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THE DCI AND INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY PRODUCTION

- In 1947 the DCI's job was created primarily to "correlate and evaluate."
- After a few false starts, this responsibility soon came to be seen as one of presiding over production of national intelligence by a "Community."
 - National Intelligence is the intelligence needed for policy formulated by the President and the NSC. It should make use of all information available to the USG from whatever agency, and should reflect the best and most authoritative judgment that can be brought to bear. When there are differences of judgment, these should be presented.
 - The Community consists of the various intelligence agencies represented on the NFIB, although this does not preclude the DCI from turning elsewhere for information and judgment.
- There are now ten member agencies of NFIB, plus representatives of the four military services. The full members include minor players such as Treasury, Commerce, and DEA. The Big Four of the NFIB, however, are CIA, DIA, INR, and NSA. The first three are the producers of finished intelligence assessments (with some help from the services on military matters).
 - CIA does political, economic, military (on all national-level questions) and scientific/technical. ~~(Expect a question on CIA's military production role.)~~ ILLEGIB
 - DIA does military and scientific/technical. ILLEGIB
 - INR does political and some economic.
 - NSA does its thing very well.
 - Note that only CIA is free of departmental responsibilities and pressures. It of course has to guard -- as do the other agencies -- against possible analytic bias.
- In a sense, the production of national-level intelligence is a competition between analytic organizations, using the same body of shared information.
 - Competition works best in the military and weapons technology fields, where CIA, DIA, and the services have strong resources.

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- It works OK in political intelligence, where not only INR but the State Bureaux (and almost everyone else) can play.
 - Competitive analysis is poorest in economics and non-military science, where CIA has more of a monopoly.
 - Competitive analysis is also furthered by the wide use of top-flight outside consultants, on the part of CIA and other members of the community.
- Like all competitions, you've gotta have some rules for the community. We do.
- All information must be shared.
 - Competitors must work to common TOR's, so consumers can judge the results.
 - Differing views must be presented in parallel, with supporting arguments, so consumers can understand them.
- As Chairman of NFIB and head of the Community, DCI is chief umpire and primus inter pares.
- But in the final analysis, the text of a national estimate is his views; this sets the standard from which others dissent.
- In other realms -- budget and tasking -- DCI has greater authority over the community, but with respect to intelligence production, he has line authority only over CIA/NFAC. DCI nonetheless usually has enough clout to accomplish what needs to be done re production.
- This authority is real and the system has worked for many years, to a considerable extent because the dissent process provides a safety valve not present in other DCI-Community relationships.
 - Since 1977, the system has been hampered, especially in military matters, by personality clashes among principals and by fundamental differences of view on non-substantive matters (APEX, net assessments).
 - Beyond such differences, which have varied over the years with different issues and personalities, is the underlying problem of the unevenness of the community's capabilities. In particular
 - The many constraints and vulnerabilities of DIA.
 - The small size and Departmental focus of INR.
 - Some continuing problems of fully integrating NSA's community capabilities.

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- The mechanism the DCI uses to regulate national intelligence production is the National Intelligence Council, or NIC.
 - Under DD/NFA, but not part of NFAC. (See graphic)
 - Ecumenically manned
 - Successor to the old Office of National Estimates
- Core of NIC are the NIOs (Enumerate from graphics). Each NIO has three principal functions:
 - DCI's staff officer for all NSC matters.
 - Link between policy community and intelligence producers (and sometimes collectors -- role of CTS needs better definition)
 - Producer of National Estimates -- both procedurally and substantively.
- Other elements of NIC are:
 - NIOs at Large
 - Analytic Group (elite drafting staff)
 - Warning system
 - Academic relations
- The primary expression of national intelligence is the community-coordinated NIE
 - Focuses all information and wisdom available to USG on question of major importance at national level.
 - Can be massive (11-3/8) or very quick (SNIE): one year's time or one week. All-time record is two days.
 - Can be initiated anywhere in intelligence community or by policymakers.
 - Process (describe)
 - Strengths of NIEs
 - Allows all views to be heard and recorded, with checks against policy preference and analytic bias.
 - Careful use of all the evidence available to the community.

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- The finest available talent consults, drafts, and weighs evidence and judgments.
- Yes, a few mis-estimates over the years, but a good record for independent judgment.
- Problems NIEs face:
 - Time-consuming to bureaucratically produce.
 - No fully systematic link to policy process.
 - Question of impact on policymakers.
- Present estimates program is especially focussed on items to support incoming administration
 - Community papers produced in 1980: a total of 43, varying from multi-volumed 11-3/8 to 7 pp. one-week SNIE on Western European attitudes toward USG. In 1979, a total of 37 papers.
 - Draft schedule for 1981, not yet coordinated within CIA and with community. (See separate doc)
 - 40 priority papers
 - 26 additional papers, if resources permit
 - This schedule purposely leaves room for handling papers requested by policymakers and/or generated by world crises.
- Some "national intelligence" production by CIA which does not go the above full coordination route with the community.
 - A few projects which are joint CIA-DIA, CIA-INR, etc.
 - A very large number of studies are prepared by the various offices of CIA/NFAC, over and above current intelligence items. These studies are "national intelligence" papers which are usually less broad in scope than the NIEs and go more intensively into particular questions. Examples (at hand):
 - OSWR study on Soviet capabilities to cram a very large number of RV's into the SS-18.

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- OPA study on implications for Western Europe of a Soviet invasion of Poland
- OPA (ORPA, Jan. 79) study on the politics of Soviet energy decisionmaking
- OGSR study on the USSR's 1980 crop shortfall
- OER study on the economic cost to the USSR of intervening in Poland
- OER damage assessment re Iran-Iraq oil facilities
- OSR study on Sov capabilities to conduct military operations in the Arabian Peninsula and the Horn of Africa
- NIC Memo on politics and OPEC oil policy

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