

A straightforward exposition of the differences between the two sides; an unemotional appraisal of the effects on NATO; overall, a balanced piece which reminds the reader of the depth of feeling dividing the parties, and hamstringing NATO planners in the process. The only point not made, and one of importance to the US, is that should tempers flair and tensions eventually mount to the point of actual conflict, both sides would expect two things at a minimum from us: Support (or at the very least assurances that we would not help the other side); and the expectation that we would in some way intervene to keep things from going too far. Otherwise, it's an excellent piece.

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The Greek-Turkish Dispute: Effects on NATO (U)

A Defense Research Report



Defense Intelligence Agency

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November 1986

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The Greek-Turkish Dispute: Effects on NATO (U)

A Defense Research Report

*This is a Department of Defense Intelligence Document
Prepared by the West Europe/Latin America Division,
Directorate for Research, Defense Intelligence Agency*

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Effects on NATO (U)****SUMMARY**

(S/NF) Several longstanding problems between Greece and Turkey continue to interfere with NATO military activities in the southern region and to obstruct overall Alliance business. Athens and Ankara are fundamentally tied to their positions and neither government is likely to make concessions on the main issues.

(S/NF) The Greek Government of Prime Minister Andreas Papandreu has exacerbated Greek-Turkish tensions by claiming that Turkey, not the Warsaw Pact, is the primary threat to Greece. Papandreu is more obsessed with the Turkish threat than previous Greek governments have been, and he exploits Greek-Turkish problems for domestic political reasons.

(S/NF) The dispute between Greece and Turkey over Athens' militarization of Limnos Island complicates NATO operations on the southern flank. The Greeks want NATO to recognize their forces on Limnos and are boycotting major NATO exercises in an attempt to push the Allies to support this stance. Turkey insists that Greek forces on Limnos must not be recognized by NATO in any way and will not concede this issue. Both Athens and Ankara believe their positions in the Aegean are at stake over the Limnos dilemma.

(S/NF) Greece's attempts to extend its sovereign rights over the Aegean Sea and airspace are interfering with NATO exercises in the southern region. The Greeks are increasing their claims of territorial airspace and Flight Information Region (FIR) violations in an effort to pressure the Allies into supporting Greek positions. Athens and Ankara both use Alliance forums in their efforts to force NATO into taking sides. Unresolved Greek-Turkish problems are blocking important Alliance planning documents and Alliance defense projects on NATO's southern flank. Problems between Greece and Turkey also undercut NATO defenses and solidarity in the southern region. In particular, Athens' unwillingness to participate fully in NATO's integrated military structure degrades the Greek Armed Forces' ability to operate with the Allies.

(S/NF) Other NATO members avoid openly taking sides on Greek-Turkish issues in order not to alienate either Ally. Key NATO members are seeking ways to limit damage to the Alliance as a result of Greek-Turkish disputes, but they generally agree there is little NATO can do to solve the problems. Current disputes, coupled with traditional animosities, will keep bilateral tensions high, and an armed confrontation between the two cannot be ruled out. In the event of hostilities, neither side would be likely to back down.

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(C/NF) Turkish Prime Minister Turgut Ozal (l) and Greek Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou (r) exchanged few words at a meeting of government and business leaders earlier this year in Switzerland. Papandreou repeatedly has rejected Ozal's invitations to discuss bilateral problems, and Ozal, therefore, is taking a harder line toward Athens.

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The Greek-Turkish Dispute: Effects on NATO (U)

The Backdrop for Greek-Turkish Animosity

(S/NF) Deep-seated mutual distrust is at the core of Greek-Turkish disputes. Virtually all Greeks, including the professional military, view Turkey as the main threat. Most Greeks believe Turkey seeks, at some point, to annex the eastern Aegean islands and Cyprus. The Papandreou government, however, is more obsessed with the Turkish threat than previous Greek governments, and in its efforts to fuel anti-Turkish sentiment, has sharply exacerbated Greek-Turkish problems. For example, Papandreou has announced a formal defense doctrine that identifies Turkey, not the Soviet Union, as the primary threat to Greece. He has also directed his military leadership to enhance Greek defense strategy for conflict with Turkey, including strengthening Greek military forces in the Aegean Islands and Cyprus.

