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# Prospects for US Military Access Abroad

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National Intelligence Estimate

*This National Intelligence Estimate represents  
the views of the Director of Central Intelligence  
with the advice and assistance of the  
US Intelligence Community.*

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# **Prospects for US Military Access Abroad**

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*The following intelligence organizations participated  
in the preparation of this Estimate:*

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# Key Judgments

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During the 1990s it will become progressively more difficult and more expensive for the United States to maintain land bases and other access arrangements abroad. Even where they are welcome, US forces will have less freedom of operation; nuclear-capable forces will be especially constrained. Access negotiations with host countries will become increasingly protracted and contentious.

None of the foreign countries in which there are vital US military installations appears likely to eject US forces outright during the next five years. A number of host countries, however, may raise the costs of retaining US bases higher than the US Government will pay. The Philippines, where a new basing treaty must be concluded by the beginning of 1992, is of particular concern in this regard. Moreover, a global trend toward increasing restrictions on the overseas activities of US forces appears to be developing. Potentially, such constraints could have nearly as much impact as outright termination of US access.

Thus, with regard to prospects for the entire US foreign basing and access system, there is a spectrum of jeopardy:

- At one extreme, continuing US access is ensured in most NATO countries, which largely share the US strategic outlook and believe the US presence enhances their security.
- At the other extreme, continuing US access is becoming problematic in a number of developing countries, which disagree with the US strategic outlook and which only grant access in return for compensation ("rent").
- In the middle of the spectrum lie many host countries whose governments may permit US forces to retain access but will be increasingly truculent and demanding.

## Adverse Trends


**Declining Strategic Consensus.** Spurred by intensifying nationalism and the perception of a declining global Communist military threat, a growing number of host countries outside the NATO heartland are coming to view their military relationships with the United States as anachronistic and their national interests as divergent from US interests. Consequently, they are beginning to challenge the traditional strategic rationale for granting US forces access, and to compare more critically the costs and benefits of their military association with the United States. In terms of the costs, host countries may:

- View US access arrangements as serving US interests primarily, or even exclusively, and sometimes at the expense of their own.

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**Figure 1**  
**Prospects for US Military Access Abroad**  
**During the Next Five Years**

**Note:**

Countries listed in **bold type** have a substantial US military presence; regular type indicates a smaller but vital US presence or access arrangement; *italic type* denotes a minor US presence or access arrangement.

The length of each bar indicates the degree of uncertainty or disagreement among Intelligence Community analysts. Striped bars denote countries where review or renegotiation of the US access agreement is scheduled within the next two years.

**The problem areas are:**

- 1 = Parties opposed to aspects of US access may come to power.
- 2 = Annoyance over US policies may lead to retaliation.
- 3 = Local perception of external threat may diminish.
- 4 = Antinuclear restrictions exist or may be adopted.
- 5 = Compensation issues are especially acute.
- 6 = Political stability is questionable.

- Fear ideological, cultural, or even physical contamination arising from contacts between US service personnel and local citizens.
- Resist being dragged into US conflicts with other countries with which they have no quarrel.
- Feel that the presence of US military units with extraterritorial rights infringes on their sovereignty.
- Oppose even the transitory presence of US nuclear weapons in their territory or waters or airspace.

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Figure 1 (continued)

	Spectrum of Concern		Problem Areas
	Low	High	
<b>East Asia and the Pacific</b>			
Japan			2
South Korea			2, 3
Philippines			1, 3, 4, 5, 6
Australia			3
New Zealand			4
Palau			4
Thailand			
<b>Africa and Neighboring Islands</b>			
Diego Garcia (UK)			
Ascension (UK)			
Kenya			2, 5
Liberia			2, 5
Morocco			2
Somalia			1, 5, 6
Djibouti			
Senegal			
Seychelles			6
South Africa			2
Zaire			2, 3, 5
<b>Latin America, the Caribbean, and the South Atlantic</b>			
Cuba			
Panama			1, 2, 6
The Bahamas			2
Bermuda (UK)			
Honduras			1, 2, 3, 5
Antigua			

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Where a host country deems the US presence to be vital to its security, such objections may be suppressed or at least muted. Elsewhere, they find expression in demands for a more equal role in the US-host country partnership, for expanded legal jurisdiction over US facilities and forces, and for additional restrictions on the activities of those forces.

***Spiraling Demands for Compensation.*** US security assistance often serves to assuage objections to aspects of the US military presence and to fend off unacceptable host-country demands. If host countries come to believe themselves undercompensated, however, that becomes an additional source

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of friction.

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Some host countries threaten to impose restrictions they know are unacceptable to Washington, hoping to be bribed into submission by additional compensation.

**Antinuclear Policies.** Owing to spreading antinuclear sentiment within the mainstream of public opinion in many host countries, a growing number of host governments have been edging toward the adoption of policies restricting US deployment of nuclear weapons and nuclear-powered ships. Among host countries, only New Zealand now rejects the US (and British and French) policy of neither confirming nor denying (NCND) the presence or absence of nuclear weapons on its ships and aircraft, but others may follow suit within the next few years.

#### **The Possibility of Collusion**

Many host countries pay close attention to US basing and access agreements with other countries, looking for US concessions they could demand for themselves and trying to calculate how much US compensation they can wangle. A number of host governments have tried to set up formal exchanges of information with other governments negotiating access arrangements with Washington. In two recent instances, the overtures were rebuffed; still, such exchanges could facilitate the development of coordinated positions on US access issues and reinforce a host government's determination to obtain US concessions.

Judging by their behavior to date, however, there seems to have been little actual cooperation among host countries in this regard. Indeed, a number of factors limit the likelihood of such collusion:

- Host countries resist being treated as if they were like any others; instead, they want special US consideration based on their own unique characteristics.
- Some host governments may fear that Washington might discover their collusive activities and react punitively.
- The host countries that receive US compensation are competing against one another for their shares of the US security assistance pie.

#### **Impact of US Actions**

The attitudes of many host governments toward granting access to US forces will continue to depend considerably on US policies and actions, often in areas having nothing to do with military cooperation, such as trade or human rights. By taking or refraining from specific actions, Washington can strongly influence their attitudes. For example, the passage of an "Armenian Genocide" resolution by the US Congress would probably

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lead Ankara to retaliate by imposing restrictions on US military activities in Turkey. US support for Israel will continue to constrain the willingness of Arab governments to expand US military access in their countries.

#### **Effects of Lost Access**

Owing to the limited redundancy in the US foreign military access system, a loss of access to certain foreign facilities—or of sufficient freedom of operation at such facilities—could significantly affect the capabilities of US forces to conduct operations in the surrounding regions. The strategic impact of such a development would depend on the region and the circumstances and on whether alternative arrangements were made. For example:

- In the aggregate the huge US facilities in the Philippines could never be replicated, but many of the activities undertaken there could be accomplished at available sites elsewhere, if at considerable losses in timeliness, convenience, efficiency, and cost.

