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### ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional) Polygraph Examinations

FROM:   
Chairman, SECOM

EXTENSION

NO.

DATE

2 December 1981

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)

DATE

RECEIVED

FORWARDED

OFFICER'S INITIALS

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

1.

DD/OS

2 DEC 1981

*12/2/81*

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*DD/PSI*

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D/OS

7 DEC 1981

8 DEC 1981

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*C/OPS/PSI*  
*DD/PSI*

4 DEC 1981

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*C/POLY DIV*

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*CHAIRMAN/SECOM*

*3/10/82*

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*ATI WOULD SUGGEST EXAMINE THIS FOR POSSIBLY USEFUL MATERIAL. SECTIONS MAY EVEN BE WORTH COPYING FOR FUTURE REFERENCE.*

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DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE  
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES AIR FORCE  
WASHINGTON, D.C.

25 November 1981

STAT  
MEMORANDUM FOR

SUBJECT: Polygraph Examinations

The Air Force is the executive agent for a Special Access Program which has extremely high level national interest. Approval has been received to implement a polygraph program which will help to ensure the security of that program. Implementation will involve giving 1500 polygraphs the first year, an additional 500 the following year, with another 1000 the third year. From that point on, there will be 3000 given each year. It is felt that this program will greatly enhance security for this very important program.

A handwritten signature in black ink, reading "Richard E. Gordon", is positioned above the typed name.

RICHARD E. GORDON, Lt Col, USAF  
Special Plans Office  
Directorate of Plans, DCS/P&O

## Background

On

### SPECIAL ACCESS POLYGRAPH PROGRAM

1. AFSC wants to use polygraph examinations as an access requirement for a SPECIAL ACCESS program. These examinations will be used to enhance the existing security procedures used for this program access. The polygraph exams will be taken by all personnel requiring access. This background paper outlines the history, justification, coverage, legality, and mechanics of such a polygraph program. Also the unanswered issues which such a program stimulates are addressed. The background of this program must precede any detailed outline of the AFSC position.

2. The use of polygraph examinations as a screening device within DOD has seen limited use. The approved uses of polygraph as specified in DODD 5210.48, "The Conduct of Polygraph Examinations and the Selection, Training and Supervision of DOD Polygraph Examiners", includes:

- a. serious criminal cases
- b. examination of agents or operators in intelligence/counterintelligence operations
- c. certain sensitive intelligence access determinations.

The last group includes designated military and civilian personnel assigned to NSA, DIA, and CIA or to certain ad hoc groups(1). Exceptions to DODD 5210.48 must be approved by the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (OUSD/P) (2). Within the Air Force the Office of Special Investigations (AFOSI) is the sole agency which is charged with the responsibility of implementing DODD 5210.48 and conducting polygraph investigations (3). Air Force Regulation 124-15, "Conduct of Polygraph Examinations within the Department of the Air Force and the Selection, Training, Certification, and Supervision of USAF Polygraph Examiners", prescribes the procedures and conditions under which polygraph examinations can be used within the Department of the Air Force. In view of the severe restrictions placed upon the use of polygraph by DODD 5210.48 and AFR 124-15, the legality of polygraph as a screening device needs to be addressed.

3. There is no existing regulatory authority to use polygraph in lieu of investigative techniques for granting clearance requirements (4). By directive, such authority can only be given by OUSD/P and must be specifically obtained before polygraphs can be used as an access requirement. From a criminal justice standpoint, the use of polygraph has seen little use in court cases. To date, the results of a polygraph test have never been admitted as evidence in any court-martial. Just as interesting is the fact that there are no records showing a single case in the federal or state courts indicating the polygraph was an invasion of privacy or a violation of constitutional rights. (19). The use of the polygraph in this program is legal if properly authorized and conducted. Justification for securing the authority to use the polygraph is based on national security needs.

4. The extent to which SPECIAL ACCESS activities are known has been limited in large part due to the security measures taken to protect them. If someone with access wants to collect information about the test programs, facilities, capabilities, or other intelligence data, he could do so with little threat of disclosure. Without a doubt such information would prove to be valuable to our enemies if passed to them. Access for SPECIAL ACCESS program support would allow a human intelligence collector the exposure to all activities of the program. To prevent the unwanted disclosure of program/project information, security procedures are used which limit the ability of foreign governments to gather sensitive information. For access to the SPECIAL ACCESS program, a completed TS/SBI is required along with the "must know" criteria. The backlog in SBI completion has necessitated the approval of waivers to the minimum clearance level required for access (16). In 1981, some 1200 people will be granted access before the completion of the SBI. Another major loop hole in these procedures is in assessing a foreign government's ability to recruit an individual with information about the project who is willing to share his knowledge. It is generally hoped the Special Background Investigation (SBI) will identify personnel who might be inclined to provide such information. The SBI is conducted by the Defense Investigative Service (DIS) and includes information which covers the last 15 years or from the subject's eighteenth birthday-whichever is shorter. The scope of the investigation includes:

a. A National Agency Check (NAC) which is a review of the files of the Federal Bureau of Investigation; Office of Personnel Management; Defense Central Indices of Investigations; Coast Guard Intelligence; Immigrations and Naturalization Service, if the applicant is an alien immigrant; State Department, to cover foreign travel and other federal agencies as appropriate (14).

- b. Verification of birth and citizenship.
- c. A check of college education and full time employment for the past five years.
- d. A check of local criminal justice records.
- e. Development and interview of three character references.
- f. Verification of non-duty related travel for more than 90 days.
- g. A neighborhood check to verify residence for a period of six months or more during the last five years. This check includes the interview of present or former neighbors who might be able to comment on the applicant's character.
- h. A credit bureau records check or interview of credit reference if no records are available to determine indebtedness or undue affluence (15).

