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
OVERVIEW

The Foreign Broadcast Information Service inherited by R. Evans Hineman in 1982 was poised for perhaps the biggest change in its 41-year history. Hineman, while not the originator of the FBIS Modernization Program, in the following seven years as DDS&T influenced its scope and pace. During Hineman's tenure, was spent modernizing FBIS, the annual FBIS budget doubled, the number of FBIS staff employees grew by 20 percent, and the FBIS headquarters was moved from Arlington to western Fairfax County. In the process, Hineman named three new directors and four deputy directors of FBIS, including automation experts from the Office of Research and Development and the Office of Development and Engineering. By the time Hineman retired in 1989, FBIS was a larger and more productive service of common concern to the US Intelligence Community.




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FBIS was also more integrated into the DS&T than it had been since its transfer from the Directorate for Intelligence 13 years earlier. Nevertheless, FBIS in 1989 remained different from other DS&T offices in several respects: It dealt primarily, although not exclusively, with unclassified information; it employed mostly liberal arts graduates; and its overseas posts were not under cover, an anomaly in CIA ascribable to the unique history of the monitoring service.

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FBIS Bureaus/Units



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HALF A CENTURY OF FOREIGN MEDIA COLLECTION

Looking Back

Prior to joining the DS&T on 22 November 1976, FBIS had performed its mission for 35 years as a subcomponent of other organizations. It was established by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) in 1941 to monitor, analyze, and report on foreign radio broadcasts for the US Government. Known during World War II as the Foreign Broadcast Intelligence Service, FBIS disseminated information from Axis and other radio and press agency transmissions to US war agencies.

With the cutback in governmental spending at the end of the war, the FCC could not afford a service unrelated to its domestic regulatory responsibilities. As a result, FBIS became a temporary orphan while Washington officials attempted to establish a post-war national intelligence apparatus to prevent future surprises like Pearl Harbor. In this period FBIS was maintained by the War Department (1946) and the Central Intelligence Group (1946-47). When the National Security Act of 1947 established the Central Intelligence Agency, six-year-old FBIS, renamed Foreign Broadcast Information Service, became a charter component.

Responding to CIA collection guidance, FBIS supplied a steady flow of information on developments abroad from foreign radios, press agencies, newspapers, and journals. By the start

of Hineman's time as DDS&T, a network of 17 field bureaus around the world supplied monitored information by teleprinter to FBIS headquarters, located since 1965 in Key Building at 1200 Wilson Boulevard in the Rosslyn area of Arlington, Virginia.

By 1982 FBIS had field bureaus in Vienna, Austria; Nicosia, Cyprus; Tel Aviv, Israel; Amman, Jordan; Manama, Bahrain; Abidjan, Ivory Coast; Mbabane, Swaziland; Okinawa, Japan; Bangkok, Thailand; Hong Kong; Seoul, South Korea; Panama; Asuncion, Paraguay; and Key West, Florida. London Bureau operated jointly with the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) Monitoring Service, with which FBIS has exchanged monitored information since World War II.

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The bureaus, most situated at overseas US diplomatic or military installations, employed foreign national linguists as monitors under the supervision of staff editors. At FBIS headquarters, field information was prepared for publication in regional Daily Reports and for a 24-hour Wire Service to intelligence watch offices. Also at headquarters, staff linguists scrutinized thousands of foreign-language publications, a task assumed in 1967 when the Foreign Documents Division of the CIA's Office of Central Reference was merged with FBIS. Material selected by the staff linguists was

processed by freelance translators under contract with the Joint Publications Research Service, an FBIS auxiliary in Arlington. A small group of staff analysts in Key Building read Communist media for clues to policy trends, and reported their findings.

In the 1970s it was generally recognized that FBIS, which had been maintained on a spartan budget in the Directorate of Intelligence, had not kept pace with automation and other advances in information handling. For example, a speech by a foreign leader was typed at least three times before appearing in the Daily Report: first by the field monitor who translated it into English, then by a communicator who manually copied it on a teleprinter keyboard for transmission to headquarters. At Key Building, the printout was edited by pencil, then retyped for printing. If the speech was also carried on the FBIS Wire Service, it was retyped a fourth time. FBIS had long dreamed of regenerating material by some mechanical or electronic means. Experiments with mechanical means in the 1960s proved unsuccessful, as did an effort in the 1970s to introduce electronic text handling, Project RAPID (Radio and Press Information Dissemination).

