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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF FOR INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

29 JUL 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. G. MARVIN GENTILE, CHAIRMAN, DCI SECURITY
COMMITTEE

SUBJECT: Community-Wide Adherence to DCID 1/14 (U)

1. (U) Reference is made to Memorandum, SECOM Executive Secretary, 12 July 1977, subject as above.
2. (C) The following comments are keyed to the questions posed in para 2, referenced memorandum:

a. Special Background Investigations (SBI's) are conducted for Department of the Army by the Defense Investigative Service (DIS), and usually meet DCID 1/14 standards. In those few instances where cases are closed which reflect that the proper scope has not been met or a significant lead has not been exploited, the case is returned to DIS for completion prior to making a final determination. As provided for in paragraph 15, DCID 1/14, existence of a minor investigative deficiency will not cause a case to be reopened.

b. Minimum standards expressed in DCID 1/14 would appear to ensure comparability among all agencies except NSA and CIA. The latter two agencies have the added feature of a polygraph examination, which other agencies do not utilize. Accordingly, screening accomplished by CIA and NSA should be acceptable to other agencies, but screening accomplished by other agencies would probably not be acceptable to NSA and CIA until the polygraph examination could be completed. From the DA viewpoint, current DCID 1/14 standards are adequate and do not require change.

c. Department of the Army has established a computer based system to identify personnel having access to SCI. This roster includes investigation dates, and is the medium which triggers servicing Special Security Offices (SSO's) to initiate bring-up investigations. A review of closed SBI-BU's referred to the US Army Intelligence Agency for review and adjudication reflects close adherence to the five-year bring-up requirement.

d. Mutually supporting procedures, constituting DA's continuing security program, consist essentially of three areas:

ARMY review(s) completed.

Classified by 72422
EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652
EXEMPTION CATEGORY 2
Retirement of Originator

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DAMI-DOS

SUBJECT: Community-Wide Adherence to DCID 1/14 (U)

(1) Personnel being granted access to SCI for the first time receive required indoctrination. Six months following the initial indoctrination, a reindoctrination is presented to ensure full understanding of the program. Reindoctrination is given to all persons having access to SCI two years after the date of last indoctrination. Personnel who change duty stations are debriefed upon their departure and reindoctrinated at their new location (if under Army cognizance), thereby ensuring familiarity with access procedures in the new environment while reinforcing their knowledge of safeguards and procedures previously learned.

(2) Servicing SSO's are required by regulation to sustain close and continuing relations with supported commanders to monitor the activities and conduct of persons having access to SCI; through this coordination, instances of mental instability, excessive drinking habits, indebtedness, unexplained affluence and other unusual conduct or attitude which may bear on continued eligibility for access to SCI *are* surfaced and reported to adjudicative authority for review and/or reinvestigation. Further, the Army's adjudication element advises an SSO/local command of possible problem areas concerning an individual at the time indoctrination authority is forwarded, and the SSO is instructed to caution an individual about his conduct and to monitor the individual's behavior through his supervisor.

(3) By regulation, Army commanders are required to sustain close supervision and observation of activities and behavior of personnel having access to classified information (collateral as well as SCI). They are also required to establish security training programs within their respective commands to ensure personnel knowledge of appropriate security regulations and procedures and awareness of hostile element operating techniques. This training takes the form of classic "security lectures," briefings to small groups on the hostile threat, incorporation into other areas of required military training, publicity in the forms of brochures/pamphlets/entries in unit bulletins, desk-side trouble shooting, and frequent unannounced inspections and spot checks. A majority of commands require at least an annual attendance of a formal security education program.

The measures noted in paragraph (1), above, apply to all persons having access to SCI. As of 15 June 1977, approximately 24,500 persons were identified as having such access, thus it follows that approximately one-half of this number is involved annually in the reindoctrination program. The measures in paragraph (3), above, apply across the board to all members and employees of the Army, but exact annual numbers have not been developed.


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DAMI-DOS

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e. Within DA, when an individual nominated for SCI is denied access, a memorandum summarizing the adverse information is prepared. This item with supportive material is filed in the Army's Investigative Records Repository (IRR), and this dossier number is recorded in the Defense Central Investigative Index (DCII). A subsequent check of the DCII by another Federal agency will disclose the existence of the IRR dossier, and this item will be released to the agency upon request. Feasibility of all DOD components and NSA using this procedure is suggested. The "Third Agency Rule" would apply, but no significant hurdles are foreseen. This centralization within DOD would constitute a primary, single source reference point for all agencies to query DOD. It is suggested that reciprocal exchange procedures among all agencies may best be established by DCI Directive on the subject. Such reciprocal procedures should include the voluntary notification of one agency to another when adverse information is developed which concerns a member of the second agency.


MERRILL T. KELLY
Army Member

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