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The Director of Central Intelligence

Washington, D.C. 20505

National Intelligence Council

NIC #89-00056  
17 January 1989

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence  
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

FROM: Fritz Ermarth  
Chairman

SUBJECT: National Intelligence Council Goals for 1989

In 1989, as in the past, the National Intelligence Council will have four principal functions:

- To give you the best possible staff support in your capacities as advisors to the President and the members of the National Security Council.
- To prepare National Intelligence Estimates and other Community products of the highest quality and utility.
- To represent your interests in the Intelligence Community on selected programming, collection, and analysis issues.
- To stimulate better products from the individual agencies of the Community.

Our topical goals for the coming year are formulated in the Production Plan for FY89 which will soon be published. Although necessarily subject to adjustment as events dictate, this year's Plan shows the increasing complexity of "traditional" topics, e.g., Soviet domestic and foreign policy, and the growing importance of novel ones, e.g., global economic trends. As in the past, individual NIOs will contribute to and in some cases lead the process of wiring together the efforts of separate agencies in specific areas, such as counterintelligence, terrorism, and narcotics.

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Goals for 1989

We have chosen to focus in 1989 on five major goals, both substantive and managerial:

1. To enhance further the utility and impact of national intelligence products.

We are gratified that the Interagency Production Committee's recent survey of several hundred intelligence consumers found National Intelligence Estimates highly appreciated. We have made progress in shortening many of our products, a must for most users. But we know more can be done to enhance their quality. Hence we shall a) sharpen the process of selecting national intelligence topics, especially for estimates; b) work harder at producing crisp and vivid judgments, while not obscuring uncertainties; and c) follow up with marketing measures, e.g., briefings by NIOs, to assure our messages get across and to gauge reactions.

2. To enhance the intelligence advisory role of NIOs in support of the policy process.

As new officials take their places in the Bush Administration, NIOs will be active in establishing rapport with their natural constituencies, particularly at the assistant and deputy assistant secretary level. Initially they will strive to educate their customers to the capabilities and limits of intelligence, and how to use it. At the same time, NIOs will work to identify the emerging policy agendas and policy review processes of the new administration to maximize the utility of intelligence support at the early, formative stages of its planning.

3. To collaborate more effectively with the Intelligence Community Staff in shaping the Community's overall requirements, strategies, and programs.

Dick Kerr has specifically commended this objective to us. For years, the NIC has helped the IC Staff develop programatic documents, such as the National Foreign Intelligence Strategy, and to review requirements in specific areas. Often, however, this help has been perfunctory, with the NIC's perspective on the world at the front of such documents having little evident connection with the programatic material that followed. Austere budgets and greater pressure to optimize resource allocations across the Community will force us to improve NIC and IC Staff collaboration.

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At the same time, with the IC Staff and the agencies of the Community, we should do more to identify specific collection and analysis gaps and strategies for closing them. As yet we do not have a precise formula for enhancing this collaboration, but General Heinz and I have begun a dialogue to find one.

4. To recruit NIOs and A/NIOs of the highest quality.

This is, of course, a standing goal. But it deserves special emphasis because a rather large number of NIC members will be turning over in 1989 due to retirements and rotations. Having settled into the job in 1988, I shall have perhaps my greatest opportunity to shape the performance of the NIC in the years ahead through recruitment in 1989. Special emphasis must go to attracting minority and women candidates. I know I can count on your support in making the jobs of NIO and Assistant NIO appealing to the potential candidates we want.

5. To rationalize ADP support to the NIC and to equip all members with PCs.

This seemingly mundane administrative goal is very important. In this area, the NIC suffers from the "evolutionary disorder" of the rest of the Agency, and depends on much larger Headquarters components to chart the course we must follow. Yet ADP is a powerful force multiplier, especially valuable to a relatively small and flat staff organization. We shall strive to make a quantum leap ahead in 1989 so that all NIC offices can tap into electronic data bases and can communicate electronically with one another.

Achievements in 1988

At TAB A are the NIC's goals for 1988, and at TAB B our mid-year report. I believe only a few comments are warranted on the past year:

- Relations with policy officials remained largely static during 1988, in large part because the administration was winding down. Where NIOs had strong ties from earlier years, they remained strong, while weaknesses were not much improved. In the coming year of new faces, we shall all have to hustle.


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- In addition to the monthly warning meetings chaired by individual NIOs, we have called special warning meetings of the Intelligence Community to assess developments in specific areas. These have yielded "sense of the Community" memos less formal than estimates but still useful in capturing Community views. We plan to do more of these in the future.
- Although we shall strive for more improvements, in 1988 we did make progress in strengthening the process of drafting NIEs (especially shortening) and subjecting most of them to outside review by consultants. These measures helped gain the positive customer reactions found by the IPC.



Fritz W. Ermarth

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SUBJECT: National Intelligence Council Goals for 1989

C/NIC:FWE:  17 Jan 89)

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Distribution:

- 1 - DCI
- 1 - DDCI
- 1 - SA/DCI
- 1 - ER
- 1 - Each NIO (w/o attach)
- 1 - O/C/NIC Chrono
- 1 - FWE Chrono

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OVERVIEW - NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE COUNCIL

The National Intelligence Council, an umbrella organization for the National Intelligence officers, is headed by a Chairman and Vice Chairman. It includes 15 National Intelligence Officers (NIOs) 19 Assistant NIOs, a Warning Staff, a Foreign Intelligence Activities Staff, an Analytical Group, and a support staff. Although CIA houses and provides administrative support, the Council is an Intelligence Community organization and the NIOs report to the DCI in his capacity as head of the Intelligence Community.