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- Similarly, in order to accomplish certain missions or reach certain destinations, US military aircraft might absolutely require access to airfields in East or West Africa like those now made available by Somalia and Liberia.

#### **The Shorter Military Reach of the Soviet Union**

Compared with the United States, the Soviet Union maintains relatively few military facilities and relatively slim forces in far-distant regions. The USSR has only two significant overseas land installations—a naval and aviation base at Cam Ranh Bay in Vietnam, and a complex of intelligence, communications, and support sites in Cuba. Aside from the Mediterranean, where the Soviets would like to replicate the shore facilities they had in Egypt until the mid-1970s, Moscow does not seem to be trying to obtain more bases overseas—in part, probably, because they do not fit into its defense strategy, but also because Moscow does not want to pay what prospective host countries would demand. And, like the United States, the USSR has benefited from technological advances that have reduced the need for foreign bases.

[Redacted]

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# Discussion

In 1947 the United States had several thousand military installations in about a hundred foreign countries. Today the US military has basing or access arrangements with roughly 40 countries. Thus, during the past four decades, the US overseas basing complex has shrunk considerably. Although the end of the US involvement in conflicts such as Vietnam accounted for some of this contraction, most of it resulted from changes in military strategy and from reduced need owing to improvements in military technology, such as the development of communications and intelligence satellites; large, long-range air transports; and submarine-launched ballistic missiles.<sup>1</sup>

The elimination of redundant bases has saved money, but it has also increased the importance to the US forces of the bases and access arrangements that remain, especially those that serve as essential links in the transfer of US forces between regions. The value of such links has grown as the United States has taken on new military commitments, such as protecting shipping in the Persian Gulf.

The Soviet Union has deployed thousands of aircraft, tens of thousands of armored vehicles, and hundreds of thousands of troops abroad, but mostly in the territory of neighboring states. Compared with the

<sup>1</sup> This Estimate addresses the issues most likely to affect prospects for US military access in foreign countries during the next five years. It also presents an overview of those prospects organized by region. The annex addresses, more briefly, corresponding prospects for Soviet access in distant regions.

As used in the Estimate, the term "access" refers to the full gamut of use rights enjoyed by US military forces in foreign territory, from bases and other permanent facilities, to aircraft landing and portcall privileges, to prepositioning and other contingency arrangements.

United States, the Soviet Union maintains relatively few military facilities and relatively slim forces in far-distant regions.<sup>2</sup>

## Decline of the Strategic Consensus

Following World War II, the main function of US forces overseas shifted from administering the territory of defeated nations to thwarting the expansionist designs of the Soviet Union, China, North Korea, and other Communist countries. In those days, many governments concurred with the US position that the Communists posed the chief threat to world peace and welcomed the protective presence of US forces on their soil. During the past two decades, however, the external Communist military threat has lessened in the eyes of most developing countries and even of some West European countries—particularly in the wake of recent Soviet overtures aimed at reducing tensions with the West. In the absence of a common enemy, the local concerns of host countries have been looming ever larger in their relationships with the United States.

Moreover, during the years since their US bases were established, many host countries have undergone substantial political change. The strongly anti-Communist (and sometimes antidemocratic) governments of host countries such as Spain, Portugal, Greece, and the Philippines have been replaced by more liberal regimes that do not necessarily share their predecessors' preoccupation with the external, primarily Soviet Communist threat. Some of these regimes resent how strongly the US Government supported their predecessors. Some now consider the main menace to be the possibility that the US-Soviet rivalry may erupt into a global nuclear holocaust. Some simply regard US national security interests as not particularly relevant to their own. For instance, Greece worries more about

<sup>2</sup> The foldout map at the end of this Estimate compares US and Soviet military access around the world.

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Turkey, Somalia more about Ethiopia, and the Philippines more about its internal insurgency and struggling economy than any of them worries about long-term Soviet designs. Yet all of them are important links in the global US basing and access system designed primarily with the Soviet threat in mind.

### A Proliferation of Restrictions

In many cases the local concerns of host countries conflict with aspects of US foreign policy and efforts to implement it. Host governments increasingly sensitive about infringements on their sovereignty have placed various restrictions on what US forces do on, over, or from their territory. Arab host countries, for example, may forbid US forces to operate against other Arab states from their soil, as Bahrain has done. A country that sees a global nuclear conflict as the only real military threat to its security may refuse to allow visits by nuclear-powered or nuclear-armed US warships, as New Zealand has done. A West European host country may deny permission for US bombers to fly over its territory enroute to their target, as Spain did in 1986 when US aircraft struck at Libya.

### Contagion

As such restrictions proliferate, in one host country after another, they encourage still other host countries to impose their own. In addition, various regional and international organizations—the Arab League, for example—may put pressure on host countries to restrict the activities of US forces. While the Soviet Union promotes such policies through its propaganda outlets, agents of influence, and front organizations, the anticolonial and anti-Western activists of the so-called Nonaligned Movement need little encouragement to criticize countries that accommodate US military forces overseas.

In addition to such restrictions, other local developments might constrain the ability of US forces to conduct operations, at least during peacetime:

- Terrorism might become so frequent or destructive that it would prevent accomplishment of the US

military mission or pose an unacceptable risk to US military personnel stationed there, as is the case in West Beirut.

- Work stoppages by local employees could bring activities at some bases to a standstill, or even, if the local employees controlled base entry and egress, impede access to the facility, as happened at Iraklion Airbase in Greece.
- AIDS is becoming so widespread in parts of Africa that it could eventually become necessary to reconsider present US ship visit policies—even if the local governments continued to welcome them.

### The Thorny Issue of Compensation

During the coming few years, the most difficult issue to resolve during basing and access negotiations with many host countries will be the amount of compensation they will receive. That is because, in an increasing number of cases, compensation is being used to ameliorate disagreements over more fundamental issues such as sovereignty and antinuclear sentiment. Furthermore, some host governments appear to believe they can increase their compensation by making excessive demands, either specifically for more compensation or for other US concessions that Washington would pay extra compensation to avoid.

Any host government weighs the security and economic benefits from granting US forces access or basing privileges against the drawbacks: the frictions generated by the presence of foreign troops, compromises of national sovereignty, risks of becoming embroiled in US quarrels, and vulnerability to ideologically motivated foreign and domestic criticism. If a host country does not perceive security benefits from the US presence—or considers that presence a security liability—then the balance must be made up in economic benefits.

