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Director of
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
Soviet Military Production, 1975-88

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Interagency Intelligence Memorandum

Key Judgments



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NI IIM 89-10003//
September 1989
Copy 523

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IIM 89-10003/I

Soviet Military Production, 1975-88



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*Information available as of August 1989 was used
in the preparation of this Memorandum.*

*The following intelligence organizations participated
in the preparation of this Memorandum:*

The Central Intelligence Agency
The Defense Intelligence Agency
The National Security Agency
The Bureau of Intelligence and Research,
Department of State

also participating:

The Deputy Chief of Staff
for Intelligence, Department of the Army
The Director of Naval
Intelligence, Department of the Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence,
Department of the Air Force
The Director of Intelligence, Headquarters, Marine Corps

*This Memorandum was approved for publication by the
Chairman of the National Intelligence Council.*

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Soviet Military Production 1975-88

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- *Although fewer major weapons were produced during the 1980s than during the 1970s, the Soviets have maintained levels of output that are extraordinary by any standard.*
- *Since Gorbachev came to power in 1985, levels of weapons production generally were somewhat below those for the full 14-year period of this estimate, but remained high—well above the US effort in every major category.*
- *As a result of Gorbachev's announced unilateral reductions, Soviet military materiel production is expected to decline. We anticipate that the largest cuts will occur in the production of land armaments with lesser cuts, if any, in strategic offensive weapons depending, in part, on the results of negotiations on strategic arms reductions. In contrast, there may even be increases in production of air defense systems.*

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
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Figure 1
Ratio of Selected Soviet to US
Cumulative Weapons Production, 1975-88

1975-1988
 1985-1988



1:2 ICBMs and SLBMs Cruise missiles Crew-served surface-to-air missiles Bombers Fighters Helicopters Submarines Surface warships Tanks Major artillery pieces

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Key Judgments

Soviet defense industries exhibit a stability and momentum that have resulted in levels of weapons production that are extraordinary by any standard. We note, however, that the period covered in this Memorandum—1975-88—has been followed by repeated Soviet statements that they will reduce defense expenditures and significantly alter how much and what they produce and procure for their military forces. The implications of these claims will become clearer over the next several years.

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
Figure 1 depicts the ratio of Soviet to US cumulative weapons production for 10 major military equipment categories. In every category, Soviet production has exceeded that of the United States. As shown in figure 1, from 1975 through 1988, the Soviets produced about four times as many intercontinental ballistic missiles and submarine-launched ballistic missiles as the United States, and twice as many nuclear-powered submarines. During this period, the USSR produced some 500 long- and intermediate-range bombers, whereas the United States produced 103 B-1 bombers. In addition, the Soviets produced about six times as many crew-served, land-based surface-to-air missiles as the United States, three times as many tanks, and six times as many major artillery pieces. Figure 1 also depicts the ratio of Soviet to US cumulative production for the period 1985-88—the Gorbachev years. Although the Soviet-to-US ratios for 1985-88 are generally smaller than for the overall period, the Soviets still outproduced the United States in each of the major categories. In the area of land armaments—those systems where we anticipate major reductions by the Soviets over the next few years—the ratio of Soviet to US production since Gorbachev came to power has been steadily increasing. Figure 2 illustrates whether production for major military categories was higher, lower, or about the same in 1988 as compared with 1985.

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Tables 1 through 14 along with figures 3 through 9 reflect estimated Soviet military materiel production during the period 1975-88. CIA and DIA have agreed on year-by-year production estimates for more than 80 percent of the more than 400 military systems covered in this Memorandum. However, such agreement by itself should not be taken as an indication that we have high confidence in these estimates. Although large amounts of data are available and analyzed in the estimate process, there remain major gaps in our knowledge that require analysts to make analytic assumptions that, in some cases, differ substantially. The result is that, in a limited number of cases, there are major differences in the estimate of production for important weapon systems.

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Figure 2
Selected Soviet Weapons Production Levels,
1988 Compared to 1985




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
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Although Soviet weapons production rates remained extremely high throughout the 1975-88 period, in most cases production rates over the last several years have been lower as compared with the mid-to-late 1970s. These included:

- A general decline in the annual production of surface warships, submarines, fighter aircraft, helicopters, short range ballistic missiles, surface-to-air missiles, and artillery.
- A noticeable reduction in the annual rate of production of intercontinental ballistic missiles and submarine-launched ballistic missiles during the early 1980s as production of older generation missiles entered their final phases and production of the next generation began. Although production rose noticeably over the past few years as the Soviets began deploying their latest generation of ICBMs and SLBMs, annual rates remained well below those of the 1970s.

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Downward trends are the result of several factors, such as the Soviets' introduction of more complex, sophisticated, and capable weapon systems into production. More complex systems embody substantial improvements in performance and can often replace older systems on a less than 1-for-1 basis. Thus, the Soviets have reduced their quantitative requirements for fielding the newer systems.

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In contrast, the annual production rates of bombers, cruise missiles, and heavy trucks generally increased. Although there is considerable uncertainty in estimates of tank production, tank production clearly increased during the period of this Memorandum. From 1975 through 1983 Soviet tank production levels fluctuated between about 2,300 and 3,000 tanks annually. Since 1984, production levels remained above 3,000—reaching

3,550 in 1987—the highest level since the early 1970s. By comparison, peak US tank production occurred in 1979 when 1,200 tanks were produced.

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As a result of General Secretary Gorbachev's announcements of unilateral reductions, we expect military materiel production to decline—in some cases significantly—over the next few years. Although the Soviets have announced a 20-percent cut in weapons procurement, the precise implications for the production of specific weapon systems are unclear. We anticipate that the largest cuts will occur in the production of land armaments, with lesser cuts if any in strategic offensive weapons depending, in part, on the results of negotiations of strategic arms reductions. In contrast, there may even be increases in production of air defense systems. Some of the announced cuts will become manifest soon, but the entire program of reductions could stretch well into the 1990s.

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Through 1988, however, the quantities of most military materiel produced for general purpose forces since Gorbachev came to power in 1985 remained high; the output of strategic missile systems generally increased, as several ongoing programs reached full-series production; at the same time, the output of both tactical and strategic aircraft dropped. These changes probably are rooted more in the schedule of programs initiated earlier than in recent political decisions. During 1988 the Soviet leadership clearly decided to shift some resources from the military to civilian production; however, evidence of shifts will become apparent only over time. We have recently discerned a reduction in tank production, but we are not yet able to assess with certainty how much output has been or will be reduced or to what extent similar reductions are occurring in other programs.

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Color Codes for Tables 1 to 14

These tables present the total Soviet production of each weapon system or item of military equipment cited, in the period under consideration. These numbers are, in fact, the total amount estimated to have been delivered to Soviet military forces unless some production went for export or was delivered to the Soviet civilian economy. In those cases, a second portion of the table reflects just that amount that was delivered to Soviet military forces, but includes all production used in development and testing programs associated with that system.

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The color codes displayed in the tables reflect the degree of confidence the analysts have in the accuracy of their estimates. In some cases there is agreement on the estimated numbers but a difference between agencies on the confidence levels. The levels of confidence used in the tables are portrayed as plus or minus a percentage, as follows:

- We judge that the actual production figure does not deviate from the estimated figure by more than plus or minus 10 percent.
- We judge that the actual production figure does not deviate from the estimated figure by more than plus or minus 10 to 25 percent.
- We judge that the actual production figure does not deviate from the estimated figure by more than plus or minus 25 to 40 percent.
- We have no confidence that the estimate is within plus or minus 40 percent of the actual production figure.

The intervals reflect the subjective judgment of the analysts involved and their confidence in the estimates. These judgments are not a measure of our ability to monitor production directly at the factory.

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Footnotes follow table 14.

Secret**Table 1^a****Soviet Strategic Missile Production**

(Where CIA and DIA have different estimates, the DIA figures are presented first in bold italics followed by the CIA figure in nonitalic bold type. In this table, figures are presented for INR production estimates in plain italic.)