(S/NF) There is no evidence that Turkey covets Greek territory, and Greece is not central to Turkish security concerns. The Turks do believe, however, that Greece is trying to undermine Turkey's relations with its Western allies, particularly the US. Ankara is concerned that Greece, through large Greek-American political constituencies, can influence the US Congress to reduce security assistance to Turkey. The Turks also are suspicious of growing Greek ties to Syria, which Turkey long has viewed as a Soviet surrogate and sponsor of anti-Turkish terrorism. Ankara, in addition, believes the Papandreou government is seeking to undercut Turkish relations with the European Community and several Balkan countries.

Contentious Issues

(C/NF) There is a wide range of quarrelsome

issues between Athens and Ankara, many of which are longstanding. Each side is adamant and neither is likely to make major concessions.

Greek Militarization of the Aegean

(S/NF) The Turks object strongly to Greece's militarization of its eastern Aegean islands — a process that began after Turkey's 1974 invasion of Cyprus — and claim that Athens is violating international law. Turkey holds that Greece has militarized its islands at the entry to the Turkish Straits in violation of the 1923 Straits of Dardanelles Convention. Athens, on the other hand, argues that the Dardanelles Convention was superseded by the 1936 Montreux Convention, which does not mention the islands in the Turkish Straits, and therefore no longer prohibits their militarization. Turkey also believes that Greece is violating the 1947 Italian Peace Treaty that calls for demilitarization of the Dodecanese Islands. Greece rejects Ankara's assertions by noting that Turkey is not a signatory to that treaty and by claiming that it must defend its eastern islands in light of Turkey's moves on Cyprus. The Turks view Greek militarization of the Aegean islands as provocative, but have opted, thus far, to take a low key approach except for the Limnos island issue.

The Limnos Issue

(S/NF) The militarization of Limnos is only part of the broader dispute over Greece's right to place military forces on its eastern Aegean islands. Limnos, however, has gained visibility because the Greeks want NATO to recognize their forces on the island and to include Limnos in NATO exercises. Since 1984, the Greeks have included their Army brigade on Limnos in

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the annual NATO Defense Planning Questionnaire (DPQ) as NATO-committed forces in an attempt to obtain NATO's recognition. Alliance support for the Greek position would be viewed as a major victory for Athens, and justification for militarization of the other Aegean islands. For the Turks, Limnos has become a symbol for their stance against Greek militarization and Greece's attempts to exert sovereignty over the Aegean. Turkey would view any type of recognition of Greek forces on Limnos as undermining its overall position in the Aegean, and consider NATO approval of the Greek position a major strategic defeat.

Aegean Sea and Continental Shelf

(S/NF) Athens and Ankara disagree over the delimitation of the Aegean territorial water boundaries and the continental shelf. Greece claims a 6-mile territorial sea boundary, but reserves the right to extend its limits to 12 miles under

provisions of the 1982 Law of the Sea Treaty, which Greece, but not Turkey, has signed. The Turks strongly oppose any extension of Greek sea limits since this would give Athens claim to about 70 percent of the Aegean, dramatically reducing the area of international waters. Ankara warns that such a move would be cause for war. Greek-Turkish differences on the continental shelf center on how it is to be delimited around the islands in the Aegean. Greece believes each of the islands has a shelf, and, therefore, claims most of the Aegean's mineral resources.


Aegean Airspace

(S/NF) Greece disagrees with Turkey, as well as with other NATO Allies, on the division of Aegean airspace. Greece claims 10-mile air boundaries surrounding its mainland and islands for security reasons, while Turkey and the rest of NATO recognize only 6-mile airspace limits. In addition, Greece requires all foreign aircraft, including Allied military aircraft, to file flight plans upon entering Greece's FIR. NATO military aircraft, are exempt from filing flight plans with Athens according to the 1944 International Civil Aviation Convention, but Greece claims the agreement permits enforcement of national rules.

