Mr. President, the needs of the homeless are immediate. The legislation being considered today provides for a coordinated, Federal effort to address this emergency.

States, local governments, and private voluntary and charitable organizations have been unable to meet all of the basic human needs of our Nation's homeless. The Federal Government must take a greater role in providing assistance to protect and improve the lives and safety of millions of suffering homeless. A serious legislative response to homelessness in our country is both desperately needed and long overdue. I urge my colleagues to support this legislation.

Mr. HEINZ. The legislation before us authorizes regional staff for the National Council in each of the standard Federal regions. They are to support regional efforts on behalf of the homeless, share information, and coordinate homeless assistance. I applaud the chairman for this provision. My concern, and that of many service-providers, is that FEMA boards and nonprofits will have to answer to the regional staff, that we are placing an additional layer of approval on existing programs. My understanding is that the regional staff do not have an approval role, but are to provide assistance and guidance. Is my understanding correct?

Mr. GLENN. The Senator is correct. While we envision an active role for the Council staff, coordinating the many local and regional efforts on behalf of the homeless, they are not to play an administrative role. I do not envision an additional layer of bureaucracy for homeless programs.

Mr. HEINZ. I thank the Senator for his statement, and congratulate him on the splendid work this legislation represents.

Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, there will be no more rollcall votes today.

MORNING BUSINESS

Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that there now be a period not to extend beyond 6:15 p.m. today during which Senators may transact morning business and during which Senators be permitted to speak for not to exceed 5 minutes each.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection? Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. HELMS addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from North Carolina.

THE SENATE SHOULD DEBATE WHETHER TO ABROGATE THE ABM TREATY, INSTEAD OF DEBATING INTERPRETATIONS OF U.S. UNILATERAL ABM COMPLIANCE POLICY

SUMMARY

Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, the Senate has been debating the fine legal and technical points of an 18-year-old treaty negotiating record and a 15-year-old ratification hearing record on the SALT I Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. This is a very esoteric and highly complex debate, and unfortunately, it is also distracting the Senate from the real issue. The Senate needs to wake up and smell the coffee—America is in gravest mortal danger and we should abrogate the ABM Treaty. The point is, Mr. President, that the ABM Treaty is impeding our ability to defend our supreme national interests. Instead of debating fine legal and technical points of our ABM Treaty compliance policy, we should be concerned with a much more momentous debate over the very core of our national security. The Senate should be debating instead why we are unilaterally restricting development, testing, and early deployment of our vital strategic defense initiative, in the face of now obvious Soviet ABM Treaty break out.

While we engage in our irrelevant debate, we are allowing the Soviets to lock in the final one-sided prohibition on the United States SDI. This one-sided prohibition is all the Soviets need to obtain overall offensive and defensive strategic supremacy for all time, to obtain the capacity for nuclear blackmail and world domination that comes with such military supremacy. In fact, even the broad interpretation will not allow the United States actually to deploy SDI. But deployment is the name of the game. Near-term deployment of SDI is absolutely essential to American national security. Thus there is a head-on collision between the ABM Treaty and American supreme national security interests.

In due course, I will review of the basis for what is really the secondary issue, namely that of the legally correct, broad interpretation. But first I must repeat that debating U.S. unilateral ABM Treaty compliance is an irrelevant debate, distracting us from the real debate. The real debate should be over whether to abrogate the ABM Treaty as a proportionate response to Soviet ABM Treaty break out. Indeed, Secretary of Defense Weinberger has declared that nothing could be more dangerous to Western security than the Soviet deployment of a nationwide ABM defense, a deployment that would amount to break out.

Mr. President, the American people should be provided with some very frightening, newly declassified information. The public should now be aware that the CIA has evidence that the Soviets have actually privately admitted and boasted to themselves that their Krasnoyarsk radar violates the ABM Treaty. Even more significant is the fact that the Reagan administration now believes that the Soviets are working on an integrated plan for a nationwide ABM defense.

Indeed, the Soviets already have established the prohibited base for a prohibited nationwide ABM defense, and they will have an operational nationwide ABM defense within a year or even less. While the Western democracies complacently debate ABM compliance policy interpretations and are foolishly preoccupied with negotiating for a new INF Treaty, the Soviets are always carefully calculating the correlation of forces. The chilling impact of this new information is that the Soviets will soon be able to use their overwhelming strategic offensive first strike capability, combined with their emerging monopoly on nationwide ABM defense, for nuclear blackmail.