The failure of RAPID contributed to a perception that FBIS was "all thumbs" when it came to technical matters. The transfer of FBIS from the DI to the DS&T in 1976, part of a swapping of several offices, was expected to help the monitoring service overcome its technological shortcoming. The

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move took several years to bear fruit, however, with the main benefit to FBIS of DS&T membership coming in the 1980s during the Hineman era.

In 1980, following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and with US-Iranian relations in a crisis, Congress unexpectedly granted FBIS [redacted]

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[redacted] DDS&T Dirks authorized [redacted] of this windfall to start a new FBIS headquarters automation

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effort involving the FBIS Wire Service and two regional Daily Report volumes. [redacted] formerly deputy director of

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the Office of ELINT, was selected to head the project under the Office of Research and Development. Called MIDAS, for Media Intelligence Dissemination Automation System, it was due to be operational in 1982.

Meanwhile, the boost to FBIS capabilities provided by the [redacted] was followed in 1981 by the advent of the Reagan administration, with William J. Casey as DCI. The desire of the administration and Congress to strengthen US intelligence and security capabilities -- reflected in increased defense and intelligence spending -- provided an exceptional opportunity to improve FBIS.

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In these circumstances, FBIS Director [redacted] ordered an internal study to assess the situation of FBIS and to identify its goals. Deputy Director [redacted] wrote the report on the study. It pointed out that FBIS had been

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performing in basically the same fashion since 1941, and concluded: "Clearly we need to modernize." In particular, FBIS needed to automate the handling of the material it collected, expand its monitoring of foreign communications satellites, and develop its own satellite communications network. DDS&T Dirks endorsed the concept in principle in the spring of 1982, after which [] staff developed the "FBIS Modernization Program" into a budget initiative for FY-1984 to FY-88. The program eventually was extended through FY-1989.

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Hineman Oversees FBIS Modernization

The FBIS Modernization Program was among the pending Directorate projects when Hineman succeeded Dirks as DDS&T in July 1982. The CIA Executive Committee in September 1982 approved the FBIS initiative as part of the Agency's budget for FY-1984 and beyond. Throughout Hineman's tenure the Modernization Program would be the main consideration in his oversight of FBIS. It was the biggest, most complex, and most costly undertaking in the history of the monitoring service.

FBIS managers did not assume they would be in full charge of the modernization project. They did, however, want an active role in determining its characteristics. They did not want it imposed by outsiders unfamiliar with FBIS, regardless of their technical expertise.

Hineman's response was to appoint experienced DS&T technical managers to oversee the Modernization Program as

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director or deputy director of FBIS, letting FBIS managers and contractors work out the details within agreed bounds. Hineman explained later that this approach "probably takes a little longer because you've got some people to train, but I think you'll end up with a better end product and people more willing to use the end product because they've been part of the development."

Modernization Managers

The first appointment opportunity arose early in 1983 when [redacted] finished his three-year stint as head of FBIS 25X1 and left for a new assignment in the Directorate of Operations. FBIS veteran [redacted] deputy 25X1 for three years, wanted a turn at the job before retiring and expressed reluctance to "train" another outsider to be director. [redacted] was the author of the 1981 study that led 25X1 to the modernization initiative, but he lacked personal interest in new technologies, as evidenced by his continuing use of a manual typewriter. After some hesitation, Hineman named [redacted] as director, but stipulated that his deputy had 25X1 to be an experienced manager of technical programs. Chosen was 25X1 [redacted] previously deputy director of ORD. [redacted] 25X1 [redacted] assumed their respective new positions in January 25X1 and February 1983.

[redacted] was expected to succeed [redacted] as director upon 25X1 the latter's retirement at the end of 1984. As it turned out, 25X1

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however, Hineman needed a new director of the Office of Technical Service in 1984 and considered [] the best choice. [] an experienced OD&E engineer/manager, was named to replace [] as the FBIS deputy. Because of this unexpected development, [] asked [] to delay his retirement a year. This would give [] time to become familiar with FBIS before succeeding [] as director.

