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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

May 7, 1987

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE SECRETARY OF COMMERCE
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
THE DIRECTOR, UNITED STATES INFORMATION AGENCY

SUBJECT: United States Policy Toward Southern Africa,
NSDD-272 (C)

The President has approved and signed NSDD-272 , establishing U.S. policy toward Southern Africa. In paragraph 1.2, the President has approved an unambiguous public posture of opposition to apartheid and support for a democratic nonracial system in South Africa. However, as a practical matter, the President wishes to avoid counterproductive public demands that would make it politically impossible for the South African Government to appear to be taking orders, thereby delaying meaningful progress. (C)

FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Frank C. Carlucci

Attachment

NSDD- 272

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May 7, 1987

NATIONAL SECURITY DECISION
DIRECTIVE NUMBER 272UNITED STATES OBJECTIVES IN SOUTHERN AFRICA (C)

United States policies toward South Africa and Angola have been based on NSDD 187 of September 7, 1985 (South Africa) and NSDD 212 of February 10, 1986 (Angola). While the fundamental objectives set forth in those directives remain valid, U.S. policies should accommodate new realities in southern Africa and the United States. In southern Africa, the U.S. seeks:

1. The earliest possible end to apartheid in South Africa through negotiations leading to the emergence of a democratic and non-racial South Africa.
 - 1.1 Avoidance and prevention of a scenario in South Africa of revolutionary violence and expanded Soviet influence through exploitation of internal and regional conflict.
 - 1.2 Clear and unambiguous American and western alignment on behalf of the principle of consent of the governed and the process of negotiation necessary to resolve South Africa's crisis; and, similarly, avoidance of U.S. alignment in support of specific parties, individuals, or their constitutional proposals.
 - 1.3 To the extent appropriate and feasible, achievement of western unity and clarity of commitment to a genuinely democratic post-apartheid future for South Africa as a means of strengthening parties committed to achieving those goals and challenging those not so committed to reassess their positions.
 - 1.4 Broadened participation in and acceptance by all South Africans of a strong market-based economic system in South Africa. (S)
2. Reduction and elimination (to the greatest possible extent) of Soviet and Cuban military presence, access, and influence in Angola and elsewhere in the southern African region.
 - 2.1 Negotiation of an internationally acceptable solution to the Namibian problem based on UNSCR 435 and Cuban troop withdrawal from Angola.

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- 2.2 Promotion of political reconciliation in Angola between the MPLA and UNITA.
 - 2.3 Reduction of Soviet and surrogate opportunities for exploiting regional tensions and fueling arms build-ups.
 - 2.4 Denial of expanded Soviet and surrogate military access to regional facilities.
 - 2.5 Prevention of the establishment of Soviet and surrogate military relationships where they do not now exist. (S)
3. Strengthened public and congressional consensus in support of U.S. policies in the region.
 - 3.1 Avoidance, if possible, of another round of heightened domestic controversy over southern Africa policy.
 - 3.2 Achievement of a consensus between the executive and legislative branches on a policy toward South Africa which preserves executive branch flexibility in pursuit of regional policy goals and avoids new punitive sanctions. (S)
4. Solidarity with our western allies and greater acceptance/support in Black Africa of our policies in South Africa, Angola/Namibia, and the rest of the region.
 - 4.1 Coordination of major political and economic initiatives in U.S. southern African policy with key allies and friends.
 - 4.2 Achievement of adequate western burden-sharing and division of effort in pursuit of the above goals.
 - 4.3 Maintenance of western unity not only against apartheid but--more importantly--in favor of a multiparty, non-racial constitutional democracy achieved through a negotiated settlement.
 - 4.4 Achievement of greater western and African support for our Angola policy (including recognition that UNITA has a valid and critical role to play in Angolan reconciliation), together with development of more effective Western pressure on the MPLA and its Soviet/Cuban supporters to turn from their vision of a military victory to a negotiated political outcome.

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- 4.5 Avoidance of U.S. isolation on southern African issues in our alliances, i.e., denial of opportunities for Soviet efforts to divide the West.
 - 4.6 Development (together with our allies and appropriate international organizations) of more effective ways to address the mounting human rights abuses, humanitarian problems, and population dislocations in South Africa, Angola, and the region. (S)
5. Increased regional stability and emergence of a climate in southern Africa conducive to: coexistence between the South African Government and the Front Line States; regional economic cooperation; and expanded representative government and market-oriented economic policies in the region.
- 5.1 Deterrence of cross border violence including SAG operations against its neighbors and guerrilla/terrorist operations directed at South Africa from the territories of its neighbors. (S)
6. Maintenance of reliable western access to critical mineral supplies from southern Africa and development of enhanced alternative sources or substitutes for critical materials, including appropriate contingency stockpile management. (S)

Ronald Reagan

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