



**Director of
Central
Intelligence**

~~Top Secret~~

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National Foreign Intelligence Board

24 September 1987

1500 hours

~~Top Secret~~

REVISED GUIDELINES

BACKGROUND / ISSUES

SECRET

NEW PRODUCTION GUIDELINES

Background and Issues that May Arise

- The proposal to revise the 1981 guidelines for interagency intelligence production (1981 version is at Backup Tab #1) surfaced while shaping our response to NSDD 266 on objectivity and integrity (your response to the NSC is at Backup Tab #2). At the 1 June 1987 NFIB meeting you chaired, it was noted that some members had suggested revisions to the guidelines, as one means of addressing the objectivity and integrity of the process, while potentially enhancing the quality and relevancy of the product. It was agreed at that meeting that we would undertake the project.
- The Vice Chairman, National Intelligence Council met with Community representatives on 16 June to discuss the earlier suggestions for revisions and to receive additional contributions they had for new guidelines. The thrust of these was the need for brevity, simplicity, clarity, and flexibility in outlining the key elements of the process. While expressing general satisfaction with the current process, particular emphasis was placed on the need to reduce the number and length of estimates produced.
- A draft revision was prepared for review internally by the National Intelligence Officers. It took account of the revisions to your role outlined in your response to NSDD 266, made in the interest of assuring independence of the process and fostering NFIB discussion. We continued to make minor adjustments to assure that the draft would be consistent with other elements of your response to the NSDD, and to accommodate evolving procedures for our interaction with you and for your review of the product at various stages. The special role of the Senior Review Panel as advisory body to the DCI was taken into consideration and protected.
- The NFIB Principals were sent a draft revision of the guidelines on 5 August for comment. The cover letter (at Backup Tab #3) summarized the distinguishing features of the new guidelines and requested comments and suggestions for changes before the guidelines were placed on the NFIB agenda. The only suggestions for changes came from Treasury, State, and the DIA. All other organizations concurred in the draft, with laudatory comments on brevity and clarity. The Treasury and State comments were incorporated into the final revised draft.
- The DIA suggestions were inappropriate for incorporation into the guidelines because of their level of detail or because they dealt with issues best handled in other ways. It is possible that the Director, DIA could raise these issues at the NFIB, but we believe the rationale for declining their suggested changes is adequately explained in the exchange of correspondence between the Deputy

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Director of DIA and the Vice Chairman, National Intelligence Council at Backup Tab #4. At this point, we don't expect anyone, including DIA, to raise any issues at the meeting.

- On 9 September the final draft revision of the guidelines was forwarded to the NFIB Principals by Deputy Director Gates, with the indication that the Principals would have an opportunity to discuss the guidelines at a future NFIB meeting prior to official publication. That final draft revision, and the summary handout that Maj Gen Horton plans to use to initiate discussion of the revision at the 24 September NFIB meeting, is at the "Revised Guidelines" Tab.
- If the NFIB concurs, and you approve, we have prepared a memorandum for your signature to officially promulgate the new guidelines. It is the attachment at the back of this book. Propose you sign the memo at the conclusion of NFIB contingent on NFIB concurrence and your approval. Upon your return of the signed memo with this NFIB package, we will ensure prompt distribution to the community.

DRAFT REVISED GUIDELINES

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NEW GUIDELINES

**Objectivity and integrity
Responsiveness and relevancy**


**Update and strengthen
Clarify and simplify**

**Aim at senior policymakers
Recognize wider audience**

**Shorter and focused
Fewer and estimative**

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PRODUCTS



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PROCEDURES

**Solicitation and anticipation
Screening and vetting**

**NIO management
Interagency participation**

**Drafters dedicated
Representatives empowered**

**Alternative views
Logical flow**

**DCI review
NFIB views**

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The Director of Central Intelligence

Washington, D. C. 20505

9 September 1987


MEMORANDUM FOR: National Foreign Intelligence Board Principals

SUBJECT: Revision of Guidelines for Interagency Intelligence
Production


1. During our review of the integrity and objectivity issues raised in NSDD 266, many of you had recommended that a revision to the 1981 guidelines for interagency intelligence production be undertaken. During our 1 June 1987 NFIB meeting we agreed to proceed. In response, the attached draft was developed.

2. This draft draws upon your contributions to the NSDD 266 response, as well as our 1 June discussion, the contributions of your representatives at a 16 June meeting held by the Vice Chairman, National Intelligence Council, and your subsequent review and comment on an earlier draft. I appreciate all the efforts that you and your people have made toward producing the revision.

3. The revised draft guidelines appear consistent with the response to NSDD 266, a copy of which I sent to you on 31 July. They set out the principles and criteria for our interagency production process at about the right level of detail. They will be placed on the NFIB schedule in the near future, so that we can discuss them prior to official publication.


Robert M. Gates
Acting Director

Attachment:
As stated



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28 August 1987

GUIDELINES FOR INTERAGENCY INTELLIGENCE PRODUCTION

This Notice replaces the 27 July 1981 DCI guidelines for interagency production of national intelligence.

Purpose

These guidelines are intended to strengthen the Intelligence Community's capacity to support the DCI in producing national intelligence responsive to the needs of senior consumers while assuring the objectivity and integrity of the process. The system must be able to anticipate and respond quickly to foreign trends and developments that create new requirements for estimative intelligence products. These will be formulated primarily with a view to assisting senior policymakers at the NSC and Cabinet level, although they normally will have wider application and receive wider distribution. These products will be predominantly estimative and usually will address a limited number of policy relevant key questions. They should generally be short and focused; accordingly they should contain no more factual and historical detail than necessary to provide context for the findings, judgments, and projections.

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Types of Interagency Intelligence Products

National Intelligence Estimate (NIE)

The NIE provides the most authoritative judgments of the Intelligence Community on subjects of highest policy concern to the United States. Judgments and projections will be derived from the most comprehensive intelligence data and research available but will be presented in a concise form. The main text will develop the analyses and estimative judgments over the period of the NIE, evaluating alternative scenarios where appropriate, and identifying indicators associated with alternative scenarios.

The time projection for a NIE usually will be in terms of years. For most NIEs the preferred length is in the range of 10 to 20 pages with background data and detailed discussion carried in annexes. The Key Judgments should be proportionately brief, in the range of one to four pages. An Executive Summary, following the Key Judgments, should be considered in the case of unusually complex or detailed papers. The time allocated for preparation of the NIE will generally be in terms of months although it may be required within weeks on occasion. The nomination of topics, the formulation of concept papers and terms of reference, and the review and coordination process through NFIB discussion will be more deliberate and thorough than for other interagency products.

Special National Intelligence Estimate (SNIE)

While the SNIE shares many of the characteristics of the NIE, it differs from the latter in several significant ways. The SNIE addresses more specific and urgent problems; urgency is the dominant of these two criteria. The SNIE is an unscheduled interagency intelligence product while the NIE is scheduled and listed

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in the annual production plan. The time projection for a SNIE usually will be in terms of weeks or months. The preferred length of a SNIE is less than 10 pages, with very limited background data or description. Key judgments of SNIEs should be very brief and normally not exceed two pages. The time allocated for preparation is days to weeks. The nomination of topics, the formulation of concept papers and terms of reference, and the coordination process will be accelerated.

Interagency Intelligence Memorandum (IIM)

The IIM will address problems of high policy concern to the United States, although not the highest concerns where the NIE is more appropriate. The IIM provides an Intelligence Community assessment of data and events, with a considerable amount of evidential or methodological detail, and usually will be estimative. It is the appropriate interagency product when the primary objective is a community judgment on factual matter.

There is no set time horizon for the factual determinations or the estimates made in the IIM. There are no prescriptions for length or format beyond succinctness appropriate to the subject requiring community judgments. The Key Judgments, and Executive Summary where appropriate, should be proportionately brief. An IIM usually will be prepared over a period of months. The process of nominating topics, formulating concept papers and terms of reference, and the review and coordination will be deliberate and thorough without sacrificing timeliness. The product usually will be coordinated at the senior working level and approved by the Chairman, National Intelligence Council.

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Special Interagency Intelligence Memorandum (SIIM)

The SIIM has much the same relationship to the IIM that the SNIE has to the NIE. While the IIM usually is scheduled, the SIIM is an unscheduled interagency intelligence product. It provides an assessment of data and events and usually will provide a near term projection of the immediate situation. The preferred length of a SIIM usually is less than 10 pages; the key judgments should not exceed two pages. The time projection for a SIIM usually is weeks to months. The process for nomination of SIIM topics and the SIIM coordination process will be accelerated. The SIIM usually will be coordinated at the senior working level and approved by the Chairman, National Intelligence Council.