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[] agreed and [] replaced him as director on 3 January 1986, with [] an FBIS careerist, as his deputy. [] had the distinction of being the first Director of FBIS from elsewhere in the DS&T, the first electrical engineer to head FBIS, and the Director with the shortest tenure. After eight months in the position [] retired upon reaching age 50 in September 1986.

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With [] abrupt departure, Hineman was compelled to send to FBIS a technical manager new to the Modernization Program. He needed a quick study who could take over the reins of modernization while developments proceeded apace. He chose [] then serving as Deputy Director of ORD. Since leaving the aerospace industry, [] had served in four DS&T Offices and on the DDS&T's staff, where as a planner he had become acquainted with FBIS. At FBIS, [] saw the Modernization Program through some of its most challenging phases to completion in 1989. [] continued as

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Deputy Director under [] until April 1988, when he retired 25X1
and was succeeded by [] another FBIS 25X1
careerist.

At lower levels the Directorate assigned technical personnel from other offices to FBIS to help carry out the Modernization Program. Skilled personnel on rotation from other Directorates also provided expertise.

In 1985 [] created the FBIS Engineering Support 25X1
Group, consolidating technical efforts related to modernization
and conventional operations. [] a division chief 25X1
~~from the Office of Communications, served as chief of the group~~
~~from 1985 to 1990.~~

Automation Gets Priority

Of the three FBIS modernization goals enunciated in 1981, automation of the handling of collected material had top priority among most FBIS employees. Information was the business of FBIS and electronic handling would improve efficiency, volume, and speed.

Further development of the MIDAS project, which in 1983 had introduced electronic word processing to the FBIS Wire Service and two of the eight Daily Reports, was terminated in 1985. It was considered too limited to serve as the foundation for computerized information handling, storage, and retrieval throughout FBIS.

In its place, the much more ambitious Automated FBIS System (AFS) was designed to serve the varied information handling needs of headquarters editors, linguists, and analysts. To persons involved in its development, AFS also meant the who joined FBIS from the Office of Research and Development in 1983, spent the remainder of the decade on FBIS automation efforts.

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In June 1985 Lockheed Electronics Corp. was selected as contractor for the AFS project.

AFS consisted of separate unclassified and classified computer systems. The unclassified segment had subsystems for handling electronic mail, editorial terminals, and editorial composition, and was mainly used for preparing information for publication. This segment went into service in August 1987. The more complex classified system handled communications with field bureaus, reference materials, and product data bases. It became operational in January 1989.

In the field, automation began in June 1987 when Austria Bureau started using personal computers for word processing in translation, editing, and communications processes. Electronic information handling was introduced among other bureaus as funding permitted, but tight budgets precluded its introduction worldwide until the early 1990s.

In Hineman's view, automation was a major advancement for FBIS, resulting from its move to the DS&T from the DI. The

transformation of FBIS information-handling processes to electronic means was "a pretty slick revolution" and "a big achievement that I was proud of," he said after his retirement.

Move to Reston: Great Leap Forward

Automation developers initially assumed AFS would be installed in FBIS headquarters in Key Building in Rosslyn. The 20-year old structure was ill suited for high-tech wiring and air conditioning requirements, however, and the FBIS space was already crowded, even with some components in two other Arlington buildings. Computer engineers were daunted by the prospect of maintaining MIDAS while installing AFS in such quarters. In addition, rising rental costs indicated that FBIS might have to relocate to a more suburban location.

[redacted] favored moving sooner rather than later. He wanted to find a new building to house all FBIS components, one in which the new AFS equipment could be installed and tested before it was occupied. In March 1986 he learned of the availability of [redacted]

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Some FBIS employees expressed concern that the move to western Fairfax county would isolate them from governmental

analytical and policymaking centers. FBIS management pledged to make special efforts to maintain customary contacts.

Following installation of the unclassified segment of AFS [redacted] in mid-1987, FBIS components began moving from Rosslyn to the new headquarters. The FBIS Wire Service and two of the eight Daily Report volumes began operating [redacted] on AFS on 20 August 1987 and by early October all FBIS components were working there under the same roof. For the first time in its 46-year history, the entire Daily Report was prepared for publication on computer terminals by editors and compositors, without need of typists.

