

THE DIRECTOR OF
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

National Intelligence Council

9 December 1985

NOTE FOR: ADDI

SUBJECT: Analytical Improvements Since 1981

1. Dick, a couple of weeks ago, Herb Meyer told me that the DCI had asked him to do a little piece on analytical improvements since 1981, and asked me for some draft inputs for such a piece. I asked Herb, "just the NIC; or DDI, too?" Herb thought maybe both.

2. So, I informally asked for some help re DDI offices in the form of brief sub-contract inputs. Later, running into Bob Gates, I asked him the same question I had Herb. Bob said better to confine Herb's piece to NIC. We have done so.

3. Hence I have some brief inputs left over about DDI analysis (attached) which I send on to you -- for your interest and possible future use.

Cheers,



Hal Ford

Attachments:

As stated (re EURA, ACIS, NESA, OGI, OEA, OCR, SOVA, ALA, and OIA)

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The Director of Central Intelligence

Washington, D.C. 20505

National Intelligence Council

NIC 05982-85
6 December 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

FROM: Herbert E. Meyer
Vice Chairman, National Intelligence Council

SUBJECT: Changes Since 1981 in Intelligence Community Support of
Policymaking

A. National Estimates

1. The quantity of Estimates (of various types) produced by the National Intelligence Council (NIC) each year has risen sharply: from some 40 in 1980, to some 100 this year.

2. The quality and utility of Estimates has likewise improved, in several ways. Policymaking consumers have indicated that they find our Estimates of the last few years improved in relevance, timeliness, and ease of digestion.

3. The DCI's Senior Review Panel (SRP) has explicitly confirmed this, reporting (May 1985) that since 1981 national intelligence production has, as compared with the period before 1981:

- Presented more adequate threat perceptions: as compared to the period before 1981 twice as many estimates have been done on military matters, five times as many on non-military subject matter.
- Given better coverage of Third World problems by a factor of four.
- Improved periodicity of coverage and analysis by a factor of more than four: principal such subjects revisited include the Philippines, Central America and the Caribbean, terrorism, and chemical and toxin weapons.
- Fuller treatment of previous relative estimate gaps: principal subject examples include East-West trade,

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Soviet-East Europe relations, Soviet-Asian relations, technology transfer, nuclear proliferation, southern Africa, and the world oil market outlook.

- Broken new ground by a number of pioneering estimates on new questions: examples, USSR and the Third World, debt problems of the major LDCs, African famine prospects, narcotics trafficking, anti-American terrorism, and the outlook for instability/sudden change in the Third World.
- Involved fuller participation of the Intelligence Community in the preparation of national estimates -- an expansion by a factor of four: prior to 1981, the community was involved (with full opportunity for input, concurrence, or dissent) in less than one-half of the NIC's estimates; since 1981, that participation has grown to more than three quarters.

4. Reflecting much fuller contact with the policymaking community has been a rapid growth in the production of specially requested "fast track" Estimates, usually concerning foreign crisis issues. Such Estimates account for exactly one-half of the Estimates produced in 1985, up from 15 percent of the Estimates produced in 1981. Prime examples of such subjects in recent months include Qadhafi's challenge to US and Western interests, West European terrorism and its threat to NATO and US interests, radicalism in Lebanon, and the Philippine succession and the US.

5. Similarly, many more specially requested especially sensitive Estimates have been produced, some on a fast-track basis.

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6. We have meanwhile insisted that our Estimates be written more crisply, stressing especially the need for Key Judgments that are clear, brief, and unequivocal, and yet faithfully distill the Estimates' messages and tone.

7. We have also pushed the Community to make fuller use of dissenting or alternative judgments, rather than to settle for watered-down "coordinated" language.

8. Our Estimates have consciously included more emphasis than in previous years on the implications of the given paper's message for US interests. This has provided policymaking consumers more "handles" or ideas, without in any way compromising intelligence objectivity.

9. Where appropriate we have added certain well-received new sections to our Estimates: alternative scenarios, statements on collection gaps, and intelligence bibliographies.

10. Senior policymakers now receive advance copies of the Key Judgments of certain Estimates in a specially printed executive format.

B. Parallel Improvements in the NIC

11. Through various means and settings, the NIC's National Intelligence Officers (NIOs) have increased their contact with the policymaking community and with the Congress. This has included additional NIO access to top-level officials, including the President, members of the Cabinet, and the Joint Chiefs; and briefings of joint sessions of the House and Senate, in addition to special testimony before all of the major Congressional committees. The NIC has also become the Intelligence Community's chief point of contact with the academic and business communities, whose judgment and expertise have contributed much to our products.

