

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

9 MAR 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. L. Britt Snider  
Director for Counterintelligence and Security Policy  
Office of the Secretary of Defense

SUBJECT: Interagency Group/Countermeasures - Tasking  
on Operations Security (U)

REFERENCE: Memorandum for the Executive Secretary, IG/CM,  
Subject: IG/CM Initiatives, dated 5 Jan. 1983

1. At the third meeting of the Interagency Group/Countermeasures, on 18 February 1983, the Chairman, IG/CM requested that the membership review a draft proposed National Security Council policy on Operations Security which was one of the subjects mentioned in Reference. This draft policy has been reviewed and the following comments are offered. (U)

2. Operations Security (OPSEC) is defined in the National Security Study Directive 2-82 (NSSD-2) report, "Capabilities Against the Hostile Intelligence Threat 1983-1988, as ". . . the systematic evaluation of military operations (emphasis added) to find activities or weaknesses that could be exploited by the enemy for intelligence purposes." The report continues that ". . . By extension, the technique can be applied to any activity or program and represents the process of comparing friendly vulnerability with hostile capability and intent to arrive at countermeasure judgments." (C)

3. The National Security Council OPSEC policy draft, in its first paragraph, addresses what OPSEC policy perhaps should be, but does not anywhere in the document, define Operations Security itself. If, as the NSSD-2 study suggests, OPSEC applies to evaluation of military operations and by extension (emphasis added) to other programs and activities, it is essential that a definition of OPSEC be provided to reflect to just what extent evaluation of "any activity or program" is required. This Agency does review its programs and activities, particularly those of an operational nature, to ensure that common sense and practical security measures are utilized in the protection of intelligence assets. The approach is multi-disciplinary, and, because of the

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diverse nature of intelligence operations, is tailored to meet specific operational requirements. It is not as "limited" as the use of that word in the NSSD-2 Study might suggest. The Agency is constantly concerned about the hostile threat to operations, personnel and facilities. There are active programs which include on-site inspections/surveys, polygraph programs both within the Agency and in industry, an expanding reinvestigations program, and extensive security awareness rebriefings. These are constants within the operating environment. (C)

4. This Agency's normal operational planning includes detailed attention to intelligence-related OPSEC matters. The operational climate, threats and vulnerabilities, and how to counter them are all taken very carefully into account in the regular planning process. (C)

5. The operational activities of the Central Intelligence Agency are conducted in accordance with Executive Order 12333, dated 4 December 1981, "United States Intelligence Activities," as amplified by the Director of Central Intelligence in specific procedures which were approved by the Attorney General on 3 June 1982. Agency operations are already under the oversight of the National Security Council, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, and the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. The Agency operates also, in accordance with Executive Order 12356, dated 6 April 1982, "National Security Information," which authorizes the Director of Central Intelligence establish Special Access Programs and which directs that he exercise this function for such programs "pertaining to intelligence activities (including special activities but not including military operational, strategic and tactical programs), or intelligence sources or methods . . . ." A clear distinction is thus stated between military operations and intelligence activities. (U)

6. This Agency does not object to the formation of a permanent IG/CM Subcommittee which would oversee the implementation of military OPSEC within the Department of Defense. This Agency would, however, oppose oversight of CIA operations by such a group. It is believed that sufficient oversight of CIA operational activities already exists through Executive Orders, the National Security Council, Senate and House Committees, and Agency internal control mechanisms. To add still another oversight entity covering intelligence (as opposed to military) OPSEC matters would add unnecessary complications and would endanger the compartmentation fundamental to the success of sensitive intelligence operations. (U)

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
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Director of Security

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