

input to national estimates as well as to inform officials in various departments who need detailed intelligence. Thus, it is necessary to ensure that departmental intelligence production is consistent with national priorities.

As with other types of intelligence activities, management of the analytical process is handled through NSCIDs, DCIDs, various committees, and requirements documents, NSCIDs No. 1 and No. 3 being the general guidance documents for all aspects of intelligence production.

Section 6 of NSCID No. 1 defines national intelligence as intelligence required for the formulation of national security policy, concerning more than one department or agency, and transcending the exclusive competence of a single department or agency. It authorizes the DCI to produce national intelligence and disseminate it to the President, the NSC, and other appropriate U.S. government components. Section 6 also stipulates that national intelligence will carry a statement of abstention or dissent of any NFIB member or intelligence chief of a military department.<sup>53</sup>

NSCID No. 3 of February 17, 1972, "Coordination of Intelligence Production," distinguishes between different types of intelligence—basic intelligence, current intelligence, departmental intelligence, interdepartmental intelligence, and national intelligence—and assigns responsibilities for the production of basic and current intelligence to the CIA and a variety of other agencies.

The Directive also specifies that

1. The Department of State shall produce political and sociological intelligence on all countries and economic intelligence on countries of the Free World.
2. The Department of Defense shall produce military intelligence. This production shall include scientific, technical and economic intelligence directly pertinent to the mission of the various components of the Department of Defense.
3. The Central Intelligence Agency shall produce economic, scientific and technical intelligence. Further, the Central Intelligence Agency may produce such other intelligence as may be necessary to discharge the statutory responsibilities of the Director of Central Intelligence.

It assigns to all NFIB members charged with the production of finished intelligence the responsibility for producing atomic energy intelligence. In addition, when an intelligence requirement is established for which there is no existing production capability, the DCI, in consultation with the NFIB, is responsible for determining which departments or agencies of the intelligence community can "best undertake the primary responsibility as a service of common concern."<sup>54</sup>

On the basis of NSCIDs No. 1 and No. 3, the DCI issues DCIDs in the 1/1 and 3/1 series to further implement the Directives. The original DCIDs governing the national intelligence process were issued in July and September 1948. DCID 3/1 of July 8, 1948, "Standard Operating Procedures for Departmental Participation

in the Production and Coordination of National Intelligence," required, except under exceptional circumstances, that upon initiation of a report or estimate the CIA inform departmental intelligence organizations of

1. the problem under consideration;
2. the nature and scope of the report or estimate involved;
3. the scheduled date of issuance of the first draft;
4. the requirements for departmental contributions . . . ; and
5. the date upon which such departmental action should be completed.<sup>55</sup>

Under normal procedures the CIA was to prepare an initial draft and then furnish copies to departmental intelligence organizations with a request for review and preparation. If the comments received indicated differences of opinion, the CIA was instructed to arrange for an informal discussion with departmental personnel. The CIA was then to prepare a final draft and distribute it to departmental intelligence organizations for concurrence or statements of substantial dissent which would be incorporated in the final paper.

DCID 3/2 of September 13, 1948 complemented 3/1. Entitled "Policy Governing Departmental Concurrences in National Intelligence Reports and Estimates," the Directive specified three options for departmental intelligence organizations: concur, concur with comment, or dissent. The Directive further stated the considerations that should be involved in choosing among the options.<sup>56</sup>

Subsequently DCIDs 3/1 and 3/2 were superseded by DCID 3/5 of September 1, 1953, entitled "Production of National Intelligence Estimates." The Directive reflected the changes that occurred in the intervening years—particularly the establishment of the Board of National Estimates (BNE) and the Intelligence Advisory Committee (IAC). It was required that by January 1 the BNE present to the IAC a production program for NIEs and SNIes.<sup>57</sup>

