

MEMORANDUM FOR:

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NFAC #6849-80

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15 October 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director, National Foreign Assessment Center

FROM : Hal Ford, Acting Chairman
National Intelligence Council

SUBJECT : Annual Report for FY 1980

Overview

1. FY 1980 saw the National Intelligence Council created (December 1979) and off to a promising start. As outlined below, tangible progress is being made in this effort to retain the many strengths of the NIO system while strengthening the NIO corporate structure and providing a much-needed in-house drafting capability. This invigoration of the estimative process has been noted in the Community and among our consumers, and present programs will further increase the quality and impact of NIC's contribution during FY 1981. At the same time, a number of problems and constraints need to be overcome.

2. Accomplishments:

(a) The NIC has been organized. Following weeks of staff studies and planning discussions among the NIOs and senior officers of NFAC, the DCI approved and created the NIC on 3 December 1979 and announced it to NFIB on 14 January 1980. Now, at the end of the fiscal year, the NIC consists of the following officers: a Chairman and NIO for Warning (Richard Lehman); an Associate Chairman (Hal Ford); eight NIOs with regional or military portfolios (Robert Ames, David Brandwein, Gray Cowan, Jack Davis, John Holdridge, Arnold Horelick, Ennis Whitehead, and Joe Zaring); two NIOs-at-Large (Jeremy Azrael and Hans Heymann); 14 Assistant NIOs; eight staff members (Analytic Group); and supporting administrative and clerical officers.

(b) Centralized substantive review and administrative procedures have been established. Various directives have been produced and revised after circulation to NFIB members and NFAC offices which redefine the major kinds of estimative papers we produce, regularize and clarify procedures for producing them, and set up new guidelines for handling estimative dissents from other agencies.

(c) Production of estimative materials is increasing in quantity and quality. Ten NIEs and 31 other estimative pieces were produced under NIC auspices in FY 1980, as compared with six NIEs and

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30 other estimative pieces during the previous year. An estimative production program for the July 1980 to June 1981 period was produced and refined after review by NFIB members and NFAC production offices. This program is an ambitious one, put together with considerable care; it will result in a further increase in the number of estimative pieces produced by the NIC, and in a heightened proportion of estimates which cross geographic lines and academic disciplines. Comments from a number of NFIB members and principal consumers attest to their awareness of a new spark in our efforts to produce estimates of greater utility, to increase the Community's participation in the process, and to be imaginative in generating ideas for new estimative undertakings.

(d) Progress has been made in making the NIO function a more orderly and collegial one. This has resulted from a number of factors: the central managerial role of a Chairman and Associate Chairman; new procedures which expand opportunities for meeting and discussing substantive issues within the NIC; creation of informal panels of NIOs to review estimative drafts; creation of the NIC Memorandum as an in-house art form for enhancing exploration of estimative issues by NIOs, assistant NIOs, and AG officers; creation of the NIO-at-Large function to facilitate the collegial review process; the discipline and coordination imposed by the process of assembling an estimates program; and improvement registered in the operating relations among NIOs and NFAC production offices.

(e) Progress has been made in creating an elite drafting staff (AG) within the NIC. Here NIC has begun to repair one of the chief problems of the pre-NIC system: the demonstrated unevenness that resulted from NIOs having literally to scrounge drafters as best they could for each new estimative endeavor. Much of the progress is thanks to the cooperativeness of certain NFAC offices in making some of their best people available to the NIC for duty on rotation. The NFIB agencies have reacted in various fashion to our invitations to them to nominate Analytic Group candidates. Although we have one good IC officer aboard and other promising ones in the pipeline, some agencies have anted up no nominees thus far. Still other candidates for the AG from outside the Community are in the pipeline, although bringing non-CIA people into the NIC continues to prove a terribly difficult process. Our eventual goal continues to be a staff of 20 estimates officers, roughly half of whom will be from outside CIA. Experience to date confirms our confidence in (1) a desired AG of broad-gauged scholars of diverse backgrounds; (2) the deliberate care and pace with which we have been adding AG staff members; (3) the merit of having a substantial proportion of our AG officers from outside CIA; and (4) our setting of exacting standards of performance.

(f) Progress has been made in tying the NIC and NFAC efforts more closely together. This has been effected principally through two means: (1) with a few exceptions, the improvement in personal working relationships between NIOs and NFAC officers; and (2) deliberate coordination of the NIC estimative and NFAC research programs, with more NFAC "building block" projects scheduled to be folded into future estimates.