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**Types of Compensation**

Officially, the United States does not pay rent for military basing and access privileges. Nevertheless, many host countries receive US economic and military assistance, which they often construe as compensation for granting access. Types of US security assistance include:

- Foreign Military Sales (FMS) credits.
- Economic Support Fund (ESF) disbursements.
- International Military Education and Training (IMET) Program allocations.
- Military Assistance Program (MAP) grants.

FMS credits are guaranteed loans, sometimes at concessionary rates, for the purpose of purchasing US military equipment. They constitute by far the largest component of overall US security assistance, though they can be provided in large amounts only to countries ready to absorb substantial inputs of US military equipment, willing to go deeply into debt to obtain it, and able to make regular payments on that debt. "Forgiven" FMS credits are essentially grants rather than loans.

Under new US legislation, FMS borrowers are permitted to refinance the portion of their FMS

debts bearing interest rates of 10 percent or higher by taking out new loans, 90 percent of which would be guaranteed by the US Government. Egypt and Turkey are among countries taking advantage of this program.

Other forms of US aid that host countries may request include special US trade concessions, donations of surplus US military equipment, or help for their defense industries through coproduction arrangements and the like.

Furthermore, the presence of US military facilities can provide important boosts to host-country economies. For example, the US bases in the Philippines employed some 69,000 Filipinos and pumped more than \$500 million into the Philippine economy annually, in addition to the more than \$1.1 billion in US economic and military assistance that was provided to the Philippines during the past four years. On the other hand, because these funds are spent chiefly on goods and services in the immediate regions of the bases, much of the country receives little apparent benefit from them.

**Allies or Landlords?**

Host countries that largely share the US strategic outlook regard access arrangements with the United States as a natural outgrowth of a relationship between military and political allies. Such countries include most of the NATO countries, as well as—to a gradually decreasing extent—Japan, South Korea, and Australia. These countries neither demand nor receive compensation for granting access to US forces; indeed, some of the more affluent among them—West Germany, the United Kingdom, Italy, Japan—help pay the costs of basing US forces on their soil. South Korea does also, but there is a growing debate in that country over whether it is

paying more than its share, on a per capita basis, considering what richer US allies pay

Other host countries see less congruence between US national interests and foreign policies and their own. Liberia and Somalia are examples of countries that tend to view military access arrangements with the United States as basically commercial arrangements. Because they do not consider the US presence to be contributing much to their security, they want to be compensated, if not in money then in kind.

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Between these extremes lies muddier terrain. Some host countries that clearly value US military support and consider themselves to be US allies nevertheless believe they require US economic or security assistance in order to continue to help defend Western interests. Among these countries are some of the biggest US aid recipients such as Turkey and Portugal. They would be offended by the suggestion that this aid was a form of rent. [redacted]

On the other hand, since the overthrow of Marcos in 1986, the Philippines has demonstrated a lower regard for the contribution to regional security made by the US bases on its soil. Increasing nationalism has led many Filipinos to question whether the United States should retain its bases in the country. Defenders of the bases increasingly use economic arguments to justify their presence. In a bow to nationalism, Manila now insists that US compensation for the bases be termed rent. Such developments are likely to occur in other host countries in coming years. [redacted]

**Access Costs Are Ambiguous**

Though most of the recipients of US security assistance have afforded US forces access to their territory to one degree or another, there has often been little correlation between the nature and extent of the access and the type and amount of compensation. Rarely is the aid intended solely as compensation for access. Usually it is also meant to bolster the economy and military capabilities of the host country or to serve other US foreign policy goals. [redacted]

The top five US aid recipients during the past decade were Israel, Egypt, Turkey, Greece, and Pakistan; they absorbed about three-quarters of total US foreign aid. Only Turkey and Greece, however, hosted substantial numbers of US forces, while Egypt provided relatively limited access, and Pakistan almost none, [redacted]

[redacted] Israel has indicated it would consider accommodating US forces if requested. [redacted]

**The Coming Compensation Crunch**

Together with the decline in the perceived security benefits of a US military presence, a number of

developments have been putting great upward pressure on compensation costs:

- More and more host countries have come to view such aid explicitly as compensation for granting access to US forces. They hold that it is only appropriate that the US Government pay rent or access charges for the military facilities it uses and that it accept the same kinds of restrictions and limitations any landlord might impose in order to protect his property and minimize disruption.
- The large amounts of US security assistance granted to countries such as Turkey and Greece have encouraged other host countries—even minor players like Liberia and Zaire—to up their demands. The substantial increase in compensation won by the Philippines for the last two years of the current bases agreement will probably intensify this pressure.
- After the US Government agreed to help refinance the high-interest foreign military sales (FMS) debts accumulated by Israel and Egypt, and to provide that all new FMS credits be in the form of “forgiven” credits—that is, grants—other host countries have sought similar relief. [redacted]

**Constraints on Aid.** During the next few years, much less money will be appropriated to compensate host countries than, in the aggregate, they will demand. US disbursements for security assistance to foreign countries peaked in 1985 at \$11 billion. Most of the money went to host countries, though in important cases (Israel, Egypt, Pakistan) there was little if any relationship between the amount of aid and the degree of military access. Since then, such disbursements have been dropping, with \$8 billion budgeted for both FY 1988 and FY 1989. [redacted]

In addition, an ever greater portion of this aid is being earmarked by Congress for a few specific countries. Host countries not so favored are already displaying irritation at falling US aid levels and are likely to

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***The Possibility of Collusion  
Among Host Countries***

*Host countries tend to pay close attention to US basing and access agreements worked out with other countries, looking for US concessions they could demand for themselves and trying to calculate how much US compensation they can wangle. US negotiators expect this and sometimes encourage it as a means of persuading host governments that certain of their demands are out of line relative to US agreements with other host countries.*

*A number of host governments have reportedly done more than simply pay attention, however. They have tried to set up formal exchanges of information with other governments negotiating access agreements with Washington. In some cases these overtures appear to have been rebuffed; in other cases we do not know what the response was. Such exchanges would not necessarily entail collusion, but they would facilitate the development of coordinated positions on access and basing issues and possibly reinforce any host government tendencies toward intransigence in the pursuit of US concessions.*

*Some host countries have openly coordinated their policies regarding nuclear issues, as exemplified by their support for nuclear-weapons-free zones. Other than that, however, there seems to have been little cooperation among them so far. One factor limiting the likelihood of collusion is the tendency of most host governments to resist being lumped together with others in any particular category; instead, they want special US consideration based on their own unique characteristics. Another factor may be apprehension over the possibility that the US Government would discover covert efforts at collusion and react in a punitive way.*

*A third factor is that the host countries that receive US compensation are essentially in competition with one another for available US security assistance. Thus, gains by some are likely to entail losses by others. Turkey, Greece, and Portugal, for example, are competing for a limited amount of high-quality surplus US military equipment made available to them under the terms of the Southern Region Amendment.*

bargain tenaciously when US access agreements come up for renegotiation. Generally working to the United States' advantage is the absence of alternative foreign benefactors who could step in and meet a host country's financial expectations. Thus, the real choice facing most host governments is between US compensation, however inadequate they may perceive it to be, and none at all. [redacted]

