. 2		ROUTIN	G AND	RECOR	D SHEET
SUBJECT:	(Optional)		<del></del>		
FROM:				EXTENSION	NO.
-	Legislative Counsel 7D35 HQ				
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·					26 July 1976
TO: (Offic building)	er designation, room number, and	DATE		OFFICER'S	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from who
		RECEIVED	FORWARDED	INITIALS	to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment
1.	Director of Security 4E60 HQ				Attached is a draft letter I have prepared in response to the 1 July
2.				•	Senate Select Committee letter regarding dissemination of the
	•			.	FBI cable. I have not included the
3.				• Tajk 1 .	attachments—Attachment A is merely copies of several Agency
	C/SAG ACTION				regulations; Attachment B is a
4.					report prepared under the auspice
			·		of the Inspector General last April I did not make copies of this repor
5.					because of its length. I propose to
					send all of that report except for the three-page introduction. Please le
6.					me have your comments by COB
<i>i</i> • •					27 July, if possible. Thank you.
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					Director Security
			1		OS 63342

Honorable Daniel K. Inouye, Chairman Select Committee on Intelligence United States Senate Washington, D. C. 20510

Dear Mr. Chairman:

I am responding to your letter regarding the 24 June 1976 Washington Star article concerning dissemination of an FBI cable to CIA. CIA did receive a copy of this cable, which reported on a rally in front of the Federal Building in Bowling Green, Kentucky. The demonstrators carried placards denouncing the CIA and FBI. The cable did not contain the names of any of the participants, nor were the participants in any way identified except as "16 individuals."

It is the responsibility of CIA's Office of Security to carry out the mandate of Section 4(b) of Executive Order 11905 to "protect the security of its [CIA] installations, activities, information, and personnel." Section 5(b)(7)(vi) of the Order further authorizes CIA to collect information concerning persons or activities which pose "a clear threat" to Agency facilities or personnel. Messages such as the subject FBI cable alert the Office of Security to potential problems, so that Agency personnel can be notified if danger or violence appears imminent.

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When the FBI cable was received at the Agency's Cable Secretariat, the action copy was sent to the Office of Security. Copies also went into the Cable Secretariat's chronological reference files, and to the Operations Directorate, which handles the large majority of Agency contacts with the FBI. Two components of the Office of Security

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received copies; both concluded that there was no indication of a clear threat to Agency facilities or personnel. Office of Security copies were then destroyed, with no action taken. Operations Directorate personnel also had no interest in the message, and those copies have been destroyed as well.

The publicity given dissemination of this cable has highlighted the need for the Office of Security to delineate more precisely the types of FBI information it needs. The Director of Security has met with and a draft letter spelling out the information requirements of the Office of Security has been prepared. This letter is currently being reviewed by FBI officials. I will be happy to provide the Committee a copy of the final agreement.

STAT	With regard to your request on the collection, analysis, production, dissemination, use or retention of information on U.S. citizens, the most recent guidelines are described in E.O. 11905. These guidelines have been integrated into CIA internal regulations	
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ligence or security files which include the names of American citizens, I am submitting a copy of a report prepared internally in April of this year (Attachment B). This report separates these files into three categories: administrative records on employees or others who have or have had a relationship with CIA (category 1); files created for specific purposes, such as the MHCHAOS files, which are no longer used but which cannot be destroyed (category 2); and current files on non-employees which the Agency maintains to fulfill its foreign intelligence, counterintelligence, or security missions.

I trust the above is responsive to your request.

Sincerely,

George Bush Director