12. NIC officers now produce several additional types of estimative projects for the DCI. These include not only certain sensitive, coordinated papers on given country's vulnerabilities, but various kinds of in-house "think" papers, what if? exercises, and certain papers which treat special economic or other needed subjects which do not happen to fit going art forms.

13. The DCI and the NIC have instituted a well-received new series publication, the NIC Outlook, whose outside distribution is limited to the President, the Vice President, and four other top policymakers.

14. The DCI has added certain specific new NIO portfolios which permit the NIC to support policymaking much more effectively in these fields: foreign deception and intelligence activities; counterterrorism; nuclear, chemical, and biological proliferation; science and technology; and narcotics.

15. In addition to individual contact with the DCI, the NIOs now meet regularly with the DCI on pre-arranged substantive agendas, the geographical and functional NIOs alternating every other week.

16. Closer NIO-DCI contact has been accomplished by a 1981 reorganization which placed the NIC directly under the DCI. Among the benefits of this change has been a greater role for NIOs as the personal representatives of the DCI in a variety of venues.

17. The NIC's Analytic Group has been strengthened in various ways. Its 12 members now draft about one-third of each year's estimates, do a lot of repair work on others' ailing drafts, fill in for absent Assistant NIOs, and do special studies for the DCI.

18. The NIC has instituted informal measures to increase collegial review and quality control of certain Estimates, particularly those whose subject matter spans regions, issues, or disciplines.

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19. The DCI has instituted measures which make NIC products more responsive to quality control suggestions from the DCI's SRP.

HEM

Herbert E. Meyer

cc: DDCI
ER
C/NIC
✓ Hal Ford
DDI Reg
H. Meyer

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Memorandum for:

NIC/Production Officer

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Aaaa,

I hope that the attached short statement will help Mr. Ford respond to the DCI's request for a summary of how our intelligence support for policymakers has changed since 1981. As we try to make clear, the recurrent theme has been "outreach" to the policy community. We think that EURA is among the most active DI Offices in several important ways that we mention in the attached.

If you need more prose, please let me know. Regards,

EURA/XO

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2 December 1985



E U R A

Office of European Analysis

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Changes in Intelligence Support to Policymakers Since 1981

Office of European Analysis
Directorate of Intelligence


One phrase sums up how support to policymakers from the Office of European Analysis has changed since 1981: outreach to the policy community. This has been in three fundamental ways:

-- most important, through rotational assignments to the policymaking agencies. We now regularly detail managers and selected senior analysts to State Department bureaus (European and Canadian Affairs, and Political-Military Affairs) and to the Defense Department (to work on nuclear forces and arms control policy). We hope to expand this program to other agencies. These rotations have served to alert us, in a more timely way than normal channels can, to issues that require intelligence coverage; and they have led to an increase in direct, specific tasking of EURA analysts by policymakers who have gotten to know us better and to appreciate our capabilities. (There has been a marked increase in our production of specifically tailored typescript memoranda and deskside briefings of policymakers.) And, of course, EURA people who have gone on these rotations return to us with a sharpened understanding of the policy agenda and how we can tailor our production to be most helpful.

-- regular attendance at staff meetings where policy options are debated, principally at State Department. For example, EURA managers participate in weekly sessions of the Bureau of European and Canadian Affairs plus three of its regional offices (covering Southern, Eastern, and Central Europe). This permits us to have direct input into discussions of the options and to gain first-hand understanding of the intricacies of these issues.



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3 December 1985

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ACIS

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3 December 1985

POST 1981 IMPROVEMENTS IN INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT
TO POLICYMAKERS ON ARMS CONTROL MATTERS

Since 1981, CIA's Arms Control Intelligence Staff has benefitted from a threefold increase in manpower, substantial improvements in the technical support available to these officers and upgrading of office space. The selection process that led to a threefold growth in personnel stressed the qualitative side. The officers chosen were mature, experienced individuals who had distinguished themselves in previous assignments; at one point, in fact, four of the senior officers assigned to the Staff were former special assistants to the Director of Central Intelligence. Improvements in technical support included substantial communication enhancement

[Redacted]

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The improvements undertaken at CIA were mirrored at other agencies within the Intelligence Community. Moreover, the interagency body, the Strategic Arms Monitoring Working Group under the chairmanship of C/ACIS was reinvigorated and the representatives from other agencies were asked to play more prominent roles, for example, at Congressional hearings. (S NF)

Of particular note is the fact that ACIS has undertaken a major effort to improve and systematize methodologies for monitoring arms control agreements.