***Tactics of Aggrieved Host Governments.*** When they believe themselves undercompensated, host governments can put pressure on the US Government in various ways. Like Portugal, one may call for a review of a formal access or basing agreement. Like Liberia, another may cancel joint military exercises and place additional constraints on local US military operations. In lieu of cash, some host governments have sought

other forms of compensation such as trade concessions or surplus US military equipment. [redacted]

Recent reductions in US security assistance have led a growing number of host governments to adopt a truculent, confrontational posture before and during military access negotiations. They make unrealistically high demands coupled with highly publicized threats of the dire consequences of failing to meet these demands. Because some of the host countries that have used such tactics, such as Turkey and Greece, are among the greatest recipients of US security assistance, other host countries may be encouraged also to posture and bluster when the time comes to renegotiate US access arrangements. [redacted]

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**Secret****Where Compensation Issues Are Most Acute**

Among the host countries that currently receive US security assistance, the following are expected to demand significant increases in direct or indirect compensation during the next five years:

- In Europe: Turkey, Greece, and Portugal.
- In the Middle East: Oman.
- In Africa: Kenya, Somalia, Liberia, and Zaire.
- In East Asia: the Philippines. [redacted]

Overall, it appears that resentment over the perceived inadequacy of compensation is highest in Africa. In countries such as Somalia and Liberia, if agreements over compensation are not reached, US access could be at risk. Most of the leaders of the African host governments are not only annoyed but genuinely baffled by what they perceive to be US indifference to their countries'—in some cases, desperate—need for foreign aid, especially considering the small amounts involved relative to the large amounts of US aid given to much better-off host countries on other continents.

[redacted]

Turkey, Greece, and Portugal receive much more US security assistance than most other host countries; yet, because past levels of aid were even higher, they are dissatisfied. Nevertheless, we think it unlikely that any of these NATO Allies will take the drastic step of terminating their military access arrangements with the United States during the next few years. The Philippines is a much closer call, given the uncertain political dynamics of the next few years there. Open to all of these countries, of course, is the option of displaying their dissatisfaction by imposing additional restrictions on the operations and privileges of US forces in their territory. [redacted]

**The Impact of Antinuclear Sentiment**

Another foreign access issue that transcends national and regional boundaries is antinuclear sentiment. Around the world, opposition to nuclear weapons is widespread and firmly entrenched. Rooted in various potent combinations of fear, principle, and ideology, such opposition is a factor to be reckoned with not only in democracies but also in countries headed by authoritarian regimes. Since US military forces use

nuclear propulsion and possess nuclear weapons, nuclear issues are inextricably interlaced with US military basing and access arrangements abroad. [redacted]

Soviet efforts to manipulate and aggravate foreign antinuclear sentiment compound the problem. The antinuclear theme is a major component of the Soviet Union's global diplomatic and active measures campaign to reduce US military access abroad. Nevertheless, the Soviets have had only mixed success in undercutting the US position on nuclear weapons—partly because they themselves are vulnerable to criticism from antinuclear groups. Even East European government leaders have expressed muted concern about the stationing of Soviet nuclear weapons in their countries. [redacted]

Perhaps more influential than Soviet active measures aimed at inflaming antinuclear sentiment where it will discommodate the West are actual developments that make nuclear weapons or other uses of nuclear energy seem more frightening, such as the deployment of a new nuclear weapons system or a nuclear mishap like the one at Chernobyl'. [redacted]

While the activities of antinuclear groups occasionally complicate US military operations overseas, it is not until antinuclear sentiment is translated into government policy that it poses major problems for US forces in host countries. Thus, although there is substantial opposition to nuclear weapons in the United Kingdom and West Germany, in the most recent elections the more antinuclear of the contending parties were defeated, permitting the governments to continue policies tolerant of nuclear weapons and nuclear-powered ships. Similarly, the new Danish Government has adopted a policy of essentially ignoring a resolution forced on the preceding government by the antinuclear parliamentary majority that would, if enforced, effectively prevent nuclear-powered or nuclear-armed ships of its NATO Allies from calling at Danish ports. [redacted]

**A Continuum of Constraints**

In many host countries, US nuclear capabilities are viewed as menacing rather than as protective, both

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*Leaders of African Host Countries*

*In most African host countries, continued US access depends mainly on maintaining good relationships with their leaders.*



*President Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaire*



*President Daniel T. arap Moi of Kenya*



*President Mohamed Siad Barre of Somalia*



*King Hassan of Morocco*



*President Samuel Doe of Liberia*



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**Alternatives to Land Bases**

During the 1960s and 1970s, improvements in military technology significantly reduced the US need for bases and other installations in distant regions. In particular:

- The development of turbofan technology helped to double the distance that military transport aircraft could fly nonstop, eliminating the need for some previously indispensable transit bases.
- The development of long-range bombers and ballistic missiles led to the dismantling of many US overseas installations associated with strategic offense.
- The development of satellites made it possible to eliminate numerous ground facilities all over the world and to reduce the size and profile of many of those that remained.

During the next few years, however, technological innovations are unlikely to play as important a role in reducing the US need for overseas bases or access. None of the various transport and weapon systems in the pipeline has the potential to radically reduce US basing requirements the way any of these developments did.

Nevertheless, current and near-future technology do offer some possibilities for reducing, or occasionally even eliminating, the need for military facilities on foreign territory. For example:

- Prefabricated military base kits that can be transported to and assembled in foreign areas are already being used effectively in the Middle East.
- US naval and marine forces could be reorganized and reequipped to extend their sea-basing capabilities.
- Container ships can function as floating supply depots. Military units can be configured so they can be transported in and operate from standard containers.
- Sea platforms with enormous capacities for storage and operational activities could be built by

using supertankers to support large expanses of decking.

- Dirigibles could be used as semistationary communications or intelligence-collection platforms, or even as mother ships for fleets of drone aircraft.
- Advances in satellite systems will continue to reduce the need for ground stations in distant regions of the world.

Further in the future, technological innovations offer other potential—if costly to develop—alternatives to a reliance on permission to use foreign military facilities. Examples include hypersonic or orbital military transport aircraft and artificial islands.

Still, some bases are almost irreplaceable, whether because of their location, their function, or other attributes, such as a plentiful supply of cheap but skilled labor. There is no possibility, for example, of fully replicating Clark Airbase and the US Navy complex at Subic Bay in the Philippines, even though many of the activities undertaken there could be accomplished at available sites elsewhere. Apart from the expense of relocating and rebuilding the huge support infrastructure and the difficulty of training thousands of new workers to replace the highly competent and reliable Filipino workforce, no alternative sites are available in the immediate region to accommodate anything nearly as large and capable as those bases, whereas sites farther away are for that reason less useful.