The NIOs are divided among regional and functional accounts that reflect the major analytical elements of the Intelligence Community. The NIOs have four functions. They provide staff support to the Director and Deputy Director on substantive intelligence issues. This may take the form of preparing memoranda on significant subjects, offering briefings, or assisting the Director in improving Community performance. Second, they help the Director coordinate Intelligence Community activities. To this end, they meet with analysts and supervisors in the Community, represent their interests and identify weaknesses for correction. Third, they manage the preparation of National Intelligence Estimates and other coordinated interagency products. Their job is to insure that these products represent the absolute best the Intelligence Community has to offer and that they accurately reflect the coordinated views of the entire Community. Finally, they help make intelligence products more relevant to the needs of policymakers. Their daily interaction with policymakers and their knowledge of opinion outside the Intelligence Community enables them to test the relevance and accuracy of the Community's agenda.

To accomplish these tasks NIOs are required to have experience, seasoning and a broad view. Most are drawn from the Intelligence Community, but some come from policy agencies or academic institutions and think tanks. They are generally recognized experts in their field. They circulate both inside and outside the Intelligence Community and maintain contacts outside the Government.

The base level would permit the National Intelligence Council to perform its basic functions of previous years, but would not permit directed improvements in DCI advisory panels, quality improvements in National Intelligence Estimates, full strength as called for in the Intelligence Authorization Act of 1985 or replacement of obsolescent ADP equipment.

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The Director of Central Intelligence

Washington, D.C. 20305

7:4 JAN 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR: National Foreign Intelligence Board  
SUBJECT : National Intelligence Council

1. Effective 3 December 1979, the Director of Central Intelligence authorized the establishment of the National Intelligence Council as the principal organization in CIA charged with fulfilling that Agency's responsibilities in producing national intelligence estimates and other interagency assessments. The NIC will report to the Deputy Director, National Foreign Assessment, and through him to the Director of Central Intelligence.

2. Organization: The National Intelligence Council is chaired by Richard Lehman, who will also serve as National Intelligence Officer for Warning. The other principal members are:

Associate Chairman: Vacant  
National Intelligence Officer/Africa: L. Gray Cowan  
National Intelligence Officer/China and East Asia:  
    Amb. John H. Holdridge  
National Intelligence Officer/General Purpose Forces:  
    MGen. Paul E. Gorman, USA  
National Intelligence Officer/Latin America: Jack Davis  
National Intelligence Officer/Near East and South Asia:  
    Robert C. Ames  
National Intelligence Officer/Strategic Programs: Howard  
    Stoertz, Jr.  
National Intelligence Officer/USSR and Eastern Europe:  
    Arnold L. Horelick  
National Intelligence Officer/Western Europe: Joe L. Zaring  
(4) National Intelligence Officers-at-Large: Hans Heymann, Jr.  
    (3 vacancies)

(Three former NIO accounts -- Nuclear Proliferation, Political-Economy, and Special Studies -- will from now on be handled at a different level.) Other elements of the NIC will include the Assistant NIOs, who will continue to work under and, as necessary, substitute for their principals, and a relatively small Analytic Group. This will be made up of officers

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with broad substantive and regional expertise and proven writing skills, drawn from NFIB agencies and to some extent from outside government. Its numbers in general will serve with the NIC on rotational assignments of two or three years. The Analytic Group's principal function will be to draft national intelligence estimates\* and other assessments under the guidance of the appropriate NIOs. [redacted]

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3. Purpose: The primary purpose of the National Intelligence Council is to improve the quality of national-level intelligence assessments. Formation of the Analytic Group, whose resources will be wholly dedicated to and trained in the production of such assessments, will reduce our need to call upon the other NFIB agencies of CIA/NFAC for drafting assistance from their frequently overburdened staffs. The creation of the Analytic Group should also help reduce delays in the production process. Further improvement should stem from the regular collegial review of each assessment that will be a principal function of the four new National Intelligence Officers-at-Large, each of whom will bring to bear a wide range of substantive strengths on the critical review of drafts. [redacted]

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4. Community Role: Another important purpose in creating the NIC is to make it possible to enhance each individual NIO's role as substantive adviser to and surrogate for the DCI within his own field of expertise and as the Intelligence Community's manager of national intelligence production in that field. Each NIO will continue to work directly with and represent the DCI as before. The NIO also continues to be the principal mechanism for ensuring that national intelligence production is relevant to the consumers' needs. Creating the NIC and providing it with its own staff structure should make it easier for each NIO to perform these important Community-related roles than in recent years. It is important to note that while the NIC reports to the Deputy Director, National Foreign Assessment and must necessarily draw heavily upon NFAC resources, it is an Intelligence Community-related organization with a national role and is not a unit of NFAC. [redacted]

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5. What we seek to establish is, in sum, a fortified NIO system with somewhat more structural coherence, with modest analytical resources of its own, and with a charter that permits and encourages the NIOs to work more closely with their associates in the intelligence and national security policymaking communities. To that end, we solicit your cooperation and support, and we invite your comments. In particular, we invite you to nominate officers possessing broad substantive expertise and first-rate drafting ability as candidates for rotational assignment to the Analytic Group. [redacted]

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\*Most military estimates, however, will continue to be produced by interagency teams, and other estimates and assessments will on occasion be drafted by non-NIC officers when the best or most appropriate drafters are to be found outside the NIC. [redacted]

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SUBJECT: The Community and the National Intelligence Council

Distribution:

Orig - DCI (to be given to NFIB Exec. Sec.)  
1 - DDCI  
1 - ER  
1 - DD/NFA  
1 - C/NIC  
1 - NFAC Registry

KEY JOB ELEMENTS

1. Provide analytical judgments and advice to the Director and Deputy Director on substantive issues. Represent the Director and Deputy Director as requested in interagency fora.
2. Manage the drafting and coordination of national estimates and intelligence memoranda.
3. Organize, provide leadership to and acquire a working knowledge of appropriate elements of the Intelligence Community.
4. To assure the relevance of Intelligence Community production sample views at universities, think tanks, corporations and in the policy community regarding the priority and significance of major foreign policy issues.

