A reciprocal agreement has been made between the Security

Staff and the Consolidated Administrative Office to ensure that both parties are notified of any official foreign travel by Department officials as defined in the memoranda. It is anticipated that this arrangement will greatly enhance the Security Staff's ability to provide Defensive Security Briefings to DOJ Senior Executives.

With regard to an Intelligence Community-wide study of foreign travel policy, it is my recommendation that DCID 1/20 be reviewed so as to reflect the provisions of pertinent Executive Orders and to be consistent with other recently updated DCI directives.

If you wish to discuss these matters further, please contact me on 633-2094, or have a member of your staff contact Mary Andriacchi on 633-3738.

Sincerely,



D. Jerry Rubino  
Department of Justice SECOM Member

Enclosures

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

DEFENSIVE SECURITY BRIEFING

1. Techniques Used by the Communist Espionage Agencies.

The Communist regimes, through such means as travel controls and restrictions, surveillance, and harassment, seek to hide from foreign visitors everything except that which may contribute directly to their political and propaganda aims. Additionally, those regimes have sought to discredit, subvert, and recruit for espionage purposes, U.S. citizens who have been traveling in Communist countries for business or personal reasons. Tight police control over the movements of all persons gives them great advantages in terms of opportunities to observe and evaluate the U.S. traveler, and to exploit or entrap him. The techniques used against foreign visitors have been extremely clever and range from psychological to technical. They include:

- a. Careful control of the visitor through travel arrangements made by In-Tourist, ORBIS, CEDOK and other Communist travel agencies.
- b. Physical surveillance of the visitor.
- c. Extensive use of telephone taps, clandestine listening devices, clandestine photography, and mail censorship.
- d. Exploitation of human weaknesses, indiscretions, and vices.
- e. Coercion of U.S. nationals by threats against, or promises of assistance to, relatives in Communist countries.

2. Control of Visitors by Communist Travel Agencies.

a. Guides and interpreters are members of, or cooperate with, the secret police agencies. They act as the "eyes and ears" of the espionage services and their personal accompaniment of the tourist serves as a form of surveillance. It is therefore important that the visitor be cautious in what he says and does.

b. Some of the guides are experienced intelligence personnel trained to exploit U.S. travelers for intelligence and propaganda purposes. For example, a civilian employee of the U.S. Government was questioned in detail by his In-Tourist guide concerning his highly technical scientific research. The guide, although well in his thirties, explained that he was a college student working for his degree and needed this information for his thesis. In another instance, statements by a Reserve Officer on inactive duty were highly publicized by the Communist propaganda agencies as praising the Russian way of life over the free enterprise system of the West.

### 3. Physical Surveillance.

a. Delegates to international conferences, members of exchange groups, scientists, industrial contractors, military personnel on active or inactive duty, and other particularly knowledgeable individuals are of great interest to hostile intelligence. Persons in those categories must assume that following application for a visa to a Communist country, biographic and intelligence data on the traveler are forwarded to the intelligence service of the country being visited. These individuals may be subjected from the moment of arrival to obvious surveillance or to surveillance so discreet as to be undetectable. It may be conducted by male or female agents on foot or in cars and may cover all travel performed by the visitor whether by train, plane, or other means of transportation within the country. The Communist intelligence services have the personnel and facilities to keep the target individual under total surveillance at all times if they so desire.

b. Should the traveler become aware that he is under surveillance he should act normally and avoid any actions that could be even remotely considered compromising or embarrassing. He should not attempt to "play games" with the surveillants or attempt to lose them or embarrass them.

### 4. Technical Surveillance Devices.

a. On 26 May 1960, Ambassador Lodge displayed at the United Nations a wooden plaque of the Great Seal of the United States which had been presented by the Soviets to Ambassador Harriman in 1945. In 1952 we found that a hidden listening device was concealed in the plaque. Described as very small, the microphone is even today considered to be an extremely advanced piece of electronic equipment.

b. Mr. Lodge stated that security personnel had found more than 100 concealed listening devices in United States embassies and in the residences of American personnel in Communist countries, including 25 in Poland.