	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	Cumulative 1975-88
ICBMs															
SS-11 Mod 2/3	<i>100</i>	<i>100</i>	<i>50</i>												250 *
	215	180													395
	<i>120</i>	<i>120</i>													240
SS-13	<i>10</i>	<i>10</i>	<i>10</i>	<i>10</i>	<i>10</i>	<i>10</i>	<i>10</i>	<i>10</i>	<i>10</i>						90 *
	7	10	12	14	16	17	18								94
	<i>12</i>	<i>12</i>	<i>12</i>	<i>12</i>	<i>12</i>	<i>12</i>	<i>12</i>	<i>12</i>							96
SS-16	<i>20</i>	<i>20</i>	<i>30</i>												70
	23	29	35												87
	<i>20</i>	<i>10</i>	<i>10</i>												40
SS-17	<i>30</i>	<i>35</i>	<i>40</i>	<i>50</i>	<i>55</i>	<i>60</i>	<i>40</i>								310 *
	32	40	48	56	47										223
	<i>40</i>	<i>50</i>	<i>60</i>	<i>60</i>	<i>40</i>										250
SS-18 ^b	<i>55</i>	<i>60</i>	<i>60</i>	<i>60</i>	<i>60</i>	<i>60</i>	<i>60</i>	<i>60</i>	<i>45</i>	<i>10</i>	<i>4</i>	<i>8</i>	<i>9</i>	<i>30</i>	581 *
	42	54	66	78	89	77	10	10	10	10	4	8	11	19	488
	<i>50</i>	<i>60</i>	<i>60</i>	<i>60</i>	<i>60</i>	<i>60</i>	<i>30</i>	<i>30</i>	<i>10</i>	<i>10</i>	<i>4</i>	<i>8</i>	<i>11</i>	<i>19</i>	472
SS-19	<i>45</i>	<i>70</i>	<i>70</i>	<i>70</i>	<i>70</i>	<i>70</i>	<i>70</i>	<i>70</i>	<i>70</i>	<i>45</i>	<i>25</i>				675 *
	27	63	71	79	85	90	25	26	27	28					521
	<i>50</i>	<i>72</i>	<i>72</i>	<i>72</i>	<i>72</i>	<i>72</i>	<i>40</i>	<i>30</i>	<i>30</i>	<i>30</i>					540
SS-25								<i>5</i>	<i>10</i>	<i>25</i>	<i>60</i>	<i>60</i>	<i>70</i>	<i>90</i>	320
								1	6	18	65	47	64	80	281
								<i>2</i>	<i>12</i>	<i>36</i>	<i>70</i>	<i>50</i>	<i>60</i>	<i>70</i>	300
SS-24								<i>3</i>	<i>7</i>	<i>10</i>	<i>10</i>	<i>20</i>	<i>30</i>	<i>45</i>	125
								2	5	10	12	16	26	41	112
								<i>3</i>	<i>7</i>	<i>10</i>	<i>10</i>	<i>15</i>	<i>30</i>	<i>40</i>	115
SLBMs															
SS-N-6	<i>45</i>	<i>50</i>	<i>60</i>	<i>65</i>	<i>75</i>	<i>80</i>	<i>85</i>	<i>90</i>							550
	45	52	61	67	74	79	86								464
	<i>50</i>	<i>50</i>	<i>60</i>	<i>70</i>	<i>70</i>	<i>80</i>	<i>80</i>								460
SS-N-8	<i>110</i>	<i>115</i>	<i>130</i>	<i>100</i>	<i>70</i>										525 *
	110	114	131	109											464
	<i>120</i>	<i>120</i>	<i>120</i>	<i>110</i>											470
SS-N-17	<i>4</i>	<i>7</i>	<i>10</i>	<i>10</i>	<i>15</i>										46
	6	8	9	11	12										46
	<i>4</i>	<i>7</i>	<i>10</i>	<i>10</i>	<i>15</i>										46
SS-N-18	<i>5</i>	<i>25</i>	<i>20</i>	<i>50</i>	<i>80</i>	<i>110</i>	<i>140</i>	<i>100</i>	<i>70</i>						600 *
	3	23	21	51	82	111	140	169							600
	<i>5</i>	<i>25</i>	<i>20</i>	<i>50</i>	<i>90</i>	<i>110</i>	<i>110</i>	<i>110</i>							520
SS-N-20					<i>1</i>	<i>10</i>	<i>15</i>	<i>20</i>	<i>20</i>	<i>25</i>	<i>30</i>	<i>40</i>	<i>40</i>	<i>40</i>	241
					1	6	7	20	15	20	25	30	35	15	174
					<i>1</i>	<i>8</i>	<i>13</i>	<i>20</i>	<i>14</i>	<i>30</i>	<i>30</i>	<i>26</i>	<i>20</i>	<i>20</i>	182
SS-N-23									<i>10</i>	<i>20</i>	<i>30</i>	<i>40</i>	<i>50</i>	<i>50</i>	200
									7	22	35	5	25	35	129
									<i>10</i>	<i>20</i>	<i>35</i>	<i>40</i>	<i>40</i>	<i>40</i>	185

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Table 1^a (continued)**Soviet Strategic Missile Production**

(Where CIA and DIA have different estimates, the DIA figures are presented first in bold italics followed by the CIA figure in nonitalic bold type. In this table, figures are presented for INR production estimates in plain italic.)

	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	Cumulative 1975-88
IRBMs															
SS-20 ^c	<i>25</i>	<i>50</i>	<i>90</i>	<i>110</i>	<i>110</i>	<i>110</i>	<i>120</i>	<i>120</i>	<i>120</i>	<i>125</i>	<i>110</i>	<i>20</i>	<i>70</i>	<i>45</i>	<i>1,225</i> *
	24	44	66	87	75	104	127	125	41	49	7	15	17	10	791
	<i>25</i>	<i>50</i>	<i>80</i>	<i>70</i>	<i>80</i>	<i>80</i>	<i>80</i>	<i>80</i>	<i>80</i>	<i>83</i>	<i>8</i>	<i>12</i>	<i>43</i>	<i>28</i>	<i>799</i>

* DIA'S cumulative estimate shown above represents production required to support observed Soviet strategic ballistic missile development and deployment programs and DIA's assessment of refire requirements. DIA is confident that its cumulative estimate for the period does not exceed the actual number produced by more than 15 percent. However, the actual number produced could exceed the cumulative estimate shown here by 25 percent or more.

Footnotes follow table 14.



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Table 2**Soviet SRBM Production**

(Where CIA and DIA have different estimates, the DIA figures are presented first in bold italics followed by the CIA figures in nonitalic bold type. In this table, figures are presented for INR production estimates in plain italic.)

	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	Cumulative 1975-88
Total production															
SS-12 ^d	70	70	100	125	125	125	100	100	100	25	25	25	25		1,015
SS-21	5	5	10	10	30	60	100	150	200	300	300	300	250	250	1,970
	<i>5</i>	<i>10</i>	<i>10</i>	<i>10</i>	<i>10</i>	<i>15</i>	<i>25</i>	<i>50</i>	<i>50</i>	<i>75</i>	<i>80</i>	<i>80</i>	<i>80</i>		<i>500</i>
SS-23 ^{d e}	5	10	10	10	10	15	25	50	50	50	80	80	80		475
	<i>5</i>	<i>10</i>	<i>10</i>	<i>10</i>	<i>10</i>	<i>10</i>	<i>10</i>	<i>10</i>	<i>15</i>	<i>25</i>	<i>50</i>	<i>80</i>	<i>100</i>		<i>345</i>
Scud-B	<i>1,000</i>	<i>1,000</i>	<i>1,000</i>	<i>750</i>	<i>750</i>	<i>500</i>	<i>300</i>	<i>200</i>	<i>200</i>	<i>200</i>	<i>200</i>	<i>200</i>	<i>200</i>	<i>200</i>	<i>6,700</i>
	1,000	1,000	1,000	750	750	500	300	200	200	125	125	125	125	125	6,250
FROG-7	525	525	525	525	175	175	175	175	175	175	175	175	175	175	3,850
Delivered to Soviet forces (if different from total production)															
Scud-B	800	800	800	600	600	350	150	100	50	10	10	10	10	10	4,300
SS-21	5	5	10	10	30	60	100	150	150	250	250	250			1,270
FROG-7	450	375	275	150	150	15	15	15	15	15	15	15	15	15	1,535

Footnotes follow table 14.




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
Figure 3
Soviet Military Production, 1975-88

Note scale change


ICBMs




SLBMs



IRBMs



SRBMs



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Table 3**Soviet Spacecraft Production**

(Where CIA and DIA have different estimates, the DIA figures are presented first in bold italics followed by the CIA figures in nonitalic bold type.)