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
The Age of Satellite Monitoring

Another part of the Modernization Program involved increasing the initial capability of FBIS to monitor foreign broadcasts from communications satellites. When [redacted] outlined the need in his 1981 paper, FBIS had barely entered the age of satellites, although their potential as a source of information had been recognized for years. The [redacted] funding in 1980 enabled FBIS to procure its first two receive-only satellite earth terminals (ROSETs) [redacted]

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The second FBIS Headquarters building, at 1424 K Street NW in Washington, D.C.


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As part of the Modernization Program, FBIS developed plans to install second-generation ROSETs at three other sites around the world. Together the chain of five sites could cover the entire geosynchronous plane, monitoring satellites parked at any point over the equator. A high-capacity, two-dish antenna was inaugurated at Panama Bureau in December 1984 and a similar installation at Bangkok Bureau in December 1985.

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Smaller satellite antennas, however, were erected at other bureaus for limited coverage, including Paraguay Bureau in 1986 and Tel Aviv Bureau in 1988.

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In addition to the overseas ROSETs, a 9-meter satellite dish was erected on the grounds at CIA Headquarters in 1985 to provide selected foreign television broadcasts to analysts.

To plan and coordinate field coverage in the satellite era the seven-person FBIS Field Coverage Staff was enlarged in 1983 into Monitoring Operations Division.

Budget Constrains Communications Modernization

The most contentious proposal in the FBIS Modernization Program called for the establishment of a satellite-based communications network to link FBIS headquarters and field facilities. Only a portion of the original proposal survived repeated reviews by skeptics and budget managers who were intent on protecting FBIS automation, which was seen by more employees as more important.

As envisioned by engineer [REDACTED] the network, called Internet, would have been a real-time, interactive information exchange system linking 17 FBIS sites on five continents. Each site would have a small dish antenna for transmitting and receiving by way of leased Intelsat satellite transponders. FBIS could send whatever signals it chose over

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
this "pipeline," free of the message format and queuing requirements of the teleprinter circuits used by FBIS since the 1940s. Besides carrying the texts of monitored information, the wide-band network would introduce various new capabilities. For example, field bureaus could send monitored television broadcasts to headquarters and relay broadcasts among themselves to share translation loads, while headquarters could use the network as a command channel.

The primary obstacle to the establishment of Internet was its anticipated cost, which approximated the entire premodernization FBIS budget. Adding to the expense was an international convention requiring the employment of communications contractors to handle transmissions via commercial satellites. Because of budget pressures, in May 1984 DDS&T Hineman and ADDS&T Hirsch limited plans for Internet to FBIS headquarters and the five bureaus projected to have ROSET satellite-monitoring facilities. A few months later, as a result of another budget cut, Internet planning was further reduced to a "Phase I" consisting only of FBIS headquarters and London and Panama Bureaus. Subsequent phases were not developed due to lack of funds.

The three-site Internet was established in 1987 after communications contractors set up send/receive satellite facilities at London and Panama Bureaus costing

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
Envious analysts of Far Eastern and other countries had to be told that while similar live relays from their regions were technically possible, FBIS could not afford them. They had to settle for FBIS field videotapes of monitored newscasts from Beijing, Tokyo, Jerusalem, Havana, and Bonn sent by commercial air courier, a service instituted at the request of the DDI in 1985.

While the original Internet concept proved to be too ambitious for FBIS in the 1980s, several other innovations helped FBIS improve its communications capability at relatively modest cost. These included computer-to-computer communications using international direct-dial telephone circuits, faster transmission speeds, and facsimile equipment at each site.

Changes Wrought by Modernization

The FBIS Modernization Program formally ended as a separate budget category at the close of the 1989 fiscal year, but FBIS in FY-1990 had a base budget higher than before the program started. Much of the increase was for continuing annual operating and maintenance costs stemming from the program.

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Hineman saw the modernization of FBIS as a process that ought to continue indefinitely. "Once we get FBIS modernized," he said early in 1989, "we cannot afford to just stop. There will be a continuous effort to be sure that each year we're

"bringing more and more modernization in.... We now have to keep up with the state of the art and bring in new and better ways of doing business as we go along."

