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16 May 1984

SUBJECT: Various Remarks on the NIO Function

A. Miscellaneous

1. From John McMahon to Horton in May 1983. Some NIO's just sit on behinds and get the DDI to do their work for them, says John. Later, David Gries told Horton that McMahon had said that ". . . the DDI and the NIC should face away from each other." McMahon was emphatic at the NIC retreat about the need for NIO's to get out into the world, away from the Community, to get different views. (This is much easier said than done, what with the workload some NIO's have.)

[Redacted]

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He does not want to see disagreements between the NIC and the CIA, particularly via NIC memoranda.

2. Hal Ford commented on the 1982 forecasts (which see) and Horton copied down these notes from his comments:

- be sensitive to the United States as an actor especially in financial and world economic developments, and for the prospects in places where the US is heavily committed.
- include more contingencies, clearly labelled as such.
- identify and explain areas where there are substantial differences in judgment.
- where intelligence support will improve, or not.

3. Things Horton felt we should think more about:

- irrationalities (because of two-dimensional reporting and a lack of continuity both among analysts and those serving abroad, we lack information on personality and character of leaders, their biases, ambitions, weaknesses, and the same with other persons in the society.)
- watch those border disputes.

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- what are the unresolved policy issues, especially those that may involve the United States?
- what causes instability? And how does the economic scene relate to it?

4. Advice from Charley Waterman.

- Spend 40% of the time on policy-related activities, such as meetings at State or at the Pentagon; Congressional testimony or briefings; ISA/DoD.
- Devote 25% to Community management: that is meeting with NSA, INR, DIA (both current and estimates)
- Estimate, some 25-30% of the time, but don't ever draft it.
- Contingency papers: future-leaning, in Waterman's term. [redacted] is good at this. Horton wrote several on Central America, without changing our course there.)
- Outside contacts, meaning think tanks, academic people, business people, and do a memo for DCI when something interesting comes out of it.
- Collection guidance: Often by what comes out of an estimate or other paper where ignorance is starkly revealed. A regular feature of warning meetings should be collection needs.
- See Ambassadors, COS's, and so on.

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B. From the NIC retreat in March 1984

1. Ambassador Leonhardt discussed the study\* the SRP did on estimates in the past and described them -- some of them, anyway -- as . . . thin, faltering efforts to stitch together analytical sections: political, economic, military. There were few estimative projections, according to him, and they lacked speculative content. There was an overstress of precedent and historical continuity. Some of these cases led to unlikely outcomes. History and trends were of marginal value if not counterproductive, and he noted a lack of attention to the unlikely outcome. There was a reluctance to quantify probabilities. (But simply, 2 to 1.) Incident-oriented, episodic--there was no analytical framework or looking at different alternatives and, therefore, alternative outcomes

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\*Be sure to read this.

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were neglected. The lesson is to focus on the speculative content and alternative outcomes. There was often an ignorance or neglect of economic and business activity in the country involved and of market reactions. Need for integrative analysis, the blending of fields: countries are often handled as discrete, disembodied cases, with no relation to the outside. Many estimates were too long. There was discussion here of the OGI spread sheet with computerized maps, the use of graphics to tell a story, even a reference to the electronic displays at the Crisis Management Center, the easy visual presentation with which our writings must compete.

2. Maurice Ernst said that estimates are not necessarily more useful to the consumer than are other papers nor are they read more carefully. They are expensive to produce, and we write too many, writing estimates when other papers will do. Why should a paper be an estimate?

- When it is convenient or necessary for specific policy purposes: An oil paper or on Iran/Iraq War. Action must be taken by the United States.
- Bureaucratic differences: The Soviet Energy Estimate, for example -- and when there are CIA/DIA differences.
- One way to get the expertise: sometimes only the writing of a formal estimate will bring the experts out.
- Address an issue that otherwise would be too narrowly addressed by one agency or another.

Therefore, we must ask ourselves: What unique functions does the estimate serve?

Maurice went on:

- An analytical framework should show how you get from here to there: Indicators -- what to look for -- and collection guidance.
- Saying what we think is going to happen may not be useful because it is usually traditional wisdom: instead tell the policymaker what he should worry about -- and is it actionable?
- Don't say there is a 10% chance that it will fall apart: how do we get there? Therefore, do think pieces and the building blocks elsewhere than in the estimate.
- In many cases, individual papers serve us better, and estimates should be reserved to focus on specific questions.