NIC #00074-89  
23 January 1989

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence  
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

FROM: David D. Gries  
Vice Chairman

SUBJECT: National Intelligence Council Checklist

The NIOs are among the principal officers reporting to you and the Deputy Director who concentrate on the capabilities of the Intelligence Community to collect, analyze and produce intelligence for customers at the NSC, State, Defense and other national security organizations. As a result, the NIOs can assist you in making the Intelligence Community more responsive to customers and more effective in using resources. What follows is a checklist of NIO capabilities.

The NIOs represent you to the Intelligence Community. Because they know the Community's strengths and weaknesses, they can help you improve its performance. They can advise you on:

- views of member agencies on issues
- strengths and weaknesses of agencies
- Community requirements and evaluation system
- Community resource issues
- talking points for your meetings with Community leaders
- national estimates and other Community papers

The NIOs spend a substantial amount of their time in the policy community. They represent you at the Interdepartmental Group level and enjoy cordial relationships with appropriate assistant secretaries and NSC officers. Therefore, they can inform you on:

- the state of play in various interdepartmental groups
- policy positions and agendas of key assistant secretaries
- intelligence requirements of the policy community
- feedback from the policy community on Intelligence Community performance
- policy trends on major issues

The NIOs also maintain contact with key military customers, especially the CINCs. They can advise you on relationships between these military customers and the Intelligence Community, including:

- intelligence requirements of military customers
- feedback on intelligence support to the military
- scope and function of military intelligence organizations
- talking points for your meetings with senior commanders

Although the NIOs concentrate on issues within the Intelligence Community, their interaction with CIA's DI, DO and DS&T position them to advise you on issues that involve more than one directorate. Some of these are:

- cooperation, competition and disputes between the directorates
- disconnects among the directorates on particular issues

The NIOs are expected to identify trends and anticipate major developments. Travel to their areas and consultation with American academic and business leaders help to sharpen these forecasting skills. They help you assess:

- long-term trends
- integrated (political, military, economic) views about the future
- impact of trends on Intelligence Community requirements and resources
- attitudes towards the Intelligence Community in academic and business circles

David D. Gries

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Notes used in preparing for discussion with DCI Webster -- discussed with DCI and DDCI on 18 December 1987; discussed with NIOs 13 January 1988

### What do NIOs do

You are familiar with NIOs' most visible responsibility--managing the national estimates process on your behalf.

Today, I wish to discuss what the NIOs do in order to prepare themselves for that task.

My starting point is that the NIOs are your personal staff officers and they are working on your behalf, with respect to your broadest interests. Their activities are to be in support of your policies, in support of you, responsive to your needs.

The principal focus, the mission of the NIO, is to know everything in their assigned portfolio that the DCI would know if he had the time to indulge in that detail available to the NIO, who does have the time.

Let's put this in historical context and discuss what Schlesinger and Colby had in mind when we formulated the personal staff concept and translated it into the NIO system.

Their view has not been the only one but it has been the centerpiece of the concept as individualized by succeeding DCIs.

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The origin of the NIO concept was not in the estimates process; it grew out of a concern that the CIA is fragmented along the lines of analysis, human collection and covert action, and technical collection. Further, there are significant barriers to the cross-flow of information within those three directorates. Thus, if a DCI turns to one of those DDs, he will not receive a fully informed, well thought out view of an activity. At the least, he needs to ask all three DDs and assimilate the information himself. A formidable task for any DCI.

In the broader responsibilities of the DCI, this problem is multiplied in terms of the other organizations: the NRO, the services, DIA, NSA, etc.

The personal staff officer concept was developed:

- o to have senior, experienced officers; rank equal to senior managers anywhere in CIA or Community (SIS-4);
- o assigned a specific portfolio, functional or geographic, and to know everything in it in the detail the DCI would if he had the time; everything the DCI may need to know;
- o NIO should work the policy community/military command level at the Assistant Secretary/JCS Deputies/CINC levels to know the policy, the issues, the problems, and the perceptions.

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- o NIO should work intelligence production community at CIA/DI office level, NSA group level, INR office director; he should know what has been produced, what is being produced, and what will be produced. And why, and why not.
- o NIO should work with collectors at the DO Division level, NRO program, collection requirements staffs, NSA group chiefs, Director of Attaches, and INR and bureaus.

The NIO now is in a position to counsel; first of all his responsibility is to keep the DCI informed, across the range of his portfolio, of significant events across the full breadth of DCI interests. Also, the NIO is prepared to exhort, urge, suggest, recommend to policy people the intelligence support they need; ditto to producer of intelligence and to the collector.

The sum of:

- o knowledge of policy concerns
- o production
- o collection
- o knowledge of DCI concerns and responsibilities
- o equals full preparation for managing estimates on behalf of the DCI
- o providing counsel to the DCI



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We should note here that the development of this concept of a senior personal staff for the DCI in 1973 arose from his need for a mechanism to integrate the Agency and the Community. The concept was deemed also to be a solution for a moribund process of producing estimates. It was an excellent single solution to two separate but related problems.

What is the point of this recitation? So what? There are several points to make:

- o there are good, defensible, necessary reasons for DCI senior personal staff to be fraternizing with policy people and military commanders, the Tower Commission notwithstanding.
- o these NIOs are available to you, they are your staff representatives, they and their utterances carry considerable weight, they can provide you the best single-stop shopping for details across CIA offices and directorates and across the whole Community.
- o the NIOs need access to you to glean concerns, priorities, and to inform.
- o the NIOs should be selected by you, or on your behalf, for the qualities necessary to fill the described role.