At the end of the Modernization Program in 1989, FBIS was publishing monitored information at the rate of about 180 million words a year. About 113 million appeared in the Daily Report, some 45 million more than in 1982. The FBIS Wire in 1989 carried approximately 19 million words, compared with about 11 million in 1982.

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The FBIS modernization, particularly automation, significantly altered the work force of the service. Machines replaced some people in performing many repetitive tasks, but other people were needed to maintain the machines.

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At the same time, average FBIS editors, linguists, and analysts, like many other Agency employees, spent considerable time in the 1980s learning to operate computer hardware and



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FBIS's Field Operations Center, a 24-hour service which responds to Community needs for translations and transmissions of foreign media materials.



The FBIS DAILY REPORT, staffed by over 40 editors, is published in eight geographic-area volumes each weekday. It supplies the Intelligence Community and outside subscribers with selected materials from foreign radio and television broadcasts, newspapers and journals, and news services.

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software and other new tools. Many new employees were young and computer literate, willing to help find still newer ways of performing tasks.

The Modernization Program left FBIS with little energy for other initiatives. During the six-year program, for example, no additional field bureau was opened, while in the previous four decades an average of about one a year had been set up at least temporarily. Field collection nonetheless was enhanced by the establishment of three unique S&T Units and several one-person remote sites operated by contractors and by increased satellite monitoring.

Service to the Community

Although faced with a variety of challenges during the Hineman years -- new management techniques, an information explosion, and modernization, among others -- FBIS sought to enhance its service to the Intelligence Community and policymakers. That effort was reflected in a phenomenal growth in the dissemination of products. In 1983 some 400 consumers received FBIS translations directly from field bureaus via the and the military AUTODIN system. By the end of Mr. Hineman's tenure in 1989, that figure had doubled to just over 800 direct recipients and included all major military commands and many smaller tactical units, US embassies and consulates throughout the world, and

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virtually all US Government agencies and departments. These consumers were receiving material tailored to their needs based on some 650 different geographic and thematic services. The large increase in published wordage was accommodated in an updated product line that included special worldwide thematic reports, frequent special supplements for events of international significance, and press report summaries which allowed analysts more efficient access to information.

✓
wordage

The modern axiom that world events play themselves out over the media seemed to be increasingly true during the 1980s. Timely reporting of foreign media coverage of significant events was the responsibility of the FBIS Wire Service, a 24-hour operations center that continuously reviews field traffic for significant developments. Although the period saw vast improvements in international commercial news networks, such as CNN, policymakers still relied on FBIS for alerts to important information as it came "from the horse's mouth."

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New Pressures, New Directions*Parsons*
Dec 1989


While the Modernization Program was the focus of FBIS attention in the Hineman years, several other developments emerged to affect the direction in which the service was heading in 1989. These included the evolving mission of FBIS, competition among information providers, changes in the Soviet Union, security, and innovative management practices.

The mission of FBIS was clear in 1941 when President Franklin D. Roosevelt allotted money from his emergency fund for "recording, translating, transcribing and analyzing certain radio broadcast programs" from foreign countries. This mainly involved monitoring short-wave propaganda broadcasts. FBIS later monitored additional foreign media outlets found to be informative to Washington analysts and policymakers: medium-wave radio broadcasts, press agency transmissions, radiophotos, television, and publications. In July 1982, DCI Directive 2/3 reiterated the FBIS responsibility "to perform,

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as a service of common concern on behalf of the Intelligence Community, the monitoring, processing, and analysis of information from foreign public information media."

The growth in electronic information services in the 1980s, however, raised new questions about the boundaries of FBIS' responsibility for collecting information. Among numerous foreign electronic mail services, FBIS chose to cover only several local news files found among them. FBIS declined responsibility for collecting from most foreign data bases, but accepted responsibility for identifying and accessing foreign commercial data bases specializing in science and technology (S&T) information.



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To handle the output of the three units and consolidate headquarters personnel involved in S&T collection, FBIS in 1986 established a Science and Technology Center, with division status.