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3. Hal Ford mentioned again the question of the impact of an estimate versus the White House electronics arrangements. He finds enormous conservatism in the NIE's. Conventional wisdom, the drive to coordinate, even with dissents; up-the-line leaning on estimates; and the need to read first drafts because of the difficulty of getting the paper through the Agency; Hal mentioned all these problems and referred back to papers on the Chinese in North Korea and the French in Vietnam. NIE is only one form of estimating: oral presentations, think pieces, and the use of video, again, versus the long, composed paragraph. Dave Gries referred to the question of where to put the alternative outcomes and we should not try to cover all bets. Discuss a few outcomes, said Dave, and show them early, to follow the Key Judgments. Larry Gershwin talked about listing things that matter and those that don't matter in an estimate: also he talked about mysteries versus secrets. It would be a good idea, someone said, to do a post mortem after an estimate is finished or of a number in a given world area to see how well we called it. [redacted] said that we are good at saying what we know, but not so good at saying what we don't know: He pointed out that gaps in information might make a difference. Hal wants to eliminate the phrase: "We believe," in estimates, asking "Who is 'we'?"

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4. Gates said that the NIC had somewhat less cohesion than a university department, referring to administration. He went from there to talk of the NIO role in collection strategy and said to make collection a part of every estimate, as an Annex or as a part of the text. Use your Community-wide perspective, he said, to do memoranda for Casey or for others if collection gaps are seen. In an aside, he said that the NSC staff wants more political analysis. He considers the method of writing of estimates an unsatisfactory system. At one time, an ONE board member or staffer pulled together various contributions in a draft. Perhaps a TOR should be sent out and each Agency do a draft and the drafter or NIO would put it together. Weakness is the "reps meeting." The NIO must see that -- in the TOR -- alternative approaches are provided. Have close relations with the Office Director, said Gates, for improving the quality of work as well as for topics for papers. Follow-up remarks by [redacted] send the draft out for comments before coordination. Gershwin added: circulate the draft internally (DDI) before letting it go to the NIO. Then someone said there are various bodies to talk to about collection: warning, COMIREX, the COS, the Ambassador, and NSA.

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- C. These discussions contain the remarks of the three visitors plus comments from others: Hal tells me that each of them is going to submit a transcript of what they said.

Rich Armitage.

1. This Administration more than any other uses force as an excuse (substitute?) for policy. (That's what my notes say!) CIA information is used in summaries or in background papers for OSD. If power is not enough in itself -- it must be timely and relevant -- intelligence is the same. Timeliness is more imperative because decisions must be swift. Relevance concerns the need for judgment, for the forecasting of events or conditions, and the need to affect policy -- we should be looking for opportunities, not only threats. He likes predictive studies. (He got a lot from a Monday group that would get together to talk over things: Dave Gries and others.) He mentioned the inability of the Community to provide divergent views. Intelligence everyone can agree on is not what is needed. He spoke of (the need for?) a compendium of key unresolved questions and spoke of intelligence papers failing to provide conclusions or judgments.

Ken deGraffenreid, mostly on the President's needs.

2. The President is sometimes briefed on Key Judgments. (He said that a paper, to deGraffenreid, is either great or garbage, and garbage not because of bias but because it does not tell the President anything.) Is it on an issue on which he needs to focus? Why does he (or another reader) need to know this? The President needs to know trends, the essence, not details. He needs education more than judgments, the bounds of the problems, that the opinion runs from x to y, the nature of the threat or opportunity. There is no place for nice-to-know information: it must lead to taking action or the reverse. He needs macro-economic assessments. He should be told the nature of the hostile intelligence threat, not about the individual KGB operation.

3. Intelligence is not the only window. He receives an incredible amount of information--someone is always lobbying him. Intelligence is competing with this in a neutral way where the other is purposeful. The latter is coherently packaged, and intelligence thus may lose out.

4. Relations between policymaker and intelligence: The policymaker needs to think of questions and listen to the answers. We need to say what we don't know and explain the limits of intelligence, that it is not omniscient and that there are questions that can't be answered. It is not important to know when Franco would die, but the parameters of the meaning of his death. It is important to know what the policymaker is facing rather than to worry about being right or wrong in a particular issue.

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5. DeGraffenreid went on to say that we should concentrate on the few things that the President needs, not a sociological theory of the world: we may need that but the President does not. On politicization, which he called also policy-zation, in this Administration, he said it is all right for the President to ask N-S questions: Mondale might ask E-W questions. Neither one can ask that we give them what they want to hear in that way.