c. It was also reported that guest houses and hotels where official U.S. Visitors stayed were "bugged". Evidence that listening devices had been installed was furnished in one instance as a result of an experimental conversation. There was a discussion about a U.S. citizen in which he was given a rank he did not actually hold. The following morning Soviet officials addressed him by that rank and treated him with greater courtesy than he had previously received.

d. In-Tourist, ORBIS, CEDOK and the other Communist travel agencies invariably arrange for American travelers to stay at the better class hotels and there is evidence that in many cases the U.S. travelers are assigned rooms in which listening devices have been installed. Devices have been detected in telephones, radios, lighting fixtures and furniture, and have also been concealed behind wallboards and imbedded in walls. One may be certain that telephones in these hotel rooms are tapped. Secret listening devices have also been planted in bars and restaurants frequented by tourists and in automobiles.

e. Instances have been reported of hotel rooms equipped with window mirrors, that is, treated glass which appears as a mirror on one side, but through which an individual on the other side can observe or even photograph anything going on in the room.

f. A number of instances have been reported of rooms of U.S. travelers having been entered surreptitiously and their baggage searched. Visitors are urged to keep in mind that any diaries, letters, notes, and film (both exposed and unexposed) which are left in hotel rooms may be examined, photographed, or confiscated. Any notes or films valued by the tourist should be kept on his person but he should never have in his possession any material which could possibly be interpreted as compromising or incriminating.

5. Clandestine Photography.

a. Along with developing extremely clever listening devices, the Communists have made significant technological advances in the field of photography. They have miniature cameras with which they photograph without the knowledge of the tourist. With telescopic lenses, they can produce identifiable pictures of persons at a great distance from the cameras. Additionally, through the use of infrared, pictures can be taken at night or in darkened areas with the subject of the photography completely unaware that his picture has been taken. As in the case of listening devices, cameras loaded with infrared films and with infrared flash bulbs may be planted in hotel rooms and photography accomplished completely without detection. They may also be used through window mirrors.

b. Closed-circuit television is another possible form of surveillance. A camera for such purposes could be as small as six by five inches, or about the size of a pocket radio. It could be effective through an opening only a little larger than a pinhead.

c. Indigenous photographers accompanying large groups of American tourists in Communist countries have occasionally requested permission to take candid shots of individuals in the group. Such photographs can be altered to make them embarrassing and, thus, useful for attempted blackmail and recruitment to serve as Soviet agents on their return to the United States.

6. Mail Censorship. All mail to and from Communist countries is subject to censorship and is a fruitful field for intelligence exploitation. The Intelligence Services of Communist countries examine the mail of U.S. tourists from both a counterintelligence and a positive intelligence point of view. Tourists should be extremely careful in writing to or about relatives or friends in those countries as those people may then become targets for investigations or exploitation. Extreme care should be taken to avoid revealing any information which might be of positive value to Communist intelligence collection efforts. In addition, personal and family problems of a confidential nature, or any information which might be self-incriminating, should not be discussed in correspondence mailed through international or foreign mails since those matters can be used to develop pressure against the individuals concerned. U.S. travelers must be careful in both what they write and to whom they write.

7. Exploitation of Human Weaknesses, Indiscretions and Vices.

a. When seeking to subvert, to compromise, to blackmail, and to recruit U.S. visitors for espionage purposes, foreign intelligence agents take full advantage of human weaknesses. These agents are alert to detect immoral and indiscreet behavior of U.S. travelers. Suspicion of irregularities in matters of sex, liquor, smuggling, black-market activities, illegal currency exchange, etc., are exploited to the utmost. Failing to detect a weakness, foreign agents have in some cases attempted entrapment of innocent travelers. They have deliberately arranged situations involving U.S. visitors in illicit sex affairs, have planted compromising material in their possession, and have worked on their sympathies to involve them in some illegal or improper act.

b. U.S. travelers must maintain a high level of personal behavior at all times. They should remember that they are guests in a foreign country and representatives of the United States. They should be temperate in their drinking. Aside from creating embarrassing or even scandalous scenes, U.S. travelers, by overindulgence, may set themselves up for compromise and a possible recruitment effort. Cases have been reported wherein intoxicated U.S. visitors have been maneuvered into sexual and homosexual activities which were photographed and which formed the basis for blackmailing them into espionage. Sexual relations with Soviet citizens, or citizens of other Communist countries, must be avoided. This is one of the oldest and most favored methods of compromising an individual, particularly if photographic evidence is presented at a later date.