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MEMORANDUM FOR:

Jeral -

*Per your request, here's
something from CPDS
on how our support for
policy makers has changed
over the past five years.*

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Date

12/3/85

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CPAS


Tuesday, December 3, 1985

Daily intelligence support to senior policymakers by CPAS over the past five years has become more extensive, more sophisticated, and more personalized.

The principal vehicle remains the President's Daily Brief. Five years ago it went to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs for his use in briefing the President and the Vice President. Copies were provided to the Secretaries of State and Defense. Today, individual copies of the PDB go directly to the President, the Vice President, the President's Chief of Staff, the National Security Adviser, the Secretaries of State and Defense, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Most of these PDBs are now delivered directly to the principals by senior Agency personnel who can follow up on questions and requests for additional information.

Qualitatively, more sophisticated printing techniques enable us to use more and better graphics and to keep the PDB and the National Intelligence Daily "open" later for updates that give us greater currentness. New communications capabilities enable us to send the PDB to its regular readers wherever they may be in the US or abroad.

Although we have not greatly increased the number of NID recipients, in the interest of tightening control over its external dissemination, we have beefed up its contents over the past five years with a significant increase in our coverage of economic intelligence topics and transnational issues such as technology transfer, terrorism, and narcotics.



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We have increased current intelligence support most recently by instituting a Midday Intelligence Report which provides to a select readership of 20 senior officials in Washington an update of significant reporting received by the CIA Operations Center from the time the NID went to press until approximately 11 a.m. CPAS produces this publication and delivers it by courier by no later than 1 p.m. each working day, making the Midday Report not only the newest but the most timely of our current intelligence publications.

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FROM: EXO/NESA		
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NESA

2 December 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR : NIO at Large/Director, Analytic Group

FROM :
Executive Officer, NESA

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SUBJECT : Changes in NESA's Support to Polcymakers

1. With no institutional memory to depend upon, it is somewhat difficult to define how our policy support has changed over the past few years. It is easy to describe what we do now but difficult to compare it to what we did a few years ago.

2. Unquestionably, NESA does much more now than previously. The volume of briefings, typescripts, etc. is up significantly over earlier years. This is certainly true as far as Congressional support is concerned. NESA's managers/analysts brief Congressional committees and staffs two or three times a month on a wide variety of topics. In earlier years such briefings were usually done by one or two key DI managers and then very infrequently.

3. Feedback from our consumers indicates our products play an important role in policy formulation. It is not unusual for the office to receive a couple of kudos per week from key policymakers who want us to know how valuable they find our analysis. The writers of the kudos range from high level personnel at the Departments of State and Defense to key individuals at the NSC. Their comments are based on a reading of an item in the NID or to one of our Intelligence Assessments.

4. A very marked change in NESA's support has come about through the use of typescripts--a one- or two-page memo that provides greater analysis on a topic of current interest. Typescripts are done for a small, select audience and allow our analysts the opportunity to detail the significance of the topic and its impact on US foreign policy.

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(fm [redacted] OGI)

ANALYTICAL IMPROVEMENTS SINCE 1981

1. The most notable improvement probably is the development of the [redacted] Model for analysing political environments to understand what influences are weighing on a policymaker and what choices he is likely to make. The approach is based on microeconomic decision theory and examines the costs and benefits associated with alternative policy choices. It enables the analyst not only to predict outcomes but also to comprehend what will cause the decisionmaker to choose a particular course of action. The model was developed under a contract managed by the DS&T and has recently been taken over by the Political Instability Branch of OGI for general application.

2. Other, very sophisticated models have been developed in the Economics and Resources Divisions of OGI. The economic models are used for such matters as predicting levels of indebtedness of developing countries and the impact of debt burden on the international financial system. The Resource Division modelling includes extremely complicated oil field models that have been used, among other things, for predicting the decline of oil field productivity in the Soviet Union and, I believe, the major points of vulnerability of Persian Gulf oil fields.

3. Major analytical improvement has also occurred in the area of indicators intelligence. OGI has pioneered the development of systematic, comprehensive lists of indicators for tracking the potential for political instability in all developing nations and for assessing prospects for insurgency worldwide. It has also created systems for applying these indicators at regular intervals and for reporting the results to the intelligence and policy communities.