Memorandum to Holders (M/H)

Any of the interagency intelligence products may be amended by a M/H if changes in intelligence information or analysis justify a modification but the changes are not extensive enough to justify a new product. The procedures followed will be the same as for the basic documents they amend.

The Interagency Process

Topics for interagency intelligence products may be suggested by any senior officer in the intelligence or policy communities. A request may be made directly to the Director Central Intelligence or the appropriate National Intelligence Officer or to them through departmental channels.

The NIO is responsible for advising the DCI on the policy relevance, importance, and utility of the topics nominated for interagency production. The

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Utility of the product for the policy community should be clearly demonstrated, the requirement for an Intelligence Community judgment should be justified. The NIO must assist the Intelligence Community in limiting its formal interagency intelligence production to a clearly articulated need-to-do basis vice a nice-to-do approach. Topics of general interest but not meeting NIE/SNIE criteria might be more suitable for an IIM or SIIM, or might better be addressed by single agency production. The NIO recommendation is critical in reducing the time demands on NFIB principals and focusing the resources of the interagency process on the most important topics.

The DCI is the approving authority for initiating interagency intelligence products. Some topics will be approved following NFIB consultation on the annual interagency production plan. Others will be proposed as the need arises and approved following such formal or informal NFIB consultation as appropriate.

The appropriate National Intelligence Officer will manage the production of the interagency product on behalf of the DCI. The NIO is responsible to the DCI to ensure maximum Intelligence Community participation in the production, balancing the requirements for timeliness and thoroughness. The NIO, in consultation with the representatives of the NFIB principals, will modify the attached production checklist to fit the circumstances.

The NIO will as a rule prepare a draft Concept Paper and Terms of Reference in consultation with NFIB representatives and policy officers. Policy community participation is especially important here to ensure relevance of the final product. The Concept Paper, incorporating Key Questions, and the Terms of Reference then will be approved in draft by the DCI and will be the basis to proceed.

The draft Concept Papers and TORs for scheduled NIEs and IIMs then should be furnished to NFIB principals for their review and subsequent coordination by their representatives. For SNIE's and SIIMs, this review and coordination will be accelerated, depending on the urgency of the paper.

The NIO will consult with NFIB representatives on designating drafters and contributors. The NFIB principals should relieve drafters of regular duties to the maximum extent possible until their special assignments to the estimate have been fulfilled. Participants in developing and coordinating the draft should be aware of policy community concerns, but NFIB principals must ensure that the integrity and objectivity of the intelligence process are maintained. The DCI usually will review draft texts of estimates at the time they are submitted to NFIB representatives for coordination to confirm that the paper and its key judgments meet the criteria established by the Concept Paper and Terms of Reference. He will reserve his decision on the estimate until after he receives recommendations from NFIB.

The NFIB representatives should have sufficient delegated authority to agree to changes in the text at the coordination meeting such that, except in the most unusual circumstances, they will be supported by their agencies. Changes submitted after coordination usually will be reviewed by the representatives before sending the text to the NFIB principals. For scheduled NIEs, NFIB agencies should have 10 working days to review final drafts prior to the NFIB meeting. For SNIEs, agencies should have five working days to review final drafts, except for the most time-sensitive estimates. Final coordination by NFIB principals may be by telephone vote, without benefit of an NFIB meeting whenever timeliness dictates or other factors indicate this as a preferable option.

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Alternative views usually should be succinctly stated in the body of the Estimate with a concise statement of the reason for the views, but the NIO must not let the discussion of alternative views distract from the logical flow of the Estimate.

Attachment: Summary Production Checklist

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SUMMARY PRODUCTION CHECKLIST

I. TOPIC INITIATION

- | | | |
|---|-----------|--|
| A. SCHEDULED ANNUAL PRODUCTION
(most NIEs and IIMs, no
SNIEs or SIIMs) | OR | B. OUT-OF-CYCLE PROPOSAL
(all SNIEs and SIIMs, some
NIEs and IIMs) |
| 1. NIO annually solicits or anticipates requirements from intelligence and policy communities | | 1. NIO continually receives or anticipates new requirements from intelligence and policy communities |
| 2. NIC incorporates requirement(s) in production plan and seeks NFIB review and DCI approval | | 2. NIO reviews new requirements with NIC and community contacts on an accelerated basis for proposed SNIEs and SIIMs |
| 3. NIO initiates work to meet projected completion date | | 3. To seek approval for NIE or IIM, go to step I.A.2. For SNIE or SIIM, go to step II.B.1. |

II. CONCEPT PAPER (CP) and TERMS OF REFERENCE (TOR) DEVELOPMENT

- | | | |
|---|-----------|--|
| A. NORMAL TRACK
(all NIEs and IIMs) | OR | B. FAST TRACK
(all SNIEs and SIIMs) |
| 1. NIO develops CP and TOR in consultation with community | | 1. NIO develops CP (and time permitting TOR) in consultation with community on accelerated basis |
| 2. NIO seeks DCI endorsement on CP and TOR | | 2. NIO seeks accelerated DCI endorsement of CP (and TOR) |
| 3. NIO seeks NFIB rep coordination on CP and TOR | | 3. NIO seeks accelerated NFIB rep coordination on CP (and TOR) |
| 4. NIO distributes coordinated CP and TOR to DCI and NFIB | | 4. NIO distributes coordinated CP (and TOR) to DCI and NFIB |

Attach. 1

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III. DRAFT DEVELOPMENT

A. NORMAL TRACK

OR

B. FAST TRACK

1. NIO works with drafter to produce pre-coordination draft
2. NIO provides draft to DCI while simultaneously seeking NFIB rep coordination on draft

1. NIO works with drafter to produce pre-coordination draft on an accelerated basis
2. NIO provides draft to DCI while simultaneously seeking accelerated NFIB rep coordination on draft

IV. APPROVAL AND PUBLICATION

A. NORMAL TRACK

OR

B. FAST TRACK

1. NIO distributes coordinated draft to DCI and NFIB Principals for consideration
2. IIMs approved and published by C/NIC unless DCI calls NFIB meeting
3. NIEs discussed and approved at NFIB meeting unless telephone vote is called

1. NIO distributes coordinated draft to DCI and NFIB Principals for consideration
2. SIIM approved and published by C/NIC unless DCI calls NFIB meeting
3. SNIEs discussed and approved at NFIB meeting unless telephone vote is called


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BACKUP MATERIALS

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The Director of Central Intelligence

Washington, D.C. 20505




NFAC 4652-81

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30 July 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR: National Foreign Intelligence Board Principals
FROM: Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT: Interagency Intelligence Production

The attached procedures for interagency production, which we discussed at NFIB on 21 July, are approved and are effective immediately. When feasible, estimates in progress will be adjusted to conform. I ask your cooperation in making the new system work.


William J. Casey

Attachment:
Procedures For Production
Of Interagency Intelligence
Assessments, dated 27 July 1981

DERIVATIVE CL BY SIGNER
REVIEW ON JULY 87
Derived from Multiple

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27 July 1981

PROCEDURES FOR PRODUCTION OF
INTERAGENCY INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENTS

This Notice establishes ~~new~~ guidelines for production of interagency intelligence assessments, based on the experience to date of the National Intelligence Council (NIC), and on recent critiques of existing procedures.

Policy

National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs and SNIEs) are the most important product of the Intelligence Community and should be given the highest priority by all intelligence agencies. They will again become the primary Intelligence Community contribution to the policy formulation process at the national level. (Interagency Intelligence Memoranda will continue to be produced as before, on occasions when the paramount intelligence task is the reaching of factual determinations. See Page 5.)

The principal purpose of these changes

- To produce NIEs and SNIEs which are better suited than are existing estimates for NSC and Cabinet-level examination and consideration, while preserving their usefulness for other important consumers
- To assist senior policymakers by producing interagency assessments which are less bulky -- and to do so quicker.
- To improve the substantive usefulness of such assessments to the policy process.
- To enhance senior review within the Intelligence Community by engaging the DCI and the other NFIB principals more fully in arriving at the judgments set out in these assessments.

Categories of Estimates

Special National Intelligence Estimates will be oriented to a current event or policy issue. The need for such estimates will normally arise from the policy formulation process. To be useful, they must be brief and timely. Papers directed at relatively narrow questions and on particularly short deadlines will normally be produced as "Category A" SNIEs. This category includes "Contingency" estimates, e.g., "What would be the reaction if the US did X?" There will also be broader "Category B" SNIEs, particularly in the political and economic fields, that require expeditious handling. Production of SNIEs will be governed by the "fast track" procedures discussed below (page 2).