Similarly, there is currently no reasonable way to replace certain US intelligence-related facilities in foreign countries, though technological advances promise to make some of them redundant in upcoming years.

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because of the global devastation that a major international nuclear conflict would entail and because countries that allow US nuclear weapons on their soil may for that reason alone be dragged into such a war.

**Nuclear-Weapons-Free Zones (NWFZs).** In efforts to reduce the nuclear threat, various countries have formally agreed to establish NWFZs in specific parts of the world. Antarctica, Latin America, the South Pacific, the seabed, and outer space currently constitute such zones, and several others have been proposed. None of these NWFZs actually restricts the transit of US ships through international waters, since provisions that would be restrictive are contrary to longstanding international law and thus not enforceable. Although the Soviet Union is actively promoting the creation of new NWFZs, we doubt any will be established during the next few years, owing to longstanding animosities, disagreements over security issues, and other fundamental differences among the prospective signatories.

**Unilateral Prohibitions.** Nevertheless, the proliferation of NWFZs, both actual and proposed, has imperiled US security interests by encouraging the governments within these zones—and other governments as well—to constrain US deployments of nuclear forces. Among the steps some governments have taken to limit US nuclear activities are:

- Prohibiting the storage of nuclear weapons and munitions on their soil.
- Denying permission for the transport of nuclear weapons through their airspace or territorial waters.
- Banning visits by nuclear-powered and nuclear-armed ships.

#### The NCND Policy Under Fire

For nearly 30 years, the US Government has maintained a policy of neither confirming nor denying (NCND) the presence or absence of nuclear weapons or components on any US military aircraft, ship, or station. This policy forces a potential enemy to treat all stations and units as if they were nuclear-armed, complicating both targeting and tactics. In addition, it gives both host governments and US officials abroad a ready and consistent (if ambiguous) answer to questions about nuclear weapons deployment, thereby

reducing the host governments' susceptibility to domestic criticism. The other Western nuclear powers have similar policies; the Soviet Union is believed to rely on unverifiable denials.

**Looking the Other Way.** Many countries, including some US allies, have laws prohibiting nuclear weapons in their territory that, if strictly enforced, would severely limit US nuclear deployments. However, most of these laws are worded ambiguously enough to permit governments so inclined to accept the US refusal to discuss the possible presence of nuclear weapons on its ships, aircraft, or bases. For example, US naval ships that may or may not have been armed with nuclear weapons have received permission to visit such countries as Iceland and Japan, even though these countries ban port calls by nuclear-armed ships.

#### Problem Countries


New Zealand has already refused to take NCND for an answer, and other host countries may follow suit. Such a policy may be:

- A reaction to political pressure generated by strong or widespread antinuclear sentiment.
- A consequence of genuine security concerns such as fear of becoming a nuclear target in wartime.
- A response to fear of nuclear mishaps.
- A means of demonstrating independence from the United States or opposition to US foreign policies.
- A tactic designed to gain leverage over the United States in basing or other access negotiations.

In October 1987, Greece announced it would begin enforcing its official policy of requiring 90 days' advance notice of visits by nuclear-powered ships. Since then, all requests for permission for US nuclear-powered ships to visit Greece have been submitted with less than 90 days' notice, and—despite US remonstrations in diplomatic channels—all have been turned down for that reason. The United States has not yet tested whether Greece would allow a nuclear-powered vessel to visit if provided sufficient warning. The Greek policy toward port calls by ships that may

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Figure 2  
Nuclear-Weapons-Free Zones



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be carrying nuclear weapons is ambiguous. Many US warships visit Greek ports each year without being challenged on that score. Prime Minister Papandreu is a proponent of NWFZs; he supports both a Balkan NWFZ and a Mediterranean Zone of Peace.

In Spain the electorate voted in the 1986 referendum on NATO membership to bar nuclear weapons from Spanish territory. The previous Defense Agreement, which expired in May 1988, made the *storage or installation* of nuclear weapons in Spain subject to Madrid's consent. A Spanish ban on overflights by US aircraft carrying nuclear weapons was acknowledged in a separate exchange of letters. The new

Defense Agreement makes the *introduction* of nuclear weapons into Spain also subject to Madrid's approval. In addition, though, it explicitly commits each country to refrain from questioning the cargo on board visiting naval ships from the other country—meaning that, in effect, Spain will continue to honor the US NCND policy. This provision has already caused a furor in Spain, with government opponents claiming it violates the spirit, if not the letter, of the 1986 referendum. Because of the strength of the anti-nuclear lobby, this issue is likely to abrade US-Spanish relations for the duration of the agreement.

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In April 1988, over the strenuous objections of the minority government, the Danish parliament passed a resolution requiring that approaching warships be informed of Denmark's policy of prohibiting nuclear weapons within Danish territory, including ports, during peacetime. Fearing that the resolution undermined Denmark's role in NATO and mindful of serious concerns on the part of the British, French, and US Governments, Prime Minister Schlueter called new elections. The resulting new government has instituted a ship visit policy that does not challenge NCND responses, in effect ignoring the antinuclear resolution; that resolves the problem for now but not necessarily forever. [redacted]

The 1987 Philippine Constitution prohibits nuclear weapons in the Philippines "consistent with the national interest." During the recently concluded review of the current bases agreement, Washington agreed not to store or install nuclear weapons in Philippine territory, while Manila agreed not to challenge the possible presence of nuclear weapons on board US ships and aircraft transiting the country. This issue may arise again during the negotiation of a new treaty to cover the period after September 1991, when the current treaty expires. [redacted]

New Zealand forbids visits by ships that are nuclear-powered and requires that the Prime Minister be satisfied that visiting ships are not carrying nuclear weapons. The current Prime Minister rejects NCND responses as evasive. This policy, in effect since early 1985, has essentially reduced the ANZUS alliance to a bilateral US-Australian relationship [redacted]

If current trends continue, antinuclear groups appear to pose substantial long-term threats to continued US access in a number of other host countries in Western Europe and possibly in East Asia. Even in these countries, however, though local disputes and demonstrations over nuclear issues can be expected, it is unlikely that antinuclear sentiment or policies alone will force the closure of US bases. While we anticipate that nuclear issues will play a role in many upcoming negotiations involving basing and access rights, in most cases sovereignty or compensation issues will be the decisive factors, rather than US nuclear weapons deployment policies per se. [redacted]