8. Medical and Dental Service. Medical or dental service should be obtained only from a U.S. Government facility or from individuals or institutions approved by U.S. Consular Officials. Speech-inducing drugs, medicines, serums, and anesthesia are known to have been used under the guise of medical treatment for the purpose of aiding in interrogations. Consideration should be given to the possibility that they might be used in certain circumstances where an enemy may be interested in obtaining highly sensitive information. Normally, the place where a traveler might be exposed to this type of treatment would be in a private clinic or doctor's office. Except in emergency, medical treatment other than from the U.S. Embassy should be avoided in Communist countries.

9. Conclusion.

The following set of rules will help to keep you out of trouble:

a. DON'TS.

- (1) Don't take classified material outside the U.S.
- (2) Don't discuss classified information outside of secure official areas.
- (3) Don't get involved in moral indiscretions or vices.
- (4) Don't engage in blackmarket or illegal currency exchange activities.
- (5) Don't accept letters, photographs, packages or any other material to be smuggled out of the country for any reason.
- (6) Don't make statements which may be exploited for propaganda purposes. Do not sign petitions, however innocuous.
- (7) Don't write letters to or about relatives or friends in Communist countries.
- (8) Don't photograph military installations or other restricted areas or military personnel.
- (9) Don't be misled by overly friendly tourist guides, interpreters, or other citizens. Be particularly suspicious of guide personnel who just "happen" to know your special field.
- (10) Don't permit photographers to take candid pictures of you. The results may be anything but flattering.

b. DO'S.

- (1) Do remember that, as a U.S. Citizen affiliated with the Department of Justice, you may be a target for attempted exploitation by Communist intelligence organizations.



- (2) Do report any apparent or suspected attempts at subversion to the Embassy Security Officer. If you have been indiscreet or think, for any reason, that you may have been compromised, you can discuss the situation in confidence with him. He is not interested in damaging your reputation but in protecting the United States, you, and the classified information you possess.

## Memorandum



Subject Foreign Travel Clearance

Date  
June 7, 1982To Heads of Offices, Boards  
Divisions and BureausFrom Kenneth W. Starr *KWS*  
Counselor to the  
Attorney General

In my memorandum on Foreign Travel of March 5, 1982, I advised you that all planned foreign travel by officials of the Department in Levels I through V of the Executive Schedule and members of the Senior Executive Service must be reported to the Executive Officer, Consolidated Administrative Office, for clearance by the National Security Council and the Department of State.

We have been notified by the State Department that the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs is now the sole contact for clearance of foreign travel planned by officials at or above the Assistant Secretary level or equivalent. Accordingly, a new form for your use is attached for notification of planned foreign travel.

In addition to the notification required by the Assistant for National Security Affairs, travel by Government employees below the level of Assistant Secretary to Taiwan or to countries on the State Department's Travel Advisory, or to posts listed on the Overburdened Posts List must be cleared by the State Department. Attached are the most up-to-date lists, and a form for your use for this notification. The attached forms are to be forwarded to the following address:

Ms. E. Jean Reecer, Executive Officer  
Consolidated Administrative Office  
Department of Justice, Room 4218  
10th and Constitution Avenue, NW  
Washington, D. C. 20530

Attachments

DATE: \_\_\_\_\_

TO:

FROM:

SUBJECT: Notification of Foreign Travel

Traveler's Name and Title:

Date(s) of Travel:

Cities/Countries to be Visited:

Purpose:

Anticipated Contact with US and Foreign Officials:

State Department Post Services Requested:

Date: \_\_\_\_\_

TO: Consolidated Administrative Office  
Office of the Deputy Attorney General  
Room 4218, Department of Justice  
Washington, D.C. 20530  
Telephone: 633-2118

Attn: E. Jean Reecer  
Executive Officer

\_\_\_\_\_ The National Security Council has no objection to this travel.