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National Intelligence Estimates will also fall in two Categories. "Category I" NIEs will be those devoted to less pressing policy concerns. e.g., Yugoslavia After Tito. Papers in this category will take somewhat longer to prepare than those tied to more immediate issues, and may include extensive back-up analysis. Production will be governed by more deliberate procedures (see page 3). The number of Category I NIEs should decrease in coming months as the number of SNIEs increases. The major periodic estimates, including the Soviet military series, will be listed as Category II NIEs. They will be produced on a schedule approved by the DCI after consultation with NFIB (see page 4).

Content of NIEs and SNIEs

In preparing estimates, Principals, Chairmen, and drafters shall assure that drafts:

- Are as directly relevant to ongoing policy concerns as possible, within the ground rules of appropriate discussion by intelligence officers. They should be written in awareness of the US role in the given situations, analyze the degree to which these situations may be susceptible to the influence of the US or its friends, and address the significance of various outcomes for US interests.
- Contain as much estimative thrust as possible, including where appropriate possible alternative future developments.
- Integrate political, military, economic and other factors-- especially with respect to economic forces and to the broader political purposes of military power.
- Avoid secondary issues and unnecessary detail.
- Contain, as has been the practice, any alternative or dissenting views.
- Indicate the validity of the intelligence supporting the estimate.

Fast-Track Procedures for SNIEs

Initiation: Preparation of SNIEs may be proposed to the DCI by any senior officer, although the concerned NIO is expected to anticipate the need for such estimates through his participation in the policy formulation process. If the DCI approves a proposal, the Chairman NIC will immediately notify NFIB Principals by telephone or LDX, designating an NIO as Chairman of the estimate and requesting that each Principal name a single qualified officer fully empowered to represent him in the coordination process. Representatives should have access to and be able to speak for their Principal.

Terms of Reference (TORs)/Concept Papers: The Estimate Chairman will immediately prepare draft TORs and a concept paper, check them out with the requester and the DCI, and coordinate them with the representatives by telephone and LDX. For Category A SNIEs, these steps should take no more than 24 hours, for Category B, no more than 3 days.

Drafting Responsibilities: The Chairman will in the course of establishing TORs negotiate with the representatives to identify drafters and contributors who are both qualified and available. It will be the responsibility of the Principals to free assigned drafters and contributors from conflicting duties until the draft is completed. For Category A this should regularly require no more than 2 days, for Category B, 5 days.

Format: The SNIE will regularly run no more than 5 pages for Category A and 10 for Category B. Where essential, annexes may be appended.

Coordination: When the Chairman has a satisfactory draft, he will distribute it to the representatives for coordination, normally by LDX. Representatives should immediately seek the views of their Principals. For Category A SNIEs, the Chairman will, when time permits, convene a representatives meeting to coordinate the paper, but in extreme cases will coordinate by telephone. In any case the time required should not be more than 2 days. For Category B, representatives will normally meet, and coordination should be complete in no more than 5 days.

NFIB Consideration: SNIEs will normally be reviewed by the DCI at this stage. Concurrence of the Principals in Category A SNIEs will then be obtained by telephone or through a special NFIB meeting within the next 24 hours. Category B SNIEs usually will be considered at a regular NFIB meeting if conveniently scheduled, or at a special meeting; no more than 3 days should be required.

Category I NIE Procedures

Initiation: NIEs in Category I will normally be proposed by the NIC and scheduled well in advance, although any NFIB Principal or senior policy officer may request one. The schedule will be considered by NFIB quarterly and approved by the DCI. Should an addition to or deletion from the schedule be proposed, Principals will be given an opportunity to comment prior to a decision by the DCI. Before work begins on a paper, the Chairman, NIC is responsible for designating an NIO as Chairman and notifying the Principals. Each Principal in turn will designate a single qualified officer fully empowered to represent him in preparation of the estimate.

Terms of Reference/Concept Paper: The Estimate Chairman will prepare draft TORs and a concept paper. He will assure that before they are sent out to the agency representatives, these papers have been checked out with the policy officers concerned and have been submitted to the DCI for his review. Once these papers go out to the representatives, the latter will be expected to review them with their Principals before the representatives come to the coordination meetings. The usual time to be given for such review, prior to the meetings of the representatives, will be one week. In cases where

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circumstances warrant significant changes in the initial purpose, scope, concept, or TORs of a given paper, the Chairman will ensure that these changes have the approval of the DCI and the NFIB Principals.

Drafting Responsibilities: The Chairman will, in the course of preparing and coordinating TORs, negotiate with the representatives to identify drafting officers and arrange for contributions from individual agencies. It will be the responsibility of each Principal to ensure that contributions assigned to his agency are delivered on schedule. Drafts should regularly be completed within one month.

Format: Each draft Category I NIE will normally consist of the basic estimate and a shorter Key Judgments section. Both will be coordinated by the Agency representatives. When published, the first volume of the NIE will contain only the Key Judgments. Volume I should be no more than 10 printed pages in length. The basic estimate will be published as back-up analysis in an accompanying Volume II. There will, of course, be occasions where the length or complexity of the estimate will necessitate variations on this concept.

Coordination: When the Chairman has a satisfactory draft, he will distribute it to the representatives. The latter will be given 2 weeks to consult with their respective Principals on the content of a draft before the representatives meet for coordination with the paper's Chairman. The representatives will meet on consecutive working days for as long as necessary to complete coordination. Discussion at these meetings will center on ironing out questions of fact, examining the principal assessments of the given paper, and identifying main areas of agreement or disagreement/dissent. If major revisions are necessary, there can be a clean-up meeting to review the final text; new issues will not be raised at clean-up meetings. Any major issues not resolved at representatives' meetings will be examined at NFIB by the DCI and the Principals.

NFIB Consideration: Volume I as coordinated by the representatives (that is, Key Judgments, together with any dissents or unresolved issues) will go to the DCI for approval and distribution to the Principals, who will be given at least 7 working days to review the final draft. It will be scheduled for the next regular meeting of NFIB thereafter. At NFIB, discussion will center on the estimate's major questions, with any necessary editorial or minor fixes to be done subsequently under the direction of Chairman, NIC and the paper's Chairman, as directed at NFIB by the DCI. The Chairman will also be responsible for conforming a coordinated Volume II to Volume I. Volume II will be published within one month after Volume I.

Category II (periodic) NIE Procedures

The procedures outlined above for Category I NIEs in general apply also to Category II. These papers are likely to be longer (sometimes more than two volumes) and more complex than those in Category I, and arrangements for

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their production may involve an elaborate structure of working groups and subgroups, DCI Committees, etc. They will also take more time to prepare. Nonetheless, every effort will be made to move them along expeditiously, and to keep Volume I concise and policy-oriented. Present production of periodic NIEs should not be significantly changed under these procedures.

Interagency Intelligence Memoranda (IIM)

The IIM will be prepared in accordance with SNIE or NIE procedures as appropriate to the issue addressed, except that it will be coordinated in the Community at the NFIB representatives level and issued by the Chairman, NIC. Representatives may, of course, seek the approval of their Principals. An IIM may be referred to NFIB and issued by the DCI if he so decides, or if requested by a NFIB Principal.

General

These procedures should provide a maximum of one week for the production of Category A SNIE's, three weeks for Category B SNIE's, and three to four months for the production of Volume I of Category I and most Category II NIE's. Principals will, of course, retain their right of dissent in all cases and categories of estimates, including IIM's.

After NFIB discussion of an SNIE or NIE, the estimate Chairman will convene the representatives for a review of and follow-up to the NFIB proceedings. This meeting should also focus on identifying gaps in collection or analysis for future emphasis. The Chairman will be responsible for initiating further action through appropriate channels to fill such gaps.

These procedures may be abridged by C/NIC when an estimate is needed more quickly than they will permit. The only essential conditions are that each agency have an opportunity to dissent, and that the DCI approve the final product.

The Director of Central Intelligence

Washington, D.C. 20505

31 July 1987

The Honorable Frank C. Carlucci
Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Frank,

This report is in response to the President's instruction in NSDD 266 to review the established procedures for producing national foreign intelligence estimates. These procedures were reviewed to determine if we were achieving our goal of maintaining the integrity and objectivity of the process and the products.

We believe the national intelligence estimates process does achieve objectivity in the many interagency products issued by the Intelligence Community. We find that there is integrity and independence on the part of the people and the process. Nonetheless, we have taken steps to reinforce the safeguards already built into the system. These include

- reemphasized with the National Intelligence Officers their responsibilities to assist me in maintaining the integrity of the process
- held special meetings with NFIB Principals and their representatives reviewing and reaffirming the requirements of objectivity, integrity, and quality of the estimates
- initiated a revision of the Intelligence Community's guidelines for interagency production to bring currency and more clarity to the guidelines for process
- made changes in the DCI role to assure myself that the independence of the intelligence process is maintained at several key points and to foster full discussion of national estimates by the members of the National Foreign Intelligence Board.