This screening process is essentially the same for military, GS civilians, and contractor personnel. The SBI requires a revalidation or bringup every five years. At the present, DOD has a moratorium on bringups imposed by the Deputy Secretary of Defense (16). The reliability of the investigative process and the SBI has been questioned. NSA, DIA, and CIA are conducting their own investigations because they have found the quality of DIS screenings to be poor. (17). The need for thorough security clearance procedures must be evaluated in light of the security threat. NB

5. The primary threat is from espionage committed by agents from the Soviet Union. The value they place on such espionage is clearly shown by the following quote:

"Over the years, the Russians have become so addicted to spying that they seem to distrust information unless it is procured by illicit means. They traditionally have regarded technological and industrial espionage as an indispensable component of their own scientific research and development. Knowledge of Western plans obtained through espionage at times has enabled them to initiate profitable actions they might not otherwise have risked" (20).

The Soviets have targeted a number of groups to help in their espionage operations:

a. employees of government institutions who are cleared for secret political, economic, military, scientific, technical, intelligence, and counterintelligence information.

b. employees of private firms who have access to scientific, technical, and economic information.

c. persons who have good prospects of joining government organizations such as students who are studying courses in areas related to areas of interest (20).

Recruiting for these operations pose some problems for the Soviets because most Americans do not support the Communist ideology. Consequently, KGB operatives recruit their agents by praying on American weaknesses such as the desire for financial gain, the need for revenge against some sensed grievance in the American way of life, or fear from threat of exposure of some compromising materials. An assessment of the threat posed by these agents was accomplished in Oct 1979 and updated in 1981. People aren't the only threat, but they represent a threat which can be minimized. Polygraph offers a means for reducing the risk. What is polygraph?

6. The polygraph is a portable machine which measures and records pulse rate, relative blood pressure, rate and depth of respiration, and galvanic skin response (GSR) (8:10). Theory says the act of lying leads to a conflict within an individual which will create fear or anxiety. This in turn results in measurable physiological changes which the polygraph can measure. A pattern of questions and yes or no responses are used to measure these body changes to determine deception. For this program a specific pattern of questions will be used which relate only to the issue of espionage activity. But just how reliable are these examinations?

7. Use of the polygraph as a screening device for the purposes envisioned by this program is new to DOD. On the other hand, a 1978 survey indicated that one-fifth of major US corporations are using the polygraph in personnel-related areas, generally to screen a sampling of applicants or employees. (8:11) The three industries which most use the polygraph are retailers, commercial banks, and transportation companies. Industry use of the polygraph is driven by cost. Polygraph costs approximately \$50 per test while other screening methods cost about \$300 per person. "While there is evidence from the criminal investigation context that polygraph judgments are accurate well beyond a chance rate, there are sufficient differences between some employment uses of the polygraph and the criminal investigation context to

seriously limit the generalizability of accuracy figures from one context to the other" (9:502).

Other sources show rates as high as 100% for the pre-employment screening polygraph (22). Reliability of the tests conducted by OSI is controlled by the polygraph operator through his questioning and by an aggressive quality control program. Issues raised using the polygraph in pre-employment screening generally fall in three areas.

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will be quality controlled at two levels. The individual conducting the examination must evaluate the results after the subject has completed the questioning. The polygraph supervisor will then review the exam. He can concur or pass the results back to the examiner for reevaluation. After a concurrence on the part of the supervisor, the exam and evaluation are sent to HQ AFOSI for review and storage. A nonconcurrence at HQ requires the review process to be completed again. Exam results are releasable to the individual tested under the Privacy Act but cannot be used for any other reason than those specified for our program. No one out of the normal review channel will be given access to the results (11). The use of polygraph for this type of examination has been successfully used by other DOD agencies.

9. Presently, the CIA, NSA, and DIA are authorized to use polygraph as a screening method on certain individuals. Use of polygraph varies from agency to agency. For instance, DIA doesn't use the polygraph while CIA polygraphs everyone who comes to work for them. Additionally, the CIA conducts approximately 3000 counterintelligence polygraph examinations a year on contractor personnel who work on CIA contracted efforts. CIA criteria on the use of the polygraph are explicit in that without the polygraph you don't work on CIA projects. The denial of access rate for the personnel taking these exams is less than 2%. Less than 1% refuse to take the exam. This industrial program is highly indorsed by CIA and they strongly advocate a similar program for USAF use for the Special Access programs (10). NSA also strongly advocates the use of polygraph as a screening method prior to granting access (21). They conduct a full screening polygraph on all civilian applicants desiring work with NSA and a full screening polygraph on all supporting contractors. NSA develops their own background investigations but claim the polygraph provides 95% of the unfavorable information developed on applicants (15). Use of the polygraph as a screening method for access will provide an added level of security confidence which NSA and CIA feel is justified. The level of coverage for such a program is an important consideration.

10. This program will include all personnel (military, GS civilian, contractor) requiring access to this SPECIAL ACCESS PROGRAM. The requirement for a polygraph examination will be an access requirement. This means access will not be granted until this requirement has been met. Applicants for work requiring program access will be made aware of this requirement. In all cases, the polygraph exam is voluntary. Those declining to take a polygraph exam will not meet the access criteria and will thus be prevented from access to the



program. Waivers to this requirement will be considered by AFSC/CC or AFSC/CV on a case-by-case basis for all military departmental personnel (except Pentagon personnel) and their contractors. CSAF/CV may approve and grant waivers for all other personnel. Specific polygraph policy guidelines (Atch 3) were developed by AFSC and were coordinated with HQ AF. These guidelines outline the requirements of the polygraph examinations; the priority for conducting the examinations; procedures to be followed before, during, and after the examinations; and the specific procedures to be followed on those personnel who refuse to take the examination or who fail the examination. The guidelines for this program will follow the intent and provisions outlined in DODD 5210.48 and AFR 124-15. Contractor compliance with the additional access requirements will be handled through existing contract provisions with the use of the DD Form 254: Contract Security Classification Specification. As a Federal Government activity, this requirement will be exempted from state provisions which govern the use of polygraph. Establishment of the program requires physical assets and personnel.