By the late 1980s FBIS faced continued pressure to widen its foreign media collection net to encompass what intelligence practitioners called "open sources." Some consumers and community managers argued that FBIS should use its experience in the collection of unclassified information to exploit electronic and other sources of information outside the traditional media arena. Many FBIS managers viewed "open sources" as a Pandora's box that probably could not be dealt with without significantly enlarging -- and changing -- FBIS. Despite the trepidation, by late 1989 the FBIS mission officially was defined as the "collection, processing, analysis, and dissemination of foreign open sources of intelligence value," although conventional media still constituted the great bulk of its sources.

One factor contributing to the association of FBIS with the "open-source" arena was the proposed establishment of an electronic data base containing unclassified information. The Open-Source Information Exchange (OSIX) was proposed in the mid-1980s by the Intelligence Community Staff as a unclassified data bank for the community. The staff wanted FBIS to be the main participant in maintaining an on-line network for potentially thousands of government users who would have access via their own computer systems. FBIS was willing to supply its output electronically to key consumers for use in their own fashion, but lacked the means to host a large data service containing information from various other collectors. OSIX was

not funded in the 1980s but proponents continued to campaign for the electronic dissemination and storage of information from open sources.

DS&T management practices in the 1980s also contributed to the identification of FBIS with open sources. Under its corporate approach to management, in which the DDS&T, ADDS&T, and office directors constituted a "Board of Directors" who met to discuss directorate "business areas," FBIS was designated the DS&T's "open-source business area." At the directorate level, therefore, the continued inclination of FBIS to define itself in relation to conventional media collection met with some impatience.

Another development in the late 1980s involved competition among providers of information from the media, always a matter of some concern to FBIS.

In its first year, for example, FBIS set up its first overseas reporting post after the office of Coordinator of Information -- headed by William J. "Wild Bill" Donovan, later head of the Office of Strategic Services -- threatened to set up its own monitoring facility. During World War II FBIS contended with the Office of War Information in collecting and analyzing information from Axis radio broadcasts.

Recognition of the competition among commercial media, as well as copyright strictures, causes FBIS to restrict much of its product to government channels by labeling it "For Official Use Only." In the 1980s competition came to include high

technology commercial information services with products rivaling those of FBIS. Cable News Network could provide Washington viewers with live Soviet television scenes of Moscow parades and policy debates, as could FBIS. In some cases CNN coverage may have eased the pressure on FBIS, even though FBIS could provide the coverage. In other instances CNN coverage probably helped to raise expectations among official consumers regarding services FBIS could not provide. The FBIS channel on the CIA in-house television grid was but one of several news channels available to Langley analysts. Also, in the late 1980s commercial video houses began marketing their customized services to intelligence analysts. A northern Virginia company, for instance, was under contract to provide analysts in the Directorate for Intelligence with translations and compilations from the same Moscow television news programs covered by FBIS.

At the same time, the information from various foreign press agencies, newspapers, and broadcasts covered by FBIS appeared in commercial computer data bases. While FBIS did not directly contribute to these repositories, the BBC sold its monitoring output, which included some FBIS material received under the exchange agreement.

With the growth of alternate sources of foreign media information, the value to official consumers of the FBIS product appeared increasingly determined not by its uniqueness but by factors such as timeliness, accuracy, and completeness.


It appeared possible that the further development of information services might lead to some new division of labor in which FBIS would produce unique material for the government while avoiding unnecessary competition with other information providers.

Another development involved coverage of the Soviet Union, the principal target of the US-UK media monitoring effort after World War II. The output of Soviet media changed markedly in the late 1980s as strict media controls were relaxed in line with the policies of perestroika and glasnost. As Soviet broadcasts and publications became more open and informative, Washington consumers wanted more FBIS reporting even though the Soviet military threat appeared to be declining.

FBIS had already increased its Soviet reporting from the Moscow press and television. It was not, however, immediately able to satisfy the new interest in media emanating from the Soviet republics. These regional broadcasts and publications formerly were of limited value to analysts because they generally echoed the well-publicized Moscow party line. Under glasnost, the value of regional media to analysts increased as they began reflecting political and ethnic differences among sectors of Soviet society.

On behalf of Intelligence Community analysts, DDCI Robert M. Gates complained to DDS&T Hineman in the summer of 1988 about the inadequacy of FBIS coverage of the Soviet regional press for political and military information.

