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16 April 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Intelligence

SUBJECT : INR

1. You have asked me to consider whether the continued existence of INR is desirable. My answer would be that INR falls on the scale between "essential" and "desirable", and on the high side.

2. INR has fallen on bad times, and this tends to obscure the issues at stake. Under Rogers it has lost status in the Department; Cline is lashing about futilely in an effort to recover, but has virtually no chance of doing so as long as Rogers is Secretary. Equally important, INR's people are not as strong as they used to be. The number of long-term professionals is decreasing, while the proportion of FSO's on perhaps their second assignment is rising. The latter know little about intelligence and are forever conscious of the Bureau to which they must return glowering over their shoulders.

3. What does INR do?

a. For the Department internally, INR supplies much the same services DDI supplies to CIA. It provides current intelligence briefings and research on request. Its officers are in daily contact with the Bureaux and therefore acutely conscious of current policy interests. INR is also the custodian and purveyor of SIGINT and other sensitive intelligence.

b. For the Department externally, INR guards its interests in the Intelligence Community. This responsibility includes participation in the NIE process (serious, but not as useful as it once was) and in the CIB (perfunctory, but

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still occasionally useful). INR also represents the department in non-substantive matters, from those of USIB and IRAC

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c. For the Secretary. In the past Secretaries have found INR's independence useful in balancing the weight of the Bureaux. Under Rogers this has been buried, but in the long-term interest of the USG it should not be lost forever.

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e. For the USG, INR provides another civilian voice in the Intelligence Community to balance those of the military. Its influence in the estimates process, though weaker than in years past, is still a healthy one, both for the Community and for CIA's central position.

4. There is little doubt that CIA could furnish State with most of the important substantive services that INR does, and at a considerable saving in personnel through reduction of duplication. We would not have the same feel for Bureaux needs, being too distant and detached, but we have generally better people, more of them, and a far better information handling system. On the other hand, handling the job would eliminate the minimal analytic base that State now has, and thus destroy what remains of INR's capability to take an independent substantive position in the USIB arena and in the Department.

5. INR's staff function, representing State in the non-substantive intelligence business, is essential to the Department and must continue. It is, however, independent of INR's substantive functions.

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6. There seems to be general agreement that INR is at present too weak, both in personnel and in prestige, to do the things we expect of it and need from it. Thus there is no convenient "Option B--leave things as they are" of the sort the Department likes. We are left with:

Option A: After somehow circumventing the Rogers-Cline impasse, (or allowing time to remove it) build INR up. Staff it with long-term professionals having civil service status and remove the FSO's. Restore competence in political and economic fields for purposes of research rather than current intelligence support, and provide sufficient strength in military field to enable State to carry its weight on that subject matter also. Perhaps rely on OCI for current intelligence initial reporting.

Option C: Allow INR to disappear as a substantive organization. Retain a staff to maintain State's voice in non-substantive intelligence matters, and to provide a channel for the Bureaux to be heard on substantive ones, particularly in the NIE process. Turn the routine substantive support job largely over to OCI, OSR, and OER, along with the better professionals to carry this out and to maintain liaison with the Bureaux.

7. Option C can be made to work, more or less. Nonetheless it is generally felt in CIA to be a serious weakening of the national intelligence concept as we have come to know it since what ought to be one of the principal centers of competitive analytical effort would be eliminated. If the old rules still apply, Option A makes much better sense. If, however, strictures on the evils of duplication are to be applied rigorously Community-wide, there are savings to be found in Option C. In the real world, I suspect we will end up with good old Option B.

[redacted]

Richard Lehman
Director of Current Intelligence

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