Let us not forget, Mr. President, that Adolf Hitler similarly boasted in private in the mid-1930's of his arms control treaty violations, at the same time that he pushed his aggressive ambitions to the point of global war. Soviet Leader Gorbachev already has capabilities for intimidation and world domination that would have made Hitler very envious indeed. The late Soviet Leader Brezhnev prophetically stated in 1973 that by 1985 the correlation of forces would have shifted so decisively in Soviet favor that the Soviet Union would be able to exert its will in any region of the world it wanted. Mr. President, that is exactly where the Soviets are today.

Mr. President, our distinguished colleague, Senator NUNN, has focused our attention on the issue of American unilateral disarmament. This issue has distracted us from the fundamental threat. But he has done one constructive service to the Senate, and I congratulate him for this service. Senator NUNN has focused our attention upon the nearly 20-year history of the SALT process. There is much in this history that the Senate needs to be reminded of, because in my opinion, the SALT process has definitely undermined American national security interests because it has failed to achieve the two fundamental American objectives for SALT—prohibition of offensive first strike and nationwide ABM defenses for both nations. These two United States fundamental objectives were completely thwarted by the Soviets. Indeed, the Soviets have now achieved a monopoly in both the key capabilities that the United States intended to prohibit. As Senator NUNN suggested, let us carefully scrutinize the history of the SALT process. Many colleagues will be astonished by what we will find.

Mr. President, there is strong, converging evidence from many sources that the Soviets deceived the United States on the key issues in the negotiations leading up to the 1972 SALT I ABM Treaty and Interim Agreement. The Soviets likewise deceived the United States on the key issues in the negotiations leading up to the 1979 SALT II Treaty. There is additionally strong evidence that the Soviets in-

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tended to violate these treaties from the very moment of their signature.

In late May 1972, the evidence of Soviet SALT I negotiating deception and their intention to violate was suppressed within the United States intelligence community, was withheld from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and from Congress. There is authoritative testimony to the Senate on this suppression, and on the meaning of the intelligence suppressed. The Senate may thus have been misled by the executive branch on all the key issues of the SALT I agreements. Therefore, the Senate may have approved the SALT I agreements without full knowledge of the situation.

Mr. President, this evidence was suppressed. Indeed, it follows from this suppressed evidence of Soviet deceptive negotiating and violation intentions at the beginning of the 20-year SALT process, that the entire SALT process itself has been conducted on false assumptions about Soviet reciprocity from the very start in 1967.

Early this year, the Senate voted 93 to 2 that Soviet violations of existing arms control treaties are an important obstacle to the advice and consent of two-thirds of the Senate for ratification of any new treaties. President Reagan recently reported to Congress that:

A number of activities involving SALT II constituted violations of the core or central provisions of the Treaty frequently cited by the proponents of SALT II as the primary reason for supporting the agreement.

If Soviet violations of central provisions of existing treaties are so important that they might prejudice the Senate against voting for ratification of new treaties, then it may also be true that the Soviet violations of existing treaties themselves constitute an important obstacle to continued United States unilateral compliance with those violated treaties. As President Reagan told Congress for the first time on March 10, 1987:

It was, however, the continuing pattern of noncompliant Soviet behavior that I outlined above that was the primary reason why I decided, on May 27, 1986, to end U.S. observance of the provisions of the SALT I Interim Agreement and SALT II.

If Soviet violations of the central provisions of both the SALT I Interim Agreement and the SALT II Treaty were serious enough to finally cause the President to abrogate these agreements, albeit only long after both had expired, perhaps the President and the Senate will also decide to abrogate the SALT I ABM Treaty for the same primary reason. After all, Soviet ABM Treaty break out violations are even more flagrant, and are much more dangerous to American national security.