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The attached report lays out in greater detail the results of the review directed by the President. The review included solicitation of the views of each National Foreign Intelligence Board member on the issues of integrity and objectivity in the production of our national foreign intelligence estimates. The NFIB members provided thoughtful responses, including consideration of the relationships between their intelligence organizations and the policy community. These responses were included in the review conducted by the Chairman of the National Intelligence Council and the National Intelligence Officers who manage the interagency production on my behalf. The review also included a special session of the National Foreign Intelligence Board where the members discussed their views and recommendations for strengthening the independence of the intelligence process in order to preserve the integrity and independence of the product.

Sincerely yours,



William H. Webster

Enclosure

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THE INTEGRITY AND OBJECTIVITY OF THE ESTIMATIVE PROCESS

SUMMARY

We believe the current practices of the Intelligence Community do preserve the integrity, objectivity and independence of the process for the production of national foreign intelligence estimates. The integrity, quality, and objectivity of the personnel involved in estimative work is at least as important as the process itself. Some further changes in the DCI's role have been made to reinforce further the independence of the process. The guidelines for the process of interagency production are under NFIB and DCI review and will be republished.

The integrity of Estimates is safeguarded principally through:

- Careful selection and orientation for each of the key people in the process.
- The broadening of the scope of key policy questions to provide a context beyond that suggested by policymakers.
- The exclusion of policymakers from the analytic and coordination process, ensuring Intelligence Community independence.
- The participation by all elements of the Intelligence Community in the development and coordination of estimates from concept through final drafting.
- The development of most likely and alternative outcomes in recognition of uncertainty on some evidence and the unpredictability of some events.
- Explicit recognition in estimates of differing views within the Intelligence Community on particular judgments.
- The right of any community member to explicitly dissent from any or all parts of estimates.
- Numerous levels of review within each Agency throughout the process.
- The use of outside specialists and consultants for independent views on selected issues.

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- Evaluation of completed estimates and feedback to the preparation of new ones as the cycle continues.
- The ability of member agencies of the Intelligence Community to publish their own estimates and bring them to the attention of policymakers whenever they feel that a new line of analysis needs to be taken which may be at odds with the Intelligence Community's consensus views.

The independence of the estimative process from policymaker preference, however, is not an absolute end in itself but rather involves a number of trade-offs:

- NIO's must maintain close contact with the policy community to ensure they are aware of US policy goals and the details of its implementation. Analysis conducted without knowledge of the US role on the international scene will inevitably be skewed.
- There inevitably exist areas in which policy and intelligence cannot and should not be surgically separated--each has something to offer the other in insight; nearly all participants in both the policy and intelligence communities are engaged in some facet of the other's work at some time.
- Senior review within the Intelligence Community should bring advantages of wisdom, experience and perspective to the analysis--but is also possibly open to the charge of "politicizing" analysis written at the working level.
- Consensus cannot be allowed to eliminate sharpness of judgment.
- Evidence can serve to buttress Community judgment, but the relative absence of evidence cannot be allowed to stifle creative insight where evidence may not be immediately available.

Recent changes in the DCI's role in the process should serve to reinforce further the objectivity of his key role:

- The DCI will no longer approve draft estimates prior to coordination by NFIB representatives, but will review them to ensure that they conform to goals set in the Terms of Reference.
- The DCI will no longer approve post-coordination drafts, but will bring his own comments and any suggestions for change to the NFIB table.
- The DCI will seek the judgment and advice of NFIB members before deciding on the disposition of draft estimates.

Further, the DCI has directed the revision of the 1981 guidelines for interagency production in order to provide currency and clarity to this process.

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DISCUSSION

1. As the President has stated, it is an important goal of the United States intelligence effort that the integrity and objectivity of the intelligence process be maintained, demanding critical differentiation between foreign intelligence and policy advocacy. This is a particularly important and sensitive goal as applied to the production of national estimates. It requires critical and constant attention especially by the Intelligence Community but also by the Policy Community. This must be considered side by side with another important goal, emphasized by the SSCI in a draft report last year, that the utility and relevance of the intelligence product be sustained, demanding cognizance of policy concerns in the production of foreign intelligence. This dual objective of assuring policy relevance while assuring against policy prescription makes two basic demands.

- First, while input to the estimative process is to be sought from the Policy Community, it should be as to the questions asked, and not as to the answers provided. And the Policy Community should not be the only source of these questions.
- Second, while the output of the estimative process should outline the general implications of the Intelligence Community's judgments for US interests, it should not cross the line to the advocacy of particular policy proposals. That must be deferred to the consumers in the Policy Community.

It should be recognized that the search for perfection in the estimative process inevitably involves a process of tradeoffs between faithful observance of the full bureaucratic process and the intellectual vigor of the final product. As more people and more opinions become involved, many of the sharp edges of insight can be lost; process can be observed but the product can be pallid, and the message to the policymaker can be unenlightening. The Intelligence Community must strive to strike a balance between often conflicting goals of timeliness and deliberation, between crispness of judgment and full consideration of alternative views, between safe consensus and boldness of insight, between policy relevance and policy neutrality.

2. The estimators must interact with policymakers, but maintain their independence from them. They must provide not only what the policymaker wants to know, but also what he needs to know. While the estimators need to focus on a policymaker's topic, they need to place it in proper context, which may well provide an estimate not anticipated by the policymaker. An estimate must examine the conventional wisdom on an issue, but also challenge it. Estimators must examine all the evidence on an issue, but, when evidence is lacking, they must not shrink from offering the insights the Community may nonetheless be able to offer. Complicating the process is

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the impact of US activity on the event to be analyzed while the outcome of an estimate may influence future choices of action. The estimators must assess both risks and opportunities for the US, and here they will march up to the fine line short of policy prescription. They owe it to their readers to engage in prediction, including which outcomes are most likely. But they owe it also to their readers to make their uncertainties clear and to provide alternative scenarios.

3. We have reviewed the national estimates process in terms of three basic elements--personnel, process, and products. This facilitates highlighting areas where vulnerabilities exist and safeguards help, especially noting where senior officers directly affect the process.

Personnel

4. The most critical element in ensuring the integrity and objectivity of the estimative process is people. Without individual integrity and objectivity at all levels, particularly at the top, no process will work; with it, nearly any process will be successful.

- The National Intelligence Officer system is designed to select experienced, skilled officers who will manage the estimates process on behalf of the DCI. These NIOs are assigned to the Office of the DCI where they can be relatively free of pressures from the policy arms of government. The NIOs, selected from different parent agencies and backgrounds, also bring a variety of Intelligence Community perspectives to the estimates.
- Additionally, Assistant NIOs, drafters, and Agency representatives--themselves representing different parent agencies and backgrounds--bring additional range of perspective to the analytic process. If the NFIB agencies fail to provide their best talent, the process will not provide the best product.
- There are balances that each of these players must strike. The NIOs manage the production of estimates for the DCI and serve as guardians of the Community process. Drafters need to be able to utilize their agency background and at the same time rise above it and take on the community mantle. Representatives need to represent their agencies ably and responsibly, while being capable of setting aside parochialism in the interest of producing the best possible Community product.
- And finally there are the intelligence principals, who need to be involved throughout the process, initially through their representatives and ultimately at the National Foreign Intelligence Board, to bring to bear their broader perspective and to help protect the intelligence process against undue policy pressures. A key to the success of this endeavor is the NIOs keeping the representatives informed, so that they in turn can keep their principals informed and involved.

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The Process

5. The Request for the Estimate. Any executive office can request an estimate, but most are generated by State, DoD, or NSC. The DCI also calls for estimates, as do other senior intelligence officers, although the greatest number of nominations come from the NIOs. The NIOs usually suggest that an Estimate be written because they have learned--from their contact with the policymakers and their knowledge of the intelligence--that such an estimate will be timely and relevant to a policy decision; sometimes one that has not yet captured the policymakers' attention.