	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	Cumulative 1975-88
Low Res	11	10	10	10	7										48
ASAT		<i>4</i>	<i>4</i>	<i>2</i>	<i>1</i>	<i>1</i>	<i>2</i>	<i>2</i>	<i>1</i>	<i>1</i>	<i>1</i>	<i>1</i>	<i>1</i>	<i>1</i>	22
		4	4	1		1	2	1							13
ASAT target	<i>2</i>	<i>3</i>	<i>1</i>		<i>1</i>	<i>1</i>	<i>1</i>	<i>1</i>	<i>1</i>						11
	1	3	3			1	2	1							11
Hi Res 1	19	18	17	17	10	4									85
Hi Res 2	<i>1</i>	<i>2</i>	<i>2</i>	<i>2</i>	<i>5</i>	<i>7</i>	<i>8</i>	<i>8</i>	<i>10</i>	<i>10</i>	<i>10</i>	<i>9</i>	<i>8</i>	<i>7</i>	89
	1	2	2	1	4	5	10	8	10	8	8	8	8	7	82
Med Res		<i>1</i>	<i>3</i>	<i>2</i>	<i>10</i>	<i>17</i>	<i>20</i>	<i>18</i>	<i>18</i>	<i>18</i>	<i>16</i>	<i>16</i>	<i>16</i>	<i>17</i>	172
		1	3	1	9	17	20	20	18	17	16	16	15	16	169
IMSAT								<i>1</i>	<i>1</i>	<i>1</i>	<i>1</i>	<i>3</i>	<i>2</i>	<i>3</i>	12
								1	1	1	1	3	2	3	11
Molniya 1	3	4	3	4	3	3	4	4	4	4	3	4		3	46
Molniya 2 ^f	4	3	1												8
Molniya 3 ^f	<i>3</i>	<i>2</i>	<i>2</i>	<i>2</i>	<i>3</i>	<i>3</i>	<i>3</i>	<i>3</i>	<i>3</i>	<i>3</i>	<i>3</i>	<i>3</i>	<i>1</i>	<i>3</i>	37
	3	2	2	2	2	2	4	2	3		5	3	1	2	33
Raduga ^f	<i>1</i>	<i>1</i>	<i>1</i>	<i>1</i>	<i>2</i>	<i>3</i>	<i>2</i>	<i>1</i>	<i>2</i>	<i>2</i>	<i>2</i>	<i>2</i>	<i>2</i>	<i>3</i>	25
	1	1	1	1	1	2	3	2	2	2	2	2	2	3	25
Gorizont ^f			<i>1</i>	<i>1</i>	<i>2</i>	<i>1</i>	<i>1</i>	<i>2</i>	<i>2</i>	<i>2</i>	<i>1</i>	<i>2</i>	<i>1</i>	<i>4</i>	20
				1	2	1		2	2	2	1	2	1	2	16
SPCS	<i>2</i>	<i>3</i>	<i>2</i>	<i>3</i>	<i>3</i>	<i>2</i>	<i>2</i>	<i>3</i>	<i>3</i>	<i>3</i>	<i>3</i>	<i>3</i>	<i>3</i>	<i>2</i>	37
	2	3	2		3	1	2	5	3	2	2	3	3	3	34
MPCS ^s	3	3	3	3	3	3	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	1	32
LDS 1	2														2
LDS 2		<i>1</i>	<i>3</i>	<i>2</i>	<i>2</i>	<i>5</i>	<i>5</i>	<i>5</i>	<i>3</i>	<i>8</i>	<i>8</i>	<i>8</i>	<i>4</i>	<i>5</i>	59
		1	3	2	2	6	5	5	3	7	8	7	4	6	59
LDS-2-Geo										1	1		1	1	4
Cosmos 1870													<i>1</i>		1
													2		2
Erpho ^f	1	2	2	2	6	7	5	6	8	8	6	4	4	2	63
Foton (MATPROC)											<i>1</i>	<i>1</i>	<i>1</i>	<i>1</i>	4
										1	1	1	1	1	5
Meteor 2 ^f	<i>1</i>		<i>2</i>		<i>2</i>	<i>1</i>	<i>1</i>	<i>2</i>	<i>1</i>	<i>2</i>	<i>1</i>	<i>1</i>	<i>2</i>	<i>1</i>	17
	1		2		2	1	1	2	1	2	1	1	2		16
Meteor-P ^f		<i>1</i>	<i>1</i>		<i>1</i>	<i>1</i>	<i>1</i>		<i>1</i>		<i>1</i>			<i>1</i>	8
									1		1			1	3
Mod-Erpho ^f													2		2
RELSAT						<i>1</i>		<i>1</i>		<i>1</i>		<i>1</i>	<i>1</i>	<i>1</i>	5
						1						1	1		3
ELINT 2	<i>4</i>	<i>4</i>	<i>3</i>	<i>3</i>	<i>1</i>	<i>1</i>									16
	3	5	3	2	1	1		1							16
ELINT 3	<i>2</i>	<i>3</i>	<i>4</i>	<i>5</i>	<i>5</i>	<i>5</i>	<i>5</i>	<i>5</i>	<i>5</i>	<i>5</i>	<i>5</i>	<i>6</i>	<i>5</i>	<i>4</i>	64
	2	2	3	5	5	5	5	6	5	3	6	6	5	5	63
ELINT 4										<i>1</i>	<i>3</i>		<i>1</i>	<i>3</i>	8
									1	1	2		1	3	8

Table 3 (continued)**Soviet Spacecraft Production**

(Where CIA and DIA have different estimates, the DIA figures are presented first in bold italics followed by the CIA figures in nonitalic bold type.)

	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	Cumulative 1975-88
EORSAT	<i>1</i> 1	<i>2</i> 2	<i>2</i> 1	<i>1</i> 2	<i>1</i> 2	<i>2</i> 2	<i>3</i> 3	<i>3</i> 3	<i>3</i> 2	<i>3</i> 2	<i>3</i> 3	<i>4</i> 3	<i>2</i> 2	<i>2</i> 3	<i>32</i> 29
RORSAT	<i>3</i> 3	<i>2</i> 2	<i>2</i> 2	<i>1</i> 2	<i>1</i> 1	<i>1</i> 1	<i>3</i> 3	<i>4</i> 4	<i>1</i> 1	<i>2</i> 2	<i>2</i> 2	<i>3</i> 2	<i>2</i> 2	<i>2</i> 2	<i>29</i> 25
NAVSAT 1	<i>2</i> 1	<i>2</i> 3	<i>2</i> 2	<i>2</i> 2											<i>8</i> 8
NAVSAT 2	3	3	4	5	5	4	4	6	5	7	5	5	4	4	64
GEOSAT 2							<i>1</i> 1	<i>1</i> 1	<i>1</i> 1	<i>1</i> 1	<i>1</i> 1	<i>2</i> 2	<i>1</i> 1	<i>2</i> 2	<i>10</i> 8
NAVSAT 3	1	1	2	1	1	2	1	2	2	2	1	2	2		20
GLONASS ^g								<i>1</i> 1	<i>2</i> 2	<i>2</i> 2	<i>2</i> 2	<i>2</i> 1	<i>2</i> 2	<i>3</i> 3	<i>14</i> 13
RADSAT 1	4	2													6
RADSAT 2	<i>2</i> 1	<i>2</i> 2	<i>2</i> 2	<i>1</i> 1	<i>1</i> 1	<i>1</i> 1	<i>2</i> 3	<i>1</i> 2	<i>2</i> 2	<i>1</i> 2	<i>1</i> 1	<i>1</i> 1	<i>1</i> 1	<i>2</i> 2	<i>20</i> 20
RADSAT 3	<i>1</i> 2	<i>2</i> 2	<i>2</i> 2	<i>1</i> 1	<i>1</i> 1	<i>2</i> 2	<i>2</i> 1	<i>2</i> 3	<i>4</i> 4	<i>1</i> 1	<i>2</i> 2	<i>2</i> 1	<i>1</i> 1	<i>2</i> 2	<i>25</i> 23
CALSAT				1	1	1	1	1	1	2	1	1	1		11
GEOSAT 1	<i>2</i> 2	<i>2</i> 1	<i>1</i> 2	<i>1</i> 1											<i>6</i> 6
Salyut M		1													1
Salyut R ^f			1					1							2
Cosmos 929-type ^h	1	1	1		1		1		1		1	1	1		9
Kvant (MIR Module)													1	2	3
Mir												1			1
Soyuz Ferry ^f	<i>6</i> 3	<i>5</i> 3	<i>4</i> 3	<i>3</i> 5	<i>3</i> 3	<i>3</i> 4	<i>1</i> 2								<i>25</i> 20
Soyuz T ^f	<i>1</i> 1	<i>1</i> 1	<i>1</i> 1	<i>1</i> 1	<i>2</i> 2	<i>2</i> 2	<i>1</i> 1	<i>3</i> 3	<i>3</i> 3	<i>3</i> 3	<i>2</i> 2	<i>1</i> 1			<i>21</i> 20
Soyuz TM ^f											<i>1</i> 1	<i>2</i> 2	<i>3</i> 2	<i>3</i> 2	<i>9</i> 7
Progress ^f			2	3	3	3	2	3	3	4	3	3	7	6	42
Space plane ⁱ						1		1	2	2	1	1	1	1	10
Space shuttle ^j										1				1	2
Ocean R									1	1		1	1		4
Photo Geo 2							<i>1</i> 1	<i>1</i> 1	<i>1</i> 1	<i>1</i> 1	<i>1</i> 2	<i>1</i> 1	<i>2</i> 2	<i>2</i> 2	<i>10</i> 11
Probable RORSAT													2		2
RORSAT 2													2	1	3
SDRS											1	1	1		3
Sixpack											2	1	2	2	6
											2	1	2	2	7

Footnotes follow table 14.



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Table 4**Soviet Space Launch Vehicle Production**

(Where CIA and DIA have different estimates, the DIA figures are presented first in bold italics followed by the CIA figures in nonitalic bold type.)