THE SOVIET BROAD INTERPRETATION IS CORRECT FOR BOTH SIDES

The Reagan administration's legally correct, broad interpretation of the ABM Treaty has easily survived the attacks of the "Blame America First" bloc in Congress. The broad interpretation is the Soviet interpretation, because the Soviets clearly and repeatedly refused to agree to the narrow interpretation, and Soviet spokesman have clearly stated since 1972 that the broad interpretation was their view. I find it difficult to disagree with the Soviets, because the broad interpretation is the correct one. Of course, the broad interpretation suits Soviet interests, because the Soviets are probably ahead of the United States in developing and testing SDI-type, space-based ABM defenses, while claiming to be complying with the ABM Treaty.

Moreover, the Soviets proposed a draft space treaty containing the narrow interpretation to the United States in March, 1985. This Soviet proposal tried to ban the development and testing of space-based ABM defenses. This Soviet proposal therefore assumed that development and testing of space-based ABM's were not already banned by the ABM Treaty. This is precisely the broad interpretation of the ABM Treaty, and this Soviet proposal itself confirms that the Soviets had always embraced the broad interpretation. The Soviets clearly thought that development and testing of exotic spaced-based ABM's was not banned by the ABM Treaty. Their proposal was obviously intended to stop U.S. strategic defense initiative research and development and testing dead in its tracks. Their proposal conclusively indicated that they believed that the broad interpretation was the correct interpretation, and so they wanted to induce the United States into agreeing to being constrained by the narrow interpretation.

Judge Sofaer has reportedly stated that after his extensive research into the SALT I negotiating history, he was forced to conclude that the Soviets had deceived the United States negotiators into believing that they had somehow achieved a mutual ban on development and testing of ABM's based on new physical principles, when in fact the United States negotiators had achieved no such result. Judge Sofaer has thus stumbled upon another significant but long unknown case of Soviet SALT I negotiating deception.

CONCLUSIVE EVIDENCE OF SOVIET NEGOTIATING DECEPTION IN SALT I

Mr. President, on March 26, 1987, in the joint Senate Foreign Relations Committee and Judiciary Committee Hearings on the ABM Treaty interpretation, I asked Assistant Defense Secretary Richard Perle an important question. I asked: "Does the SALT I Interim Agreement negotiating record indicate that the Soviet SALT negotiators deceived the United States on the issue of whether heavy ICBM's were prohibited from replacing light ICBM's?"

Richard Perle answered:

Yes, Senator. I believe this is not only the most dramatic instance of Soviet deception, but the one that carried the gravest consequences. It was one of the most important provisions of the Interim Agreement, that launchers for light missiles could not be converted into launchers for heavy missiles. We were unable in the negotiations to get the Soviets to agree to a definition of the terms heavy and light. There were limitations in the treaty (sic) on the extent to which the silos in which missiles were based could be enlarged. At the time, the Soviets had a new missile, vastly more effective and substantially larger than the light missiles, the launchers for which could not be converted to launchers for heavy missiles.

I believe they concealed the testing of that missile until after the Interim Agreement was signed, and we subsequently, to our dismay, discovered that the light SS-11s were replaced by SS-19 missiles that, by the understanding conveyed to the Senate of the United States would surely have constituted heavy ICBMs. I know that this was a particular concern because that conversion meant a sixfold increase in the number of Soviet warheads and a very substantial increase in the throw-weight of that ballistic missile force.

In addition to the evidence in the SALT I diplomatic negotiating record indicating Soviet deception, there is important, dramatic, intelligence evidence indicating Soviet deception on the SS-19 heavy ICBM.

This evidence is the best and most authoritative evidence of the intentions of the Soviet leadership regarding negotiations and compliance in the entire 20 year SALT process.

This evidence was acquired in 1972. The story has already been published in many places, including at least three times in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD. One example is William Beecher's article in the Boston Globe of October 10, 1976, entitled "United States May Reply to Soviet Rays." There are several other unclassified descriptions of this evidence. William Safire wrote about it in the New York Times article of August 6, 1981, entitled "Deception Managers." It was described in detail in the Heritage Foundation 1980 book, "Mandate for Leadership." And it was referred to in Admiral Zumwalt's testimony to the Senate Defense Appropriations Subcommittee on March 28, 1984, and in Air Force magazine of December 1978, January 1979, and March 1979.

CIA has cleared several articles and books containing this information for publication.