- The NIO is routinely in contact with other members of the Intelligence and Policy Community in his area of expertise. He needs to be well aware of current US policy to anticipate both the intelligence needs that the policy might spark as well as the foreign policy repercussions of prospective US action. Those contacts are a constant and common source of ideas for new estimates--a boon for policy relevance and legitimate support to the policy process, but carrying with it the danger of skewing production to topics formulated only to support, and not to illuminate, policy.
- To guard against this, the NIOs, and other intelligence officials generate estimates where policy attention is needed, to tell the policymaker what the Intelligence Community feels the policymaker needs to hear, not necessarily what he wants to hear. And second, each request for an estimate is reviewed by the NIO with the Chairman of the National Intelligence Council and must be approved by the DCI. Disapproval is infrequent--never because of uncongeniality to the Policy Community--and only because of limited resources, conflicting priorities, or appropriateness--especially if a topic appears to be of a limited interest or too narrow or parochial in its focus for a national level estimate. The NFIB members' periodic review of the interagency production plan assures that they are well informed and can advise the DCI. The NIOs also maintain a continuing dialogue within the Intelligence Community and with the DCI to ensure that the production plan remains up to date and relevant.

6. Preparation and Coordination of TORs. In conjunction with the proposal for an estimate, the NIO presents a Concept Paper and Terms of Reference (TOR), drawing on suggestions from the Intelligence Community and the relevant policy people to define the scope and major themes of the estimate.

- Usually the office requesting the estimate will set forth the main questions which it hopes to see answered. The NIO views any intelligence questions posed as legitimate and will respond to them. The NIO and his Intelligence Community colleagues will not necessarily limit the scope of a proposed estimate strictly to the questions and issues posed by the requester, however. Answering

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only those questions posed by the requester, without considering the broader context could give a misleading impression regarding policy implications.

- The NIO maintains contact with the requester to insure that he understands the specific interests and purposes of the questions posed in an estimate, and to insure that the requester's intelligence needs are met. Although this is a practice long followed, it is worth noting that the SSCI in a September 1986 draft study also urged that NIOs remain in close contact with policymakers during the estimative process to ensure that relevant issues are addressed.
- A critical part of the TOR is the Key Questions. This section sets forth the few central questions which the NIO believes to represent the heart of the intelligence problem.
- The TOR also should clearly highlight the specific policy-related questions posed by the requester. Responses to these should also be highlighted in the estimate itself to catch policymaker attention.
- The TOR also includes a retrospective look at previous estimates on the same subject. This process helps remind the Community of past discussions on the topic and provides opportunity for minority or alternative views to be tested against subsequent events.
- The draft TOR also is seen by the Senior Review Panel (SRP) for its independent comment to the DCI and the NIO. The SRP is made up of retired senior diplomats, military officers, and scholars and reports directly to the DCI. Other independent DCI or NIO consultants or panels may also be asked to comment.
- The NIO then will make changes in the Concept Paper/Terms of Reference as he believes are necessary. The TOR is then sent to the DCI with a cover memo indicating how informal Community inputs and SRP comments were or were not accommodated.
- The DCI views the proper formulation of the TOR as a key element in developing a good estimate. Further, he uses the TOR as the first step in his personal supervision of the process to ensure objectivity and integrity of the product.
- The Intelligence Community representatives then meet with the NIO to review the TOR, suggest changes for content, clarity, and comprehensiveness, and coordinate for their agencies. The revised TOR is sent to the DCI and Community principals as the formal, coordinated TOR for the Estimate.
- This process of TOR review almost invariably adds to the scope of the paper. Rarely, if ever, are questions or issues dropped in the course of such review, except when deemed outside the purview of intelligence.

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7. The Drafting Process. The NIO will select a drafter for the estimate, from within the Intelligence Community. The drafter thereafter is responsible to the NIO for the estimate. The drafter seeks ideas and contributions from the Intelligence Community and outside experts as he develops the estimate.

- The drafting process, however, is sometimes influenced by the drafter's parent organization biases. The drafter--whatever his parent organization--will usually submit his draft for review at least to his own immediate superior and possibly higher reviewing officials before the draft goes to the NIO. This is not always the case, and usually is prompted by a desire to improve the writing through peer review.
- This review by the drafter's parent organization usually does contribute in terms of clarity, style and accuracy, but it also can affect the position taken by the drafter. In the real world, however, any drafter will be in part influenced by his own bureaucratic culture whether he undergoes his own in-house review or not.
- The NIO will review the draft closely and critically. He has license to make any changes he feels are necessary in the interest of clarity, style, length, comprehensiveness, focus, sharpness and accuracy of judgment. Initial drafts often require extensive work to insure that they are terse and estimative in character. The NIO's changes in the draft reflect a balance of his own best substantive judgment and an awareness that he will have to coordinate the text with the Intelligence Community and that he has an obligation to reflect their significant views in the main or alternative text.
- The draft estimate will then go to the SRP for independent review and comment. The NIO will accommodate as much of the SRP suggestions as he believes is appropriate. In most cases, SRP suggestions for change and improvement are incorporated. The revised draft is then sent to the DDCI and the DCI with a cover memo indicating how the SRP comments were accommodated. In a "fast track," this may occur after initial DCI review and simultaneous with informing the DCI and NFIB principals of the results of Community draft coordination.
- DCI review at this point is intended primarily to ensure that the draft meets the goals set forth in the TOR and to ensure sharpness of judgment. The DCI may offer comment on substance as well but prefers to reserve his comments until after he has heard from the NFIB principals. Simultaneous with DCI review (this does not imply his approval yet), the paper is sent to NFIB representatives for review and staffing.
- The NIO and the NFIB representatives take care throughout to ensure that the policy community should not have impact on the conclusions of the draft estimate. Policymakers do not attend the coordination process.

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8. Draft Coordination. The role of the NIO at the coordination meeting is a crucial one. He is responsible to the DCI to produce the best possible estimate he can along the lines agreed upon in the TOR, and is responsible to the Intelligence Community to assure that alternative views are adequately expressed.

- The estimate must reflect the best Community judgments but must not be allowed to deteriorate into the "lowest common denominator" consensus. It must reflect important alternative views while avoiding the pitfalls of becoming a Christmas tree of endless possibilities that destroy clarity of the judgment.
- The NIO cannot simply be an "honest broker" among contending parties; his role involves a greater degree of leadership--more akin to that of judge and manager who must ultimately arbitrate conflicts of view and serve as catalyst to ensure judgments are considered and far-reaching. The NIO must avoid foreclosure of debate or rejection of certain viewpoints by having recourse to statements such as "the DCI has special interest in this issue," or "the Secretary of _____ wants," which can serve to intimidate some representatives. The NIO should encourage expression from all representatives of the Community, avoiding dominance of the process by any one element or person.
- Organizations and their representatives presenting dissenting viewpoints have a special obligation to present a coherent and significant alternative view that enriches the document--rather than simply noting dissent or blurring the judgment.

9. Final DCI Review. The DCI receives an information copy of the post-coordination draft as it is forwarded to all NFIB principals for review.

- DCI comments or criticisms of the paper usually will be withheld until after full discussion at NFIB with the principals. This is a change from previous practice, in which DCI-proposed changes usually were inserted prior to NFIB. This change is meant to encourage a more free-flowing and active discussion of alternative views at NFIB.

10. Final Review in the Intelligence Community. Following distribution to NFIB principals, most agencies will submit the estimate to further in-house review. Certain problems can arise in the course of this process.

- Some Intelligence Community working level representatives may not fully represent their agency and their principal at coordination meetings--because of unresolved differences within the agency, inability to get the view of the agency's principal, or lack of empowerment. As a result, a commitment by a working level representative at the pre-NFIB coordination meetings may not be

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supported by the NFIB principal, sometimes over lesser issues. Getting the NFIB principals into discussions at the table is a positive development in most cases, but sometimes the discussion is over issues that could have been more efficiently handled by effective representatives working with the NIO at pre-NFIB meetings.

- Intelligence organizations attached to departments with policymaking responsibility face other complications. Their working level intelligence representatives sometimes commit their NFIB principal to an intelligence judgment in the estimate that is seen as unwelcome by the policy side of the department. This places a special responsibility on the heads of INR, DIA, and the Service intelligence organizations to insulate the intelligence process from undue policy influence.
- For whatever reason, we find that even after completion of working level coordination and pre-NFIB distribution, representatives sometime report back to the NIO that new changes are being sought by their Agencies. This part of the process is vulnerable to charges of politicization. These issues can be resolved, however--pre-NFIB brokering for routine adjustments, and deferral to NFIB hearing for those of greater significance.

11. NFIB. The National Foreign Intelligence Board represents the final forum for adjudication of estimates. The DCI and the principals are free to propose changes in the work of the Community representatives. It falls to the DCI to stimulate discussion, to elicit explanations of disagreements, to accept footnotes or alternative language, or to remand the estimate for further work. The dissent procedure at NFIB is one of the important mechanisms available to ensure that each intelligence agency has an opportunity to express its views if they have not already been adequately reflected earlier. Finally, it is the DCI who approves the document.