	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	Cumulative 1975-88
Total production															
SL-3	<i>5</i>	<i>5</i>	<i>10</i>	<i>10</i>	<i>10</i>	<i>5</i>	<i>5</i>	<i>5</i>	<i>5</i>					<i>2</i>	<i>62</i>
	5	5	7	5	8	7	6	5	4		1			2	55
SL-4	<i>40</i>	<i>40</i>	<i>45</i>	<i>45</i>	<i>45</i>	<i>45</i>	<i>45</i>	<i>45</i>	<i>45</i>	<i>45</i>	<i>45</i>	<i>40</i>	<i>40</i>	<i>40</i>	<i>605</i>
	40	39	39	45	47	45	42	45	43	44	40	37	44	45	595
SL-6	<i>10</i>	<i>10</i>	<i>10</i>	<i>10</i>	<i>10</i>	<i>10</i>	<i>10</i>	<i>10</i>	<i>10</i>	<i>10</i>	<i>15</i>	<i>15</i>	<i>5</i>	<i>10</i>	<i>145</i>
	10	11	10	9	7	12	14	11	11	11	16	14	5	10	151
SL-7	<i>5</i>	<i>5</i>													<i>10</i>
	5	5	2												12
SL-8 ^k	<i>18</i>	<i>28</i>	<i>29</i>	<i>21</i>	<i>18</i>	<i>15</i>	<i>18</i>	<i>24</i>	<i>23</i>	<i>19</i>	<i>11</i>	<i>14</i>	<i>14</i>	<i>8</i>	<i>260</i>
	20	30	30	25	20	20	20	25	20	20	15	20	15	15	295
SL-11	<i>5</i>	<i>5</i>	<i>5</i>	<i>3</i>	<i>4</i>	<i>5</i>	<i>5</i>	<i>5</i>	<i>5</i>	<i>5</i>	<i>5</i>	<i>8</i>	<i>6</i>	<i>7</i>	<i>73</i>
	5	8	7	1	2	4	8	8	2	4	5	5	6	6	71
SL-12/13	<i>5</i>	<i>5</i>	<i>5</i>	<i>5</i>	<i>5</i>	<i>5</i>	<i>5</i>	<i>10</i>	<i>15</i>	<i>15</i>	<i>10</i>	<i>10</i>	<i>15</i>	<i>15</i>	<i>125</i>
	5	5	5	8	6	5	7	10	12	13	10	9	13	13	121
SL-14		<i>1</i>	<i>2</i>	<i>2</i>	<i>2</i>	<i>2</i>	<i>4</i>	<i>4</i>	<i>5</i>	<i>8</i>	<i>15</i>	<i>10</i>	<i>10</i>	<i>10</i>	<i>75</i>
		1	3	3	1	1	5	4	5	7	12	12	11	12	77
SL-16							<i>1</i>	<i>2</i>	<i>1</i>	<i>3</i>	<i>4</i>	<i>4</i>	<i>5</i>	<i>2</i>	<i>22</i>
								2	1	3	3	1	3	3	16
SL-17													<i>1</i>	<i>1</i>	<i>2</i>
											1	1	1	1	4
Delivered to Soviet forces (if different from total production)															
SL-3	<i>1</i>	<i>2</i>	<i>6</i>	<i>8</i>	<i>7</i>	<i>3</i>	<i>2</i>	<i>4</i>	<i>4</i>					<i>2</i>	<i>39</i>
SL-6	<i>9</i>	<i>9</i>	<i>9</i>	<i>9</i>	<i>10</i>	<i>9</i>	<i>10</i>	<i>10</i>	<i>9</i>	<i>10</i>	<i>19</i>	<i>9</i>	<i>4</i>	<i>11</i>	<i>137</i>
SL-12/13	<i>2</i>	<i>3</i>	<i>4</i>	<i>3</i>	<i>3</i>	<i>3</i>	<i>2</i>	<i>6</i>	<i>5</i>	<i>6</i>	<i>9</i>	<i>8</i>	<i>10</i>	<i>11</i>	<i>75</i>
SL-14				<i>3</i>	<i>1</i>	<i>1</i>	<i>3</i>	<i>3</i>	<i>3</i>	<i>2</i>	<i>9</i>	<i>8</i>	<i>11</i>	<i>10</i>	<i>54</i>


Footnotes follow table 14.




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Figure 4
Soviet Military Production, 1975-88

Spacecraft



Space Launch Vehicles



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25X1

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Table 5**Soviet Cruise Missile Production**

(Where CIA and DIA have different estimates, the DIA figures are presented first in bold italics followed by the CIA figure in nonitalic bold type.)

	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	Cumulative 1975-88
Total production															
Air-to-surface missiles															
AS-4	220	220	220	220	220	150	150	150	150	150	150	150	150	100	2,400
AS-5	175	175	175	175	150										850
AS-6	155	160	165	170	180	200	150	100	75	75	50				1,480
AS-15							5	10	45	75	160	185	205	215	900
AS-16										5	5	5	50	250	315
AS-X-19												3	7	10	20
Naval cruise missiles															
SS-N-2	470	500	520	545	565	580	600	600	600	600	600	600	600	600	7,980
SS-N-3B Mod 2	25	75	100	100	100	100	100	75	25	25	25	25	25	25	825
SS-N-7	40	40	40												120
SS-N-9	60	65	70	75	80	85	90	95	50	40	30	20			760
SS-N-12	15	40	65	75	80	80	85	90	45	45	45	45	45	45	800
SS-N-14	75	80	85	85	85	85	85	85	85	85	85	85	85	50	1,140
SS-N-19			5	5	20	30	50	50	50	80	100	120	120	150	780
SS-N-21				1	1	3	5	10	10	83	140	180	180	180	793
SS-N-22					5	5	10	20	50	100	100	120	120	150	680
SS-NX-24							8	5		5		7	5	10	40
ASW missiles															
SS-N-15	15	15	15	15	15	15	15	15	15	15	15	15	15	15	210
SS-N-16	2	2	2	2	2	5	5	20	45	45	45	45	45	45	310
Ground-launched cruise missiles															
SSC-X-4 ¹				<i>1</i>	<i>1</i>	<i>3</i>	<i>5</i>	<i>5</i>	<i>10</i>	<i>100</i>	<i>120</i>	<i>100</i>			<i>345</i>
						1	5	10	40	60	69	10			195
KY-16 ^m							1	2	3	1	5	2	5	5	24
Delivered to Soviet forces (if different from total production)															
SS-N-2	427	496	405	467	177	439	429	436	491	547	524	550	594	551	6,533
SS-N-3B Mod 2	25	75	100	88	100	88	100	75	25	13	25	25	25	25	789

Footnotes follow table 14.



25X1

Table 6
Soviet SAM Production

	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	Cumulative 1975-88
Total production															
SA-4	2,700	1,400	1,300	900	900	900	900	600							9,600
SA-12a Gladiator			5	5	10	15	15	15	20	50	150	200	300	350	1,135
SA-X-12b Giant		1				1	1	2	5	10	15	20	20	20	95
SA-6	2,400	3,600	4,800	3,600	2,100	800	700	600	600	500	400	300			20,400
SA-11	20	20	20	20	50	100	150	200	500	600	850	1,000	1,200	1,400	6,130
SA-8	500	1,000	2,500	3,000	3,000	3,400	3,000	3,000	2,800	2,800	2,800	2,250	2,000	1,500	33,550
SA-9	6,000	6,000	6,000	3,600	3,600	2,000	2,000	1,200	1,200	500	300	300			32,700
SA-13	150	325	600	950	1,400	2,000	2,700	3,600	4,500	5,700	7,000	6,000	5,000	3,500	43,425
SA-2	3,000	2,500	2,100	1,700	1,500	1,300	1,100	1,100	700	700	700	700	500	500	18,100
SA-3	1,730	1,830	1,930	2,020	2,110	2,210	2,000	1,500	1,300	1,000	1,000	1,000	800	500	20,930
SA-16				100	250	500	2,500	4,000	5,600	7,600	9,900	12,200	14,600	16,200	73,450
SA-19					25	25	50	50	100	250	450	750	1,300	2,000	5,000
SA-5	1,200	1,200	1,200	1,200	600	600	600	600	600	600	600	600	300	250	10,150
SA-10	20	30	40	100	120	240	600	900	1,800	2,000	2,000	2,000	3,000	3,500	17,350
SA-7	21,900	24,300	26,600	29,000	25,000	18,000	16,000	5,000	2,000						167,800
SA-14	1,000	4,000	5,600	7,500	9,500	11,000	8,000	5,000	3,000	1,000	500	500	500	500	57,600
Delivered to Soviet forces (if different from total production)															
SA-4	2,400	1,200	1,200	600	600	600	600								7,200
SA-6	1,200	1,200	1,200	1,200	400	200	100								5,500
SA-8	500	1,000	2,500	3,000	3,000	3,000	3,000	2,500	2,000	1,500	1,500	1,500	1,500	1,500	28,000
SA-9	4,000	4,000	4,000	1,000	1,000										14,000
SA-13	150	300	500	1,000	2,000	2,400	2,600	3,300	3,500	3,000	3,000	1,000	500		23,250
SA-2	2,500	2,275	1,835	1,500	1,160	745	855	855	440	400	485	435	375	375	14,235
SA-3	1,330	380	960	1,160	170	1,460	1,470	700	850	425	340	250	500	500	10,495
SA-5	1,200	1,200	1,200	1,200	600	600	600	600	600	550	455	385	155	250	9,595
SA-7	15,000	15,000	15,000	15,000	15,000	8,000	6,000								89,000
SA-14	1,000	4,000	5,600	7,500	9,500	11,000	8,000	5,000	3,000	1,000	200				55,800
SA-16				100	250	500	2,500	4,000	5,600	7,600	9,900	11,000	13,000	16,200	70,650

Footnotes follow table 14.

