

Why Did Cyprus Coup Surprise U.S.?

By Norman Kempster
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Perplexed House intelligence investigators are trying to determine why the U.S. government apparently was taken by surprise by the 1974 Cyprus coup in spite of strong evidence that such action was likely.

Former Greek strongman Dimitrios Ioannidis personally told a CIA official in Athens about a month before Archbishop Makarios was toppled from the island nation's presidency that a coup was in the works, according to the committee's chief counsel, A. Searle Field.

But on July 15, 1974, the date that Greek Cypriots — acting at the instigation of the Athens regime — overthrew Makarios, the CIA was still assuring U.S. policymakers that all was well.

THE DAILY National Intelligence Bulletin — a top-secret news summary prepared for the highest levels of the government — reported July 15 that "Gen. Ioannidis takes moderate line while playing for time in dispute with Makarios."

The committee wants to know why the warning of a pending coup was discounted. Although bad judgment seems to be the most likely explanation, it was understood that the lawmakers have not ruled out the possibility that the CIA lost its objectivity for reasons that have not been explained.

A CIA "postmortem" on the crisis, released yesterday by the committee, shows that in June the intelligence community provided "explicit warning of the growing confrontation." But it said that although the U.S. Embassy in Athens attempted to "discourage" action against Makarios that nothing much was done.

Field, apparently basing his assessment on documents that have not yet been made public, said the explicit warning came from Ioannidis, who told a CIA official that he was planning a coup and asked how the United States would react.

IN SPITE of the June warning, the postmortem shows that on July 3, the CIA filed a report discounting the possibility of a coup. Field said this report was based on a "new and interested source." He said it is a mystery why so much reliance was placed on this source.

The CIA document says the intelligence agencies correctly foresaw the initial Turkish invasion July 20, but they provided only a "confused and unconvincing" warning of the massive Turkish attack which began in August and resulted in the de facto partition of the island which remains in effect.

The Cyprus crisis caused havoc with U.S. foreign policy.

As a result of the Turkish invasion, Congress slapped an embargo on arms sales to Turkey, putting severe new strains on relations between Washington and Ankara. President Ford and Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger have been trying for more than a year to convince the lawmakers to lift the ban.

Also as a result of the Cyprus coup, the dictatorial Ioannidis regime was ousted in Athens and replaced by a democratic government. Relations

between Greece and Turkey remain hostile, weakening the southern flank of NATO.

MAKARIOS WAS later returned to the presidency but reverberations from the coup continue.

The committee is known to be concerned with the possibility that officials in the Athens CIA station developed such close relations with the Greek dictators that they lost their ability to make objective judgments.

The lawmakers are also trying to determine what role Kissinger may have played in the affair. Kissinger was virtually in total control of U.S. foreign policy at the time of the coup which came only about three weeks before former President Richard M. Nixon's resignation. Nixon was preoccupied with Watergate matters and delegated foreign policy to the secretary of state.

The report that Ioannidis tipped his hand in June seems to contradict the State Department's position that it had no warning of the coup.

At the time of the coup, the Athens CIA station was serving in effect as the nation's embassy because the Greek regime would have nothing to do with Ambassador Henry J. Tasca, preferring to deal with the CIA.

Tasca apparently was cut off both from the government in Athens and the State Department in Washington. Summarizing a six-hour interview with Tasca, who has since left the Foreign Service, committee staff member Jack Boos said the ambassador main-

tained that he had been kept in the dark.

"HE FLATLY denied having been told by the CIA station that Ioannidis on June 20 had threatened a coup," Boos said in relating the interview which was conducted under oath.

"Tasca was greatly puzzled as to why the U.S., which purportedly had a neutral policy between the two NATO allies, apparently did not complain when the Turks ignored the cease-fire arrangement that had been worked out by Secretary Kissinger, did not complain as the Turks ran amok . . . and did not complain when the Turks launched their massive invasion on Aug. 14," Boos said.

Tasca was replaced in the aftermath of the coup. The State Department also replaced its desk officers in charge of relations with Cyprus, Greece and Turkey as a result of the crisis.