Richard Betts (Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institute)

6. He spoke of the differences between the analytical and the decision processes. He spoke of a basic tension between accuracy which is

{ thorough  
with ambiguity and  
balance with the danger it may  
be mush. Long papers and delays  
in production

and the influence which should be

{ punchy  
simple  
conclusive and can be tendentious.

There is a problem with the Executive Summary when people know the subject well. Then the Key Judgments are less significant and you need to highlight Key Differences--what's new?--and Key Disagreements. What is disputed? What is not known? Politicization is all but inevitable and even desirable. Bias comes from basic assumptions about how the world works. Politicization is more in the management of the conflict of ideas, and if there is no controversy, the result is a second order of intelligence. Almost difficult to differentiate between good analysis and correct analysis. According to Betts, garbage is bad analysis or something written with a quick deadline (want it bad--get it bad) or something too long or too short. DeGraffenreid worries that analysts lack knowledge of Blue policy and intentions. Garbage to Gates is prevented now by strict DDI review of written work: He cites as a bad example the Key Judgments not agreeing with the text. Armitage on a summary: A summary tells him what he wants to read the piece, but

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doesn't tell him what the Key Judgments are. Gates noted the diminishing ability of policymakers to look ahead: certainly not three to five years. He has said more than once that maybe the CIA (the NIC?) is the place where it is (or should be?) done for neither at State in Policy Planning nor at the DoD or at the NSC does anyone look far ahead.

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Perhaps Hal Ford, or others who might read this, could add to what are the bare notes I accumulated in this year, especially those taken at the NIC retreat. I recommend getting aside with Hal for advice and also to get advice from Dave Gries, Milt Kovner, Graham Fuller, as well as Randy Pherson.

  
John Horton

STAT

11 May 1984

NOTE FOR: Constantine C. Menges  
NSC

FROM: John Horton, NIO/LA

Attached is the memorandum you requested. I would remind you that both the DDI and DDO disagreed with much of the data and analysis, and would challenge its use as an intelligence document.

  
John Horton

Attachment:  
as stated



( SECRET [redacted] )

THE DIRECTOR OF  
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

National Intelligence Council

22 December 1982



NOTE FOR THE DIRECTOR

FROM: Constantine C. Menges  
National Intelligence Officer for  
Latin America

SUBJECT: Worldwide briefing; the connection  
between events in Central America  
and Mexico

As you requested yesterday, I have written briefing material on this theme. You may find the four pages too long, but I felt it would be better for you to have too much, rather than too little, information on this important subject.

Also attached is a copy of the opening Key Judgement from the September 1981 NIE on Central America which represented the first time (to my knowledge) that the Intelligence Community pointed out the potential danger a communist Central America could pose to Mexico.

I am also sending a copy to [redacted] and C/LA/DDO so that they can review and comment on this during your absence. If there are major objections or differences of view, I will let you know by indicating this in a revised text with comment or dissenting footnotes.

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*Crutt*

cc: DDCI D/ALA  
C/NIC C/LAD/DDO  
VC/NIC



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United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

February 29, 1984

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**TO:** Ambassador Gavin  
CIA - Mr. Clarridge  
CIA - Mr. Horton  
NSC - Dr. Menges  
NSC - Mr. North  
DOD/JCS - Adm. Moreau  
DOD/ISA - Mr. Sanchez  
Treasury - Mr. DeFalco  
Agriculture - Mr. Tracy  
Commerce - Mr. Dennin  
STR - Mr. Rosenbaum  
EXIM Bank - Ms. Rodriguez

**FROM:** ARA/MEX - George High *[Signature]*

**SUBJECT:** Economic Initiatives in Central America: Mexico

**REF:** Michel memorandum on this subject, 2/24;  
IG meeting, 2/29

Attached is a redraft of the paper prepared by State for the Interagency Group meeting this morning. This responds to NSDD 124 and to the McFarlane memorandum on this subject of February 18.

The redraft takes into account views expressed at this morning's IG meeting. If you have further comments on the redraft, please get them to me by opening of business, March 1, in writing or by phone, as appropriate (632-9894).

**Attachment:**

Paper, "US Influence on Mexico's Central American Policy, 2/29 redraft

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16 July 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence  
Chairman, National Intelligence Council

FROM : National Intelligence Officer for Latin America

SUBJECT : Overview of Work Performed by the NIO/LA During the  
First Nine Months with CIA--September 1981 to June 1982

I am providing this review of my first nine months with CIA both to give you perspective on what I have done and as a potentially useful case of the multiple roles carried out by the National Intelligence Officer. In the first section I summarize in quantitative terms the work performed using my records to provide an overview of the number of personally-written analytic items and meetings/briefings attended. The second section of this report provides a brief discussion of some of this work--especially the large amount done directly for the DCI. Annex 1 provides a list of individuals within the Executive branch with whom I have a working relationship, while Annex 2 lists a few examples of my personal analytic production to illustrate the type of writing done.