12. After NFIB. The NIO and the drafter accommodate changes directed by the DCI as a result of NFIB deliberations. Usually, these changes will be coordinated only by the NFIB representatives but any agency can request further NFIB principal review depending on the nature of the changes.

13. Feedback. There is a feedback process that enables the DCI to determine customer satisfaction. The DCI meets frequently with his senior readers; the President and the Cabinet-level consumers. The NIOs meet with sub-cabinet consumers on a daily or weekly basis. The interaction of senior intelligence officers with intelligence consumers in the interagency meetings occurs on a daily basis. All of these contacts afford the DCI the opportunity to gauge consumer satisfaction with the product.

14. Competitive Analysis. While the community has no formal mechanism to force competitive analysis, it does in fact exist. In addition to the expression of alternative views in the estimates themselves, each agency in the Intelligence Community is free to--and usually does--provide its own

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in-house and contract studies and estimates which usually gain broad dissemination. These (sometimes) alternative views are brought to bear in coordination of National Intelligence Estimates or even after publication. These individual Agency studies keep competitive analysis available to policymakers.

15. The Problem of Evidence. Uncertainty needs to be clearly identified in the text whenever judgments are made that are based more on informed insight than abundant evidence. Appendices can buttress arguments for positions taken in the text but meager evidence also cannot be allowed automatically to bar a judgment. A judgment on an issue can sometimes be sustained by insight into and experience with an area even when intelligence is skimpy or ambiguous. This is especially true in areas involving clandestine or covert activity by another party. In short, the drafter and the Community likewise must not be so mesmerized by absence of indicators, or by a misplaced faith in the most likely outcomes that it leads to automatic rejection of judgments based on intuitive feel for behavior of the players. Thus, on the evidentiary problem the Community is called to walk a fine line between establishing a legal brief and accepting a position based on circumstantial evidence and intuition in the absence of any certain knowledge.

16. The Dilemma of Senior Level Review. The review of draft estimates by the DCI and NFIB principals and their suggestions for changes can evoke charges of politicization of the intelligence process. These individuals, and their subordinate senior managers in particular, are closer to the policy process than are the intelligence analysts who draft the estimates and they bring a different outlook to the intelligence process. Differing senses of international realities can be identified mistakenly as a politically partisan view. The benefit of senior level review of estimates is that it often brings to bear a broader view of the international order and the character of international conflict. These views inevitably influence the assessment of the likelihood of certain events. It is important for all parties involved to distinguish between a legitimate critique of a narrow, ill-formed or naive conception of politics or the international order, and the advocacy of preferred political views on how to deal with the nature of the international conflict. In short, the higher the level of generalization about how certain situations will evolve, the more one's own unspoken philosophical sense of how the world works is involved. Searching critiques of Community estimative views by senior officials need not represent "politicization" of the process. But, the senior reviewer must be careful that his critique is not in fact politically driven or broadly perceived by the Community as such.

Products

17. Out of this process come four types of formal estimative products.
- National Intelligence Estimates and Special National Intelligence Estimates, or NIEs and SNIEs, go through all steps of the process just outlined. As they bear the NFIB imprimatur and DCI signature, they have the greatest weight. As a general rule NIEs deal with broader subjects than SNIEs, deal with anticipated events, look

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further ahead, and more time is given to their preparation. The SNIE usually treats with unanticipated events, more narrow questions, and over a shorter period. SNIEs further differ from NIEs in that they go through some of the steps in parallel rather than in series, to expedite production of high priority and time-sensitive requirements, but they still involve the key players, the NFIB is still the final forum for adjudication, and the DCI is still the final approval authority.

- Interagency Intelligence Memoranda and Interagency Intelligence Assessments, or IIMs and IIAs, differ from NIEs and SNIEs in that they are less estimative in nature and do not necessarily go through NFIB or bear the DCI's signature. But all agencies (in the case of IIAs at least all those with a substantive interest) still have the opportunity to coordinate, and agency representatives still have the opportunity to bring their principal's point of view to bear in the coordination process. Like the SNIEs, the IIAs go through some of their steps in parallel. Where the issues emerge as important enough, or the controversy surrounding them becomes great enough, IIMs in particular can be and sometimes are elevated to NFIB for consideration.
- It should be noted that there are other intelligence products which the NIOs work with the Community to produce, which are not formal estimates and do not go through the formal coordination process. Key among these are warning products, generated by discussions at specially convened meetings between NIOs and Intelligence Community representatives and then produced by the NIOs on a particular issue, or combined by the NIO for Warning from all the NIOs for a global review. The former are done on an as needed basis; the latter are done monthly for the DCI and further distribution. These warning products reflect Community views, often make note of alternative views, but are not formally coordinated Community products.
- Further, the NIO, as senior staff advisor to the DCI in his assigned area, fulfills a number of roles in which he does not have any responsibility to represent the Community. In these roles, such as producing talking points for DCI meetings or memos done as think pieces for the DCI or wider distribution to stimulate discussion, the NIO brings his own best judgment to bear. In these cases, it is imperative that he make explicit the fact that his views are his own, and he is not speaking on behalf of the Intelligence Community, even though his views will have been formed in the context of his interaction with that community.

18. In summary, the estimative process has some vulnerabilities in terms of meeting everyone's sense of objectivity and integrity, but it also contains many safeguards. These safeguards, consistently applied by all the players in the process, from drafters and agency representatives through NIOs and the NFIB principals, will provide the objectivity and integrity we seek. To summarize these safeguards, they are:

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- o Careful selection and orientation for each of the key people in the process.
- o The broadening of the scope of key policy questions to provide a context beyond that suggested by policymakers.
- o The exclusion of policymakers from the analytic and coordination process, ensuring Intelligence Community independence.
- o The participation by all elements of the Intelligence Community in the development and coordination of estimates from concept through final drafting.
- o The development of most likely and alternative outcomes in recognition of uncertainty on some evidence and the unpredictability of some events.
- o Explicit recognition in estimates of differing views within the Intelligence Community on particular judgments.
- o The right of any community member to explicitly dissent from any or all parts of estimates.
- o Numerous levels of review within each Agency throughout the process.
- o The use of outside specialists and consultants for independent views on selected issues.
- o Evaluation of completed estimates and feedback to the preparation of new ones as the cycle continues.
- o The ability of member agencies of the Intelligence Community to publish their own estimates and bring them to the attention of policymakers whenever they feel that a new line of analysis needs to be taken which may be at odds with the Intelligence Community's consensus views.
- o The DCI reviews the estimate at key points in its development to ensure that the integrity and objectivity of the process is maintained.

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CONFIDENTIAL
The Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C. 20505

National Intelligence Council

5 August 1987

MEMORANDUM FOR: National Foreign Intelligence Board Principals


FROM: H. F. Hutchinson, Jr.
Vice Chairman, National Intelligence Council

SUBJECT: Revision of Guidance for Interagency
Intelligence Production

REFERENCE: My memo, same subject, 8 June 1987

1. Your representatives met with me on 16 June and provided valuable written and oral suggestions for revisions of our procedures for interagency production. Those suggestions were incorporated into several drafts of revised procedures that have been discussed with the National Intelligence Officers.

2. Several distinguishing features have emerged in this revision.
- a. The procedures are much simpler, shorter, provide guidelines to a logical sequence of activity, and emphasize Community participation.
 - b. Rigid production timelines have been eliminated in favor of having the NIO establish timelines for each product in consultation with your representatives.
 - c. Emphasis upon DCI policy to seek NFIB counsel before he approves an interagency product.
 - d. Clarifies policy that any senior intelligence or policy official can request an interagency product, either directly to DCI or NIO or through departmental channels.
 - e. Stresses NIO responsibility to assist in reducing number of topics brought before NFIB, his responsibility to apply criteria of policy relevance and need for Community judgment to interagency production proposals, and the objective of more succinct interagency papers.



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- f. Simplified nomenclature to Estimates and Memoranda. The National Intelligence Estimate (NIE), Special National Intelligence Estimate (SNIE), Interagency Intelligence Memorandum (IIM) are essentially unchanged. We propose dropping the term Interagency Intelligence Assessment (IIA) in favor of Special Interagency Intelligence Memorandum (SIIM).

3. Copies of the proposed revisions also have been sent to your representatives who attended the 16 June meeting. Please provide your comments and suggestions on the attached proposal by 19 August. Then, I plan to have a final draft ready for NFIB discussion by the end of the month.