4. Significant advances have taken place in the last few years in OGI in the development and application of major computerized data bases as an analytical tool. These are now used not just for record keeping but also for manipulating data on such widely diverse subjects as international and national terrorism, conventional arms transfers, and a host of economic and financial matters.

5. OGI's Geography Division has leaped light years ahead in the last several years in the use and presentation of geographic intelligence as a policymaking tool. Particularly noteworthy is the creation of their foldout format briefs which bring together various kinds of maps and overhead photography with political, economic, and sociological data to provide policymakers with highly efficient overviews of such issues as the Falklands War and the water dispute between Israel and Jordan.

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**THE DIRECTOR OF
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE**

2 December 1985


National Intelligence Council

NOTE FOR: Hal Ford
NIO/AL

FROM: Julian C. Nall
NIO/S&T

Hal -

I hope that this helps you out. Please
let me know if I can be of further assistance.


Julian C. Nall

Attachment

SST

Changes in Science and Technology Intelligence Since 1981

Introduction

The importance of assessing foreign sciences and technologies has been recognized for many years, but since 1981 significantly increased emphasis has been placed on such assessments. The role that today's science and technology plays in understanding tomorrow's military and civil systems has been increasingly appreciated. Not only the Communist countries but also the developed Free World and Newly Industrializing Countries have become important. Stretching farther into the future and understanding the effect science and technology has on it has become a critical issue for the Intelligence Community.

NIC

In recognition of the importance of assessing foreign science and technology, the DCI established for the first time the position of a National Intelligence Officer for Science and Technology. This position provides a focal point for Community activities related to the assessment of foreign science and technology. New initiatives include:

- Stimulation of collection and analysis of Soviet science with the recent publication of the first National Intelligence Estimate on the Future of Soviet Science.

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- Increased emphasis on an understanding of Soviet military technologies by an improved version of the NIE Prospects for Soviet Military Technology and Research and Development.
- Increased emphasis on understanding the role foreign science and technology play in economic competitiveness. An NIE on Foreign Free World Advanced Technologies to be published soon addresses this critical problem.
- Because of the importance of science and technology to the newly industrializing countries, an estimate is planned. It will provide information to policymakers who can then use S&T as an appropriate lever to help carry out U.S. objectives.

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- There are now periodic meetings of the S&T Principals which is composed of the senior S&T person from each component of the Intelligence Community. One of the major purposes of this group is to improve collection and analysis of foreign S&T.

- The DCI's Science and Technology Advisory Panel and its working groups have been revitalized. The Panel's work is now focused on critical areas such as foreign activities in Stealth, SDI, 25X1

mobile launch facilities, and technology surprise. 25X1

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OSWR

The Office of Science and Weapons Research has adjusted its major thrust and program to assure more emphasis on sciences and emerging technologies. Some of their initiatives include:

- Much greater emphasis, primarily through the Foreign Sciences Assessment Center (FASAC), on assessing applied science in the Soviet Union. Also there is more emphasis on identification of emerging technologies.
- Greater stress on application of quantitative measures for technology assessments, consequently less emphasis on merely descriptive studies of Soviet technology.
- Much greater appreciation of the role of technology transfer in Soviet technical achievements, hence greater efforts at stemming technology transfer through all channels.

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- More emphasis on CW/BW motivated primarily by Soviet use of Yellow Rain.

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OGI

The Civil Technologies and Industries Division of the Office of Global Issues has increased its efforts to provide for the policymaker an improved understanding of foreign free world technologies. Such understanding is needed because of the strategic importance of any U.S. dependence on foreign sources for military technology and equipment, and any increased future economic competition.

OTE

Recognizing the importance of S&T and the future, OTE has recently initiated a training course on technology forecasting and one on emerging technologies.

Processing of Overtly Collected S&T Information

Much S&T analysis is based on overt sources of information which comes in huge quantities of often "low grade ore." Processing of such quantities prior to being received by the analyst is a major problem which had not been addressed seriously until recent years. Plans are now being made to take positive steps to aid in solving this problem.

cc: AD/OSWR



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REMARKS

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5 December 1985

NOTE FOR::

[redacted] NIC

FROM:

[redacted] OEA

SUBJECT:

OEA's Support for the Policy Community Since 1981

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1. Since 1981, OEA's direct support of the policy community has increased significantly. Cumulatively, it far outstrips the level of support maintained prior to 1981.