#### A. Quantitative Overview

As a result of requests from the DCI, interagency policy meetings, and the other work of an NIO, my personal analytic production (not counting routine administrative memos) has totaled about 350 items with 1,200 pages. The chart below summarizes activities by function:

<u>Function</u>	<u>Written Items</u>	<u>Meetings/Briefings</u>
I. <u>Analysis Tasks for DCI</u>	134	with DCI 36+
II. <u>Warning</u>	23	monthly 9
III. <u>Intelligence Community Analysis</u> (9 products completed or in process)	49	NFIB/CIA 22
IV. <u>NIO/LA Briefings/Meetings</u>		
--Executive branch	26	Executive 111
--Congress	7	Congress 21
V. <u>Analytic Review of CIA Products</u> (review/comment on 66 major papers and about 340 daily items, e.g., NID)	27	with authors 14 est
VI. <u>Other Community Products</u> (FOCUS, DCIDs, etc.)	8	community meetings 7
VII. <u>Other Analytic Production</u>	<u>76</u>	<u>          </u>
TOTALS	350	230
AVERAGE PER MONTH	39	26

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## B. Descriptive Commentary on the Work Performed

While the quantitative overview provides a rough idea of the allocation of time and energy among the different NIO functions, only a brief descriptive commentary can provide a sense for the actual work done. This will be organized according to function, and Annex 2 provides some specific examples of the related analytic products.

### I. Analysis Tasks for DCI

Four substantive issues have formed the core of analysis done for the DCI: Central America; Caribbean Basin initiative; the Falklands dispute; and, international communication needs and opportunities. Of these, Central America has been the continuing issue and accounted for eight of the ten NSC/NSPG meetings on Latin America held during the nine months.

#### Central America

An interagency group involving State, Defense, and CIA responsible for framing a US strategy toward Cuba and the conflict in Central America moved into an intensive phase between September and December 1981. During that time, there were two formal NSC meetings and about ten drafts of a lengthy paper which required a number of comments from CIA and a number of intelligence assessments concerning the feasibility of different US actions and the likely responses of the USSR, Cuba, European allies, and Latin America. For the NIO/LA, this involved about 40 analysis products for the DCI.

A second round of decisions and analysis took place in January 1982, and, a third from the post-Salvador election time at the end of March to a new NSDD issued by the President at the end of May 1982. In each of these processes, my contributions included:

- memos to inform the DCI of progress and issues;
- memos to present the DCI with alternative views and choices for his decisions in the process;
- coordination with DDI/DDO on joint suggestions for a CIA position--this occurred in all three occasions;
- briefing points and text for the DCI to use in preparing for the Cabinet-level meetings;
- individual analysis papers on key issues raised at the IG or Core Group meetings, e.g., the paper Central America After the El Salvador Elections, 31 March 1982.

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This work for the DCI in the interagency process certainly was helped by the NIO accessibility to the entire community viewpoint at the monthly warning meetings and through chairmanship of three national intelligence estimates on Central America during this time period.

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Caribbean Basin Presidential Initiative

The interagency process on this occurred during January and February 1982 and culminated in the speech and legislative proposals of the President on 25 February. The NIO role included:

- monitoring both the policy issues and the speech drafts and reporting to the DCI;
- specific suggestions to the DCI for changes in the speech (which the President accepted);
- briefing and analysis material for the NSC meetings.

Falklands and Impact on US-Latin American Relations

The crisis began with the Argentinian invasion of 2 April; and early that day the DCI asked the NIO to coordinate an analysis of both sides (which was ready later in the day). A SNIE was written later in the month, chaired by the NIO/WE with substantial contribution by the A/NIO/LA. The NIO/LA did the following:

- carefully monitored the intelligence to assess four main developments:
  - a) Soviet/Cuban moves to exploit the crisis;
  - b) possible Latin American military help/participation with Argentina;
  - c) potential military actions/surprises of both sides;
  - d) signs of military-political factionalism and reduced support for the Galtieri and his decisions within Argentina.