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Table 7
Soviet ABM Production

	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	Cumulative 1975-88
SH-4	2	1													3
Gazelle	2	2	4	4	5	5	5	1	5	7	10	15	25	30	120
SH-11 ⁿ			1	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	4	15	37

Footnotes follow table 14.

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
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
Figure 5
Soviet Military Production, 1975-88

Note scale change


Cruise Missiles



Crew-Served Surface-to-Air Missiles



Antiballistic Missiles



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Secret**Table 8****Soviet Aircraft Production**

(Where CIA and DIA have different estimates, the DIA figures are presented first in bold italics followed by the CIA figures in nonitalic bold type.)

	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	Cumulative 1975-88
Total production															
Bombers															
Tu-22M Backfire	<i>20</i>	<i>25</i>	<i>29</i>	<i>31</i>	<i>31</i>	<i>32</i>	<i>32</i>	<i>32</i>	<i>31</i>	<i>28</i>	<i>28</i>	<i>28</i>	<i>28</i>	<i>26</i>	<i>401</i>
	21	24	27	29	30	30	30	30	30	28	28	28	28	28	391
Tu-95 Bear H					1		1	4	10	17	17	13	11	11	85
Tu-160 Blackjack							1			2	2	2	5	4	16
Fighter-bomber															
Su-24 Fencer	55	75	80	85	95	100	100	105	100	95	90	90	90	90	1,250
ASW reconnaissance															
Tu-142 Bear F	5	6	6	7	8	8	7	4	2	2	2	2	2	2	63
Maritime airborne communications															
Bear J			1							2	2	3	3	2	13
Fighters															
MiG-31 Foxhound	1	2	2	3	5	15	20	25	30	35	40	45	50	55	327
MiG-29 Fulcrum			1	2	2	3	4	2	40	85	130	170	205	205	849
Su-27 Flanker			1	2	2	3	3	1	12	45	70	90	110	125	464
Yak-36 Forger	15	15	15	15	15	15	15	15	15	10	5	5	5	5	165
MiG-21 Fishbed	325	220	220	220	220	220	220	150	140	100	50	40	20	15	2,160
MiG 23/27 Flogger	495	585	605	630	655	655	600	450	285	190	110	25			5,285
MiG-25 Foxbat	85	100	85	75	75	65	50	25	25	25	15	10	5		640
Su-25 Frogfoot	1	1	2	1		5	25	50	75	90	105	115	130	140	740
Su 17/20/22 Fitter	150	175	230	230	230	225	215	200	200	145	125	100	80	50	2,355
Yak-41 (RAM-T)												1		1	2
Su-15 Flagon	75	75	50												200
MiG-21U Mongol	55	45	45	40	40	40	35	35	30	30	25	20	15	10	465
Transports, others															
Il-76 Candid	17	24	30	35	40	46	49	51	53	53	55	53	60	55	621
Midas Tanker									1	2	5	5	6	7	26
Mainstay AWACS			2				1		1	3	3	3	5	5	23
An-26 Curl	90	100	110	125	135	145	155	150	80	65	50	30	10	10	1,255
Tu-134 Crusty	48	50	52	52	53	48	42	36	36	24	24	15			480
An-124 Condor								1		1	2	3	6	7	20
An-74/72 Coaler			1	1	1				1	1	1	6	15	20	47
Madcap AWACS											1	1			2
Il-62 Classic	15	16	16	16	16	16	14	12	9	4	7	7	8	6	162
An-22 Cock	6														6
Mystic Reconnaissance								1			1			1	3
Tag-D													1		1

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~~SECRET~~**Table 8 (continued)****Soviet Aircraft Production**

(Where CIA and DIA have different estimates, the DIA figures are presented first in bold italics followed by the CIA figures in nonitalic bold type.)

	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	Cumulative 1975-88
Helicopters															
Mi-24 Hind	120	140	155	170	185	200	210	225	200	175	160	155	140	105	2,340
Mi-26 Halo				1		1	4	9	13	18	21	25	30	35	157
Ka-27 Helix	1		1	1	4	14	19	24	30	33	38	41	45	45	296
Mi-8 Hip	1,250	1,285	675	475	475	475	500	500	500	420	400	375	340	330	8,000
Mi-14 Haze	20	24	24	24	24	24	24	24	24	24	24	6	3	3	272
Mi-28 Havoc								1	1	1					3
Hokum								1	1	1					3
Ka-25 Hormone	19														19
Mi-6 Hook	38	5	5	15	12	12									87
Delivered to Soviet forces (if different from total production)															
MiG-21 Fishbed	100	40	20	10											170
MiG-23/27 Flogger	429	489	511	497	525	543	442	339	100	91	33				3,999
MiG-25 Foxbat	85	100	85	48	34	43		13	15	10	15	10	5		463
Su-24 Fencer	55	75	80	85	95	100	100	105	100	95	90	90	90	80	1,240
Su-25 Frogfoot	1	1	2	1		5	30	50	75	78	87	63	97	114	604
Su-17 Fitter	132	136	170	180	190	180	185	140	140	65	35	40	20	10	1,623
MiG-29 Fulcrum			1	2	2	3	4	2	41	82	125	120	145	135	662
MiG-21U Mongol	15	15	12	10	7	5	2	2	1						69
Il-76 Candid	17	22	25	25	27	35	28	37	38	42	44	44	46	43	473
An-26 Curl		55	55	55	45	30	45	50	30	25	20	15	10	10	445
Tu-134 Crusty		10	15	15	15	15	15	36	24	12	3				160
Il-62 Classic	2	2	2	2	2	3	3	1	1	2	2		2	1	25
Mi-8 Hip	<i>565</i>	<i>580</i>	<i>290</i>	<i>140</i>	<i>155</i>	<i>185</i>	<i>180</i>	<i>185</i>	<i>175</i>	<i>135</i>	<i>115</i>	<i>210</i>	<i>200</i>	<i>160</i>	<i>3,275</i>
	330	310	230	160	170	200	220	190	170	170	180	180	190	160	2,860
Mi-14 Haze	20	24	24	24	17	11	2	5	6	17	14		3	3	170
Mi-2 Hoplite °	150	130	120	120	130	130	120	120	120	115	110	100	75	40	1,580
Mi-24 Hind	120	140	155	132	66	110	150	130	155	130	100	110	70	59	1,627
Ka-27 Helix	1		1	1	4	14	19	24	30	33	38	37	26	29	257
Mi-26 Halo				1		1	4	9	13	18	19	21	20	25	131
Mi-6 Hook	38	5	5	10	5										63

Footnotes follow table 14.




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
Figure 6
Soviet Military Production, 1975-88

Note scale change


Bombers




Fighters



Helicopters



Transports



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Table 9
Soviet Naval Ship Production

	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	Cumulative 1975-88
Total production															
SSBNs															
Delta-I		2	2	3											7
Delta-II		4													4
Delta-III			4	2	2	2	1	1							14
Delta-IV										1	1	1	1	1	5
Typhoon							1		1	1	1		1		5
SSGNs															
Charlie-II		1		1	1	1									5
Oscar						1			1		1	1		1	5
SSNs															
Victor-II		1	1	1	2										5
Victor-III				2	4	4	3	3	2	2	1		1	1	23
Alfa			1	2		1	2								6
Mike									1						1
Sierra									1			1			2
Akula										1		1	1	1	4
Uniform SSAN									1					1	2
SSs															
XRay SSA										1					1
Foxtrot			1	2	1	1	1	1	1						9
Tango		2	1	2	2	2	2	2							15
Kilo						1	1	1	2	3	4	4	4	4	24
India SSA		1			1										2
Lima SSA					1										1
Beluga SSA												1			1
Conversions															
Yankee-II SSBN		1													1
Yankee SSGN									1						1
Yankee SSN Pod Tail									1						1
Yankee Notch SSN											1			1	2
Echo-II SSGN		1		1	1			2		1		1	1	1	9
Echo-II SSAN						1									1
Hotel SSQN					1										1
Hotel SSN										2	2		1		5
Golf-III SSB		1													1
Golf SSQ				2	1										3
Golf-V SSA					1										1
Aircraft carrier															
Kiev CVHG		1		1			1						1		4