The Cyprus desk officer, Thomas Boyatt, filed a memo complaining to his superiors of "mismanagement" by the department during the coup. The committee has asked the department for a copy of the memo, but the department has refused to supply it.

The committee tried to question Boyatt earlier this week but he declined to answer because Kissinger has prohibited junior and middle-level officials from revealing the policy recommendations they make to their superiors.

COMMITTEE sources said the material made public yesterday was "just the beginning" of the revelations about Cyprus. But there was no indication of when the committee would return to the subject. One source said the committee hoped to settle the dispute with the State Department over the testimony of working-level officials before holding its next hearing on the coup.

The committee yesterday settled one feud with the White House when it agreed to a procedure that makes Ford the ultimate arbitrator of whether disputed documents will be made public. The President, as a result, lifted his ban on the committee receiving classified documents.

"I was slipped a note that the President has withdrawn his objections and the documents will flow," Chairman Otis Pike, D-N.Y., told reporters. "I'll believe it when I see it."

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Portuguese coup block is reported

Lisbon (AP)—The Socialist party claimed yesterday that its "action and vigilance" had prevented an overnight coup attempt by an alliance of soldiers and revolutionary groups.

A statement from Socialist headquarters said the party was prepared to back up its nationwide alarm Wednesday with proof of a conspiracy to seize power at 4 A.M.

But at least one leftist newspaper scoffed at the Socialist report of a "suicidal adventure headed by irresponsible elements or provocateurs." "False alarm," read a banner headline in the leftist afternoon newspaper *Diario Popular*.

Streets remained calm overnight and no special security precautions were apparent to protect Premier Jose Pinheiro de Azevedo, allegedly the target of the conspiracy. But the Socialist alarm was seen as a sign of the widespread nervousness over the country's future.

HOW CANADA SHOWED IT CAN'T CONTROL THE ARCTIC

BY JOHN GELLNER

EVERY TIME a report appears about illicit activities in the Canadian Arctic (like the recent one about the disappearance of the Northwest Passage of a Polish schooner) one gets more exasperated over the federal Government's unwillingness to back up its words with action.

Where the more than one-third of Canada that lies north of the 60th parallel is concerned, statements were made and legal steps were taken in the first years of the Trudeau era that seemed to indicate the Government was intent on tightening Canadian control over this vast area.

In April, 1969, a new set of defence priorities was laid down that put in first place "the surveillance of our own territory and coastlines, that is, the protection of our sovereignty".

Just one year later, Parliament passed the Arctic Waters Pollution Act and far-reaching amendments to the Territorial Sea and Fishing Zones Act.

By the former, Canada arrogated to itself the right to impose special regulations upon ships operating within 100 miles of any Canadian land above 60 degrees north latitude.

By the latter, Canada unilaterally extended its territorial waters to 12 miles, measured from a base line drawn from the farthest cape to the farthest cape (which in practice means that in some places Canada claims sovereignty over belts of coastal waters 100 miles, and more, wide). The amended act also established new and more extensive fisheries closing lines.

Finally, the White Paper, Defence in the 70s, published in August, 1971, acknowledged that in the Arctic and sub-Arctic Canadian capabilities of surface surveillance were limited; and of under-the-water and under-the-ice surveillance were non-existent but promised immediate study of the problems and early improvements.

All this happened between four and 6½ years ago. The trouble is that virtually nothing has been done to put these policies into practice. Where control over Canada north of Sixty is concerned, we are not any better off—and in some respects worse off—than we were in 1969.

Take surveillance and control over the Northwest Passage, where the existing shortcomings have just been revealed again by the case of the missing Polish schooner Gedenia—or Gdynia—or Gdansk—there is not even certainty about the correct name. Whether we want it or not, world demand for scarce natural resources will no doubt lead to ever-mounting political pressure upon Canada to open up the Northwest Passage as an important avenue of trade. Sailing through it will never be easy, but the real difficulties are in fact not quite as great as has generally been assumed.

Smooth trip

Only last month, for instance, the Canadian Coast Guard training vessel Skidegate went smoothly through the passage, admittedly in abnormally favorable conditions, but without possessing the mass (the Skidegate is of only 200 tons) or the power (it has only a 640 hp engine) a ship must have to break through ice.