11. As per AFR 124-15, AFOSI is the sole agency within the Air Force authorized to conduct polygraph examinations. AFOSI/CVPG will be responsible for conducting the polygraph examinations as part of this screening program. Support for the program polygraph requirements will be provided by implementing a three phased program (Atch 4). Phase A will provide the ability to conduct approximately 1500 polygraph exams a year by four examiners. (See Table 1 and Atch 2). Special attention will be given to the problems of implementation, scheduling, transportation, and conduct of the program. The initial cost of implementing this phase is \$297,727. Phase B will involve the expansion of the program to another location. The cost of implementing Phase B will be \$150,104.

	<u>PHASE A</u>	<u>PHASE B</u>	<u>PHASE C</u>
First Yr Cost	\$297,727	\$150,104	\$336,208
#Polygraphs	1500	500	1000
Stations	4	2	4
Personnel	7 (SEE NOTE)	4	8
Start Date	ASAP	1 Yr after Phase A	1 yr after Phase B
Lead Time To Full ops	6-24 Mos	6-24 mos	6-24 Mos

NOTE: One of the personnel slots will be for a Quality Control Polygraph Specialist at HQ AFOSI.

TABLE I. Polygraph Program Implementation Schedule and Costs.

Lessons learned during Phase A will be applied to Phase B. Phase C will establish an additional capability for polygraph examinations in the vicinity of prime contractor facilities. Cost to implement this Phase will be \$336,208. Once the total program is in operation the costs for continued operation will be approximately \$553,000/yr. Lead times for setting up this program vary from 6-24 months depending on the availability of equipment, polygraphers, and floor space and priorities. The physical establishment of this program is possible but many emotional issues must still be addressed.

12. Emotions run strong when discussing this issue. "Polygraph them all...I don't know anything about polygraphs and I don't know how accurate they are but I know they'll scare the hell out of people." This statement made by an ex-President of the United States sums up most attitudes about polygraph. If this program had been planned as a harassment method for scaring the hell out of people, no doubt it would achieve its intended goal. But this is not the purpose of this program. Instead, it is a screening program which will prevent the loss of valuable National Security information. As with all sensitive and emotional programs, this one will be administered with great care. The individuals to be covered by it have shown a great degree of patriotism, motivation, and devotion to duty. If these same individuals sense that this polygraph program is anything other than an attempt to prevent espionage, then the program will be counter-productive, and may in fact, breed what we are trying to prevent. Consideration for the PEOPLE will be paramount when this program is instituted. The rights of the individual will never be waived, compromised, or treated lightly. The fact thaty the program is voluntary will in no way detract from its main goal to prevent counterintelligence. Persons who decline the polygraph will be treated like all others; but their access will be limited until other investigative methods can be used to verify their allegiance. Because of the emotion that polygraph stirs up in individuals, a public relations and education process (Atch 5) will be started for those persons who are currently working on the program to attack these fears head on. The program will involve briefings and demonstrations for all personnel who will be polygraphed. Everyone will be given the opportunity to discuss the questions to be asked, to discuss the overall intent of the program, and to discuss the consequences of participating in the program. Management will stress the positive of this program and freely admit to the negative. Concern at all levels will be the only way for implementing a worthwhile program which satisfies the national security needs and at the same time guarantees the success of the program.

- 5 Atch
1. Polygraph Questions
  2. Polygraph Implementation Costs
  3. Polygraph Program Policy and Guidelines
  4. Polygraph Program Implementation Plan
  5. Polygraph Education Plan

## REFERENCES

1. Memo from DAF/General Counsel, Subject: Polygraph (U)
2. US Department of Defense. DOD Directive 5210.48: "The Conduct of Polygraph Examination and the Selection, Training, and Supervision of DOD Polygraph Examiners (U)" October 6, 1975.
3. US Air Force. Air Force Regulation 124-15: "Conduct of Polygraph Examinations Within the Department of the Air Force and the Selection, Training, Certification, and Supervision of USAF Polygraph Examiners (U)" Washington, June 18, 1976.
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5. Deleted.
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9. Sackett, Paul R., et al., "Detection of Deception in the Employment Context: A Review and Critical Analysis (U)". Personnel Psychology, 1979, pp 487-505.
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Due to Personnel Security Investigative Shortfalls (U)" , 8 Jun 1981.

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STAT 21.  Assistant Director for Security Policy, National Security Agency, Interview, 20 Aug 81.

22. Adams, Henry E. and Correa, Eileen I. "The Validity of the Pre-employment Polygraph Examination and the Effects of Motivation (U)". In Press, University of Georgia: Athens, Georgia, 1979.

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Polygraph Implementation Costs ( )Phase A 1500 Polygraphs Per Yr at XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX1. Personnel (4 Examiners/ 1 Supervisor/ 1 Admin Specialist/  
1 Quality Control Specialist)

GS-12 x 5	\$ 134,755.00
GS-14 x 1	38,000.00
GS-06 x 1	13,672.00

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TOTAL	\$ 186,427.00
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## 2. Equipment

5 Instruments @ 4200 ea	\$ 21,000.00
2 Module Sets	50,000.00
Misc Module Expense	4,000.00
Instrument Spare Parts	\$ 2,500.00

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TOTAL	\$ 77,500.00
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## 3. Floor Space (2000 Sq Ft)

TOTAL	\$ 18,000.00
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## 4. Supplies

6 desks @ \$380.00 ea	\$ 2,280.00
5 credenzas @ \$380.00 ea	2,280.00
2 typewriters @ \$950.00 ea	1,900.00
1 typing chair @ \$120.00 ea	120.00
4 Examiner Chairs @ \$270.00 ea	1,080.00
1 Executive Chair @ \$340.00 ea	340.00
4 Polygraph Chairs @ \$200.00 ea	800.00
4 Blinds for 2-way mirrors @ \$250.00 ea	1,000.00
Carpet for 4 rooms and area (400 yds)	6,000.00

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TOTAL	\$ 15,800.00
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OVERALL TOTAL PHASE A	\$ 297,727.00
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Phase B 500 Polygraphs Per Yr at XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