Aegean Command and Control

(S/NF) Greece and Turkey also differ over NATO command and control responsibilities in the Aegean. Athens opposes the current arrangements that have been in effect since Greece withdrew from the NATO military structure following Turkey's 1974 invasion of Cyprus. Although Greece reintegrated into the military command under the 1980 Rogers Agreement, Turkey continues to share operational responsibility with the Greeks for part of the Aegean. Greece wants to regain its pre-1974 authority for Aegean command and control that would extend to its FIR — the median line between the eastern Greek islands and the Turkish coast. In an attempt to push NATO toward its position, Athens refuses to establish NATO land (LANDSOUTHCENT) and air (SEVENATAF) headquarters at Larissa that were called for in the 1980 Rogers Agreement. Turkey, meanwhile, wants to maintain its share of operational responsibility for half of the Aegean, mainly


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(U) Greek Territorial Water Limits in the Aegean Sea.

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
(C/NF) Aegean Disputes — Command and Control and Militarization of Islands.

because Ankara does not believe the Greeks have the capability or willingness to provide adequate coverage for Turkey's Aegean coast.

Aegean Army Controversy

(S/NF) The status and mission of Turkey's Aegean Army is a controversial point between Athens and Ankara. The Aegean Army, organized in the mid-1970s following Turkey's invasion of Cyprus, is headquartered in Izmir and deployed along Turkey's Aegean coast, opposite the eastern Greek islands. The Greeks believe the Aegean Army is deployed to seize, at some point, Greece's eastern Aegean islands and to provide rapid Turkish reinforcement to north Cyprus. Greek Prime Minister Papandreou claims the Aegean Army consists of 120,000 Turkish troops and has a large amphibious landing fleet. The Turks say the Aegean Army comprises only training forces, with the exception of one brigade. Turkish officials, however,

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(U) The Greek Armed Forces, like virtually all Greeks, believe Turkey poses the imminent military threat. In particular, the Greek military is wary of Turkish troops in Western Thrace and therefore keeps its attention focused on the Greek-Turkish border.


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justify maintaining the Army on Turkey's western coast in the event they need to provide rapid reinforcement to north Cyprus. DIA believes the Aegean Army is essentially a training establishment of some 28,000 men and 3 infantry brigades. It likely is the headquarters for Turkish forces on Cyprus, providing fresh troops and equipment for rotation to north Cyprus.

The Cyprus Stalemate

(S/NF) On the Cyprus issue, Greece and Turkey remain at odds. Athens and its Greek Cypriot compatriots believe the entire island should be under control of the Greek side, and seek to regain dominance over the Turk Cypriots in any negotiated settlement. The Greek side believes Turkish forces in north Cyprus may, at some point, seize more territory than the 36 percent of Cyprus that Turkey now controls. Athens, therefore, maintains about 2,450 Greek regulars on Cyprus that constitute several special forces-type units and provide much of the leadership cadre for the 13,500-man Greek Cypriot National Guard. Greece and the Greek Cypriots, in addition, do not think that the Turk Cypriots should be political equals of the Greek Cypriots. The Greek side rejects the idea of the Turk Cypriots having a veto in any combined government. Athens and the Greek Cypriots insist upon the removal of Turkish troops in the north — which they view as an occupation force — before they will negotiate with the Turkish side.

(S/NF) Turkey, at the same time, is firmly committed to protect the political rights and physical security of the Turk Cypriot community and, therefore, insists upon maintaining 22,000 to 24,000 mainland troops in north Cyprus. Turkey refuses to give up any of the territory it seized in 1974 unless the Greek side provides the specific guarantees the Turks seek, which is unlikely. Turkey will not permit the Greek Cypriots to gain a military advantage on the island and will ensure the Turk Cypriots are not dominated by the Greek side. In fact, there are indications that the Turks have increased their troop strength in north Cyprus and may be upgrading tanks. Ankara, as well as Athens, is fundamentally tied to these views, making prospects dim for any negotiated settlement.