NIO/LA advice to the DCI included the view that Argentina would lose and that this would lead to a new regime with four possible alternatives ranging from a pre-invasion military regime to pressures for immediately restoring civilian rule (my analogy was Greece after the 1974 failed Cyprus coup) to an intensely anti-US military obtaining arms from the USSR (the Nasser example). The NIO/LA raised these alternatives with the intelligence community by the end of April, and brief interagency analyses were done in early May. This will now continue with a forthcoming NIE.

One week before major military action began, I wrote a brief paper for the DCI examining a number of potential military surprises which both sides might employ (a number of these occurred). Toward the end of May the NIO/LA participated in the first of seven IG meetings on US policy toward Latin America after the Falklands; this resulted in a number of intelligence community comments (coordinated) on six drafts of an NSC paper which will soon come to the Cabinet level.

International Communications--On Latin American Issues

Following the November 1981 decision of the President to make this an integral part of the Central America program, the NIO/LA produced--with the concurrence or at the direction of the DCI--a number of analytic proposals for combining public communications, diplomacy, and special activities in a systematic effort to reduce international support

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for the Central American guerrillas from Mexico and democratic socialist parties while enhancing the public awareness of the positive support being given to the target governments by international free labor, the Christian Democrats, and others.

Two drafts were written on this in November 1981, but there was no implementation until the President made his Caribbean speech in February 1982. From that point, the NIO/LA represented CIA in the bi-weekly interagency communications meetings--which have produced some, but too few results.

The NIO/LA also participated directly in writing material for the March 1982 public intelligence briefings and in the preparation of the new international political action initiative announced by the President in his speech at Westminster on 8 June 1982.

## II. Warning

The NIO/LA has sought to make the monthly warning meetings a useful intelligence event because it is the only place and time where all the disciplines meet together (analysis, HUMINT, SIGINT, PHOTINT). I am informed that the following are innovations since my chairmanship began:

- a wholehearted effort to encourage diversity of view and test prevailing conventional attitudes--whether these are optimistic or pessimistic;
- a known agenda with requests to specific individuals (structured but still open) throughout the community for one to three minute presentations (this spreads the interest and participation);
- a short chronology prepared by the A/NIO/LA of key warning-type intelligence items available at the meetings to assure that ambiguous or potentially dramatic issues are explored;
- the incorporation of occasional briefings with photos and maps to provide a greater sense of understanding and immediacy.

On occasion, my own extensive extra-governmental network has provided warning-type information or indicators, and I have shared these with the DDO or DDI, as appropriate.

## III. Intelligence Community Production

To date, four NIEs, etc., have been completed with another four very close to completion with publication in August (see Annex 2 for a listing). The two fast-track SNIes (March: El Salvador Elections; June: Central America) occurred in the midst of other pressing requirements; and, it seemed to me, produced timely intelligence perspectives. My goal has been to encourage alternative viewpoints and seek to avoid ambiguous language that may obscure rather than clarify important differences.

The complex process and lengthy meetings (chaired by the NIO) in producing these formal products seem to have been useful places where all participants learned from the others and debated differences in a mature, collegial style.

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In addition, with A/NIO/LA taking the lead, we have sought to have the entire intelligence community debate and agree on key items of information which come up frequently such as: for Central America--the size of government and guerrilla military forces; casualties; and, civilian casualties (though the data is more difficult to obtain). This data has been attached to the warning reports. In addition, we held community meetings on the vulnerabilities of the guerrilla forces in Central America and potential means to divide them from each other and from Cuba and Nicaragua

#### IV. NIO/LA Briefings/Meetings

In October the DCI asked that I organize an intelligence community briefing on Central America. This was produced in writing by mid-November based upon agreement and review by all participants and became the core of many subsequent briefings of Congress.

My briefings have always been based on written, updated talking points, which I have given to DDI for review. I consider the art of briefing important since it is the point at which intelligence data is actually being heard and thought about by policymakers. In more than 70 briefings in Congress and the Executive Branch, I have experienced only one unfavorable reaction.

#### V. Analytic Review of CIA Products

I have reviewed about 350 short, daily production items (e.g. NID articles and about 66 longer analytic papers or assessments prepared by DDI. My approach is to raise issues only where key substantive (rather than stylistic) matters are concerned, and this has involved about 27 written analytic comments or suggestions.