Having discussed the origin of the NIOs, and the original concept, we should underline that they have been used differently by each DCI. All the described functions have been in play but the emphasis has varied.

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Common to all DCIs though is what the NIO is not:

- he has no command authority, he is a staff officer; traditional distinctions between staff and line
- the NIOs are not a unified, integrated office; they function largely as separate and independent accounts
- the National Intelligence council is not a council in the usual sense; the NIOs meet as a council only for their internal support functions
- the NIC, the NIOs collectively, is not an independent center of analysis; it is not an analytic center at all

The NIO does manage, on your behalf, as a staff officer, the Community production of national estimates.

The NIO does analysis, on his own, for you; confidential advice usually; the counsel of a senior staff officer.

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The Director of Central Intelligence  
Washington, D.C. 20505

National Intelligence Council

NIC #00596-88  
16 February 1988

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence  
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

FROM: David D. Gries *DS*  
Vice Chairman

SUBJECT: How Your NIOs Can Help You


1. During a conversation before Christmas, you asked for ideas on how the National Intelligence Officers (NIOs) could save you time, keep you informed, and extend your reach in the Intelligence Community. I think you might get some good ideas from a brief review of how your predecessors used their NIOs. Afterwards, I will offer a few recommendations.

Origin of the NIO System

CIA Director Colby put the system into place in 1973, but it was actually Dr. Schlesinger's idea, conceived while he was still at the Office of Management and Budget, to appoint senior intelligence officers as Intelligence Community referents for key geographic and functional areas.

Schlesinger asserted that much of CIA analysis was irrelevant because analysts were out of touch with the policy community. He was not the only critic:

- President Nixon faulted then CIA Director Helms for not exerting enough control over the Intelligence Community.
- Kissinger complained that National Intelligence Estimates had lost their edge and that they sometimes reached unsupported conclusions.
- Directors of other US intelligence agencies alleged that the Estimates were biased toward the CIA viewpoint.



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Colby himself saw the need for improved staff support on substantive issues. Stretched thin by other demands, he could not afford to waste his time canvassing the Intelligence Community for information. As he commented in Honorable Men, My Life in the CIA (page 352):

"I was troubled over how badly the machinery was organized to serve me. If I wanted to know what was happening in China, for example, I would have to assemble individual experts in China's politics, its economics, its military, its personalities, as well as the clandestine operators who would tell me things they would tell no one else. . ."

To help him with these problems, Colby appointed a number of senior, experienced people who combined intellectual energy with operational effectiveness, calling them NIOs. Thus, from the beginning, a close and special relationship existed between the Director and the NIOs.

Colby's successors, Directors Bush, Turner and Casey, retained the NIO system while imposing their own style and emphasis. Though the numbers and portfolios of individual NIOs have varied according to each Director's concerns and interests, the system has served all of them as a powerful yet flexible means of finding things out and getting things done.

#### The NIOs Under Colby

Colby assigned the NIOs the following functions (my breakdown, not his):

- To provide staff support to the Director on substantive intelligence issues. Better one immediately accessible NIO on China than a roomful of China watchers. Colby used his NIOs variously to provide briefings, oral and written early warnings, unconventional analysis, and back-up support at meetings and on trips abroad.
- To help the Director coordinate Intelligence Community activities. Colby realized that if the DCI was to take charge of the Intelligence Community as President Nixon was demanding, he had to have help. Not only could the NIOs give him advice in their areas of specialization; in some cases they could act in his stead. They were charged with organizing the key Intelligence Community players in their specialized areas; conveying to them the Director's goals, strategies, and priorities; and advising the Director of any weaknesses they saw in Community collection and analysis.
- To manage the preparation of Estimates and other coordinated interagency products. In particular, Colby wanted the NIOs to ensure that these products represented the absolute best the Intelligence Community had to offer and that they accurately reflected the views of the whole Community.

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- To help make intelligence products more relevant to the needs of the policymakers. Colby wanted the NIOs to be his eyes and ears. He directed them to greatly increase and improve their contacts in the policy, business, and academic communities in order to identify the issues the Intelligence Community should be addressing and in what priority. Then the NIOs were to advise intelligence collectors and producers about any gaps in their efforts.

The NIOs Under Bush

Bush was not in office long enough to have much impact on the system, though he did issue a statement of goals for the NIOs--it was similar to the above breakdown--and he made a start toward formalizing the Director's control over their activities.

The NIOs Under Turner

Upon taking charge, Turner decided that the NIO system needed more structural coherence and discipline. To increase accountability and promote collegiality among the NIOs, he created the National Intelligence Council structure you see today. The basic NIO functions stayed the same:

- Provide support to the Director. Turner met frequently with selected groups of NIOs to discuss intelligence topics; these meetings were usually scheduled some days in advance, but the discussions were unstructured except for an opening presentation. He took NIOs along with him on most of his trips abroad.
- Coordinate Intelligence Community activities. Turner installed the NIOs as key players in various Community groups that examined requirements, gaps, and critical problems.
- Supervise interagency production. Turner believed that managing the production of Estimates was the key function of the NIOs, and he stressed presentation of competitive viewpoints in Estimates.
  - Turner regarded the practice of expressing dissent in footnotes as rarely helpful to policymakers. He insisted that dissents be highlighted and explain why two or more analysts with access to the same information should come up with different conclusions. As he wrote in Secrecy and Democracy (page 244), "The most valuable NIEs are those that present differences of substance clearly."
- Help make intelligence relevant. Like Colby, Turner relied on the NIOs to ensure that Community production addressed the needs of the policy community. And like Colby, he encouraged the NIOs to make outside contacts, though he kept them on tighter leashes than Colby did.