In 1950 an Office of National Estimates (ONE) was established within the CIA's Directorate of Intelligence with the responsibility for drafting national and special national estimates. The Office consisted of a Board of National Estimates and its staff. The Board consisted of between seven and twelve senior officials with expertise in particular areas with the responsibility for managing the production of national estimates. Members of the Board were initially drawn from academia and subsequently from the CIA.<sup>58</sup>

The Board was serviced initially by fifty professional analysts, subsequently by thirty. In theory, the Board reacted to specific requests from the NSC. In emergencies this was often the case. Thus, as noted, several SNIes were commissioned during the Cuban missile crisis. However, the subject of NIEs became routinized on the basis of the Board's judgment as to the requirements of policy-makers.<sup>59</sup>

The process for drafting NIEs was that initially established by DCID 3/1: initial drafting by BNE/ONE, interagency review, revision, and submission to the USIB with dissenting footnotes, if any.<sup>60</sup> During the process, the BNE operated

in collegial fashion, taking collective responsibility for the estimates produced and exercising collective judgment in approving it.

The ONE suffered a decline of prestige and influence during the Nixon administration for a variety of reasons, including Henry Kissinger's unhappiness with its product.<sup>61</sup> In June 1973 John Huizenga, the BNE Chairman, retired on an involuntary basis. DCI William Colby decided not to replace him and abolished ONE.<sup>62</sup> Colby gave two reasons for his decision:

One, I had some concern with the tendency to compromise differences and put out a document which was less sharp than perhaps was needed in certain situations. Second, I believed that I needed the advantage of some individuals who could specialize in some of the major problems that we face around the world and look at these problems not just as estimative problems but as broad intelligence problems. They could sit in my chair, so to speak, and look at the full range of an intelligence problem: Are we collecting enough? Are we processing the raw data properly? Are we spending too much money on it? Are we organized right to do the jobs?<sup>63</sup>

Colby created the National Intelligence Officer (NIO) system in which specific individuals were held solely responsible for producing a particular estimate. NIOs are recruited mainly, but not exclusively, from the CIA and are specialists in a specific functional or geographic area. The number of NIOs has varied from thirteen to eight to the present seventeen. In addition to three at-large NIO's there are NIOs for Africa, East Asia, Europe, the Near East and South Asia, Latin America, the USSR, Counter-Terrorism, Foreign Denial, Science and Technology, Economics, General Purpose Forces, Strategic Programs, Warning and Narcotics. The NIO for Warning serves as the focal point for the receipt of all Indications and Warning intelligence for its evaluation. Initially, NIOs were purposely not given a staff but were expected to draw on the resources of the CIA, DIA, INR, and other analytical units to produce the required estimates.<sup>64</sup>

Subsequently, the NIO process was further revised with establishment on January 1, 1980 of the National Intelligence Council (NIC), giving the NIOs a collective existence.<sup>65</sup> The NIOs are specifically tasked with

1. becoming knowledgeable of what substantive intelligence questions policy-makers want addressed;
2. drawing up the concept papers and terms of references for the NIE;
3. participating in the drafting and draft review of the NIE;
4. chairing coordinating sessions and making judgments on substantive questions in debate; and
5. ensuring that the final texts accurately reflect the substantive judgment of the DCI.<sup>66</sup>

In addition to NIEs, the NIOs are responsible for the SNIEs and IIMs.

Besides giving NIOs a collective identity, creation of the NIC also provided the NIOs with a staff—the NIC Analytical Group—so as to provide the Council with control over production resources.<sup>67</sup>

When created, the BNE/ONE was firmly a part of the CIA. Under DCI John McCone and BNE was attached to the DCI's office, responsible to him alone.<sup>68</sup> Under the Carter administration the NIOs became part of the National Foreign Assessment Center (NFAC) and hence under the direct control of the CIA's Deputy Director for National Foreign Assessment.