### The Shrinking World

In coming years, foreign antinuclear sentiment will probably continue gradually constraining the access of US warships to foreign harbors as well as of US combat aircraft to foreign airports. The US NCND policy will probably be challenged repeatedly, as antinuclear elements in other countries seek to emulate the complete success of those in New Zealand and the limited victories of those in other countries such as Denmark. In a few cases, the policy itself may be at issue: a government may consider that it has a sovereign right to know when it is hosting ships carrying nuclear weapons. More often, however, the real issue will be the putative nuclear weapons on board. Countries truly opposed to visits by nuclear-armed ships are unlikely to be satisfied by evasions. [redacted]

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Thus, during the next five years, the number of ports and airfields at which US military ships and aircraft are welcome is likely to decline, though probably not to an extent that would seriously threaten the ability of the affected US forces to accomplish their missions. Nevertheless, if current trends persist over the longer term, as seems likely, foreign antinuclear restrictions may come to constitute a substantial impediment to US military operations abroad. While sizable or important foreign areas are only infrequently being put off-limits to US nuclear forces, those which have been put off-limits tend to remain that way. Consequently, the part of the world that is not off-limits is gradually shrinking. [redacted]

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### Soviet Efforts To Limit US Access

Limiting US access to foreign military facilities has long been a high-priority Soviet foreign policy goal. Through public and private diplomacy, propaganda and disinformation campaigns, manipulation of local Communist parties, and orchestration of front-group activities, Moscow has worked hard to heighten opposition to US bases worldwide. [redacted]

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The Soviets have been most active in NATO countries, in parts of East Asia—notably Japan and the Philippines, and in the South Pacific. The unevenness of the Soviet effort reflects differences both in the priorities Moscow assigns to various targets and in the assets it can bring to bear on any given target. Sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America, for example, are generally of lower priority to the Soviets because US facilities and access in these regions are limited and do not threaten significant Soviet interests [redacted]

In their dealings with foreign officials, the Soviets frequently strive to hinder and constrain US basing and access rights around the world. During a trip to India in November 1986, for example, General Secretary Gorbachev and Prime Minister Gandhi issued a joint statement calling for the dismantling of all foreign military bases in the Indian Ocean and for the prohibition of new ones. [redacted]

**Propaganda and Disinformation**

Generating opposition to US military basing or access rights is a central objective of the official propaganda guidance provided by Soviet officials to media assets in countries where such rights exist or may be granted. Following are some of the Soviet propaganda themes:

- That the US military presence violates the host nation's sovereignty.
- That the United States extorts basing privileges from its allies by making aid contingent on them.
- That the United States will destabilize or even split up countries in order to obtain foreign bases.
- That US military personnel have spread AIDS in host countries.
- That the presence of US nuclear weapons in a host country's territory threatens both its environment and its national security. [redacted]

Local Communist parties often spearhead the Soviet assault against US bases abroad, organizing conferences and demonstrations against US facilities and delivering letters of protest concerning the installations. The Soviets also work through labor and peace groups to generate broader opposition to the US military presence. In February 1987, the Soviet-controlled World Peace Council sponsored an "action week" to promote the elimination of "imperialist"

military bases. In the South Pacific, the Soviets have used the Asian Pacific Trade Union Coordination Committee, a group associated with the Soviet-controlled World Federation of Trade Unions, along with pro-Soviet groups such as the Pacific Trade Union Community, to exploit antinuclear sentiment among the area's labor movements and to push for reductions in US military basing and access rights in the region. [redacted]

**How Effective Are These Efforts?**

In general, the impact of these Soviet efforts is hard to gauge, since it can rarely be separated from the effects of other factors bearing on whether a foreign government chooses to afford US forces access to its territory. In a way, the existence of US bases in certain countries can be construed as evidence of Soviet failure in those countries. Even in countries that have terminated basing or access agreements with the United States, like Libya and Ethiopia, the causes went well beyond negative Soviet propaganda. [redacted]

Nevertheless, past Soviet campaigns in Western Europe against NATO's enhanced radiation weapons and intermediate-range nuclear forces suggest that Moscow's efforts can help transform unfocused and disorganized opposition elements into cohesive and powerful—though not necessarily successful—political movements. The impact these efforts have varies according to the receptivity of the audience and the gravity and plausibility of the charges. The Soviet techniques work best when members of the target audience are already concerned about the issue in question and, for one reason or another, are predisposed to believe the Soviet line. [redacted]

**Outlook**

Countering the US military presence overseas will remain an important Soviet priority. As Moscow's AIDS-scare campaign illustrates, the Soviets are likely to seize any opportunity to call attention to the negative consequences—real or purported—of hosting

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US military facilities or allowing the United States access rights. Since future Soviet campaigns against US access rights abroad will necessarily reflect changes both in Moscow's foreign policy priorities and in exploitable opportunities overseas, it is difficult to forecast particular Soviet tactics or estimate their impact. [redacted]

At this point, the nuclear issues appear to offer the Soviets their best opportunities to mobilize opposition to US basing and access privileges around the world. Large and politically robust antinuclear movements now exist in most West European countries and in many Asian countries. Concern is already high, and many members of the target audiences want to believe that steps within the power of their governments, like eliminating foreign military bases and refusing to allow visits by foreign warships, will make their world safer. [redacted]

The Soviet line will continue to emphasize the potential for nuclear accidents and to portray countries that host US facilities as likely targets in a nuclear confrontation. We expect Moscow to push especially hard in countries that have basing agreements with the United States that are nearing expiration. We also expect Moscow to continue to give high priority to efforts promoting the establishment of nuclear-free zones. [redacted]

### Moscow's "New Thinking"

Some Soviet policies not particularly designed to limit US access abroad may nevertheless have that effect. The Gorbachev regime's widely advertised "new thinking" about its strategic and military policies is likely to lead many US host governments to reassess the Soviet threat. Their conclusions, in turn, will color their attitudes toward granting US forces access. [redacted]

The new Soviet approach involves lowering the level of confrontation between East and West through such means as engaging in arms control negotiations, withdrawing Soviet forces from Afghanistan, and promoting a peaceful resolution of the conflict in Cambodia. We doubt that reducing US military access or im-

proving Soviet military access overseas were explicit goals of this new approach, though Moscow probably hoped it would have such effects. Instead, the Soviets appear to have several other primary objectives:

- To weaken popular support in Western countries for expensive force-modernization programs that the Soviets would have to match.
- To improve Soviet access to Western markets and goods, particularly high-technology industrial equipment.
- Possibly to free up some Soviet resources now devoted to the military so that more may be applied to the economic modernization program. (As yet, we have seen no reduction in Soviet funding of military forces and weapons programs.) [redacted]

### Impact on US Access

The impact of the alleged new Soviet thinking will depend partly on how seriously it is regarded by host countries. It will take more than reassuring Soviet pronouncements to persuade many of them that Moscow has really changed its strategic and foreign policies. Evidence that aspects of the "old thinking" remain, such as continued excessive military spending, support for antidemocratic regimes like those in Addis Ababa and Managua, and continued patronage of terrorist states like Libya and Syria, clearly reveal the limits of Moscow's new thinking. [redacted]

The impact will also depend partly on how concerned the host country has been about possible Communist aggression. That concern has been highest in NATO, because of the immediate military threat from the Warsaw Pact. It has been lowest among the developing countries, where few governments perceive any direct Soviet threat. [redacted]

*The NATO Region.* The INF Treaty and the possibility of additional US-Soviet nuclear weapons control agreements have focused new attention on the Warsaw Pact's significant edge in conventional military power in Europe. Though the Soviets are now vowing never to initiate conventional hostilities, until this

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
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**Figure 3**  
**West European Views on Whether US Military Presence**  
**in Europe Is Needed To Deter Soviet Aggression**

Percent



Source: USIA Survey, September 1987.