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The NIOs Under Casey

Eager to make a strong impact on the workings of the Intelligence Community, Casey turned early and often to his NIOs as agents of change. Interested in substance, he invited regular contact with NIOs he found congenial and helpful. He once remarked to the others that, "I don't see you very often, and that's your fault." Though Casey greatly increased the workloads of the NIOs, he allowed only a modest increase in their number: he wanted a small, hard-hitting cadre to whom he could relate personally. Despite considerable changes in style, the NIOs continued to:

- Provide staff support to the Director. Casey expected instant expertise from his NIOs, the ability to produce on demand a three- or four-sentence update on any issue within their purview.
- He frequently telephoned or met NIOs to ask questions. They became his reference library for quick response items that came up during the day. He often asked for topical briefings before meetings of the National Security Council or other senior-level groups.
- He encouraged the NIOs to prepare short think-pieces on subjects they believed he should address--he specifically welcomed dissenting views and offbeat approaches that might illuminate an issue from a new angle.
- He continued Turner's practice of taking NIOs on many of his foreign trips.
- He often held short, unstructured, wide-ranging discussions with NIOs on subjects within their competence. Sometimes he would assign work during such discussions; more frequently he just listened and asked questions in an effort to increase his own knowledge.
- Coordinate Intelligence Community activities. Casey was less interested than his predecessors in this function, and he tended to rely on his NIOs to represent him within the Community and to keep him informed about what was happening there. But he did worry about gaps in collection, and he urged his NIOs to keep the Community current on anticipated collection needs.
- Supervise interagency production. Casey was determined to increase both the quantity and quality of Estimates. The number of Estimates produced more than doubled, with NIOs deeply and personally involved at every stage of the process.

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- Casey further upgraded the importance of dissenting views. Under Casey, these became "alternative views" that sometimes received nearly as much prominence as the majority view. Casey also pushed the presentation, where appropriate, of alternate potential outcomes.
- He directed that Estimates routinely discuss relevant gaps in collection and production, and he expected the NIOs to take the lead in formulating and reviewing collection guidelines.
- Help make intelligence relevant. Even more than Colby and Turner, Casey was determined to make Intelligence Community products address the issues that concerned the policymakers--and in ways that would help them make informed decisions.
- Casey put many of his NIOs in contact with Cabinet officers. In turn, some of them used NIOs as intelligence advisors both in Washington and on foreign trips.
- Under Casey, many NIOs spent fully a third of their time attending interdepartmental meetings and discussions at State, Defense, and the National Security Council and visiting corporations, universities, and think tanks. He also arranged for more NIO briefings of very senior officers, e.g., the President and Vice President.
- Casey believed that through such close and continuing interaction with the policy, business, and academic communities, NIOs would be able to identify subjects that needed analytical attention and help set priorities for Community analysis.

Recommendations

The NIOs are uniquely positioned to save you time, keep you informed, and extend your reach.

What the NIOs can do for you:

- Identify the few really important issues in each of their areas (so that you do not waste your time searching them out yourself) and then track these issues on your behalf. They can be your eyes and ears.
- Provide you with one-stop shopping. The NIOs are just a phone call away whenever you need oral or written analysis of an issue. They can usually get it to you faster and more authoritatively than anyone else, and in whatever form you want. They can provide a Community viewpoint to complement or supplement the CIA viewpoint, and they are usually more aware of the views of the policymakers than anyone else.

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- Represent you at various Intelligence Community and national security meetings.
- Help you improve your ties with important outlying intelligence customers such as the regional military commanders.
- Add to your intellectual capital in various ways, for example, through frequent discussions of developing problems in major issue areas.
- Identify and help you focus on and rectify problems within the Intelligence Community, especially gaps in collection and weaknesses in analytical capabilities.
- Serve as your principal agents in enforcing your standards of objectivity, creativity and usefulness in the Community's analytical activities.
- Help you bridge the philosophical and structural gaps among the CIA's four directorates and among the various agencies that comprise the Intelligence Community. Community positions are often disparate, conflicting. When you need a single view, a bottom line, the NIOs can help you.

What you can do for the NIOs:

If you are to get the most from your NIOs, you will need to spend some time with them. You should make it easy for an NIO to get on your schedule for a brief discussion of something the NIO thinks you should know. You might ask an NIO for a quick and dirty update on something you are about to discuss with the Secretary of State or Defense at a White House meeting. Over time, you will learn which NIOs provide the best value in return for modest investments of your time and attention. With them you can then work out your own comfortable, informal, efficient, give-and-take arrangements.



David D. Gries



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SUBJECT: How Your NIOs Can Help You

NIC #00596-88

VC/NIC:DDG:  (16 Feb 88)

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Distribution:

- 1 - DCI
- 1 - DDCI
- 1 - SA/DCI
- 1 - EXDIR
- 1 - ER
- 1 - DDI
- 1 - D/ICS
- 1 - AC/NIC
- 1 - PO/NIC
- 16 - Each NIO
- 1 - SRP
- 1 - VC/NIC File
- 1 - O/VC/NIC Chrono

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The Director of Central Intelligence

Washington, D.C. 20505

7:4 JAN 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR: National Foreign Intelligence Board

SUBJECT : National Intelligence Council

1. Effective 3 December 1979, the Director of Central Intelligence authorized the establishment of the National Intelligence Council as the principal organization in CIA charged with fulfilling that Agency's responsibilities in producing national intelligence estimates and other interagency assessments. The NIC will report to the Deputy Director, National Foreign Assessment, and through him to the Director of Central Intelligence.