Most recently, Assistant Defense Secretary Richard Perle mentioned this evidence in testimony to the joint hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and Judiciary Committee on March 26, 1987. Here is the way these pieces of unclassified information on this "most dramatic" evidence of Soviet deception in SALT seems to fit together:

William Safire wrote:

The first inkling of [Soviet SALT I negotiating deception] came to us in May, 1972, via "Gamma Gupy," our tuning in to limousine telephone conversations between [the late Soviet General Secretary] Leonid Brezhnev, [the former Foreign Minister] Andrei Gromyko, and Soviet missile designers at the Moscow [SALT I] Summit Con-

ference. These transcripts quoted Mr. Brezhnev talking about a "Main Missile" that had never been mentioned in the SALT [I] negotiations, which turned out to be the SS-19 [heavy ICBM.] The surprised Henry Kissinger considered this "sharp practice."

William Beecher added more details:

In May, 1972, in the hours immediately preceding agreement on the SALT I pacts in Moscow, a conversation was intercepted in which Soviet Party Chairman Leonid Brezhnev checked with a top weapons expert to get assurance that an about-to-be concluded formula covering permissible silo expansion would allow the Soviets to deploy a bigger new missile then under development. That intercept provided the first solid information that the SS-19, as it is now known, was destined to replace some of the relatively small SS-11 missiles, which comprise the bulk of the Soviet ICBM force. The SS-19 has three to four times the throw-weight of the old missile.

Air Force magazine articles by Edgar Ulsammer and Peter Hughes added the following:

[There were] specific, documented instances when the late Marshal A.A. Grechko—until his death in 1976, the Soviet Defense Minister—issued dictates to Brezhnev concerning what was and was not acceptable to the Soviet military in the Politburo's SALT posture. The Soviet military five-year plan predetermines Moscow's SALT negotiating posture in a binding way * * * It is difficult to envision how SALT II will contain Soviet strategic developments. As with SALT I, U.S. critics contend that the SALT II Agreement merely codifies planned Soviet strategic deployments—a view substantially bolstered by * * * CIA analysis based on U.S. intelligence monitoring of Soviet communications. [This analysis] reportedly illustrates quite clearly that the Soviet military has not allowed the SALT process to infringe on planned Soviet strategic forces and programs.

And Richard Perle testified:

We also know * * * through what was then an extremely sensitive communications intercept, that, after General Secretary Brezhnev agreed on the issue of the extent to which silos could be enlarged, he became concerned that he might have, thereby, inhibited the substitution of this heavy [SS-19] missile for a light missile, and he got into communications with [the late Defense Minister] Marshal Grechko, and we acquired that conversation * * * Brezhnev said to Grechko, "Can we fit the new missile in? I have just agreed to a 15 percent rule." And Grechko said, "I'll have to get back to you." And he did get back to him and he said, "We can fit it in." And Brezhnev said, "Thank God." It was only at that point * * * that that particular arrangement was consummated. There is no doubt in my mind that had Marshal Grechko instructed General Secretary Brezhnev that this new missile, one that we would surely have considered heavy, would not have fit in that silo, he would have retracted the position he then had on the table.

Richard Perle added:

Unfortunately, [this conversation] was reported in the newspapers with the result that the Soviets ceased immediately communicating over a system that we had otherwise been able to penetrate, with tremendous loss to our national security.

Mr. President, this highly significant intercept occurred on May 26, 1972, just before SALT I was signed. It indicated that the then secret SS-19 was a large, heavy ICBM. Moreover, this intercept also indicated that Brezhnev himself regarded the SS-19 to be a heavy ICBM, and that Brezhnev intended the heavy SS-19 ICBM to replace the light SS-11 ICBM on a large scale. This was precisely what article II of the SALT I Interim Agreement prohibited. Yet Brezhnev and the other top Soviet negotiators repeatedly told United States negotiators that the U.S.S.R. did not intend to replace light ICBM's with heavy ICBM's.

The Soviets told the United States that:

There was no need for a definition of a heavy ICBM, since the Soviet approach fully precluded conversion of launchers for other types of ICBMs covered by the agreement into launchers for heavy ICBM's (Article II).