2. Several factors have contributed to this trend. First and foremost, OEA has made a conscious and deliberate decision to be more aggressive in providing direct, tailored support for our policy consumers. We also made a conscious decision to move in the direction of the typescript memorandum, drafted for a single consumer or small group of consumers, as the principal policy support vehicle. Over the past two years, we have produced about 250 typescripts. This has come at the expense of greater production of longer range Intelligence Analyses and Research Publications. In 1982 OEA also decided to cease publishing an office journal in order to free up resources for direct policy support. This effort in our view has been justified.

3. Secondly, for whatever reasons, we have sensed a greater receptivity to our product among many individual policy makers. This is admittedly subjective--there will always be some who don't want to play--but we are persuaded that it is so, especially compared to circumstances prevailing before 1981. Finally, in OEA's case, the broadening of the Sino-US relationship has had a decided impact on the level of our policy support. A wide array of US policymakers now have a stake in the relationship and our policy support on Chinese issues has increased dramatically.

4. The primary means of reaching policy makers--personal briefings and specially tailored memos--remain pretty much as they were prior to 1981. There are a few new twists, however.

[redacted]

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4 December 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR:

[Redacted]

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FROM:

SUBJECT: OCR Support to Policy Makers

Preparation of biographic profiles for the President, Vice President, and the Intelligence Community has been a constant in OCR's support to policymakers since 1981. Since 1981, however, the number of reports we have delivered and the policymakers we have served has grown. We estimate that now we deliver [Redacted] finished profiles to policy level customers each year. Recipients of these reports now regularly include senior officials at the Departments of Commerce, Treasury, Federal Reserve Board, and Energy. These once relatively infrequent consumers of our products are now regular customers.

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Like other offices in the DDI, the Office of Central Reference works harder to anticipate policymakers needs. Thus, OCR is now a more active participant in the DI's programmed research effort.

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[Redacted]

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A related development, brought on by the broader range of our customers is that we are more likely to research and analyze people in economic fields than we had in the past.

[Redacted]

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Another way in which our policy support has evolved is in the nature of our cooperation with other DDI components. About one half of our programmed research is done in conjunction with analysts from other offices. The result is that our biographic research and analyses take on more policy relevance and contain the results of vigorous intellectual exchange. By the same token, regional office analysts are more prone to consult OCR analysts than they had in the past. This is especially true in the production of current intelligence where NIDs and PDBs more

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frequently contain biographic profiles or perspectives than they have in the past, a development that we believe has been welcomed.



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Distribution:

- addressee



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4 December 1985

Changes in SOVA Support for Policymakers Since 1981

Reorganization at the Directorate level in 1981 and within the Office of Soviet Analysis (SOVA) in 1985 have been important stimuli for aligning our analytical efforts in accordance with consumer demands. Together, these initiatives have enabled SOVA to do more and better interdisciplinary work and to find more innovative ways of attacking the issues of concern to policymakers.

Prior to the directorate reorganization, the policy community was asking questions on Soviet issues that were broader than those posed in the research programs of the former functional offices and which required integrated answers that the disparate responses from those offices would not provide. In terms of single papers that sharply focus on the essence of policy questions, or that provide the broad multidisciplinary assessments and estimative answers that the policymaker questions frequently seek, the record was less than impressive.

The directorate reorganization put us in a better position to be responsive to these questions. We began producing integrated analysis that encompasses the full range of political, military, economic, and societal factors that effect Soviet policy choices. A combined staff of political scientists, economists, and military specialists, demographers, and sociologists have been working together on more timely, effective, and perceptive responses. Some examples are:

- Although there had been much reporting on Soviet agriculture, energy, and general economic problems and prospects, little was done to link these developments to near-term Soviet foreign policy initiatives. This broad topic was addressed in a major SOVA paper published in 1984.
- There had been reporting on Soviet agricultural imports and on several aspects of Soviet technology imports and absorption, but nothing was done on the degree of Soviet dependence on US and Western technology or the amount of US leverage. SOVA, working together with OSWR's Technology Transfer Assessment Center, has been addressing these issues.

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- In formulating Warsaw Pact force projections, we have been looking at economic and political factors that influence future defense plans. We are integrating our force projection analysis with what we know about such issues as the impact of economic and manpower problems, changes in the Soviet perception of the NATO threat, Soviet strategy in Southwest Asia and the Middle East, and the Soviet perception of China as a military force.