2. Organization: The National Intelligence Council is chaired by Richard Lehman, who will also serve as National Intelligence Officer for Warning. The other principal members are:

Associate Chairman: Vacant  
National Intelligence Officer/Africa: L. Gray Cowan  
National Intelligence Officer/China and East Asia:  
    Amb. John H. Holdridge  
National Intelligence Officer/General Purpose Forces:  
    MGen. Paul E. Gorman, USA  
National Intelligence Officer/Latin America: Jack Davis  
National Intelligence Officer/Near East and South Asia:  
    Robert C. Ames  
National Intelligence Officer/Strategic Programs: Howard  
    Stoertz, Jr.  
National Intelligence Officer/USSR and Eastern Europe:  
    Arnold L. Horelick  
National Intelligence Officer/Western Europe: Joe L. Zaring  
(4) National Intelligence Officers-at-Large: Hans Heymann, Jr.  
(3 vacancies)

(Three former NIO accounts -- Nuclear Proliferation, Political-Economy, and Special Studies -- will from now on be handled at a different level.) Other elements of the NIC will include the Assistant NIOs, who will continue to work under and, as necessary, substitute for their principals, and a relatively small Analytic Group. This will be made up of officers

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with broad substantive and regional expertise and proven writing skills, drawn from NFIB agencies and to some extent from outside government. Its numbers in general will serve with the NIC on rotational assignments of two or three years. The Analytic Group's principal function will be to draft national intelligence estimates\* and other assessments under the guidance of the appropriate NIOs. [redacted]

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3. Purpose: The primary purpose of the National Intelligence Council is to improve the quality of national-level intelligence assessments. Formation of the Analytic Group, whose resources will be wholly dedicated to and trained in the production of such assessments, will reduce our need to call upon the other NFIB agencies of CIA/NFAC for drafting assistance from their frequently overburdened staffs. The creation of the Analytic Group should also help reduce delays in the production process. Further improvement should stem from the regular collegial review of each assessment that will be a principal function of the four new National Intelligence Officers-at-Large, each of whom will bring to bear a wide range of substantive strengths on the critical review of drafts. [redacted]

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4. Community Role: Another important purpose in creating the NIC is to make it possible to enhance each individual NIO's role as substantive adviser to and surrogate for the DCI within his own field of expertise and as the Intelligence Community's manager of national intelligence production in that field. Each NIO will continue to work directly with and represent the DCI as before. The NIO also continues to be the principal mechanism for ensuring that national intelligence production is relevant to the consumers' needs. Creating the NIC and providing it with its own staff structure should make it easier for each NIO to perform these important Community-related roles than in recent years. It is important to note that while the NIC reports to the Deputy Director, National Foreign Assessment and must necessarily draw heavily upon NFAC resources, it is an Intelligence Community-related organization with a national role and is not a unit of NFAC. [redacted]

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5. What we seek to establish is, in sum, a fortified NIO system with somewhat more structural coherence, with modest analytical resources of its own, and with a charter that permits and encourages the NIOs to work more closely with their associates in the intelligence and national security policymaking communities. To that end, we solicit your cooperation and support, and we invite your comments. In particular, we invite you to nominate officers possessing broad substantive expertise and first-rate drafting ability as candidates for rotational assignment to the Analytic Group. [redacted]

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\*Most military estimates, however, will continue to be produced by interagency teams, and other estimates and assessments will on occasion be drafted by non-NIC officers when the best or most appropriate drafters are to be found outside the NIC. [redacted]

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SUBJECT: The Community and the National Intelligence Council

Distribution:

- Orig - DCI (to be given to NFIB Exec. Sec.)
- 1 - DDCI
- 1 - ER
- 1 - DD/NFA
- 1 - C/NIC
- 1 - NFAC Registry

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**DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE DIRECTIVE**  
**NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE COUNCIL**

(Effective 28 January 1982)

Pursuant to the provisions of Section 102, the National Security Act of 1947, and Executive Order 12333, there is established a National Foreign Intelligence Council (NFIC).

**1. Mission**

The NFIC will serve as the senior Intelligence Community advisory instrumentality to the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) on national intelligence issues, other than the substantive aspects which are the responsibility of the National Foreign Intelligence Board.

**2. Functions**

The NFIC will advise the DCI on:

- a. Priorities and objectives for the National Foreign Intelligence Program budget.
- b. Such other matters as may be referred to it by the DCI.

**3. Composition and Organization**

The NFIC will be chaired by the DCI or the DDCI, or in their absence, by their designated representative.

The membership is as follows:

Director of Central Intelligence, Chairman  
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, Vice-Chairman  
Executive Director, Central Intelligence Agency  
Director, National Security Agency  
Director, Defense Intelligence Agency  
Director, Intelligence and Research, Department of State  
Assistant Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation  
(Intelligence Division)  
Assistant Secretary for International Affairs, Department of Energy  
Special Assistant to the Secretary of the Treasury (National Security)  
Senior representatives of the military intelligence services  
Senior representatives of the Department of Defense special reconnaissance programs  
Senior representative of the Secretary of Defense  
Senior representative of the Attorney General  
Senior representative of the Secretary of Commerce  
Senior representative of the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

The NFIC will be supported by an Executive Secretariat.

William J. Casey  
Director of Central Intelligence

## THE ESTIMATIVE PROCESS

Interagency intelligence production of the country's National Intelligence Estimates is centered in the National Intelligence Council (NIC). The NIC serves the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) in his role as head of the US Intelligence Community not as Director of the CIA. The NIC is comprised of a chairman, two vice-chairmen, and 16 National Intelligence Officers (NIOs), their staffs, and a supporting Analytic Group. Each NIO acts as the DCI's senior substantive officer in the Intelligence Community, for either a geographic region of the world, a transnational issue, or a specialized functional issue. There are six regional NIOs plus ten NIOs for functional or transnational issues such as Soviet strategic programs and science and technology. They serve as special advisors to the DCI, and his representatives to the Community. They are responsible for the development of all interagency intelligence estimates in their area. They oversee the objectivity and integrity of the process that produces these estimates.