One should not be misled by the relative failure—it could not make it without the help of accompanying ice-breakers—of the SS Manhattan in its famous voyage in 1969: the Manhattan, at 155,000 tons and with engines developing only 43,000 hp, was in fact grossly underpowered for work in Arctic waters.

On the other hand, ships with the correct mass-to-power ratio, like the Danish icebreaking freighter that has been bringing out lead-zinc ore through the Northwest Passage from the Cominco deposits on Little Cornwallis Island, normally need no assistance during the Arctic navigation season.

The Russians have been using such cargo carriers successfully for years in their Northeast Passage (north around Siberia) and ships built on similar principles are reportedly being readied in German yards to carry iron ore from Milne Inlet on the north tip of our Baffin Island into Baffin Bay, and thence through Davis Strait into the open Atlantic.

There will have to be tight regulation of shipping north of Sixty, and effective means of enforcing the rules. The law of April, 1970, at least recognized that pollution is a deadly peril in Arctic waters. A spill, with the oil trapped underneath the ice, could foul up a considerable expanse of sea for years.

As it is, we really have no means of knowing what moves in our Arctic waters. We would not have known the Gedenia was in the passage had it not put in at Resolute, on Cornwallis Island, for supplies, and it could not be tracked once it sailed from there.

This is not surprising, since all there is in the way of surveillance in those parts is one over-flight by a Canadian Forces Argus maritime patrol aircraft every 10 days or so. This is not an effective, let alone a cost-effective, method of exercising control.

The 26 Argus planes now in operation entered squadron service from 1960 onward. They are by now old and battered and thus progressively more difficult and more costly to maintain—one flying hour in them must by now cost at least \$2,500.

Since there are no fully equipped forward bases, Arguses are stationed in Comox, B.C., and Greenwood, N.S. From there it is from 2,000 to 2,500 miles to the entrances to the Northwest Passage, 22 to 28 flying hours costing probably from \$55,000 to \$70,000 for a single round trip before the principal patrol area is even reached.

This is bad enough, but still not all that is wrong. The Arguses were built for anti-submarine warfare and as reconnaissance aircraft—a job they were given only as an afterthought—they can perform effectively only in fair weather. This makes the whole concept of Arctic surveillance flights as they are carried out now ludicrous. Their only valid purpose can be to show the flag and that at unconscionable expense.

Needs planes

Canada needs both modern long-range patrol aircraft (LRPA) with all-weather reconnaissance capabilities, and fully equipped advanced bases in the Arctic from which aircraft smaller than LRPA, and thus cheaper to maintain, could operate.

An interdepartmental committee and a project office have by now been searching for almost three years for an LRPA that would replace the Argus. Design studies by Lockheed and by Boeing have been subsidized to the tune of \$11.2-million.

There has been no decision yet and, according to Defence Minister James Richardson's latest statement on the subject, there won't be any "until later this year", provided the Government's plans to "restructure the Canadian airframe industry" (whatever this may mean) have come to fruition.

As for proper advanced bases in the North, there have been reports that the establishment of at least one, on the south shore of Devon Island near the eastern entrance to the Northwest Passage, is being seriously contemplated.

From such a base properly equipped aircraft even of the modest size of a De Havilland of Canada Dash-7 could patrol the waterway much more effectively than Arguses are able to do at present. Work hasn't been started yet on Devon Island, though. The scheme seems to be as much in abeyance as the procurement of a modern LRPA.

Meantime, a Gedenia can sail without authorization 350 miles into the Northwest Passage without being spotted and, after making its presence known voluntarily, avoid further observation the moment a bit of fog covers the area.

The next time it could be a rusty and leaky old tanker or a foreign warship.

As for under-the-ice transits, we know of some by U.S. nuclear submarines, but only because Washington had the courtesy of telling us about them.

So much for Canadian control of land and sea north of Sixty, control which is a condition of any valid claim to sovereignty.

Canadian governments have been making that claim for a long time, more stridently of late than ever before and rightly so because of the growing danger of our sovereignty being put to the test. What government has not done, and continues to postpone doing, is to invest the money and effort which are necessary to back up that claim.