\_\_\_\_\_ Remarks:

TO:

FROM:

SUBJECT: Notification of Foreign Travel

Traveler's Name and Title:

Date(s) of Travel:

Cities/Countries to be Visited:

Purpose:

Anticipated Contact with US and Foreign Officials:

State Department Post Services Requested:

Date: \_\_\_\_\_

TO: Consolidated Administrative Office  
Office of the Deputy Attorney General      Attn: E. Jean Reecer  
Room 4218, Department of Justice  
Washington, D.C. 20530  
Telephone: 633-2118

\_\_\_\_\_ The Department of State has no objection to this travel.

\_\_\_\_\_ Remarks:

OFFICIAL TRAVEL ADVISORY

AFGHANISTAN

IRAN

IRAQ

KUWAIT

LEBANON

LIBYA

PAKISTAN


SYRIA

LIST OF OVERBURDENED POSTSPOSTCOUNTRY

Abidjan (Embassy)	Ivory Coast
Amman (mbassy)	Jordan
Bangkok (Embassy)	Thailand
Beijing (Embassy)	China
Belgrade (Embassy)	Yugoslavia
Bogota (Embassy)	Colombia
Bonn (Embassy)	Federal Republic of Germany
Brasilia (Embassy)	Brazil
Brussels (Embassy)	Belgium
Cairo (Embassy)	Egypt
Caracas (Embassy)	Venezuela
Dakar (Embassy)	Senegal
Dublin (Embassy)	Ireland
Geneva (U.S. Mission)	Switzerland
Hong Kong (Consulate General)	Hong Kong
Jerusalem (Consulate General)	Israel
Jidda (Embassy)	Saudi Arabia
Khartoum (Embassy)	Sudan
London (Embassy)	Great Britain
Madrid (Embassy)	Spain
Mexico (Embassy)	Mexico
Moscow (Embassy)	U.S.S.R
Muscat (Embassy)	Oman
Nairobi (Embassy)	Kenya
Ottawa (Embassy)	Canada
Panama (Embassy)	Panama
Paris (Embassy)	France
Pretoria (Embassy)	South Africa
Rio de Janiero (Consulate General)	Brazil
Rome (Embassy)	Italy
Sao Paulo (Consulate General)	Brazil
Tel Aviv (Embassy)	Israel
Tokyo (Embassy)	Japan
Warsaw (Embassy)	Poland

Office of the Attorney General

Washington, D. C. 20530



March 5, 1982

MEMORANDUM TO: Heads of Offices, Bureaus, Divisions  
and Boards

FROM: Kenneth W. Starr *KWS*  
Counselor to the Attorney General

SUBJECT: Foreign Travel

Please find attached a copy of a memorandum from the President with respect to procedures applicable to foreign travel by officials of the U. S. Government.

The current procedures of the Department in regard to reporting the foreign travel of officials of the Department in Levels I through V of the Executive Schedule and members of the Senior Executive Service will provide the information needed to report to the National Security Council and the Department of State.

All clearing of foreign travel by officials of the Department shall be directed to:

Ms. E. Jean Reecer  
Executive Officer  
Consolidated Administrative Office  
Room 4218  
10th and Constitution Avenue, NW  
Washington, D.C.

Thanks very much.

Enclosure

cc: The Attorney General

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

February 22, 1982

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE HEADS OF EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENTS AND AGENCIES

SUBJECT: Foreign Travel by U. S. Officials

Foreign travel by high level U. S. officials is essential to the conduct of our nation's business. Such travel, however, is in itself a part of our foreign policy.

Any such foreign travel should be for specific reasons which are consistent with our overall national security policy and should be conducted by a delegation as small as possible.

You have already reviewed your general travel policies and practices as directed in my memorandum of December 16, 1981. This directive establishes procedures for foreign travel by senior officials of the Executive Branch.

Foreign travel proposals of officials at or above the rank of Assistant Secretary (or equivalent rank) of Executive Departments and Agencies are to be submitted to the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs for my approval.

With as much advance notice as possible, the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs should be furnished the following information:

- Objectives of the trip
- Names of senior participants
- Itinerary
- List of major events, meetings and appearances

Upon the completion of such trips or, if appropriate, while they are in progress, a report should be submitted to me through my Assistant for National Security Affairs, noting the response of host governments to U. S. proposals and other significant information.

*Ronald Reagan*