Although the NIC is located at CIA Headquarters, its officers are drawn from throughout the Intelligence Community (DIA, CIA, NSA, State, the military services, etc.) as well as academia, outside think tanks, and the business world. The Chairman of the NIC (C/NIC) is at present an Air Force general officer. The role of the NIC, in particular its NIOs, is to work with the Intelligence Community to produce quality, timely estimates relevant to key questions affecting national security; these estimates look ahead several months to several years and attempt to predict developments of key importance to the United States.

The NIC, in conjunction with the Intelligence Community, produces five types of coordinated Intelligence Community papers:

National Intelligence Estimate (NIE). NIEs deal with issues of fundamental importance; they are fully coordinated within the Intelligence Community and issued by the DCI upon the recommendation of the National Foreign Intelligence Board (NFIB).

Special National Intelligence Estimate (SNIE). SNIEs can have the same characteristics as NIEs, but they are more urgent and accomplished in a shorter period of time. They are usually specially requested by a policymaker and produced in a matter of weeks or days.

Interagency Intelligence Memorandum (IIM). IIMs deal with more detailed and focused topics than NIEs and SNIEs. They are produced by working level representatives of NFIB agencies and generally do not require formal NFIB review. They are normally approved by C/NIC.

Interagency Intelligence Assessments (IIA). IIAs are short estimates produced very quickly when a more formal paper is inappropriate, possibly involving less than all the NFIB agencies. They are approved for publication by C/NIC.

Memorandum to Holders (M/H). M/Hs to any of the products above are updates where extensive reconsideration is not required. M/Hs are managed by the same procedures as their parent papers.

In order to be useful to policymakers, estimates must deal with the topics that are relevant and timely, and must reach the right officials before key decisions on the particular issue are made. Estimative topics are generated in several ways. A policymaker or the DCI may ask the Intelligence Community to take a thorough look at an issue; or the C/NIC or an NIO--trying to anticipate policymakers' needs--may initiate an estimate.

Following the identification of the estimates to be produced, the key stages in the estimative process are:

Concept Paper/Terms of Reference (CP/TOR). The CP indicates the estimate's origin and purpose and asks key questions to be answered; the TORs outline in greater detail the central or pivotal issues to be addressed in the estimate. The CP/TOR are reviewed by the Community; representatives of National Foreign Intelligence Board (NFIB) agencies meet to discuss and amend them, and they are then approved by the DCI.

Writing of Estimates. The NIO supervising the draft selects a drafter from the NIC, or from the analytic offices of the CIA or one of the other agencies of the Intelligence Community. When the draft is completed, it is reviewed by the NIO and the NIC's front office, and by the DCI's Senior Review Panel (SRP)--whose members include former ambassadors, general officers, and academicians. When possible, estimates are also reviewed by specialists outside the Community to provide fresh perspectives. Estimates accommodating these comments as appropriate are sent to the DCI with a recommendation that they be sent out to NFIB agencies for formal coordination.

Coordination. Formal coordination meetings with representatives from the Intelligence Community are held, in which any differences are either resolved or highlighted, with emphasis on the latter when they are significant. Such dissenting views are clearly stated in the estimates as alternative language or footnotes.

NFIB Approval. Once an estimate has been so coordinated, the DCI reviews the paper. If he is satisfied with the quality of the product, he submits it to NFIB principals for final coordination. NFIB, comprised of the heads of the government's intelligence agencies, reviews the estimate, sometimes challenges its judgments and adds additional alternative language or footnotes, and recommends that the DCI approve or remand it.

Feedback. Once an estimate is approved and published, feedback is sought from the policymakers concerning the relevance of the analysis. Further retrospective analysis is done as the topic is being prepared for treatment again to determine how the Community's views may have changed and why.

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Last year the NIC produced 86 NIEs; this year the number will be about 75. Some of these are programmed ahead of time by the NIC, guided by the NIOs' knowledge of the policymakers consumers' needs; although about half of the NIEs now being produced are fast-track studies, especially requested by the DCI or senior policymakers, usually to fit crisis or fast-moving situations.

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### Origin of the NIO System

CIA Director Colby put the system into place in 1973, but it was actually Dr. Schlesinger's idea, conceived while he was still at the Office of Management and Budget, to appoint senior intelligence officers as Intelligence Community referents for key geographic and functional areas.

Schlesinger asserted that much of CIA analysis was irrelevant because analysts were out of touch with the policy community. He was not the only critic:

- President Nixon faulted then CIA Director Helms for not exerting enough control over the Intelligence Community.
- Kissinger complained that National Intelligence Estimates had lost their edge and that they sometimes reached unsupported conclusions.
- Directors of other US intelligence agencies alleged that the Estimates were biased toward the CIA viewpoint.

Colby himself saw the need for improved staff support on substantive issues. Stretched thin by other demands, he could not afford to waste his time canvassing the Intelligence Community for information. As he commented in Honorable Men, My Life in the CIA (page 352):

"I was troubled over how badly the machinery was organized to serve me. If I wanted to know what was happening in China, for example, I would have to assemble individual experts in China's politics, its economics, its military, its personalities, as well as the clandestine operators who would tell me things they would tell no one else. . ."

To help him with these problems, Colby appointed a number of senior, experienced people who combined intellectual energy with operational effectiveness, calling them NIOs. Thus, from the beginning, a close and special relationship existed between the Director and the NIOs.