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(S/NF) Souda Bay houses NATO fuel supplies. NATO Airborne Warning and Control System aircraft deployed at Preveza Airbase provides coverage of the central and eastern Mediterranean. The NATO Allied Missile Firing Range near Kania provides live firing ranges. The Fleet Operational Readiness Accuracy facility is under construction on Crete.


Effects on NATO

(S/NF) Greek-Turkish disputes affect NATO military matters in many important ways. Among them is the disruption of NATO military exercises because of Greek or Turkish objections to certain war game scenarios. Greece currently boycotts NATO exercises because Limnos is not included in exercise scenarios. Limnos is not included because the Alliance does not want to interfere in the Greek-Turkish dispute over Greek militarization of the island. Greece did not participate in NATO military exercises from 1974 to 1977 and only played in selective maneuvers from 1977 to 1984. While Greek military forces have not participated since then, Greek merchant vessels took part in the April 1986 Alliance exercise MED SUPPLY, a naval control of shipping (NCS) exercise designed to test wartime control of merchant shipping. For Turkey's part, Ankara has repeatedly blocked the biannual NATO exercise TRADE DAGGER because this NCS exercise deals with fundamental Aegean NATO command and control issues.

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(C/NF) The Greek Air Force generally goes on alert during NATO exercises in the Aegean to track movements of US and Turkish aircraft. Greece frequently claims its air boundaries have been violated and sends fighters to escort intruders out of Greek-claimed airspace.

(S/NF) NATO exercises also are disrupted because Greece claims the right to prohibit Allied exercise participants from using facilities on Greek soil during NATO maneuvers in which Greece does not take part. During a May 1985 exercise, for example, Greece refused to refuel the British naval support ship *Green Rover* when it called at the NATO depot in Souda Bay, Crete. In September, the Papandreu government officially announced that Greece would not allow NATO units to use any facilities on its national territory during future exercises. Nevertheless, the Greeks have continued to permit NATO members to use these facilities on several occasions, usually when Allied units have not declared their participation in an exercise.

(S/NF) Greece's efforts to advance its positions on Aegean airspace and the Greek FIR create safety problems during NATO maneuvers and aggravate tensions between exercise participants and Athens. The Greek Government repeatedly charges the US and Turkey with airspace violations, and Greek fighter aircraft escort the alleged intruders out of Greek-claimed airspace. The Greeks also claim FIR violations during exercises because US and Turkish aircraft do not comply with Greek demands that they file flight plans. The British, however, abide by the Greek requirement, primarily to avoid provoking Athens. During the May 1986 DISTANT HAMMER exercise, Athens claimed the US and Turkey violated Greek airspace 44 times and the Greek FIR in 94 instances.

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(C/NF) Greek forces do not participate in major NATO exercises but conduct their own national training, including amphibious maneuvers designed to defend the many Greek islands against a Turkish assault.

(S/NF) Greek-Turkish differences over the militarization of Limnos Island have interfered with several NATO planning documents. Because of Greece's inclusion of its forces on Limnos in its annual NATO Defense Planning Questionnaire (DPQ) country chapter, and Turkey's strong objection to this move, these two chapters have been excluded from the NATO planning document for the past 2 years. The Limnos impasse also has prevented the Alliance from producing an updated NATO-Warsaw Pact Force Comparisons Paper since Turkey refuses to accept the Greek DPQ data including Limnos forces.

(S/NF) Finally, Greek-Turkish problems have blocked the construction of NATO-funded projects for some Alliance countries. Greece, for example, opposes the construction of a low-frequency transmitter in Canakkale, Turkey, because it claims the station would provide coverage of the northern Aegean, including Greek islands. The Greek veto, moreover, is holding up release of NATO's Slice XXXV infrastructure funds that are necessary to implement several large projects in other Alliance countries.