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(g) NIC has expanded estimative contact with and use of outside consultants. Contact takes various forms: many individual, informal meetings outside; individual consultants brought into CIA; and the holding of formal seminars. Seminars held in FY 1980 included sessions on African issues, Japan, the USSR, the Western alliance, and measures of military effectiveness, to mention a few. All such meetings have involved some of the finest authorities available. And in all such contact, attention is being focused directly on particular NIEs or other distinct estimative problems; this is done early-on in the processes of conceptualization and comprehension.

(h) Progress has been made in substantive quality control and policy relevance. The various procedural innovations mentioned above have been guided by an explicit determination that NIC's estimative materials must make unique, sophisticated, and policy-relevant contributions to our consumers, if NIEs and other estimative pieces are to be read and are in fact to enrich the policymaking process.

(i) Progress has been made in enhancing the warning function. Systematized procedures have been devised to facilitate the warning role of the NIO and his colleagues in NFAC and in the Community, in being especially sensitive to warning matters and in issuing warnings in a speedy and timely manner. Of the 17 Alert Memorandums issued in FY 1980, quite a few were directly on target; those concerning Poland, the Iraq-Iran war, and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan are particular cases in point.

(j) Objective integrity of the estimative process has been maintained. There is no party line in the NIC other than to go where the evidence takes us. NIC management is also sensitive to the needs of guarding against analytic bias.

3. Problems Encountered:

(a) We still have a long way to go toward achieving the kind of product quality and impact we seek. We recognize that the NIC starts from a situation in which, with certain notable exceptions, there has not been a terribly ready market for NIEs and estimative materials. There is much more the NIC can do, and expects its officers to do, to help fill the gaps that exist in the Community's analytic effort. In particular, we have in mind the need better to discuss trends, indicate awareness of the US factor in given situations, explore the larger "so-what?" implications of events, and in general provide a unique analytic ingredient which goes beyond current intelligence and crisis support coverage.

(b) We continue to be nibbled to death by bureaucratic obstacles. The DCI and DD/NFA have commissioned NIC to put together a vibrant new office, including the best substantive drafting staff we can assemble. Yet we encounter countless roadblocks that tell us in effect that we can't do it: e.g., delays in clearing and processing outside applicants for NIC positions; getting knocked down on the salaries of-

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ferred to deserving applicants; the need to arrange follow-on assignments elsewhere in NFAC for NIC people after two or three years here as a precondition of staff employment; the interminable delays sometimes involved in bringing people from other agencies into the NIC; delays encountered in the estimative process after the NIEs and other estimative materials have been essentially coordinated; and the loss of two particularly strong NIC officers to other CIA enterprises. Also, though not a problem at the moment, NIC will have serious space problems (especially re the A/NIOs) when the NIC gets up to full strength.

(c) More progress is needed in making the NIOs and the AG into an orderly enterprise. This will take time, even though the NIOs are to be congratulated for the resilience and responsiveness they have shown to date. As for the AG, we will need to carry through on plans for a somewhat tighter organizational structure, even though this group of top scholars will not require a lot of Prussianizing.

(d) We have had difficulty in maintaining the strongest possible stable of NIOs and Assistant NIOs. During FY 1980, the NIC lost to retirement Associate Chairman John Whitman, NIO for Africa Bill Parmenter, NIO for Strategic Programs Howard Stoertz, and Assistant NIO for USSR and Eastern Europe [redacted]. In April, Maj. Gen. Paul Gorman left after one year as NIO for General Purpose Forces to take on a senior Army assignment. Assistant NIOs for Near East-South Asia, Latin America, and Strategic Programs, and the Associate Coordinator for Academic Relations were transferred to new assignments outside the NIC. In all cases the NIC was fortunate to find capable replacements relatively quickly, but the turnover contributed to making it a somewhat hectic year for all who were directly involved. Other NIO and Assistant NIO vacancies loom ahead, and the uncertainties of the present election period (about the Agency's future) make this a difficult time in which to recruit people of the high calibre we seek for these very responsible positions.

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(e) The process of introducing AG members to the production stream needs improving. Part of the problem involves the need to demonstrate to the NIOs that the AG constitutes a high-quality resource upon which they can confidently call for sophisticated, integrative drafting help. Part concerns filling out the AG -- and maintaining it -- with people expert in areas and disciplines that are now under-represented, or not represented at all.