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
Despite the various FBIS improvements in collecting Soviet information, the timely flow of much Soviet information to Washington was abruptly threatened in the spring of 1989. The long-feared problem developed when British labor union members at the BBC Monitoring Service staged a series of strikes for higher pay. Under the FBIS-BBC cooperation agreement dating from the 1940s, the British service has primary responsibility for monitoring broadcasts from Moscow and employs most of the Russian-language monitors in the two services. During the strikes, most of which lasted only a few hours, FBIS bureaus instituted contingency measures to cover primary Soviet and other broadcasts for the most important news, but their smaller staffs could not match normal BBC production.

The period demonstrated the long-recognized US vulnerability to a monitoring cutoff resulting from reliance on a foreign service. CIA Inspector General reports in 1980 and 1986 had recommended that FBIS develop a backup capability to cover important broadcasts in the event of the BBC's failure to

perform.



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
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initiative was scrapped, however, when it became apparent that all available funds were needed for FBIS automation and the move in 1987.

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FBIS nevertheless remained concerned about the susceptibility of Soviet coverage to BBC union disruption. Following the BBC strikes in 1989, FBIS began developing a low-cost capability to temporarily handle primary BBC coverage in the event of future strikes or other emergencies.

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Another demand for the talents of FBIS Russian linguists developed in the late 1980s as a result of US-Soviet arms

control agreements involving mutual visits to munition sites.

In early 1988 four staff officers were selected for the US INF monitoring team, followed by another five for the US-Soviet Verification Experiment. Subsequently a number were away at any given time, prompting FBIS Director [redacted] to serve notice that without more staff FBIS could not simultaneously handle the increasing volume of information from the Soviet media and additional requests for on-site language support.

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
Internal security in FBIS and the security of its overseas posts also were matters of more than ordinary concern during Hineman's tenure. The arrest of a retired employee, Larry Wu-tai Chin, in November 1985, and his later conviction on charges of spying for his native China for many years, shocked all of FBIS. [redacted]

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New FBIS field bureau in Nicosia, Cyprus, which was formally opened in April 1987.

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Another development affecting the course of FBIS began in 1988 when DDS&T Hineman encouraged FBIS to experiment internally with an innovative style of management earlier tried with success in the US Forest Service. Its general aim was to raise employee productivity and morale by pushing decisionmaking downward, rewarding initiative, and removing red tape. The Forest Service had adopted the approach after a study showed that it was not fostering entrepreneurship and creativity, while many of the barriers to productivity were found to be within the control of the service.

Production Group of FBIS undertook the Forest Service Initiative experiment in FY-1989, with authority to handle its personal and nonpersonal services funds as a single entity and to control its personnel structure within certain bounds. Like the Forest Service, the FBIS group rewarded employees with cash and recognition for ideas contributing to productivity and morale. Numerous suggestions were adopted, including the establishment of the Off-Premises Unit for supplemental processing of Soviet press material. Following a positive appraisal of the group's experiment, it was scheduled to be

extended to all FBIS groups at the start of FY-1991. By then several other Agency offices were considering similar measures and looked to FBIS for guidance. The prospect of increasing productivity through internal initiative was attractive at a time when "manage to budget" was the Directorate catch phrase for coping with the financial problems at the end of the decade.

A Congressional staff took a look at FBIS for different purposes, evidently with positive results. FBIS was informed in the fall of 1988 that it would be the subject of a study by the Surveys and Investigative Staff of the House Appropriations Committee, as part of a broader examination of activities within the Intelligence Community. Members of the staff visited FBIS headquarters and a number of field bureaus over several months. FBIS was not informed of the results of the study, although during their visits several staff members made favorable comments. The only outcome apparent to FBIS was a \$5 million increase by Congress in its budget allotment for FY-1990, interpreted as meaning, "Keep up the good work, FBIS."

Prior to his retirement, DDS&T Hineman approved FBIS' tentative plans for a celebration in 1991 of the 50th anniversary of its establishment in 1941. Included was a ceremony in the CIA auditorium on 26 February 1991 to which many of the prominent figures in FBIS history would be invited. At FBIS, there was no doubt that Evan Hineman would be among them.

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