We also have demonstrated that we can succeed in analyzing problems that cut across the missions and functions of the regional offices. An example was when EURA and SOVA completed a joint project on the Siberian-to-Western Europe natural gas pipeline. Dialogue between analysts in these two production elements resulted in an interregional study that focused on both Soviet and West European attitudes and options as well as on the implications of this pipeline for the United States.

The intent of the more recent reorganization of SOVA was to further increase the production of interdisciplinary analysis, to group analytical endeavors more nearly according to consumer requirements, and to provide better substantive review of our research and production. The benefits of this reorganization are becoming apparent--most notably in the closer working relationships among analysts and managers in producing Soviet defense expenditure estimates that are of interest to many US Government officials.

Directorate of Intelligence
Office of African and Latin American Analysis

3 December 1985

NOTE FOR:

NIC

The attached responds to your request for a short piece on ALA's perspective about changes in intelligence support to policy-makers since 1981.

Executive Officer

Attachment:
As stated

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Changes in Intelligence Support to Policymakers

From ALA's perspective, we have become increasingly responsive to policymakers' needs since the 1981 reorganization of the DI. The reorganization was the first step in positioning ourselves better to meet those needs with an institutional setup more in line with those of the State Department, the NSC, and other agencies in the foreign policy and intelligence communities. As a result of it, we have been able to provide more and better multidisciplinary analysis and, therefore, increase the relevance of our production and the utility of intelligence information as a tool for foreign policymaking.

Relevance and timeliness have been improved in recent years by institutionalizing regular contacts from the desk to the deputy assistant secretary level and above. We make a special effort to address specifically in our papers the implications for the US of the many issues and events we focus on.

Our increased responsiveness to the policymakers is clearly reflected in the topics we write about. For example, nearly 50% of ALA's research production in FY 1985 dealt with countries and regions of the highest policymaking interest--Nicaragua, El Salvador, Cuba, South and Southern Africa, and Ethiopia. We produce a weekly report on the tactical military situation in El Salvador and Nicaragua and a comprehensive monthly report on developments in Central America. Frequent favorable comments from downtown on a wide range of our product is also indicative of the quality, accuracy, and relevance of our effort. Simply focusing on South America--in many aspects our quietest account--shows how our reports have been received:

- The IA on Colombian peace prospects was lauded by the State Department's Director of Andean Affairs as "outstanding" and "extremely timely."
- The typescript on the new administration in Peru was praised by the Latin American specialist at the NSC.
- Assistant Secretary of State Motley read and praised the IA on Chile's emerging party system.
- The IA on Latin challenges to IMF programs was selected for inclusion in Treasury Secretary Baker's briefing book for his trip to South America.

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[Redacted] Finally, our support to Congress has grown dramatically, particularly in the form of briefings. These have been especially numerous and thorough on Central America during the last four or five years.

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OIA-223/85
3 December 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR: [Redacted] Production Officer, NIC

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FROM: Executive Officer, Office of Imagery Analysis

SUBJECT: Changes in Support to Policymakers Since 1981

REFERENCE:

[Redacted]

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1. Since 1981 there has been a noticeable increase in the number of policymakers we support--at least indirectly--and in the ways that we communicate with them. Over the past four years there has been a steady increase in the distribution of OIA reports to policymakers or their staffs. Our publications are reaching many more customers in Commerce, Energy, Treasury, Justice Department (FBI and DEA), and State than they did four years ago. In addition OIA analysts are interacting more closely and more frequently with the policymakers themselves or with their staffs through briefings and participation in interagency committees. Our support on BW/CW, narcotics, and on Soviet offensive and defensive weapons for START are obvious examples.

2. OIA is much more involved in policymaker support through the production of current intelligence than we were in 1981. This is most dramatically illustrated by our interaction with the NID staff, a development that has really evolved over the past two years. An example of this is the Soviet arms transfer issue. OIA works routinely with OGI in producing policy-relevant current intelligence on this topic, one of the Soviet Union's main hard currency earning accounts.

3. Probably the most dramatic change in OIA has been support of the USG policy of increasing drug traffic interdictions and foreign eradication programs. A Narcotics Branch has been formed in OIA to meet the increasing demands for intelligence and operational support by both policymakers and enforcement agencies. The Narcotics Branch has played an important role in several of the accomplishments in support of this policy noted in the Executive Summary of the referenced document.

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Distribution:

- Original - Addressee
- 1 - DI/OIA/ODIR

DI/OIA/EXO [Redacted] (3 Dec 85)

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