(f) Progress is needed in perfecting the quality control function performed by NIOs with respect to materials prepared outside the NIC.

(g) Progress is needed in making the contact with senior policy-makers of some NIOs as full as is that of other NIOs.

4. There follow individual summaries of FY 1980 activities by each NIO and the Coordinator for Academic Relations.

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Near East-South Asia

5. Without question, this NIO account continued in FY 1980 to be our most active and most demanding in terms of production, DCI support, and consumer demand for intelligence coverage and analysis -- and no let-up is in sight. The seizure and captivity of the US hostages in Iran and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan were only the most critical of the many developments and situations in the area requiring major attention by the NIO and his staff. The NIO played a key role in providing intelligence regarding the hostage situation; he was the primary link between NFAC and DDO in preparing for two rescue missions, and he participated in more than 100 meetings in support of the NSC on the hostage issue. On Afghanistan, the NIO and his staff have played a key role in working with OSR, the Strategic Warning Staff, and others in providing timely and accurate warning of the invasion and in keeping the DCI and policymakers abreast of unfolding developments in the area and their implications. [redacted]

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6. In addition to briefing numerous SCC and PRC meetings on regional implications of the Afghan situation, NIO/NESA has played an instrumental role in developing plans for a new US security posture in the Middle East-Indian Ocean area. This has required him to participate in some 20 Security Framework SCC meetings. In a related effort, he has represented CIA in interdepartmental working groups dealing with Middle East peace negotiations and the Iran-Iraq conflict. [redacted]

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7. Formal estimative production during FY 1980 was highlighted by major NIEs on [redacted], providing comprehensive studies of those countries' prospects over the next decade, and a two-volume re-do of the periodic detailed assessment of the Arab-Israeli military balance (August and September). Other production included numerous briefings, ad hoc special assessments, Alert Memoranda, SNIEs, and special memoranda on Egypt, Israel-Iraq, the Yemens, Pakistan, Libya, Lebanon, and Western Sahara. [redacted]

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8. FY 1981 will provide no surcease in the conflicts and tensions in the area that will require NIO attention. We anticipate that Iran, Iraq, Afghanistan, Saudi Arabia, and the Gulf will be the primary areas of our concern, and we believe that instability is likely to increase still further as aging leaders and unstable regimes leave the scene and the more subtle march of societal change creates new tensions. As a consequence, we believe this raises three important organizational issues the NIE and NFAC must address early in the year: (a) the need to find at least one Middle East specialist for the NIC Analytic Group; (b) consideration of filling an NIO-at-Large position with a Middle East-South Asian expert; and (c) the need for OPA, NIC, and NFAC to explore ways of lightening the burden on the NIO to provide representation and substantive guidance to numerous intra-Agency and Intelligence Community groups and activities. [redacted]

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USSR and East Europe

9. FY 1980 began at the tail end of the flap over the Soviet brigade in Cuba, the single most time-consuming of all issue clusters dealt with the NIO/USSR-EE in FY 1979. In early FY 80, the NIO and his assistants completed a series of briefings on the subject given to Congressional committees, senators, and other key officials, but the NIO continued to be involved in periodic follow-up assessments as the year progressed. [redacted]

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10. The central event in the Soviet work of the office, however, was the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979, which resulted in requirements for numerous briefings, NIO memoranda, and direct support of the DCI in briefing the President and Congressional groups in the first half of 1980. During March, Assistant NIO [redacted]

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briefing [redacted] Afghanistan and Southwest Asia. The NIO office was also heavily involved in analytical work on Soviet military preparations in the Transcaucasus opposite Iran; in producing Alert Memoranda and other assessments in the 4th Quarter on the strike movement and subsequent political crisis in Poland; and on intelligence monitoring of the long illness and subsequent death of Yugoslav President Tito. [redacted]

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11. Important formal estimates produced wholly or in part by the office of the NIO/USSR-EE during the year included an NIE on Sino-Soviet relations (June); a rapidly-produced SNIE on Soviet military options in Iran; a Memorandum to Holders of an 1979 NIE on prospects for post-Tito Yugoslavia (February), and an IIM on Soviet intentions and options in the near-term in Southwest Asia (March). As already noted, however, the office also was heavily engaged in writing or contributing to many less formal memoranda, briefing notes, and assessments throughout the year on a variety of Soviet and East European topics. [redacted]