## 1. Personnel (2 Examinees/ 1 Supervisor/ 1 Admin Specialist)

GS-12 x 2	\$	53,902.00
GS-14 x 1		38,000.00
GS-06 x 1		13,672.00

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TOTAL	\$	105,574.00
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## 2. Equipment

2 Instruments @ \$4200.00 ea	\$	8,400.00
1 Module Set		25,000.00
Misc Module Expense		2,000.00
Instrument Spare Parts		1,000.00

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TOTAL	\$	36,400.00
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## 3. Supplies

3 Desks @ \$380.00 ea	\$	1,140.00
3 Credenzas @ \$380.00 ea		1,140.00
1 Typewriter @ \$950.00 ea		950.00
1 Typing Chair @ \$120.00 ea		120.00
2 Examiner Chairs @ \$270.00 ea		540.00
1 Executive Chair @ \$340.00 ea		340.00
2 Polygraph Chairs @ \$200.00 ea		400.00
2 Blinds for 2-way Mirrors @ \$250.00 ea		500.00
Carpet for 2 rooms and area (200 yds)		3,000.00

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TOTAL	\$	8,130.00
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OVERALL TOTAL PHASE B	\$	150,104.00
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Phase C 500 Polygraphs Per Yr Per Location in XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX  
XX.

1. Personnel (Same as Phase B x 2)	\$	211,148.00
2. Equipment (Same as Phase B x 2)		72,800.00



3. Floor Space (Same as Phase A x 2)	36,000.00
4. Supplies (Same as Phase B x 2)	16,260.00

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OVERALL TOTAL PHASE C                   \$ 336,208.00

Yearly Cost of Continued Operation of the Entire Program

1. Personnel	\$476,198.00
2. Equipment	10,000.00
3. Supplies	3,000.00
4. Floor Space	54,000.00
5. Travel	10,000.00

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\$553,198.00

Attachment 2

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ATT 3

### Polygraph Policy and Guidelines

#### I GENERAL

( ) The following policies will be used with the XXXXXXXXXX  
XXXXXXcounterintelligence polygraph program. These policies  
will serve as the basic guide to decision making with respect  
to this program. Exceptions to these policies can only be  
approved by AF/CV.

#### II PROGRAM COVERAGE ( )

( ) All personnel who need access to XXXXXXXXXX will be  
required to take a counterintelligence polygraph examination.  
The examination will be administered by the AF Office of  
Special Investigations. Polygraph will not be required for  
access to XX at theXXXXXXXXXXXX.  
Personnel who already have access toXXXXXXXXXXXXwill be asked  
to complete the polygraph .

*1 PP should  
work this way!*

#### III WAIVERS ( )

( ) The requirement of this program applies to all per-  
sonnel requiring access toXXXXXXXXXXXX - distinguished  
visitors, military, civilian, and contractor. Exceptions to  
this program will be for emergency situations only. Each  
request to waive the polygraph requirement will be reviewed  
and approved by AFSC/CC or AFSC/CV on a case-by-case basis for  
all military departmental personnel (except Pentagon  
personnel) and their contractors. CSAF/CV will approve and  
grant waivers for all other personnel.

#### IV OTHER CLEARANCE REQUIREMENTS ( )

( ) The polygraph will be used to supplement other  
clearance requirements for XXXXXXXXXX . Access toXXXXXXXXXXXX  
will require a TOP SECRET clearance based on a Special  
Background Investigation (SBI) as outlined in the "XXXXXXXXXXXX  
Security Policy Guidance" of Feb 1979. Security clearance  
procedures will continue as outlined in that document. Any  
future changes to these requirements will be handled through  
changes to the "XXXXXXXXXXXXSecurity Policy Guide".

#### V POLYGRAPH PROGRAM OUTLINE ( )

( ) The polygraph examinations will be conducted by AFOSI  
in accordance with the procedures outlined in DOD Directive  
5210.48 "The Conduct of Polygraph Examinations and the  
Selection, Training and Supervision of DOD Polygraph

Examiners" and AFR 124-15, "Conduct of Polygraph Examinations Within The Department of The Air Force and the Selection, Training, Certification, and Supervision of USAF Polygraph Examiners". Each examination will be preceded by an interview by the examiner. The examinee will be briefed on his rights, the voluntary nature of the program, the purpose of the exam, the polygraph equipment, the questions to be asked, and the importance of this program. The examinee will be asked to sign a statement volunteering for the polygraph. He will also sign a statement saying he understands his rights. Only those questions specifically discussed in the pre-exam briefing will be asked. However, there may be times when it is necessary to expand on one of the basic questions during the examination to clear up issues which might otherwise be cause for suspicion of espionage. The examinee will be told of the possibility of such questioning and will be advised of his right to terminate the exam at anytime during the examination, should he feel it necessary. A debriefing will be held after the examination. At this time any issues with respect to the completed polygraph will be resolved. AFOSI will provide the results of the examination to XXXXXXXX. XXXX will then determine whether or not to grant access to XXXXXXXXXXXX .XXXXX will provide protection of the results of the examination until such time<sup>as</sup> the results are destroyed. At no time will the results of a polygraph examination be provided to anyone other than personnel assigned to XXXX. Protection by AFOSI of the examination related material will be handled in the same manner. An individual can obtain the results of his polygraph as per the Privacy Act.

#### VI PROGRAM PRIORITIES ( )

( ) Since it will be impossible to polygraph all people requiring access at once, the following priorities will be used to determine the order in which these examinations will be completed:

- (1) allXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX atXXXXXXXXXXXX
- (2) new access requests
- (3) XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
- (4) persons with access on security clearance waiver
- (5) XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX personnel with access over 5 years
- (6) XXXXXXXX personnel with access over 5 years
- (7) others with access who have not taken a polygraph
- (8) persons terminating access
- (9) others.

Polygraph exams will be completed at least every five years on personnel requiring access for that long.