This was the precise opposite of the Soviets' actual and later executed plans. They also falsely claimed that both sides already knew which ICBM's were heavy, and that this understanding would not change during the 5-year term of SALT I. But before the SALT I Interim Agreement was signed, only the Soviets knew about the heavy SS-19 and their plans to replace 360 light SS-11 ICBM's with the heavy SS-19. Indeed, Soviet negotiators actually told United States negotiators that the United States could "trust" the Soviets not to replace light ICBM's with heavy ICBM's.

Thus this famous intercept conclusively confirms Brezhnev's negotiating deception on the Soviet heavy SS-19 ICBM. Brezhnev knew that the heavy SS-19 would violate or circumvent article II's prohibition of heavy ICBM's replacing light ICBM's, but he also knew that in May 1972 the United States did not know about the heavy SS-19 ICBM.

But Brezhnev was cleverly disingenuous about his SALT I negotiating deception at the time of the May 1972 SALT I summit. Former President Nixon, a direct victim of Brezhnev's duplicity on the SS-19 and all other key SALT I issues, reports that Brezhnev told him then:

If we are trying to trick one another, why do we need a piece of paper? We are playing clean on our side. The approach of "catching each other out" is quite inadmissible.

WITHHOLDING OF THE EVIDENCE FROM THE JCS AND CONGRESS

Mr. President, on March 28, 1984, Senator JAMES A. MCCLURE asked former Chief of Naval Operations in 1972 at the time SALT I was approved, Adm. Elmo Zumwalt, the following questions about this evidence in a hearing that Senator MCCLURE chaired for the Senate Defense Appropriations Subcommittee:

Senator MCCLURE. In 1972, you testified on SALT I that if the Soviets deployed a heavy ICBM to replace light ICBM's, this would violate SALT I. Do you believe the Soviets' heavy SS-19 ICBM deployment violated SALT I?

Admiral ZUMWALT. I believe that it does. It directly violates SALT I as SALT I was reported and explained to the Congress of the United States during its ratification process, and I believe there was information available at the time, but unknown to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, that confirmed that a violation was going to be made.

Senator MCCLURE. That's an interesting comment. I don't want to get diverted too far, but I want to underscore your statement that our Government had information that the Joint Chiefs of Staff did not have. Did I understand you correctly?

Admiral ZUMWALT. That is correct, Mr. Chairman.

Senator MCCLURE. That, to me, is a separate issue, but not entirely separate, and a very serious charge. Because if our Joint Chiefs can't have all the information we have, how in the world can they make their judgment?

Admiral ZUMWALT. This is a matter that, at some point, we will have to go into a classified session.

This withheld evidence would probably have devastated the administration's attempt to convince the Senate about the effectiveness of the SALT I Agreement, because Dr. Kissinger's principal selling point was that SALT I contained provisions that gave us adequate safeguard against a substitution of heavy missiles for light missiles. Kissinger incorrectly told Senators that:

There is the safeguard that no missile larger than the heaviest light missile that now exists can be substituted * * * as far as the break between the light and heavy missiles is concerned, we believe we have assurances.

Ambassador Gerard Smith, chief of the SALT I delegation, also assured the Senate that:

We have put them on clear notice that any missile having a volume significantly larger than their SS-11, that would be considered a heavy missile * * * and would be a violation * * * we will have to look at what comes along [in new Soviet ICBMs] * * * we have put them on clear notice that any missile having a volume significantly larger than their SS-11, we will consider that as incompatible with the Interim Agreement.

Was the withholding, suppression, and failure to properly evaluate this evidence partly responsible for the successful Soviet SALT I deception on the heavy SS-19 ICBM? Henry Kissinger still defends his policy regarding SALT I by arguing that "we had no evidence at the time because it didn't exist, that the Soviet Union would construct a missile which was sort of half way between the SS-11 and SS-9 * * * It was simply our lack of knowledge that such a missile existed or would be built." But the evidence was in fact there.

Mr. President, several commentators have stated that there are disturbing reports that Henry Kissinger ordered the CIA to suppress, embargo, and withholding this intercept within the intelligence community. Moreover, it was also reportedly suppressed everywhere else within the executive branch, as Admiral Zumwalt has testified, and it was withheld from the Congress. Our national intelligence estimates have never concluded that the Soviets replace light ICBM's with