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12. Most of the same substantive issues that dominated FY 1980 will continue to demand NIO/USSR-EE attention in FY 1981. We will remain centrally preoccupied with the impact of Soviet political and military self-assertiveness on US interests. Issues that seem likely to require more attention include the Soviet leadership succession picture and the nature and scope of Soviet ambitions in the Middle East. Major papers we anticipate producing during the year include NIEs on Poland, Soviet-West European relations, central trends in Soviet foreign policies, and on Soviet responses to emergent economic stringencies. [redacted]

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General Purpose Forces

13. FY 1980 was a year of high productivity for those concerned with general purpose forces. The year saw the continuation of efforts to assess the capabilities of Soviet conventional forces, gauge the progress in NATO force modernization, [redacted]

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[redacted] But there were new initiatives as well, some occasioned by events in Southwest Asia, others by a need to sharpen the Community's focus on the armor/anti-

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armor problem, and others by a desire to improve our ability to measure NATO/Warsaw Pact force effectiveness. [redacted]

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14. Significant accomplishments during the year included publication of an IIM on the readiness of Soviet naval forces -- described by the DCI as a seminal work in military intelligence analysis. Other major products included an NIE on Chinese defense policy and armed forces, a quick-turnaround SNIE on Soviet military options in Iran, and an IIM on Dutch force modernization in the series on NATO countries. An IIM on the implications for warning of the Soviet move into Afghanistan was nearly complete as the year ended. [redacted]

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15. In May 1980, Maj. Gen. Ennis Whitehead, USA, replaced Maj. Gen. Paul Gorman as NIO/GPF. During his one-year tenure, Gen. Gorman had significantly expanded the production schedule on general purpose forces issues; prepared numerous innovative briefings for the DCI, the President, and Congress; and materially advanced working ties between his office and key figures in the Department of Defense. [redacted]

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16. The outlook for FY 1981 includes an important shift in priorities resulting from a decision to defer production of a major estimate on the warning of war in Europe in favor of an earlier start on an NIE examining Warsaw Pact forces opposite NATO, and on another NIE on Soviet military capabilities to project power into distant areas. Other projects will include an NIE on Soviet military forces in the Far East, an IIM on Soviet naval capabilities to interdict sea lines of communication, and more studies in the NATO force modernization series. [redacted]

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Strategic Programs

17. The list of major issuances in the strategic programs area in FY 1980 should begin, of course, with NIE 11-3/8, the annual mammoth Soviet strategic capabilities estimate. The 1979 version of this complex interagency assessment appeared in three volumes, published in April and May. Other significant NIO/SP assessments completed or almost completed during the year include an NIE on Soviet military intentions and capabilities in space (August), an NIE chaired by [redacted] of the Senior Review Panel on prospects for Soviet military technology and R&D, and IIM on the likelihood of interference with the US space shuttle, and a Memo to Holders of a 1977 IIM on Soviet civil defense. [redacted]

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18. Howard Stoertz retired in March 1980 and was replaced as NIO by David Brandwein, a senior DDS&T officer with wide experience on Soviet strategic problems. [redacted] one of two Assistant NIOs in the SP office, left for another assignment and was replaced by [redacted] a DIA officer. [redacted]

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19. In FY 1981, we anticipate a need to spend even more time in the analysis of Soviet strategic intentions and options in an environment in which either SALT III is in negotiation or SALT II is dead. Specific projects planned for the year include the completion of NIE 11-3/8-80 and much of the following year's version; the production of a special

paper for the President on Soviet strategic programs, written in conjunction with NIE 11-3/8-80; and an interagency study on the extent of Chinese missile deployment. [redacted]

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NIO-at-Large

20. One of the NIC's most significant products of FY 1980 was an exceptionally felicitous NIE on [redacted], written by [redacted] of the NIC/AG under the aegis of NIO-at-Large Hans Heymann. Not a typical NIE in style or format, the estimate also included an innovative checklist of indicators of potential instability. By carefully laying the groundwork and through skilled diplomacy, the NIO-at-Large was able to guide the paper through the interagency coordination process despite the paper's somewhat unconventional approach. [redacted]

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21. The NIO-at-Large also presided over the first attempt by the Intelligence Community to put together in a single study everything we know about Soviet mobilization -- military, economic, and civil defense -- including concepts, approaches, and capabilities. It calls attention to the peculiarities and asymmetries in Soviet practice that should be of prime concern to US defense planners. [redacted]