#### VII REFUSALS ( )

( ) This program is voluntary. Consequently, individuals may elect not to take the polygraph. Access of those persons who do not volunteer for the polygraph will be reviewed and each person in this category will be interviewed by the AFOSI Field Agent assigned to XXXXX. This interview will follow the standard SCI Screening Procedures and Personal Interview Guidelines as contained in AFR 205-32, "USAF Personnel Security Program (PA)", Attachment 13. No adverse action will be taken against those persons who do not volunteer to take the polygraph examination.

#### VIII FAILURES ( )

( ) Those personnel who fail the polygraph examination will be denied access to XXXXXXXXXXXX. The conduct of each of these cases will be turned over to the AFOSI for military and GS civilians and the FBI for contractor persons. Personnel who are cleared of all suspicion after subsequent investigation will be given XXXXXXXXXXXX access to the same level they previously held.

#### IX PROGRAM QUESTIONS ( )

( ) Relevant questions which can be asked during the polygraph exam or pre-exam and post-exam briefing will be related directly to counterintelligence issues. Irrelevant, symptomatic, and control type questions used in accordance with DOD acceptable polygraph techniques will not be reported in the polygraph results but will be listed in the Polygraph Examiner's Report retained by AFOSI. ALL questions will be discussed with the examinee prior to the polygraph examination. Should the examinee reveal self incriminating information relative to a serious prosecutable criminal issue, he will be advised of his rights against self-incrimination and right to counsel immediately. Such information will be reported to the proper authorities in accordance with Executive Order 12036. No life-style or related issues will be discussed at anytime during this examination.

#### X PROGRAM REVIEW/CONTROL ( )

( ) A permanent general officer oversight committee will be established to provide overall control of this polygraph program. This committee will provide the final review authority for all aspects of the program including the polygraph questions and completed polygraph results. This committee will report directly to AF/IG.

( ) Quality control of this program will be the responsibility of AFOSI. Supervisors at all levels must insure

strict adherence to the policy and guidelines approved for the program. An annual review of the program is required. XXXXXXXX will conduct this review and report to AFSC/CV on the status of the program.

( ) Statistical information as per AFR 124-15 and DOD Directive 5210.48 will be recorded and reported by AFOSI/CVPG. XXXXXXXX will also keep records of all refusals, failures, and related information and report these statistics to AFSC/CV.

XI PROGRAM OPR ( )

( ) This program will be directed and managed by XXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX. AFOSI will OPR for all polygraph operations. OPR's will be AFOSI/CVPG, XXXXXXXX, AF/XOXP, and XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX within their respective organizations.

XII CLASSIFICATION GUIDANCE ( )

( ) This program is UNCLASSIFIED. Tying the polygraph program to XXXXXXXXXXXX, any other SPECIAL ACCESS programs, or XXXXXXXXXXXX is classified SECRET- Special Access Required. All polygraph program related statistics are classified CONFIDENTIAL- Special Access Required.

XIII RESPONSIBILITIES ( )

xxxxxxx/xx

- 1. ( ) Management of the Polygraph Program.

HQ AFSC

- 1. ( ) Implementation of the Polygraph Program.
- 2. ( ) Granting of the XXXXXXXXXXXXaccess clearances.
- 3. ( ) Preparation of program related reports to AF/CV and AFSC/CV.

AFOSI

- 1. ( ) Administration of the Polygraph Program.
- 2. ( ) Conduct of the polygraph examinations.
- 3. ( ) Reporting information required in AFR 124-15 and DODD 5210.48.

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## Polygraph Program Implementation Plan ( )

### I. General ( )

(U) This document outlines the policies to be followed in the implementation of the counterintelligence polygraph screening program for XXXXXXXXXXXX. Final program implementation plans will require the approval of the General Officer Polygraph Oversight Committee prior to the conduct of the initial polygraph examination.

### II. Program Outline ( )

( ) This program provides for use of polygraph as a counterintelligence screening method for access to XXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXX. Program implementation is contingent on the approval of the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy as required by DODD 5210.48. This program will be administered by the Air Force Office of Special Investigations. Policy and procedures will be outlined and coordinated by XXXXXXXXXXXX.

( ) The physical establishment of the program will be handled in three phases (Atch 1). Program milestones are shown Attachment 2. The first phase will provide the capability to conduct 1500 polygraphs in XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX, the second phase 500 polygraphs at XXXXXXXXXXXX, and the third phase 500 polygraphs in XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX and 500 polygraphs in XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX. The go-ahead for each phase will be provided by AFSC/CV. Program termination can be initiated by AFSC/CV with the concurrence of AF/CV during any phase of implementation.

### III. Program Start-Up ( )

( ) XXXXXXXXXXXX will notify all agencies requiring access of the start date for the first polygraph. From this date forward, all individuals requiring access to XXXXXXXXXXXX must have a polygraph exam to meet the access requirements. The priority for polygraph exams is established in the XXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXX Polygraph Policy and Guidelines. Individuals who already possess a XXXXXXXXXXXX access clearance will not be denied access during program implementation. All new access requests must meet this new access requirement. Agencies requiring access will notify XXXXXXXX of the name, social security number, and availability of those who require access. XXXXXXXX will coordinate with XXXXXXXX for the date, place, and time an individual is to report for the polygraph exam.



IV. Program Funding ( )

( ) Funding for this program will be provided by XXXXXX XXXXXXXX. Some of the expense for the program will be passed to the projects testing at XXXXXXXXXXXX as an reimbursable cost. AFOSI will purchase all equipment required for the program and charge XXXXXXfor all such expenses.

V. Scheduling ( )

( ) Individuals will be scheduled to take their polygraph following the priorities established in "XXXXXXXXXXXXX Polygraph Policy and Guidelines". Scheduling for class attendance and the polygraph for the XXXXX personnel and the XXXXXXXX XXXXX project personnel will be handled by XXXXXXXX. XXXXXXXX will request polygraph exams for all personnel other than those XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX access who XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX basis.