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rhetoric is matched by reductions in the East Bloc's offensive capabilities—and in the rates of production of armored vehicles, artillery pieces, and combat aircraft—most NATO leaders will not be very impressed.

Absent large reductions in Soviet conventional forces in Europe, if US forces were withdrawn, they would have to be replaced by additional West European forces in order to keep the current imbalance from worsening. Even before the new Soviet approach, however, support in many NATO countries for the current level of military spending had been waning. The near infeasibility of increasing defense budgets to improve conventional forces during a period of detente with the USSR makes most NATO governments

appreciate both the military and the economic benefits of a continued substantial US presence.

Preponderant public opinion in most West European countries favors the US military presence. A 1987 USIA survey of six NATO members and two neutral states found that majorities in every country except Finland agreed that the presence of US forces in Europe was necessary to deter Soviet aggression. Except in Italy, the majorities were substantial—though it should be noted that respondents in several of these countries were approving a US presence in countries other than their own. If the Soviet Union develops a less-threatening image, however, the



majorities in favor of the US military presence will certainly shrink and may disappear. In these democratic countries, widespread popular opposition to US bases or other forms of access would sooner or later be reflected in government policies. [redacted]

**Other US Allies.** The US military relationships with countries such as Japan, South Korea, and Australia are predicated in part on a perception of the need to guard against Communist aggression. If the Soviet Union is able to persuade such countries that neither it nor other Communist states it supports, such as North Korea, threatens them or threatens world peace, the rationale for granting US forces access will begin to attenuate. [redacted]

**Developing Countries.** In many of the developing host countries, US access arrangements are already coming to be seen as serving US interests primarily, if not exclusively. Wide acceptance of Moscow's claim that it now opposes military solutions to both domestic and international disputes, with its implication that the Soviets will no longer try to subvert or promote the overthrow by force of governments they dislike, would accelerate this trend, strengthening the developing tendency toward the commercialization of US access arrangements. [redacted]

**Better Soviet Access?**

If the Soviet Union came to be viewed as "just another superpower," one no more threatening than the United States—and one, moreover, with which the United States is on improving terms—some Third World countries might become more willing to grant the Soviet Union new or expanded military access, presumably in return for appropriate compensation. There is no evidence that the Soviet Union has any intention of, or even interest in, greatly expanding its military presence in distant regions during the next few years. Nevertheless, Moscow would probably jump at an opportunity to improve its access to military facilities—especially ports and airfields—in the Mediterranean region, and possibly in other parts of the world, if costs could be held down and if such improved access fit logically into Soviet strategy. [redacted]

**The Consequences of Terrorism**

Since 1970, more than 200 terrorist attacks have been mounted against US military facilities in foreign countries. Most of these attacks took place in Western Europe, more than 100 of them in West Germany (where potential targets are the most numerous), with Turkey, Greece, and Italy accounting for most of the rest in that region. Outside Western Europe, attacks against US military facilities have occurred in countries as widely separated as Lebanon, Japan, and the Philippines. The peak year for terrorist attacks against US military targets was 1982, when there were more than 40 such attacks worldwide; since then the frequency has declined to fewer than 20 per year. [redacted]

More often than not, the attacks were basically nuisance bombings involving Molotov cocktails or other improvised incendiary or explosive devices that caused little damage and no injuries. A few were much more serious: the worst was the truck-bombing of the US Marine barracks in Beirut in 1983, which resulted in the deaths of 249 persons, including 241 Marines. In many cases the perpetrators were never identified. [redacted]

**Motives of the Attackers**

Many of these attacks reflected a generalized hatred of the US Government and its policies rather than a focused opposition to the presence of US military forces or to their basing and access rights. In these cases, all US military facilities, like US diplomatic and cultural installations, were seen as accessible appendages of the US Government. For example, the Libyans who tried to bomb the US Air Force Officers' Club in Ankara, Turkey, on 18 April 1986 were obviously seeking revenge for the US air raids on Libya three days earlier rather than objecting to the presence of US Air Force facilities in Turkey. [redacted]

Some attackers have been motivated directly by opposition to the presence of US forces, though even then this was usually an outgrowth of a more general [redacted]

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animosity toward the US Government and its foreign policies. In West Germany, for instance, the Red Army Faction and its sympathizers have been attacking US military facilities and personnel for more than 15 years, impelled partly by their objections to US "imperialism" around the world and partly by their opposition to NATO and its strongest component, the US military establishment. Similarly, the pro-Iranian Shi'ite extremists that attacked US military targets in Lebanon opposed US regional policies, but their specific goal was to eradicate all vestiges of a US presence in Lebanon. [redacted]

#### **Impact on Host Governments**

So far, the terrorist attacks against foreign US military targets have not led any host governments to place constraints on US basing and access arrangements. In coming years, host governments are likely to consider terrorism directed against the US military presence as only a minor factor in these arrangements, compared with jurisdictional, alliance, and compensation issues. [redacted]

#### **Impact on the US Military Mission**

Terrorist attacks against US military facilities in foreign countries tend to lower morale and efficiency and raise the costs of maintaining adequate security. Nevertheless, in most host countries terrorism will not significantly impede US military operations. Conceivably, though, a hyperterrorist environment of the sort that has developed in West Beirut could make it impossible for US military forces to accomplish peacetime missions. [redacted]

#### **Intimidation by Radical States**

Many small and weak countries are within the reach of agents of states such as Iran, Libya, and Syria that have routinely used terrorism as a tool of foreign policy. What worries these countries, when considering whether to afford the United States military basing or access privileges, is not so much that the US facilities or personnel may be attacked as that their own facilities or personnel may be attacked. The Iranian Government, for example, has indicated to the small states of the Persian Gulf that it is willing to use subversion and terrorism, if not outright military force, to punish any of them that becomes too cooperative with the United States. [redacted]

Although they usually deny they have been intimidated by such threats, most of the small moderate Arab states try to avoid antagonizing their powerful radical neighbors. Consequently, we believe that in at least some cases the threat of terrorist reprisal has been one of the factors constraining US military access options. [redacted]