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22. Topics that will preoccupy Mr. Heymann in early FY 1981 will include an extension of the mobilization assessment to include the entire Warsaw Pact; an IIM examining in depth for the first time the opportunities and risks of developing an accord between oil producing and consuming nations on provision of oil supplies; and a SNIE examining the ramifications of a Soviet bloc-wide oil shortfall beginning by the mid-1980s. [redacted]

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Africa

23. The conflict in the Horn of Africa and the signing of the US agreement with Somalia were the chief substantive preoccupations of the NIO for Africa and his staff in FY 1980. The NIO was a member of the interdepartmental Somali Review Group that met almost weekly over a three-month period before that agreement was signed, and substantial time was spent in preparing an IIM on Somalia and in briefing the DCI on events in the area. [redacted]

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24. IIMs were also completed during the year on Zaire, South Africa's external strategy, Sudan, and Zimbabwe; IIMs now under way on Zambia, Liberia, and internal South African political developments should be finished before the end of the calendar year. The draft of a major NIE on developments in the northwest Indian Ocean area was completed by the end of the fiscal year and is awaiting NFIB approval. [redacted]

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25. Other highlights of the year included the retirement in January of Bill Parmenter as NIO and the appointment of Professor Gray Cowan

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(Columbia University) as his successor; the DCI's trip in June to Africa [redacted]

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[redacted] Conferences on Angola and on Soviet intentions and objectives in Africa will be held during the next few months. [redacted]

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26. The problems of Southern Africa, Zaire, Sudan and Nigeria will undoubtedly continue as especial preoccupations during FY 1981. And, either a change of U.S. Administration or the renewal of the present one could, if it resulted in substantial alteration of US policy toward Africa, become a major factor in changing the NIO's FY 1981 activities.

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Western Europe

27. Substantive developments in Western Europe that preoccupied the NIO and his assistant in FY 1980 included security issues -- TNF, CSCE-CDE, and the NATO defense response to Afghanistan -- and politico-economic ones -- strains within the Western alliance, reactions to crises elsewhere (Iran, Afghanistan, Poland), and preparations for the aftermath of national elections in [redacted]

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28. Significant production during the year included two special papers: a special assessment of the CPI's role in the Italian governing process achieved agreement among CIA and INR analysts despite the dominance of a quite different point of view in some circles at State; and a SNIE on the Western alliance (June), which in a week's time reached an agreed interagency analysis of the strains in the West and the outlook for the alliance after Afghanistan. Other production included an estimate on Turkey (December) and IIMs on French foreign policy (March) [redacted]

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[redacted] A major IIM on Spanish politics was brought to the verge of completion and a SNIE on Portuguese politics was initiated. [redacted]

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29. Major NIO/WE policy support activities included preparation for and participation in DCI Presidential and Congressional briefings and in numerous PRC and SCC meetings. He sponsored a mini-seminar on Italy as part of the elaboration of the PCI paper, and sponsored a major, very lively seminar involving representatives of government and academia on the subject of US-West European policy issues in the 1980s. The office also participated actively in the work of the Political Intelligence Working Group, especially on Turkey, and NIO/WE conducted two FOCUS exercises [redacted] and chaired frequent session with mission and station chiefs outgoing to and returning from European posts. [redacted]

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30. Significant activities in the immediate future will center on completion of two major assessments: an NIE on US-West European policy issues, and a difficult IIM on [redacted]. Organizational issues that NIO/WE sees as important to address in FY 1981 are measures to improve the overall quality of the NFAC product, to effect

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substantial reductions in production times, and to bring about fuller participation of all components in the estimative process. [redacted]

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East Asia

31. The substantive highlights of FY 1980 for the NIO and his staff concerned the assassination of South Korean President Pak, its unsettled aftermath, and the rise to power of Chun Doo Hwan; the continuing conflict in Indochina, its implications for Thai internal security, and for US and international efforts to come to grips with the Indochinese refugee problem; and internal political developments in China, particularly the major party plenum and a late summer session of the National People's Congress. Increasing uncertainty about the stability of the Marcos government in the Philippines and concern over problems in the US relationship with the Suharto government in Indonesia also took an important share of the time and effort of the NIO and his staff. The NIO played a key role in directing policy-level attention to growing US-Indonesian problems. [redacted]

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32. NIO/EA production during the year featured the completion of an NIE on the Philippines (February); participation with the NIO/USSR-EE in completing an NIE on Sino-Soviet relations (June); and two Alert Memoranda and a SNIE on the politically turbulent South Korean situation. The NIO/EA staff also made substantial contributions to an NIE produced by NIO/GPF on China's military forces and policies.