VI. Manpower ( )

( ) AFOSI will require additional personnel slots to satisfy the requirements of this program. Atch 1 shows the positions required. All polygraph examiners used in this program must meet the requirements outlined in AFR 124-15, "Conduct of Polygraph Examinations with the Department of the Air Force and the Selection, Training, Certification, and Supervision of USAF Polygraph Examiners".

VII. Program Reporting ( )

( ) AFOSI will provide XXXXXXXX with the written results from each of the polygraph examinations. Each report of examination will specify whether or not the individual tested used deception in the replying to the counterintelligence questions used during the exam. If deception was noted, an assessment of whether or not other investigative methods are warranted will be made. If the examiner noted any other counterintelligence related information this will also be noted. XXXXXXXX will grant the access to XXXXXXXXXXXX based on the results of the polygraph and other security clearance information. XXXXXXwill be notified of those individuals cleared for XXXXXXXXXXXX access.

VIII. CLASSIFICATION GUIDANCE ( )

( ) This program is UNCLASSIFIED. Tying the polygraph program to XXXXXXXXXXXX, any other SPECIAL ACCESS programs, or XXXXXXXXXXXXis classified SECRET- Special Access Required. All polygraph related statistics are classified CONFIDENTIAL- Special Access Required.

IX. Responsibilities (U)

AFOSI

1. (U) Make provisions for required personnel
2. (U) Establish required polygraph facilities
3. (U) Report on examinations completed

XXXXXXXXX

1. (U) Request polygraph exam slots as required
2. (U) Grant access to XXXXXXXXXXXX
3. (U) Notify XXXXX of those cleared forXXXXaccess

XXXXXXXXXXX

1. (U) Schedule polygraph examinations in coordination with the location polygraph supervisor.
2. (U) Conduct required education classes.

Polygraph Implementation Costs ( )Phase A 1500 Polygraphs Per Yr at XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX1. Personnel (4 Examiners/ 1 Supervisor/ 1 Admin Specialist/  
1 Quality Control Specialist)

GS-12 x 5	\$ 134,755.00
GS-14 x 1	38,000.00
GS-06 x 1	13,672.00

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TOTAL	\$ 186,427.00
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## 2. Equipment

5 Instruments @ 4200 ea	\$ 21,000.00
2 Module Sets	50,000.00
Misc Module Expense	4,000.00
Instrument Spare Parts	\$ 2,500.00

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TOTAL	\$ 77,500.00
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## 3. Floor Space (2000 Sq Ft)

TOTAL	\$ 18,000.00
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## 4. Supplies

6 desks @ \$380.00 ea	\$ 2,280.00
5 credenzas @ \$380.00 ea	2,280.00
2 typewriters @ \$950.00 ea	1,900.00
1 typing chair @ \$120.00 ea	120.00
4 Examiner Chairs @ \$270.00 ea	1,080.00
1 Executive Chair @ \$340.00 ea	340.00
4 Polygraph Chairs @ \$200.00 ea	800.00
4 Blinds for 2-way mirrors @ \$250.00 ea	1,000.00
Carpet for 4 rooms and area (400 yds)	6,000.00

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TOTAL	\$ 15,800.00
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OVERALL TOTAL PHASE A	\$ 297,727.00
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Phase B 500 Polygraphs Per Yr at XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

## 1. Personnel (2 Examines/ 1 Supervisor/ 1 Admin Specialist)

GS-12 x 2	\$ 53,902.00
GS-14 x 1	38,000.00
GS-06 x 1	13,672.00

---

TOTAL \$ 105,574.00

## 2. Equipment

2 Instruments @ \$4200.00 ea	\$ 8,400.00
1 Module Set	25,000.00
Misc Module Expense	2,000.00
Instrument Spare Parts	1,000.00

---

TOTAL \$ 36,400.00

## 3. Supplies

3 Desks @ \$380.00 ea	\$ 1,140.00
3 Credenzas @ \$380.00 ea	1,140.00
1 Typewriter @ \$950.00 ea	950.00
1 Typing Chair @ \$120.00 ea	120.00
2 Examiner Chairs @ \$270.00 ea	540.00
1 Executive Chair @ \$340.00 ea	340.00
2 Polygraph Chairs @ \$200.00 ea	400.00
2 Blinds for 2-way Mirrors @ \$250.00 ea	500.00
Carpet for 2 rooms and area (200 yds)	3,000.00

---

TOTAL \$ 8,130.00

OVERALL TOTAL PHASE B \$ 150,104.00

Phase C 500 Polygraphs Per Yr Per Location in XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX  
XX.

1. Personnel (Same as Phase B x 2)	\$ 211,148.00
2. Equipment (Same as Phase B x 2)	72,800.00

3. Floor Space (Same as Phase A x 2)	36,000.00
4. Supplies (Same as Phase B x 2)	16,260.00

---

OVERALL TOTAL PHASE C                   \$ 336,208.00

Yearly Cost of Continued Operation of the Entire Program

1. Personnel	\$476,198.00
2. Equipment	10,000.00
3. Supplies	3,000.00
4. Floor Space	54,000.00
5. Travel	10,000.00

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\$553,198.00

Attachment 1



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Polygraph Education Plan ( )

I GENERAL( )

( ) This document outlines the plan for establishing an education program for the XXXXXXXXXXXX counterintelligence polygraph screening program. This education program is established specifically to reduce the reaction anticipated with the establishment of this screening program. Additionally it will serve to educate all those covered by the program on the security requirements for this special access program. Security will be stressed during all phases of the programs with special emphasis added to help in the identification of possible internal security threats to XXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXX.

II PROGRAM COVERAGE( )

( ) All personnel cleared for XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX access will be required to participate in this program. Supervisors will assure the attendance of all unpolygraphed personnel.

III PROGRAM OBJECTIVES( )

( ) The objective of this program is get everyone with access involved in security. This will require the development of an education process which stimulates, captivates, and motivates those participating. Generation of the proper attitude will in many ways lessen the chance of a major rebellion when the polygraph screening program is started. Every level of management must understand the role they play in the program. Their support is essential to the success of the security XXXXXXXXXXXX.