H. F. Hutchinson, Jr.

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Attachment:
As stated

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The Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C. 20505

National Intelligence Council

24 August 1987

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

FROM: H. F. Hutchinson, Jr.
Vice Chairman

SUBJECT: Procedures for Interagency Intelligence Production

REFERENCE: DIA Memorandum, C-0199/DE, same subject, 20 Aug 87

1. Your support of the major changes incorporated into the 5 August 87 draft is appreciated. Many of those changes were suggested by DIA and the Services. We have sought to construct broad guidelines without indulging in all the varying detail that must be dealt with by different agencies and their representatives in the interagency production process.

2. We will carry out some of the changes you recommended in your 20 August memorandum (attached), but we believe that it is inappropriate to incorporate them in these procedures.

a. We agree with your para 1.a. and 1.b.; we have made arrangements within the National Intelligence Council and to NFIB Secretariat to do that; but, this is too detailed for inclusion in the Procedures.

b. Your para 2.a. deals with an issue best treated separately from these Procedures. We have sought mutual understanding of these problems and agreements on solutions for some time now. The issue is broader than the interagency products and we believe that we should address the broader issue in another channel.

c. We agree with your para 2.b. that the NIO and the NFIB representatives should consider a recommendation for foreign dissemination of the interagency product before the approval stage. The NIOs have been reminded.

d. Your para 3 deals with a DoD procedure that we believe is best dealt with internally. We do not wish to interfere with DoD requirements that the DIA validate requests for estimates from Department of Defense components. On the other hand, we do not wish to



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erect barriers to communications between NIOs or the DCI and the senior intelligence and policy officials or military commanders. In any case, the Defense Intelligence Agency would be consulted, as would all NFIB members, concerning a proposal for an interagency product. Further, we respect your preference that DIA endorsement for production be addressed to the DCI rather than the NIO. On the other hand, we do not wish to make any change in the Procedures that would interfere with the preference of other NFIB members to address these issues to the NIOs who will deal with them on behalf of the DCI.

3. We hope that your concerns have been accommodated by the actions described above. If you would like to discuss some of these issues further, I would be pleased to drop by at your convenience.

[Redacted Signature]

H. F. Hutchinson, Jr.

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Attachment:
As stated

cc:

[Redacted CC List]

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C-0199/DE

20 August 1987

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE CHAIRMAN, NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE COUNCIL

SUBJECT: Revision of Guidance for Interagency Intelligence
Production []

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Reference: NIC memorandum, 5 Aug 87, subject as above.

1. [] DIA has reviewed the proposed draft change to the 27 July 1981 guidelines for interagency production of national intelligence.

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a. [] DIA notes that many of the major suggestions proposed earlier have been adopted. These modifications will significantly shape the thrust and content of the national estimates program. They include a reduction in the scheduled number of national estimates to be produced each year to allow for the inclusion of ad hoc fast-track estimates; a tight focus on policy-relevant questions in each estimate, and fewer text pages; and most importantly, the providing of 10 working days for final review of regular products and 5 working days for fast-track estimates prior to NFIB.

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b. [] In the revision of procedures, there are, however, some that would materially promote production efficiency and support the objectivity and integrity of the process. DIA's proposed recommendations are at the enclosure.

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2. [] DIA looks forward to receiving the next draft revision for NFIB consideration.

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FOR THE DIRECTOR:

1 Enclosure
DIA Recommendations
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ROBERT W. SCHMITT
RADM, USN
Deputy Director

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DIA RECOMMENDATIONS

1. DIA recommends the following changes: 25X1
 - a. The issuance of the NIC Production Schedule will be in July of each year to facilitate Agency member production planning and scheduling. 25X1
 - b. The use of the Wang ADP system is mandatory for the transmission of all fast-track estimates (SIE/SIIM) from the Concept Paper/TOR stage through approval and publication. 25X1

2. We note the omission of revisions for the dissemination process. We recommend the following be added to the checklist: 25X1
 - a. The dissemination of national estimates will be made by DIA to the Unified & Specified Commands as well as to the SHAPE U.S. military commands. 25X1
 - b. NIO recommendations for release of an estimate to "x" countries will be made when the estimate is considered by NFIB, not later as a separate administrative action. 25X1

3. We also recommend the clarification of Para 1.c. which states as policy that "any senior intelligence or policy official can request an interagency product, either directly to DCI or NIO or through departmental channels." Within DoD, initiation of requests for estimates are forwarded to DIA for validation and/or satisfaction by DIA, or endorsed to the DCI for production consideration. This centralized procedure provides for a more orderly evaluation by DIA of the requirement for such an estimate and, in the case of the U&S Commands, is required by JCS regulation. DIA also believes that Agency endorsement for production is more appropriately addressed to the DCI, not to the NIO. 25X1

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Enclosure to C-0199/DE

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PRODUCTION PLAN

BACKGROUND / ISSUES

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FY 88 PRODUCTION PLAN

Background and Issues That May Arise

- The draft FY 88 Production Plan is on the agenda for discussion with NFIB Principals on 24 September. While we can expect some comment, we do not expect any significant controversy because an earlier draft of the Plan was sent to the Community in August for comments and we prepared this version with those comments in mind (see Backup Tab for these comments). What we included from these comments, and what we excluded and why, were generally noted in the package we sent to NFIB Principals in advance of the upcoming meeting (see Revised Draft Plan Tab for the cover memo and new draft plan).
- To elaborate, while the latest version does not incorporate every suggestion made, it accommodates most of them, focusing on reducing the total number of scheduled items. In the process we combined some products, shifted others from NIE to IIM status thereby removing the requirement for NFIB consideration, deferred still others for possible consideration later, shifted yet others out of the plan for NIC Memo or single agency production, and eliminated some pieces altogether where there appeared to be no real policy interest.
- Those suggestions not totally accommodated, as explained in our memo to the Principals, were primarily unscheduled fast-track products that under our new draft guidelines are not included in the annual production plan. All their suggestions, or any others they care to make, will be considered over the course of the year as circumstances dictate that the subjects should be addressed. Some of these may be raised for discussion at the meeting.
- One other suggestion not accommodated that might arise was DIA's proposal to prioritize the items in the Plan in accordance with a rigid, formal scheme. A similar attempt to systematically prioritize production under the old guidelines fell into disuse, and was consciously excluded in the new draft guidelines. In our view, a formal priority system would be too rigid and counterproductive. Our priorities need to be informally and flexibly applied and revised on a case-by-case basis as policy needs shift, and not be bound by any pre-set system based on a subject matter typology or consideration of the source of the original idea.

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- Regarding the DDCI's general comments, which lead off the Backup Tab and which refer to the SRP comments which immediately follow, we of course will be continually considering fast-track unscheduled papers (SNIEs and SIIMs) to complement the annual plan. Some of these will no doubt address the INF agreement and Summit (for example, the SNIE on Post INF Europe now in work), the Iran/Iraq/Gulf situation as it develops, and emerging Central American and Pakistan/Afghanistan issues. We will be vetting these widely, seeking your approval when they appear ready for initiation, and tracking these along with the scheduled items in the weekly status report on interagency products sent to each NFIB agency.

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- Latin America area and will consider others over the course of the year. The NIOs Europe, GPF, and SP are considering additional European issues that may require interagency treatment. For example, in addition to treatment of increased European security cooperation and Warsaw Pact doctrine and forces we have already scheduled, we are certain that we must deal with other aspects of the changing context for NATO strategy. We will be considering the key political, military, and economic factors that have changed since the current NATO strategy was formulated and judge how they are likely to change in the next few years with particular concern for implications for the NATO strategy.
- Our memorandum to the NFIB Principals forwarding the revised plan for NFIB consideration invites their further comment at the meeting and concludes with the notation that suggestions for a few deletions or additions can be handled at the working level and probably will not require further attention at NFIB. Any further proposals you may have to modify the plan could be handled in the same way prior to its publication. And, of course, revisions can and will be made as necessary as the year progresses.
- Vice Chairman Fred Hutchinson will initiate the discussion and is prepared to field questions about why any particular subject is or is not in the Production Plan.
- Recommend you read the 18 September memo to Principals and peruse the attached plan at the next Tab. Time permitting, also recommend you peruse the comments on the earlier version of the draft plan at the following Tab.

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DRAFT REVISED PLAN

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The Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C. 20505

National Intelligence Council

18 September 1987

MEMORANDUM FOR: National Foreign Intelligence Board Principals

FROM: Maj Gen Frank B. Horton III, USAF
Chairman, National Intelligence Council

SUBJECT: FY 88 Production Plan

1. The attached Production Plan is for your consideration and discussion at a future NFIB meeting, currently scheduled for 24 September.