[redacted]

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34. Issues and activities to be featured in FY 1981 will include the completion of major estimates on the military balance on the Korean peninsula, prospects for China in the 1980s, and Indonesia's domestic political situation and relationship with the US. [redacted]

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[redacted]

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Latin America

35. Continuing instability and violence in Central America, the problems posed by the latest tidal wave of Cuban refugees coming into the US, and the growing political contest between extreme leftist backers of the Manley government and the moderate opposition in Jamaica were perhaps the dominant substantive issues for the NIO and his staff in FY 1980. [redacted]

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36. Production during the year included an IIM in January on prospects for leftist extremists in El Salvador, a rapidly produced SNIE in August on short-term prospects for Jamaica; two memoranda for the DCI on Central American and Caribbean challenges to US interests and on Manley's options in Jamaica; several PDB feature articles on El Salvador, Cuba, and Bolivia; and two Alert Memoranda on El Salvador. A major NIE on Cuban policy toward Latin America is now well along in the drafting process. [redacted]

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37. A major portion of the efforts of the NIO and his staff was taken up during the year by activities in support of the DCI. The NIO represented the DCI at numerous PRC and SCC meetings, mostly on Cuba and Central America; he made, with strong support from OPA/LA, major contributions to the development of US policy on Cuban refugees. In addition, the NIO was involved in developing and presenting many briefings for Congressional committees and individual congressmen on Nicaragua and Central America and helped prepare briefing materials for the DCI's Presidential briefings on Central America and Jamaica. [redacted]

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38. Prominent issues to be addressed in FY 1981 will include those involving Cuban developments -- particularly in Cuban-US relations --and continuing instability in Central America and Jamaica. Major estimates are scheduled on Central America and South America. [redacted]

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Warning

39. A principal accomplishment of the office of the NIO for Warning in FY 1980 was getting Community agreement on revised and streamlined procedures for producing Alert Memoranda and coordinating them quickly throughout the Intelligence Community. The revised procedures were promulgated by NFIB in February and have enabled subsequent Alert Memoranda to be produced much more quickly than previously. In a similar vein, A/NIO/W [redacted] revised and coordinated with the rest of the Community the procedures governing the use of the National Operations and Intelligence Watch Officers' Net (NOIWON). [redacted]

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40. The office of the NIO for Warning supervised the issuance of 17 Alert Memoranda during FY 1980. [redacted]

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41. FY 1981 will involve continuing attention to the timely production of Alert Memoranda and to the issue of the possible realignment or reorganization of the Strategic Warning Staff. [redacted]

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Coordinator for Academic Relations

42. This office, previously tied administratively to the office of the Director, NFAC, was linked with the NIC at the end of CY 1979 when the NIC was created. Significant CAR accomplishments of FY 1980 included organizing a visit to the Agency by a group of university presidents in February 1980; managing six DCI discussion meetings/dinners in which numerous academics and officials of other government agencies

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participated; and continuing to function as the principal bridge between the Agency and the academic world, providing a focal point for inquiries, exchanges of information, and efforts in general to improve the degree of mutual understanding between CIA and the academic world. Real progress was made in this last area in FY 80. [redacted]

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43. The CAR staff had an active year in fulfilling its NFAC functions. It assisted the NIC Chairman, Associate Chairman, and NIOs in selecting and recruiting academic consultants and in arranging conferences in which consultants and other academics participated. CAR arranged programs for 17 college or university groups visiting the Agency. The office served as clearing house for individual briefings and debriefings by NFAC personnel of academics visiting the Washington area and for requests from colleges and universities for NFAC volunteer speakers. Some 19 volunteers were enlisted to speak on a variety of topics. The CAR staff also continued to monitor requests by NFAC employees to publish books or articles, or speak at conferences or attend them; there were some 520 NFAC participants in over 200 conferences during the year. [redacted]

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44. FY 1981 will see a continuation of all these activities. A discussion meeting/dinner on Germany is slated for 28 October, and another visit by a group of university presidents is planned for 13 November. [redacted]

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Harold P. Ford

Annexes

- A: FY 1980 and FY 1979 Production
- B: Minority Hiring
- C: Training
- D: Travel

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