IV PROGRAM OUTLINE( )

( ) A specific training guide for this program is provided in Attachment 1. This program was developed with the thought in mind that if the threat and the concern about this threat is understood--then polygraph becomes a needed method for reducing the threat. Arriving at this logical conclusion is the desired outcome of the learning process.

V COURSE SCHEDULING( )

( ) This course will be taught once a week to 18-20 students per week. The course will fill the AFR 205-57, "Reporting and



Investigating Espionage, Sabotage, Terrorism, and Subversion (FOUO)", annual requirement for military and civilian personnel. Each member of the class will be briefed on Monday and then complete his polygraph sometime during the same week. Class sizes can be varied to meet this goal.

#### VI CLASSIFICATION GUIDANCE ( )

( ) This program is UNCLASSIFIED. Tying the polygraph program to XXXXXXXXXXXX, any SPECIAL ACCESS programs, or XXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXX is classified SECRET- Special Access Required. All polygraph related statistics are classified CONFIDENTIAL-Special Access Required.

#### VII TRAINING OUTLINE(U)

	TIME
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX's Introduction	0+05
Espionage Film (OSI)	0+20
Threat Briefing (OSI) (w/specific examples)	0+20
Break	0+15
Polygraph Intro (OSI)	0+30
Discussion	0+15
	<hr/> 1+45
<u>Desired Learning Objectives</u>	
XXXXXXXXXX's Introduction	0+05
Welcome	
Purpose of Course	
Overview	
Importance of Polygraph Program	
Voluntary Nature of Program	
Espionage Film	0+20
Threat	
What to do if approached	
Importance of Security	
Threat Briefing	0+20
Threat	
Examples	
Identification	
Polygraph Intro	0+30
Voluntary Program	
Background of Polygraph	
Test Results/Failures	
Refusals	
Questions	
Special Exam Info	

Discussion  
Issues Class Wants to Discuss

0+15

VIII RESPONSIBILITIES (U)

XXXXXXX


1. Implement this plan.
2. Monitor this program to insure the attainment of program objectives.

AFOSI

1. Conduct the training as indicated.

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**UNCLASSIFIED**



**UNCLASSIFIED**

**UNCLASSIFIED**



## **OVERVIEW**

- **PROGRAM**
  - **BACKGROUND**
  - **COVERAGE**
  - **APPROVAL**
  
- **PROGRAM POLICY**
  - **EXAMINATION QUESTIONS**
  - **FAILURES**
  - **REFUSALS**
  - **REVIEW / CONTROL**
  
- **PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION**
  - **PHASING**
  - **COST**
  - **EDUCATION**
  
- **SUMMARY**

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# POLYGRAPH PROGRAM

## BACKGROUND

- CONCERN ABOUT THREAT TO PROGRAMS
- HQ AFSC/JA LTR ON POLYGRAPH (14 JUL 81)
- OTHER FEDERAL USERS
  - DIA
  - NSA
  - CIA

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# **POLYGRAPH PROGRAM**

## **POLYGRAPH**

- **DEVELOPED IN 1920s TO AID IN CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS**
- **MONITORS CHANGES IN BREATHING, BLOOD PRESSURE, PULSE RATE, PERSPIRATION, AND ELECTRICAL CONDUCTIVITY OF SKIN**
- **EXAMINATION PROCESS**
- **QUESTIONS BY POLYGRAPH OPERATOR**
- **DETERMINES DECEPTION**
- **PROVIDES DETERRENCE**

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# POLYGRAPH PROGRAM

## COVERAGE

- ALL PERSONNEL REQUIRING ACCESS
  - MILITARY
  - GS CIVILIAN
  - CONTRACTORS
  
- WAIVERS
  
- COUNTER-INTELLIGENCE SCREENING

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# **POLYGRAPH PROGRAM**

- **APPROVAL**
  - AFSC / CC
  - CSAF / CC
  - SAF
  - OUSD / P
  - OSD
  
- **AFOSI ACTION**
  - SET UP PROGRAM
  - IMPLEMENTATION POLICY
  - PROVIDE RESULTS
  
- **AFSC / TEX GRANTING OF ACCESS**

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# PROGRAM POLICY

## EXAMINATION QUESTIONS

- COUNTER-INTELLIGENCE ONLY
- NO LIFE-STYLE ISSUES
- DISCUSSED IN DETAIL WITH EXAMINEE

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## PROGRAM POLICY

### REFUSALS

- ACCESS LIMITED
- OSI WILL CONDUCT INTERVIEW AS PER AFR 205-32, ATCH 13
- POSSIBILITY EXISTS OF MANY IN THIS CATEGORY
- REDUCE WITH GOOD EDUCATION/PR PROGRAM

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# PROGRAM POLICY

## FAILURES

- DENIED ACCESS
- WILL REQUIRE FURTHER INVESTIGATION
- DON'T EXPECT MANY (ANY)

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# PROGRAM POLICY

## REVIEW/CONTROL

- POLICY CAN ONLY BE CHANGED BY CSAF/CV
- ANNUAL PROGRAM REVIEW REQUIRED
- GENERAL OFFICER POLYGRAPH OVERSIGHT COMMITTEE

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# PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION

## PHASING AND COST

	<u>PHASE A</u>	<u>PHASE B</u>	<u>PHASE C</u>
COST (FIRST YEAR)	\$ 297,727	\$ 150,104	\$ 336,208
NO OF POLYGRAPHS	1500	500	1000 (500 EA)
NO OF STATIONS	4	2	4 (2 EA)
PERSONNEL (OP/ADMIN/SPT)	4/1/1	2/1/1	4/2/2 (2/1/1 EA)
START DATE	ASAP	12 MOs AFTER A	12 MOs AFTER B
LEAD TIME TO FULL OPS	6-24 MO	6-24 MO	6-24 MO

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# PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION

## EDUCATION

- SELLING PROGRAM TO THOSE PREVIOUSLY CLEARED
- NEEDED TO REDUCE ANXIETY OF PROGRAM
- WILL INCLUDE OTHER SECURITY ITEMS
- CONDUCTED BY COMMANDER
- DEVELOPED WITH HELP OF OSI STAFF PSYCHOLOGIST

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## ISSUES

### EMOTIONAL SUBJECT

"POLYGRAPH THEM ALL ... I DON'T KNOW ANYTHING ABOUT  
POLYGRAPHS AND I DON'T KNOW HOW ACCURATE THEY ARE,  
BUT I KNOW THEY'LL SCARE HELL OUT OF PEOPLE."