Allied Attitudes Toward Greek-Turkish Problems

(S/NF) The other NATO members, for the most part, have sought to avoid taking sides on Greek-

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Turkish issues. Most Allied governments believe NATO can tolerate Greek-Turkish problems for the time being, and believe there is little the Alliance can do to solve the problems. They generally agree that the Alliance should not take concerted action on particular Greek-Turkish disputes for fear of further damaging the Alliance's solidarity.

(S/NF) The Allies largely agree that Greek Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou is exacerbating Greek-Turkish problems and obstructing NATO business. But they also believe Turkey is equally intransigent on some Aegean issues. Most NATO partners doubt that applying pressure or sanctions on the two countries would cause them to make concessions on the disputes affecting the Alliance. Last year, however, West Germany tried to alter Papandreou's anti-NATO policies by delaying the release of military aid to Greece. German military aid to Greece, roughly \$25 million per 18 months, is the second largest — after the US — that Greece receives. Bonn later approved the aid package.

(S/NF) NATO Allies also are reluctant to condemn Papandreou publicly because of Greece's longstanding political and economic ties to West Europe. At the same time, many European Allies have been critical of Turkey on human rights policies and restrictions on certain democratic freedoms. Within NATO defense circles, however, Alliance representatives privately condemn Greek behavior and praise Turkey for its solidarity with NATO.

(S/NF) Within the NATO framework, some efforts have been made to lessen the impact of the dispute — although none of the Allies expect major breakthroughs. NATO Secretary General Lord Carrington, for example, convenes from time to time an informal contact group on Greece-Turkey-NATO issues. NATO Permanent Representatives from the US, UK, FRG, Italy, and France, meet to discuss Greek-Turkish problems that affect NATO and examine proposals that seek to limit the damage to the Alliance. In addition, the Deputy Permanent Representatives have established a working group on Aegean affairs. At their first meeting in April 1986, for example, the major Allies agreed to focus on Greek/NATO ex-

ercise problems and broader Greek-Turkish issues relating to NATO.

Conclusions

(S/NF) Aegean controversies will remain divisive and obstructive factors in NATO as each side tries to push the Allies to support its stance. In this regard, Athens more frequently will take the lead and apply strong pressure. Moreover, the Papandreou government will continue to scrutinize NATO policies and will reject those that are not perceived as being useful. Ankara, for its part, will not be hesitant to respond to Greek actions, particularly if the Turks believe their core interests are at stake. Turkey will be increasingly sensitive to NATO positions it perceives as tilting toward Greece, especially regarding recognition of Greek forces on Limnos.

(S/NF) The Greeks and Turks will continue to use Alliance forums to advance their positions on bilateral issues. Greek-Turkish disputes will intrude into NATO affairs and will hamper Allied business and projects, particularly infrastructure-funded projects in the two countries, the NATO-Warsaw Pact Force Comparison process, and Allied exercises in the Aegean.

(S/NF) While arms modernization programs in Greece and Turkey will help to strengthen each country's military capabilities and to contribute to Alliance defense posture in the southern region, the continuing Aegean disputes will persist in undercutting NATO solidarity on the southern flank. Lack of cooperation between Athens and Ankara, and Greece's unwillingness to integrate fully into NATO's military structure will complicate NATO military planning for the southern flank. Continued Greek absence from NATO exercises will degrade the armed forces' ability to operate effectively with the Allies.

(S/NF) Current disputes, coupled with traditional animosities, will keep bilateral tensions high, and an armed confrontation between the two countries cannot be ruled out. Neither side wants a fight, but one could develop over such key issues as control of Cyprus or the Aegean. Ankara, thus far, has sought to avoid provoking Athens without compromising core beliefs but might be

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persuaded to take a harder line as its patience wears thinner. Athens also wants to avoid a clash. However, the Papandreou government's obsession with the Turkish threat and use of a hard line toward Turkey for domestic political payoffs increase the likelihood that a military confronta-

tion could take place. Frequent military exercises in the Aegean area by both countries creates the setting in which the possibility for an incident — and unintentional military confrontation — is high. In the event of hostilities, neither side would be likely to back down.

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