Table 9 (continued)
Soviet Naval Ship Production

	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	Cumulative 1975-88
Cruisers.															
Kirov CGN						1			1					1	3
Slava CG								1				1			2
Kara CG	1	1	1		1										4
Kresta-II CG	1	1	1												3
Destroyers															
Udaloy DDG						1	1		2	1	2	1	1	1	10
Sovremenny DDG						1		1	1	1	1	2	1	2	10
Rajput DDG (Mod-Kashin)					1		1		1		1		1		5
Frigate/Corvette															
Krivak I FFG	2	2	2	2	2	1	1								12
Krivak-II FFG	1	2	2	2	2	1	1								11
Krivak-III WFF ^p									1	1		1	1	1	5
Koni FF	1		1	1	1	2	1	1	1	2	1	1	1		14
Petya III FFL	1	1	1												3
Grisha I FFL	1														1
Grisha II WFFL ^p	2	2	1					1	1	1	1				9
Grisha III FFL	2	3	3	5	3	3	1	1		1	1				23
Grisha III WFFL ^p						1	2	1	2						6
Grisha IV FFL						1									1
Grisha V FFL								1	1	2	1	2	3	4	14
Conversions															
Mod-Kashin DDG	1					1									2
Mod-Kildin DD		1													1
Kanin DDG	1		1												2
Mod-Petya I FFL	1	1	1	1	1		1								6
Mod-Petya II FFL				1											1
Provorny DDG		1													1
Patrol combatants															
Pauk I PG					1	2	1		2		2	1			9
Pauk II PG														1	1
Nanuchka I PGG	2		1		1		1								5
Nanuchka II PGG		2	1		1	1	2	1	1	1					10
Nanuchka III PGG			1	2	1	1			1	2	1	2	2	1	14
Tarantul I PGG				1		1			2	2	2	2	2	2	14
Tarantul II PGG						1		2	4	5	5	2			19
Tarantul III PGG							1					4	3	4	12
Dergach PGGA													1		1
Utka PGGA													1		1

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Table 9 (continued)
Soviet Naval Ship Production

	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	Cumulative 1975-88
Svetlyak PG														1	1
Pauk I WPG P						1	3	3	2	4	2	3	4	4	26
Sorum WPGF P	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	1	1	1	2	1	16
Ivan Susanin WPG P		1	1	1		1		1							5
Sarancha PGGH		1													1
Alpinist PGFT											1				1
Coastal patrol craft															
Osa-II PTG	6	10	11	11	9	9	7	11	4	2					80
Stenka WPCS P	9	7	6	1		3	3	3	3	5	5	5	5	5	60
Babochka PCSH		1													1
Matka PTGH			2	4	3	3	2	1	1						16
Mol PT/YTX	3	3	2												8
Turya PTH	4	4	1	2	2	2		2	3	3	3	3			29
Muravey WPCSH P				1	2	2	2		1	2	1	2	1	1	15
Yaz PM/WPM P	1	1	2	1	2	2	2	2	1	2	1	3	2		22
Vosh WPM P					1	3	1	1	2						8
Piyavka WPM P						4	2	3	1						10
Zhuk WPB/PB P	10	10	12	12	12	12	12	12	12	12	12	12	12	12	164
Bogomol PG													1	2	3
Mukha PCSH													1		1
Mine warfare ships and craft															
Natya MSF	4	4	4	4	4	4	2	1	1	2	2	2	2	2	38
Barentsevo More MSFT											1				1
Sonya MSC	6	6	5	5	6	6	5	5	5	5	5	5	6	5	75
Yevgenya MSI	4	4	6	5	5	5	5	7	5	5	5	5	5		66
Andryusha MSS	1														1
Olya MSS	4														4
Pelikan MSIA											1	1			2
Gorya MHS												1			1
Lida MSI													3	5	8
Auxiliary ship and craft															
Berezina AOR			1												1
Boris Chilikin AOR	1		1	1											3
Manych AW		1													1
Lama AEM					1										1
Amga AEM	1					1									2
Brykin AEM												1			1
Kapusta AGN													1		1
Katun-I ARS	1	1		1											3

Table 9 (continued)
Soviet Naval Ship Production

	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	Cumulative 1975-88
Katun-II ARS							2								2
Ingul ARS	1								1				1		3
Rudnitsky ARS				1		1		1	1						4
Pinega ARR												1		1	2
Malina ARR										1	1				2
Eibrus ASR						1								1	2
Sorum ATA	1		1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1		1	12
Sorum AGE													1		1
Ivan Susanin AGB	1														1
Pelym ADG	1	2	1	3	2	2	1	2		1	1		1	1	18
Onega AG	1	1			1				1	1		1	1	1	9
Marshal Nedelin AGE									1						1
Kamchatka AG													1		1
Balzam AGI					1		1			1			1		4
Alpinist AGE										1					1
Alpinist AGI						1	2		1						4
Neon Antonov WAK p		1	1	1		1	1	1	1	1				1	9
Neon Antonov AK					1										1
Amphibious ships															
Alligator LST		1													1
Ivan ROGOV LPD				1				1							2
Amphibious craft															
Aist LCUA	1	1	1	1	2	1	2	2	2	2	2				17
Gus LCPA	6	3	1												10
Lebed LCMA	1		2	2	2	3	1	2	2	2	1				18
Orlan LCUA			1				1		1						3
Utenok LCMA						1	1								2
Tsaplya LCMA								1			1	1	1	1	5
Pomornik LCUA											1		1	1	3
Delivered to Soviet forces (if different from total production)															
Foxtrot SS															0
Kilo SS						1	1	1	2	2	2	1	1	2	13
Rajput (Mod-Kashin) DDG															0
Koni FF	1														1
Parchim IIs												1	2	5	8
Petya-III FFL															0
Pauk II PG															0

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Table 9 (continued)
Soviet Naval Ship Production

	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	Cumulative 1975-88
Nanuchka-II PGG															0
Tarantul I PGG				1		1									2
Osa-II PTG															0
Stenka WPCS ^p	9	7	6	1		3	3	3	3	2	2	4		5	48
Mol PT		1													1
Turya PTH	4	4	1												9
Zhuk WPB ^p	2	2	4	4	4	4	8	8	4	2	3	3	3	4	55
Natya MSF	4	4	3	1	3	1									16
Sonya MSC	6	6	5	5	5	5	5	4	4	3	2	4	3	2	59
Yevgenya MSI	1	4		4	3	3	3								18
Pelym ADG	1	2	1	3	2	2		2		1	1		1	1	17
Dubna AOR ^q	1				2										3
Kaliningradneft AO ^q								2							2
Amur AR ^r			2	3				3	2			1	2	2	15
Goryn ATA ^q			2	2				5	4						13
Tomba AG ^r	2		2												4
Neftegaz AG ^r									1	1					2
Vishnya AGI ^r											1	1	3	1	6
Sura AGL ^s	2	1													3
Akademik Krilov AGOR ^r	1	1	1		1										4
Yug AGOR ^r				7	2			2	5	2					18
Finik-I AGS ^r				4	4	7	1	1	5	1					23
Biya AGS ^r	3	3													6
Yunyy Partizan AK ^t	1	1	2												4
Bereza ADG ^r											3	2	3	2	10
OB AH ^r						2									2
Emba ARC ^q						1	2								3
Emba II ARC ^q											2				2
Bogomol PB															0
Kashtan AGL														2	2
Klasma ARC ^q			1	1											2
Sliva ARS ^q										2	2				4
Smolnyy AXT ^r		1	1	1											3
Wodnik AXT ^r			2												2
Ropucha LST ^r	3	4	3	1			2	2	2	1	2	2	1	1	24
Vinograd AGS ^q											1	1			2


Footnotes follow table 14.




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Figure 7
Soviet Military Production, 1975-88

Submarines



Surface Warships



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Table 10
Soviet Armored Vehicles Production

(Where CIA and DIA have different estimates, the DIA figures are presented first in bold italics followed by the CIA figures in nonitalic bold type.)