*Richard M. Nixon,  
July 24, 1971*

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## SUMMARY

- POLYGRAPH PROGRAM NEEDED
- KEY IS OUSD/P APPROVAL
- PROGRAM POLICIES HAVE BEEN ESTABLISHED
- PHASED PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION
- PEOPLE WILL BE PRIMARY PROGRAM CONSIDERATION

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1. Concern: The method for handling a lawsuit related to this polygraph program.

Response: There appears to be no cause of action under the Constitution, legislation, or case law that could arise from this program; however, there will be no way to prevent anyone from filing suit against the US Government because of it. Our concern will be to limit potential damage by precluding the exposure of classified information during court proceedings. In the last year Department of Justice has been successful in applying the provisions of the Classified Information Procedures Act of 1980 (Pub. L. No. 94-456, 94 Stat. 2025) which specifically applies to criminal cases, to safeguard classified material in civil cases. That act employs such devices as in camera inspections, protective orders, and sanitized summaries of documents sought in discovery to protect classified information. Because it is a crime to knowingly release classified information to unauthorized personnel (8 USC, Section 793), the information disclosed during the filing of a suit is generally unclassified. The suit itself would be handled by the Justice Department using the standard procedures that they normally apply in such cases.

2. Concern: The impact of the polygraph screening program on union/management relationships for those contractors supporting our programs/projects.

Response: The security manager at the SPO assessed the impact of polygraph testing on union/management relations when this program was first considered. He found that the full impact of the program seems to be a function of the company and its present union/management relations. One contractor already is having problems in this area. In this company, if a union member is denied access because he is unable to obtain the necessary security clearances, then the union provides the member with pre-printed forms for filing a Congressional grievance. In this case, we run the risk of union problems if a member of the union is denied site access because of the polygraph exam. The union/management relationships of the various other contractors are not so strained and the impact of the polygraph program is not likely to be so immediate, but the real impact is unknown until the program starts. We believe the polygraph education program will serve to reduce adverse impact on union/management relations. Moreover, the experiences of NSA and CIA in their polygraph programs will be applied to this program to help prevent similar problems. This issue has been of paramount concern since this polygraph program was first suggested. It is still of concern and remains the area of the program which may cause the most

problems during program implementation. Every effort will be made to reduce the impact through the program education process.

3. Concern: The actions to be taken against the government/contractor employees who refuse to take the polygraph?


Response: This concern really breaks down into two situations. The first case involves the employee who already has access but does not volunteer for the polygraph examination. This program does not require an exception to that provision of DOD Directive 5210.48 which prohibits adverse actions against individuals refusing to be polygraphed. The only action to be taken in this program will be to limit such an individual's access to his immediate work area and thus deny him access to other programs/projects under testing. The OSI will be asked to conduct a SCI Screening Interview IAW AFR 205-32, Atch 13, with the individual. No record of the interview itself will be kept unless the interviewer feels he has reason to suspect the employee of involvement in espionage. If further investigation is warranted, the case will be handled by the FBI for contractor personnel and the OSI for government personnel. Every effort will be made to prevent any stigma being attached to the fact that access has been restricted.

The second situation involves the employee who desires access for the first time but is unwilling to take the polygraph. These individuals will not be granted access. The contractor can continue to use this individual on a related program/project but will be unable to get access to the Air Force part of the special program.


4. Concern: How will the polygraph requirement be incorporated into existing and future contracts?

Response: The best method for making these changes on existing contracts is by Supplemental Agreement. This will require negotiations to reach agreement on all aspects of the polygraph requirement. In addition, existing labor agreements between affected contractors and labor unions may require modification. New contracts will have the DD Form 254: Contract Security Classification Specification written to show the polygraph as a requirement for access. This will allow the contractor to advertise for employment with the stipulation that the government requires a polygraph for access to a particular project. The polygraph examination will thus not be a condition of employment but a requirement for access to this project.

5. Concern: The relevant and control questions to be asked during the polygraph examination are not specifically known.



(b)(2)



(b)(2)


The following is a list of control questions which could be used for this type of examination. It should be pointed out

that these are only some possibilities among many. Control questions must be selected during the pre-test interview and depend upon the examiner's assessment of their meaning and importance to the examinee. They are used to capture the psychological set of the examinee who is truthful to the relevant questions. The examiner uses them to normalize his evaluation of the polygraph charts. These are the questions which enable the examiner to recognize an examinee who is truthful to the relevant issues. Control questions and their answers are not reported in the polygraph results. They are in the Polygraph Examiner Report, as are all proceedings, and are retained at HQ AFOSI. They are protected by the Privacy Act. They may be requested under the Freedom of Information Act by the examinee. Subject material used in control questions is not included in an advisement of rights unless the examinee should begin to confess to a serious specific criminal act. The control question technique is used by DOD agencies in almost all specific criminal offenses, counterintelligence and counterespionage matters, and security offenses. Application of the technique in this security screening polygraph should be equally effective. A bank of approved control questions will be used for this program. Some control questions are:

(b)(2)

These questions by their very nature are broad in scope and are intended to create a physiological response from the examinee. No matter what the verbal response to the question, no attempt will be made to explore the question further. In some cases an individual may be asked more than one control

question. The value of any one control question is assessed during the pre-test interview and depends on any observed reactions of the examinee. The control questions will vary from examinee to examinee. Generally the same question can not be used for any two individuals.



25X1

(b)(2)

25X1