Colby's successors, Directors Bush, Turner and Casey, retained the NIO system while imposing their own style and emphasis. Though the numbers and portfolios of individual NIOs have varied according to each Director's concerns and interests, the system has served all of them as a powerful yet flexible means of finding things out and getting things done.

### The NIOs Under Colby

Colby assigned the NIOs the following functions (my breakdown, not his):

- To provide staff support to the Director on substantive intelligence issues. Better one immediately accessible NIO on China than a roomful of China watchers. Colby used his NIOs variously to provide briefings, oral and written early warnings, unconventional analysis, and back-up support at meetings and on trips abroad.
- To help the Director coordinate Intelligence Community activities. Colby realized that if the DCI was to take charge of the Intelligence Community as President Nixon was demanding, he had to have help. Not only could the NIOs give him advice in their areas of specialization; in some cases they could act in his stead. They were charged with organizing the key Intelligence Community players in their specialized areas; conveying to them the Director's goals, strategies, and priorities; and advising the Director of any weaknesses they saw in Community collection and analysis.
- To manage the preparation of Estimates and other coordinated interagency products. In particular, Colby wanted the NIOs to ensure that these products represented the absolute best the Intelligence Community had to offer and that they accurately reflected the views of the whole Community.
- To help make intelligence products more relevant to the needs of the policymakers. Colby wanted the NIOs to be his eyes and ears. He directed them to greatly increase and improve their contacts in the policy, business, and academic communities in order to identify the issues the Intelligence Community should be addressing and in what priority. Then the NIOs were to advise intelligence collectors and producers about any gaps in their efforts.

#### The NIOs Under Bush

Bush was not in office long enough to have much impact on the system, though he did issue a statement of goals for the NIOs--it was similar to the above breakdown--and he made a start toward formalizing the Director's control over their activities.

#### The NIOs Under Turner

Upon taking charge, Turner decided that the NIO system needed more structural coherence and discipline. To increase accountability and promote collegiality among the NIOs, he created the National Intelligence Council structure you see today. The basic NIO functions stayed the same:

- Provide support to the Director. Turner met frequently with selected groups of NIOs to discuss intelligence topics; these meetings were usually scheduled some days in advance, but the discussions were unstructured except for an opening presentation. He took NIOs along with him on most of his trips abroad.

- Coordinate Intelligence Community activities. Turner installed the NIOs as key players in various Community groups that examined requirements, gaps, and critical problems.
- Supervise interagency production. Turner believed that managing the production of Estimates was the key function of the NIOs, and he stressed presentation of competitive viewpoints in Estimates.
- Turner regarded the practice of expressing dissent in footnotes as rarely helpful to policymakers. He insisted that dissents be highlighted and explain why two or more analysts with access to the same information should come up with different conclusions. As he wrote in Secrecy and Democracy (page 244), "The most valuable NIEs are those that present differences of substance clearly."
- Help make intelligence relevant. Like Colby, Turner relied on the NIOs to ensure that Community production addressed the needs of the policy community. And like Colby, he encouraged the NIOs to make outside contacts, though he kept them on tighter leashes than Colby did.

#### The NIOs Under Casey

Eager to make a strong impact on the workings of the Intelligence Community, Casey turned early and often to his NIOs as agents of change. Interested in substance, he invited regular contact with NIOs he found congenial and helpful. He once remarked to the others that, "I don't see you very often, and that's your fault." Though Casey greatly increased the workloads of the NIOs, he allowed only a modest increase in their number: he wanted a small, hard-hitting cadre to whom he could relate personally. Despite considerable changes in style, the NIOs continued to:

- Provide staff support to the Director. Casey expected instant expertise from his NIOs, the ability to produce on demand a three- or four-sentence update on any issue within their purview.
- He frequently telephoned or met NIOs to ask questions. They became his reference library for quick response items that came up during the day. He often asked for topical briefings before meetings of the National Security Council or other senior-level groups.
- He encouraged the NIOs to prepare short think-pieces on subjects they believed he should address--he specifically welcomed dissenting views and offbeat approaches that might illuminate an issue from a new angle.
- He continued Turner's practice of taking NIOs on many of his foreign trips.

- He often held short, unstructured, wide-ranging discussions with NIOs on subjects within their competence. Sometimes he would assign work during such discussions; more frequently he just listened and asked questions in an effort to increase his own knowledge.
- Coordinate Intelligence Community activities. Casey was less interested than his predecessors in this function, and he tended to rely on his NIOs to represent him within the Community and to keep him informed about what was happening there. But he did worry about gaps in collection, and he urged his NIOs to keep the Community current on anticipated collection needs.
- Supervise interagency production. Casey was determined to increase both the quantity and quality of Estimates. The number of Estimates produced more than doubled, with NIOs deeply and personally involved at every stage of the process.
- Casey further upgraded the importance of dissenting views. Under Casey, these became "alternative views" that sometimes received nearly as much prominence as the majority view. Casey also pushed the presentation, where appropriate, of alternate potential outcomes.
- He directed that Estimates routinely discuss relevant gaps in collection and production, and he expected the NIOs to take the lead in formulating and reviewing collection guidelines.
- Help make intelligence relevant. Even more than Colby and Turner, Casey was determined to make Intelligence Community products address the issues that concerned the policymakers--and in ways that would help them make informed decisions.
- Casey put many of his NIOs in contact with Cabinet officers. In turn, some of them used NIOs as intelligence advisors both in Washington and on foreign trips.
- Under Casey, many NIOs spent fully a third of their time attending interdepartmental meetings and discussions at State, Defense, and the National Security Council and visiting corporations, universities, and think tanks. He also arranged for more NIO briefings of very senior officers, e.g., the President and Vice President.
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
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# The Intelligence Community



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# Office of the Director