The issues I find it necessary to raise most frequently in this process have been:

- possible Soviet/Cuban/internal communist intentions--it has surprised me that whether in discussing the Dominican Republic, Haiti, labor in Brazil, etc., the analysts tend to overlook the intelligence on what the opponent might be doing or might seek to do in the next months;
- the internal politics of foreign policy is generally not covered in a careful way;
- the need to point to both the positive as well as negative social and economic trends over time (e.g., how far Colombia has improved) in order to have a sense of perspective about current problems in the context of global recession.

At the end of December 1981 I wrote a memorandum to the new DDI, Mr. Robert Gates, summarizing several analysis issues and methods which my four months with this institution suggested needed far more attention:

#### Analysis Issues

- the connection between the USSR, the Soviet Bloc, and what I called a "destabilization coalition" operating against pro-western governments in Central America, the Middle East, and Southern Africa;

- the "out of area" operation of terrorist groups, e.g., Libya in the Caribbean; Spanish ETA in Central America--issues too easily missed by the area divisions;
- transnational political action in areas of strategic interest, such as Central America and the Middle East--we know too little about the Socialist International, the international labor groups, the international church, and refugee aid organizations.

Analysis Methods

- thinking like the enemy in specific contexts--what might USSR/Cuba try to do next in Argentina as a basis for becoming more sensitive to the intelligence data and also formulating indicators;
- alternative or competitive analysis--make different assumptions about key trends, and then examine consequences in the next two years.

The NIO/LA is chairing two analyses using this last approach--one will be the SNIE [redacted] and the second will have three individual analysts writing three independent papers speculating on the implications in 1983-84 for Central America of three different trends in El Salvador during 1982.

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Role of the Assistant National Intelligence Officer and Secretary

For three of the nine months, the NIO/LA worked alone with his excellent and dedicated secretary, [redacted]. The obvious high demands on [redacted] (typing, filing, appointments, frequent tight time deadlines, and a volume of work) have required extraordinary competence and substantial amounts of overtime work. Since late January, [redacted] has been the A/NIO/LA. As a CIA employee of nine years, he has provided important assistance in this production--in obtaining data, in synthesizing information, in coordinating some of the formal interagency intelligence production.

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Constantine C. Menges

Atts: (2) Annexes 1 and 2

Annex 1

EXECUTIVE BRANCH -- OVERVIEW OF PERSONS WITH WHOM THE NIO/LA WORKS

<u>Position</u>	<u>Person</u>	<u>Telephone Number</u>
<u>State</u>		
Ambassador to the OAS	Amb. William Middendorf	632-9376
Ambassador to the UN	Amb. Jean J. Kirkpatrick	632-8344
UN/Latin America	Ms. Jackie Tillman	632-8344
INR/Director	Mr. Hugh Montgomery	632-0342
INR/Latin America	Mr. William E. Knepper	632-2229
ARA/Asst. Secretary	Amb. Thomas O. Enders	632-9210
ARA/Dep. Asst. Secretary	Mr. Stephen W. Bosworth	632-8562
ARA/Dep. Asst. Secretary	Mr. Everett E. Briggs	632-8386
Policy Planning/Director	Mr. Paul Wolfowitz	632-2372
S/P/Latin America	Mr. Jon Glassman	632-8664
Politico-Military (Act. Dir.)	Mr. Stefan A. Halper	632-9022
PM/(Latin America)	Mr. Angel Rabasa	632-1862

AID

Asst. Administrator for LA	Mr. Otto Reich	632-8246
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ICA

Director/Amer. Rep. Affairs	Mr. Stephen F. Dachi	724-9021
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Defense

DIA/DIO	Col. Brian J. Bosch	695-0198
DIA/Current/Latin America		695-0542
DIA/Estimates		694-8627
DIA/Estimates		694-8627
OSD/Policy (Under Secretary)	Dr. Fred C. Ikle	697-7200
OSD/ISA/DAS	Mr. Nestor Sanchez	697-5884
ISA/CA-Caribbean	Col. Larry L. Tracy	697-9301
ISA/South America	Col. Clarke M. Brintnall	697-9301
JCS	Lt. Gen. Paul F. Gorman	697-9124

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NSC

Inter-American Affairs	Mr. Roger Fontaine	395-5694
Staff Member	Col. Richard T. Childress	395-3576

Labor

International Affairs (Dep. Under Secretary)	Mr. Robert Searby	523-6061
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Inter-American Development Bank

Executive Director	Mr. Jose Casanova	634-8044
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US Ambassadors

John Negroponete (Honduras); John Gavin (Mexico); Frank Ortiz (Peru);  
 James Theberge (Chile); William Chapin (Guatemala); Dean Hinton (El Salvador)

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