	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	Cumulative 1975-88
Total production															
Tanks															
T-55	800	750	700	500	300										3,050
T-64A	800	800	800	750	450										3,600
T-64B			50	100	300	500	600	600	600	600	500	400	300	50	4,600
T-72 Series ^u	<i>600</i>	<i>700</i>	<i>1,000</i>	<i>1,400</i>	<i>1,550</i>	<i>1,750</i>	<i>1,500</i>	<i>1,800</i>	<i>1,400</i>	<i>1,500</i>	<i>1,500</i>	<i>1,600</i>	<i>1,300</i>	<i>800</i>	<i>18,400</i>
	600	700	1,000	1,400	1,800	2,000	1,500	1,800	1,400	1,500	1,500	1,600	1,300	800	18,900
T-80	80	80	80	100	100	175	475	600	600	750	850	850	950	1,050	6,740
NT-N-87/1 ^v									50	100	300	550	1,000	1,600	3,600
Infantry fighting vehicles															
BMP 1	2,100	2,100	2,200	2,350	2,400	2,300	2,000	1,900	1,300	800					19,450
BMP 2				50	50	200	600	1,000	1,600	2,000	2,000	2,200	2,200	2,200	14,100
BMD	200	200	200	300	350	350	350	200	150	100	50	50	50	50	2,600
BMP 3												20	50	300	370
Armored personnel carriers, others															
BTR-60	1,200	1,200	1,000	1,000	750	750	700	600	600	600	600	200	100	100	9,400
BTR-70	100	200	800	1,000	1,500	2,000	1,000	500	500	500	500	400	100		9,100
BTR-80										50	200	600	1,300	2,000	4,150
BRDM-2	800	800	800	800	800	750	700	700	700	500	500	500	250	250	8,850
MTLB	450	450	450	450	450	450	450	450	450	450	450	450	450	450	6,300
Delivered to Soviet forces (if different from total production) ^w															
T-55	200	150	100	100											550
T-72 Series ^x	<i>600</i>	<i>700</i>	<i>1,000</i>	<i>1,350</i>	<i>1,050</i>	<i>1,300</i>	<i>650</i>	<i>1,150</i>	<i>850</i>	<i>1,150</i>	<i>1,150</i>	<i>1,250</i>	<i>900</i>	<i>600</i>	<i>13,700</i>
	600	700	1,000	1,350	1,300	1,550	650	1,150	850	1,150	1,150	1,250	900	600	14,200
BMP 1 ^y	2,550	2,650	2,500	2,450	2,050	2,100	1,900	750	750	450					18,150
BMP 2						100	300	500	1,000	1,400	1,600	1,600	1,600	1,600	9,700
BMD	200	200	200	300	350	300	300	150	100	100	50	50	50	50	2,400
BTR-60	1,000	700	500	500	250	250	250	200	200	200	200	100	100	100	4,550
BTR-70 ^z	50	200	800	1,000	1,500	2,000	1,150	800	950	1,200	1,200	900	450	200	12,400
BRDM-2	450	450	450	450	450	450	400	400	400	300	300	300	100	100	5,000
MTLB ^{aa}	450	450	450	500	750	1,050	1,050	1,050	1,050	1,150	1,250	700	600	500	11,000

Footnotes follow table 14.



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Table 11
Soviet Production of Artillery Pieces

	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	Cumulative 1975-88	
Total production																
T-12/T-12M 100-mm antitank gun	400	350	300	250	250	250	250	250	250	250	250	250	200	200	3,700	
D-30 122-mm gun/howitzer	700	700	600	700	600	600	500	500	600	500	400	300	300	400	7,400	
M-46 130-mm gun	300	300	300	300	300	100	100	100	100	100	100	100			2,200	
D-20 152-mm howitzer	300	300	300	300	300	300	300	250	150	150	150	50			2,850	
M-1976 152-mm gun	10	40	60	60	80	120	160	200	250	250	250	250	270	270	2,270	
2S1 122-mm SP howitzer	100	150	250	350	400	450	450	400	350	400	400	400	350	350	4,800	
2S3/2S3M 152-mm SP howitzer	100	140	220	240	260	280	280	260	240	240	240	240	240	240	3,220	
2S4 240-mm SP mortar	25	25	30	30	30	30	30	30	30	34	34	40	40	30	438	
2S5 152-mm SP gun		10	10	20	20	20	40	80	80	80	80	80	80	80	680	
2S7 203-mm SP gun	25	25	25	25	25	25	25	25	25	38	30	30	30	30	383	
M-1987 152-mm howitzer								5	10	10	50	100	150	200	525	
MAZ-7310 270-mm MRL									5	5	5	10	20	60	105	
2S9 120-mm gun/mortar						10	40	60	100	100	100	100	100	100	710	
BM-1 122-mm MRL	20	40	60	120	100	60	40	40	20	20					520	
BM-21 122-mm MRL	650	500	500	450	500	450	400	500	400	400	300	300	300	300	5,950	
BM-21V 122-mm MRL	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	140	
BM-22 220-mm MRL	10	30	40	100	100	100	100	120	120	120	120	120	120	120	1,320	
ZSU-23-4 SP antiaircraft gun	350	300	250	250	300	250	200	250	250	200	150	100			2,850	
2S6 SP AA gun SP antiaircraft gun					2	2	3	4	4	4	10	20	50	50	100	245
Delivered to Soviet forces (if different from total production)																
T-12/T-12M	350	300	250	200	200	200	200	200	200	200	200	200	150	150	3,000	
D-30	500	500	400	400	400	400	300	300	300	200	200	200	200	200	4,500	

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Table 11 (continued)
Soviet Production of Artillery Pieces

	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	Cumulative 1975-88
M-46	20	20	20	20	20										100
D-20	200	200	200	200	200	200	200	200	100	100	100				1,900
2S1	90	130	200	250	250	300	300	300	300	300	300	300	300	300	3,620
2S3/2S3M	100	140	200	200	200	200	200	200	200	200	200	200	200	200	2,640
2S4	25	25	30	30	30	30	30	30	30	30	30	40	40	30	430
2S7	25	25	25	25	25	25	25	25	25	30	30	30	30	30	375
BM-21	580	350	300	200	200	200	200	200	200	200	200	100	100	100	3,130
ZSU-23-4	250	250	100	100	100	50	50	50	50	50	50	50			1,150
M-1976 152-mm gun	10	40	60	60	80	120	160	200	250	250	250	250	250	250	2,230


Footnotes follow table 14.




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Figure 8
Soviet Military Production, 1975-88


Tanks




Infantry Fighting Vehicles



Armored Personnel Carriers



Artillery



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Table 12
Soviet Radar Production ^{bb}

	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	Cumulative 1975-88
Total production															
EW/GCI/TA															
Back Trap A/B	80	80	80	80	80	80	80	40	20	20	20	20	20	20	720
Big Back				2	2	3	4	4	4	4	4	4	4		35
Dog Ear					25	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	475
Flat Face A/ Squat Eye	100	50													150
Flat Face B/ Squat Eye		50	100	100	150	150	100	50	50	30	30	30	30	30	900
Full Time	1	1	1												3
Long Track	90	60	60	60	60	35	25	35	10	5	5	5			450
Shock Sing	3	1		1											5
Soap Box		1										2	1		4
Spoon Rest D	90	90	90	90	90	90	90	90	90	90	90	90	90	90	1,260
Tall King B	70	70	70	40	40	40	40	20							390
Tall King C							10	10	15	20	20	25	40	40	180
Tall Rack					1		1				4	4	4	6	20
Bar Lock A/B/C/D	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	50		650
Box Spring A/B			1											1	3
King Set					2				1					1	5
Show Time											1		1		2
Tin Shield						3	3	5	15	20	25	50	70	85	276
Tin Trap								2	2				10	15	29
HF															
Odd Group				5	10	20	20	20	30	30	30	50	50	50	315
Odd Pair A/B	150	150	150	150	100	100	80	80	80	80	80	80	50		1,330
Side Net	120	100													220
Thin Skin A/B	100	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	70	70	40	40	50		720
Battlefield															
PRP M-1986											20	20	20	20	80
Big Fred	20	20	30	30	30	30	30	33	33	33	33	36	30	30	418
Small Fred	20	30	40	40	40	40	40	40	40	40	20				390
Tall Mike		150	150	150	150	150	100	100	50	50	50	50	50	50	1,250
Rice Bag											10	30	50	50	140
IFF															
Dog Tail				50	100	150	150	150	150	150	150	150	150	150	1,500
End Curve				50	100	150	150	150	150	150	150	150	150	150	1,500
Missile related															
Big Bird	1	1		2	3	3	5	5	5	5	10	10	10	10	65