As noted earlier, one of the earliest Reagan administration actions concerning intelligence as the downgrading of the NFAC to its previous identity: the Directorate of Intelligence. With that change the NIOs were once again placed under the control of the DCI. According to the Director of the NFAC at that time, John McMahon, that was a decision that

the Director and I debated long and hard because at the time that happened I was in charge of the national foreign assessments, and I did not want it to happen out of the symmetry of management. The Director wanted to have it because he felt that intelligence was so vital, so important that it should not be left to one person to manage and control. And so by having the NIOs separate and under himself, he could insure that he could get a balanced view coming out of the agency on one hand and the rest of the intelligence community and the NIOs on the other. And it was just his way of assuring that all alternative views . . . bubbled to the top.<sup>69</sup>

In addition to the NIC, several NFIB committees play a significant role in managing the intelligence production effort—the Economic Intelligence Committee, the Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee, the Scientific and Technical Intelligence Committee, the Weapons and Space Systems Intelligence Committee, and the Intelligence Producers Council.

DCID 3/3, "Production of Atomic Energy Intelligence," governs the responsibilities of the Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee. The Directive, pursuant to NSCID No. 3, notes that atomic energy intelligence is the responsibility of all NFIB committees and further declares that

the mission of the Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee (JAEIC) shall be to foster, develop and maintain a coordinated community approach to problems in the field of atomic energy intelligence, to promote interagency liaison and to give impetus and community support to the efforts of individual agencies.<sup>70</sup>

The JAEIC's specific responsibilities are officially classified but certainly must include assessing major developments in the nuclear weapons development of the nuclear powers, considering the possible impact of atomic power programs on proliferation in countries not yet possessing nuclear weapons, providing national decisionmakers with advice on the possible authorization of U.S. for-

ign sales in the nuclear energy area, providing warning of a country "going nuclear," and assessing the regional impact of such an event.

On February 28, 1950 the Committee issued a memorandum stating that the Committee, "after considering certain information which has become available, is of the opinion that this information should be interpreted as an indication that a Soviet bomb test may take place in Central Asia as early as March 1950."<sup>71</sup>

The Weapons and Space Systems Intelligence Committee (WSSIC) was created in 1956 as the Guided Missile Intelligence Committee and subsequently became the Guided Missile and Astronautics Intelligence Committee (GMAIC). According to DCID 3/4, "Production of Guided Missiles and Astronautics Intelligence," the Committee's membership consists of representatives of all NFIB agencies plus Army, Navy, and Air Force representatives. Its Chairman is named by the DCI with approval of the NFIB.<sup>72</sup> The CIA was made responsible for providing secretariat support. In addition to coordinating the guided missile and astronautics intelligence activities of the intelligence community, the WSSIC has performed technical studies on Soviet missiles as *inputs* to the NIEs. These papers have been coordinated in the same manner as NIEs but have been directed at informing the intelligence community.<sup>73</sup>

At one time, functions of the Economic Intelligence Committee were governed by DCID 15/1, "Production and Coordination of Foreign Economic Intelligence."<sup>74</sup> The Directive, as noted earlier, allocated primary production responsibilities for economic intelligence among the Department of State (INR) and the CIA, the former being responsible for economic intelligence for all non-Soviet Bloc countries, the latter with Soviet Bloc economic intelligence. The Economic Intelligence Committee was assigned responsibility for periodic review of the allocations and interpreting the provisions of the Directive in areas of common or overlapping interest.

As discussed earlier, the present Committee plays a significant role in establishing economic reporting requirements. It also probably plays a similar role in coordinating the production of economic intelligence, especially since the importance of economic intelligence relative to military and political intelligence has increased in recent years.

Management of intelligence productions is also partially a function of the requirements documents discussed in Chapter 13—documents such as the Key Intelligence Questions, Key Intelligence Requirements, and National Intelligence Topics. The same documents that state collection requirements when issued by the NSC, DCI or, Secretary of Defense also establish guidelines for forthcoming intelligence production, both for the NIOs and the various NFIB committees.

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