2. This plan is a transition document. It reflects interagency intelligence production begun under the old production guidelines as well as proposals under the new proposed guidelines. Your thoughtful comments on the earlier draft plan we forwarded to you on 28 August were helpful to us and we appreciate the assistance. We have accommodated many, if not most, of the suggestions. A few, however, proposed to add certain time-sensitive Special National Intelligence Estimates (SNIEs) or Special Interagency Intelligence Memoranda (SIIMs) to the schedule. Per the new draft guidelines, we have not listed SNIEs or SIIMs in the annual production plan given their unpredictability as to appropriate scope and timing. We will consider proposals for unscheduled production, however, at any time circumstances indicate a requirement. These will continue to be tracked as they are today along with scheduled production in computer products we provide regularly to your office.

3. Under the new guidelines, we have worked toward a smaller number of scheduled interagency papers in the plan, both National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs) and Interagency Intelligence Memoranda (IIMs), as a result of rigorous application of the criteria of high importance, policy relevance, and the clear need for Community judgments. Under the old guidelines and practices, we have had a longer production plan which contained many items of a general research nature that were either not of high policy interest or truly policy relevant. This production plan contains a residue of the latter, most of which are nearly complete and will be issued by January. We propose to leave them in the plan; many have been redesignated as Interagency Intelligence Memorandum (IIM).

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4. As a result of your comments and our winnowing out, this Production Plan contains 56 separate pieces; 27 NIE, 25 IIM, and 4 Memoranda to Holders (MTH). Forty-one percent, or 23 pieces, should be completed by January and almost all of them were initiated under the old procedures. Thus, there are 33 pieces (16 NIE, 15 IIM, 2 MTH) in the FY 88 Production Plan that truly fall under the criteria in the new guidelines. We particularly invite your attention to the 20 pieces in the Production Plan on which no work has been done. An asterisk indicates that work is underway; thus, you will find 20 titles without an asterisk. Those items should fit the new criteria more closely than other groupings within the plan.

5. We have proposed to the Director Central Intelligence that this FY 88 Production Plan be entered on an NFIB agenda soon; it is currently scheduled for 24 September. Further, we have suggested that the Principals discuss it at the meeting and that the DCI approve the Plan for publication if there is general agreement. A suggestion or two for additions or deletions could be handled with your representatives later without further NFIB discussion. In any case, it should be noted that we view the production Plan as something to be adjusted whenever US interests or the international environment dictates.

Frank B. Horton III

Attachment:
As stated

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14 September 1987

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman, National Intelligence Council

FROM: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: Draft FY-88 Production Plan

1. I've reviewed the draft FY-88 Production Plan and offer my specific comments below. In general, however, I endorse the comments of the Senior Review Panel, particularly in paragraphs 2d, 2e, and 3. While I believe it is not possible to reissue the plan at the end of the first quarter FY-88 as the SRP suggests, the turning points they note are important. It seems to me, however, that we can project those turning points and incorporate them into the program. For example, an INF Agreement and a Summit seem nearly assured; Iran/Iraq/Gulf situation will continue; trouble looms for the Resistance in Nicaragua and thus all of Central America; and Pakistan aid is going to be a near thing. None of these are dead certainties but the odds would favor the outcomes indicated above and we should proceed accordingly.

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2. I have made some notes on specific papers in the program but would offer the following specific comments:

- There are several papers such as the "Chemical Warfare Use in the Iraq-Iraq Conflict" that seem to me not to require interagency examination. There are a few others I have marked this way as well.
- I question whether a couple of the papers listed by NIO Europe are, in fact, the key longer range issues in Europe for the year ahead.
- Similarly, for General Purpose Forces, the program seems too focused on narrow specific papers. At a time when it appears there are some sweeping doctrinal, political, and economic changes in train that have enormous implications for conventional forces in Europe on both sides, I do not feel that we have addressed

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that issue at all. I have the sense that we are in a period of considerable change in approaches to conventional forces and this list of papers does not put us out in front of that.

-- I share the SRP's view that the two papers on Latin America do not seem adequate, even taking into account the large number of ad hoc papers that will undoubtedly be required. Are there no more important issues or developments on a regional basis that we should try and capture in a national estimate?

-- I think the Soviet program looks pretty good.



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RF
Robert M. Gates

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The Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C. 20505

National Intelligence Council

NIC #03635-87
28 August 1987

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
VIA: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
FROM: Maj Gen Frank B. Horton III, USAF
Chairman
SUBJECT: Draft FY 88 Production Plan

1. The attached draft Production Plan has been forwarded to NFIB Principals and the Senior Review Panel for their comment by 10 September. It has benefited from earlier inputs from the working level across the Community and from the SRP.

2. With an eye to focusing the Community's resources on the key estimative issues, several estimates that had previously been scheduled or proposed have been dropped, while a few others have been modified or added. The net effect has been to reduce the plan to half its earlier length, leaving more room for unscheduled proposals, notably fast tracks, over the course of the year.

3. We believe we are now much closer to the smaller, more highly selective and policy relevant plan we have sought, but solicit any thoughts you may have for further refinements. We plan to have a final draft to you for your consideration later in September, with NFIB discussion and official publication to follow.

V/R,


Frank B. Horton III

Attachment:
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NIC #03635-87
28 August 1987

SUBJECT: Draft FY 88 Production Plan

DCI/NIC/C/NIC:FBHorton:bha(27 Aug 87)



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Distribution:

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The Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C. 20505

National Intelligence Council

28 August 1987

MEMORANDUM FOR: National Foreign Intelligence Board Principals

FROM: Maj Gen Frank B. Horton III, USAF
Chairman, National Intelligence Council

SUBJECT: FY 1988 National Intelligence Council Production Plan

1. The attached draft Production Plan is provided for your review and comment. We would like the opportunity to consider your comments before sending the final version of the draft to the DCI. We will ask the DCI to reserve some time for NFIB discussion of the final draft Plan prior to its official publication.

2. There have been changes in our approach to the annual Production Plan:

a. The NIC has converted back to a fiscal year plan, to be issued in October each year. We understand that many agencies are working their plans on this basis; the objective of our change is to allow better coordination between our Production Plan and those of the rest of the Community.

b. Toward this end, we intend to circulate an early draft of future revisions in July each year. This year we are running late because of the change to a fiscal year basis and because of new criteria for interagency products. Even so, considerable informal dialogue has taken place between NIOs and the Community at the working level in shaping the current draft.

c. The criteria enunciated in our new procedures for interagency intelligence production have been used in developing the draft, resulting in reducing the Plan to half its earlier length. We have attempted to move away from research topics and peripheral issues and focus on the truly estimative and relevant. We have also attempted to leave room for the propensity of particular NIO accounts to be required to produce unscheduled fast-track items over the course of the year.



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d. The transition to a smaller, more highly selective Production Plan is still evolving, and we solicit your thoughts on where any further cuts might beneficially be made. We are, of course, also open to proposals for modifications or additions which would enhance the overall relevance of what we would propose to produce, but would look to a net effect of maintaining or preferably reducing the total on the list.

e. Finally, we always welcome any further inputs you may have for additions, deletions, or modifications over the course of the year; the production Plan is not meant to remain static once published.

3. Your response to and any comments on the attached should be received by 10 September, in order to consider them prior to sending the final version of the draft Production Plan to the DCI.



Frank B. Horton III

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


DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
HEADQUARTERS AIR FORCE INTELLIGENCE SERVICE
FORT BELVOIR, VIRGINIA 22060-5788

13 SEP 1987

REPLY TO
ATTN OF IA

SUBJECT FY 1988 National Intelligence Council Production Plan
(Your Memo, 28 Aug 87)



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TO Chairman, National Intelligence Council

1. In response to your request for comments on the FY 1988 draft Production Plan (NIFB 14.2/41), we believe the projected list of issues for interagency production adequately covers the appropriate concerns.

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2. We are particularly pleased with the dramatic reduction in the number of estimates scheduled for production. We have long been proponents of a careful scrutiny of the requirements for estimates and for a reduction in the number of projected products. Concentrating on issues which are "truly estimative and relevant" and moving away from peripheral issues will provide better focus to NIC production efforts.

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EVAN H. PARROTT JR, Colonel, USAF
Deputy Commander for Assessments

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DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
WASHINGTON, DC 20350-2000

IN REPLY REFER TO
009Y/7C363391
18 Aug 87

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MEMORANDUM FOR VICE CHAIRMAN, NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE COUNCIL


**Subj: REVISION OF GUIDANCE FOR INTERAGENCY
INTELLIGENCE PRODUCTION**

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Ref: (a) NIC memo dtd 5 Aug 87

1. Navy has reviewed and concurs with the proposed revisions to subject guidance forwarded by reference (a).

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James M. Eglin
Captain, U.S. Navy
Assistant Director of
Naval Intelligence
(Analysis)

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