~~Secret~~**Table 12 (continued)**
Soviet Radar Production^{bb}

	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	Cumulative 1975-88
Bill Board									1		3	5	2	2	13
Clam Shell	1	1	2	4	10	12	15	15	15	20	25	30	40	60	250
Fan Song	40														40
Flap Lid	1	1	2	4	10	12	15	15	15	20	25	30	40	60	250
Grill Pan			1	1						5	10	10	10	5	42
Low Blow	40	20	30	40	50	50	30	25	20	20	20	20			365
Chair Back										1	1				2
High Screen								1			1	1			3
Snow Drift									1			4	5	5	15
Pat Hand	60	50	40	40	30	10	10								240
Square Pair	20	20	5												45
Straight Flush	50	50	40	40	40	50	50	40	30	10	10	10			420
Tube Arm	1		1						2	2	8	7			21
Wild Card	40	40	40	40	20	20	15	10							225
AAA Fire Control															
Flap Wheel	150	100	50	50	20	20	20	20	20	20	10	10	10		500
ABM related															
Cat House		1													1
Hen House			1												1
LPAR ^{cc}			1	1	1						2		1	1	7
Pill Box												1			1
Steel Work		1			1										2
Delivered to Soviet forces (if different from total production)															
Back Trap A/B	80	80	56	66	76	70	71	32	19	17	14	13	10	15	619
Dog Ear					15	40	40	40	40	40	40	40	40	50	385
Flat Face A/ Squat Eye		39													39
Flat Face B/ Squat Eye		39	8	20	16		23	20	8		23	20	25	30	232
Long Track	90	22	45	54	43	30	2	24							310
Spoon Rest D	30	63	13	31		4	3	29	50	54	72	65	70	50	534
Tall King B	62	59	60	15	15	26	30	10							277
Tall King C							10	10	2	9	19	19	25	30	124
Bar Lock A/B/C/D	25	25	25	20	15	15	15	20	35	30	35	25	30		315
Tall Rack				1		1					3	3	4	6	18
End Curve				50	100	150	150	149	150	150	150	150	150	125	1,474
Tin Shield						3	3	5	15	15	25	42	65	80	253
Odd Group				5	10	19	18	18	30	30	30	40	45	45	290
Odd Pair A/B	150	146	143	115	69	63	31	23	40	44	64	46	45		979

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Table 12 (continued)
Soviet Radar Production^{bb}

	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	Cumulative 1975-88
Side Net	95	49													144
Thin Skin A/B		15	27	25			5	18	27	40	14	13	35		219
Big Fred	20	20	30	30	30	30	30	30	30	30	30	30	30	30	400
Dog Tail				50	100	150	150	149	147	149	150	150	150	125	1,470
Fan Song	0														0
Low Blow	31	2		1		3			5		5	5			52
Pat Hand	60	41	31	29	1	3									165
Square Pair	20	19	4												43
Straight Flush	19	20		5	1	8					9	1			63
Wild Card	39	40	39	40	20	20	15	10							223
Flap Wheel	148	131	72	26	13	14	8	19	11	13	14	8	5		482
Small Fred		30	36	40	40	39	40	40	40	40	20				365

Footnotes follow table 14.



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Secret**Table 13***Thousand metric tons***Soviet Ammunition Procurement**

(Where CIA and DIA have different estimates, the DIA figures are presented first in bold italics followed by the CIA figures in nonitalic bold type)

	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	Cumulative 1975-88
Total Ammunition	<i>218</i>	<i>185</i>	<i>199</i>	<i>228</i>	<i>237</i>	<i>224</i>	<i>210</i>	<i>237</i>	<i>231</i>	<i>236</i>	<i>245</i>	<i>233</i>	<i>227</i>	<i>232</i>	<i>3,142</i>
	191	179	153	156	196	153	168	180	186	178	177	173	158	177	2,425

Footnotes follow table 14.

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Table 14*Thousands***Soviet Truck Production^{dd}**

	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	Cumulative 1975-88
Total production^{cc}															
Light trucks	132	136	134	134	131	139	138	139	136	139	141	141	142	143	1,925
Medium trucks	460	463	465	471	471	459	455	436	425	425	425	422	415	419	6,211
Heavy trucks	104	117	135	157	178	189	194	205	214	230	241	254	275	287	2,780
Delivered to Soviet forces (if different from total production)															
Light trucks	21	20	18	18	16	16	14	12	10	11	9	10	10	10	195
Medium trucks	138	139	139	140	141	136	138	137	134	136	138	138	138	138	1,930
Heavy trucks	35	42	42	42	44	43	45	57	56	63	72	72	77	80	770




Footnotes follow table 14.

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Figure 9
Soviet Military Production, 1975-88

Note scale change



Note: Figure depicts our estimate of trucks delivered to Soviet forces. Of total 1975-88 production of 10.9 million trucks, about 2.9 million were delivered to the Soviet military.

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Footnotes for Tables 1 to 14

- ^a Because all strategic missile production is for the Soviet military, there are no separate "production" and "delivered" entries.
- ^b Estimates for 1985-88 reflect SS-18 Mod 5/6 production.
- ^c Estimates for the SS-20 include the SS-20 Mod 2 in 1984-88.
- ^d The acquisition of a significant sample of SS-12 and SS-23 factory markings from INF inspections suggests that production estimates for these SRBMs—particularly the SS-12—will be the subject of major revisions in the future.
- ^e The INR numbers do not include inert training missiles.
- ^f While none of these spacecraft were produced solely for civilian space missions, the time spent in orbit by some of these spacecraft was split between civilian and military tasks.
- ^g Each MP SatCom payload includes eight satellites. Each GLONASS payload includes three satellites.
- ^h Cosmos 929-type spacecraft served as prototype space station modules and resupply vehicles in addition to their use as independent space stations in order to demonstrate multiple mission capability. Once operational, their primary use will be as modules for the MIR space station complex.
- ⁱ Subscale model. There have been 10 flights of these vehicles, but there is no evidence of reuseability.
- ^j The Soviets have produced two shuttles for actual space flight. In addition, they produced a shuttle prototype configured for atmospheric flight only, and at least three nonflyable engineering test units for ground testing and/or simulation.
- ^k In addition to its use as a space launch vehicle, the SL-8 is used for ICBM reentry vehicle tests. These numbers reflect SL-8 space launch vehicles only; they exclude some 225 SL-8Js launched from Kapustin Yar to Saryshagan for missile reentry vehicle tests.
- ^l Previous production estimates for the SSC-X-4 GLCM and the SS-N-21 SLCM were combined into one figure. Factory markings data obtained during INF Treaty-mandated SSC-X-4 elimination now permit separate estimates. Analysis of factory serial numbers recovered during INF inspections suggests there were more SSC-X-4 missiles produced than can be accounted for by the number declared in INF and those expended in flight testing. We judge that such "missing" SSC-X-4 GLCMs most likely have been converted to SS-N-21 SLCMs.
- ^m KY-16 testing is assessed to be in support of the SSN-X-24 supersonic SLCM and the AS-X-19 supersonic ALCM programs.
- ⁿ Available evidence indicates that the SH-11 is a modified ABM-1B Galosh.
- ^o The MI-2 is produced solely by Poland; the "delivered" figures reflect imports of Polish helicopters by the Soviet Union.
- ^p The leading "w" in ship types denotes KGB subordination.
- ^q "Delivered" figures reflect ships and craft imported by the Soviets from Finland.
- ^r "Delivered" figures reflect ships and craft imported by the Soviets from Poland.
- ^s "Delivered" figures reflect ships and craft imported by the Soviets from the German Democratic Republic.
- ^t "Delivered" figures reflect ships and craft imported by the Soviets from Romania.
- ^u CIA believes its cumulative estimate of production of this system is more likely higher rather than lower than actual Soviet production.
- ^v The actual Soviet designator for this tank is unknown; although it has been referred to previously as the FST-1, it has been given the interim designator "NT-N-87/1."
- ^w Entries in this category are derived from the estimated production, adjusted to reflect vehicles of the type exported to foreign countries or imported for use with Soviet forces.
- ^x This figure is derived by subtracting exports (4,700 T-72s) from total estimated T-72 production. Assuming that all NT-N-87/1 production was for Soviet consumption, then some 17,800 (CIA) or 17,300 (DIA) tanks of the T-72/NT-N-87/1 type went to Soviet forces. Intelligence Community order-of-battle estimates of these two types of tanks fielded in units, however, total only some 10,300; no clear distinction between the NT-N-87/1 tank and later models of the T-72 has yet permitted ready classification by type in deployed units. CIA currently estimates that a minimum of 1,700 additional T-72/NT-N-87/1 tanks are maintained by Soviet forces in nonunit storage or are used as training vehicles, indicating that the Soviets have procured no fewer than 12,000 tanks of these types for their forces.
- ^y "Delivered" figures include BMPs imported by the Soviets from Czechoslovakia and exclude Soviet manufactured BMPs exported to foreign countries.
- ^z "Delivered" figures include BTR-70s imported by the Soviets from Romania.
- ^{aa} "Delivered" figures include MTLBs imported by the Soviets from Poland and Bulgaria.
- ^{bb} "Stand-Alone" radars include only those systems that are not affixed to a weapons platform. This category, therefore, excludes such radars as the Gun Dish (ZSU-23-4), Land Roll (SA-8) and all radars affixed to ships and aircraft.
- ^{cc} The LPAR at Krasnoyarsk appeared externally complete in 1985. Damage occurred to the face of the receiver during late 1986 or early 1987, and subsequently the Soviets declared a moratorium on construction activity at the radar.
- ^{dd} The three truck classes are: light (less than two metric tons carrying capacity), medium (two to five tons), and heavy (over 5 tons).
- ^{ee} Total production estimates include those trucks produced for the civilian sector as well as the Soviet military.



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