#### **The Ramifications of AIDS**

The fear that US military forces abroad may spread AIDS has already made some foreign governments wary of granting basing or access rights to the United States. In the future, the proliferation of AIDS is likely to complicate US military planning and access rights in an increasing number of current or potential host countries. [redacted]

The thorough and rigorous US military testing policy has largely satisfied many host governments that the US forces in their countries pose little risk to them from the standpoint of the AIDS disease. But in other host countries, AIDS-related issues have been causing difficulties:

- In preliminary discussions of the Military Bases Agreement between the US and Philippine Governments, for example, AIDS was the main social issue and generated extensive political and press comment. Manila claims that US servicemen introduced AIDS into communities around US military bases and has sought additional US funding for the treatment of AIDS victims.
- The Turkish Government has requested that all US military personnel stationed in Turkey be individually certified as free from the human immunodeficiency virus (HIV). This appears to be a response to the policy of the US Department of Defense that Turkish military personnel, along with all other foreign military personnel, be tested for the AIDS virus before coming to the United States for military training.
- The Egyptian Government requires that all foreigners visiting Egyptian military facilities possess HIV-free certificates. [redacted]

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### **The Question of Testing**

Almost everyone in the US military has by now undergone a blood test for HIV. Prospective recruits found to be infected are not accepted. Members of the military who test positive are not assigned to overseas duty; if they are already overseas, they are sent home. Troops who are assigned to overseas duty are retested shortly before they depart. This does not absolutely ensure the absence of HIV among troops sent abroad, since there is a latency period following HIV infection during which the virus is not detectable by current testing methods, and it is also possible for a person to become infected during the period after the test but before his departure from the United States. Nevertheless, this testing program is an effective way to reduce to a minimum the number of US military carriers of HIV overseas. [redacted]

It seems only a matter of time before host countries begin to insist that the Defense Department take as many pains to ensure that military dependents, civilian employees, and contract personnel overseas are free from the disease as it does with service personnel. Such personnel are not now tested before being sent abroad. Though the incidence of HIV infection among these civilians is probably rather low, this policy is currently under review. [redacted]

### **Propaganda and Disinformation**

In host countries as diverse as Spain, West Germany, Honduras, Panama, Japan, the Philippines, and South Korea, propaganda and disinformation alleging that US forces spread AIDS have surfaced in local media. Often, the material was planted or replayed by Soviet agencies. It is not possible to establish with certainty how the HIV infection was introduced into these countries; thus, the extent to which US forces may have been responsible is unknown. At present, owing to the stringent US military testing program, they are

probably not spreading the infection to any significant degree, and allegations that they are doing so appear unfounded. In response to US remonstrations at the highest level, the Soviet Union has indicated that its agencies have ceased making such allegations. [redacted]

### **Small Impact on Access**

The concern that US forces may spread AIDS is greatest in regions where the incidence of the disease is now very low, such as East Asia. Even there, however, it does not appear that this concern will be as important as other issues such as legal jurisdiction, security, and compensation in decisions affecting basing or access agreements with the US Government. It seems unlikely that, out of fear of AIDS alone, any host countries will severely restrict the activities and movements of US military personnel in their territory. Local media are likely to continue to replay the issue, however, and some host governments can be expected to employ it to improve their bargaining positions with Washington. [redacted]

### **Small Impact on Operations**

In most host countries, US troops are no more at risk from HIV than if they were stationed in the United States. Depending on how rapidly and widely the disease may spread during the next few years, however, increasing portions of the globe, possibly including places where the United States has major bases, may become somewhat less suitable as sites for US military activities, at least in peacetime. [redacted]

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### Regional Overviews

Following is a global survey of US military access prospects during the next five years, organized by region. It is based on the more detailed country-by-country appraisals to be found in the Research Study being published as a companion to this Estimate.



#### The NATO Region

In this region, the United States has military basing or other access arrangements with the following countries and dependent territories. Those in *italics* are the ones in which it appears that the United States may have difficulty retaining its current level of access during the next five years:

Belgium	Italy
<i>Canada</i>	Luxembourg
Cyprus (British SBAs)	Netherlands
Denmark	Norway
West Germany	<i>Portugal</i>
<i>Greece</i>	<i>Spain</i>
Greenland (Denmark)	<i>Turkey</i>
Iceland	United Kingdom



Over the next five years, existing US basing and access privileges appear to be secure in most of the NATO countries, nearly all of which believe that the US military presence enhances their security. In a few of them, prospects are less glowing.

In Canada, the Tory government has generally accommodated US access requests. National elections must be held before September 1989, however, and there is a good chance that the Tories will be supplanted by a Liberal Party government or a coalition of the Liberal and New Democratic Parties. Either of these would probably want to end US testing in Canada of air-launched cruise missiles and at least cut down the amount of low-altitude bomber training. A government involving the New Democrats would probably press for further cutbacks of US military activities in Canada, though construction of the North Warning System that replaces the DEW Line would probably be allowed to continue.



In Spain, under the terms of the new eight-year basing agreement agreed upon September 1988, the United States must remove the 401st Tactical Fighter Wing (TFW) and a number of associated units from Torrejon Airbase by 1991 (the 401st is slated to move to the hitherto obscure town of Crotone, in southern Italy). The United States must also turn over several small US military facilities to Spain, but US forces will retain access to their other major bases. Spain gained greater authority over the bases used by US forces, greater criminal jurisdiction over US service personnel, and a greater role in base-related construction and maintenance contracting. In addition, the new agreement prohibits the introduction of nuclear weapons into Spain, though it also commits Madrid to continue to permit US nuclear-capable ships to call at Spanish ports without inquiring about their armament or cargo.



Greece, Turkey, and Portugal aim to obtain as much compensation as possible for permitting US forces to operate in their territory. Their chief leverage consists of their ability to withhold access or restrict US operations on their soil, and during negotiations they are likely to threaten such actions more or less explicitly, without necessarily intending to follow through. The Portuguese are likely to be the most reasonable, the Greeks the most intransigent:


- Indeed, Greece has formally indicated that, unless a new agreement is signed to replace the one that expires in December 1988, in January 1989 US forces must begin withdrawing according to the 17-month timetable specified in the current agreement. Because of Prime Minister Papandreu's illness, however, it appears increasingly unlikely that a new agreement can be reached until after the Greek election next spring.
- The Greeks have also demanded that the US airbase at Hellenikon be dismantled and that the US activities there be "abolished." Previously they had led US negotiators to believe they would permit at least some of the US forces there to be relocated at another site farther from Athens. The Papandreu regime's new, harder line appears to be a response to pressure from political opponents.

None of these countries has an alternative source for the extensive US security assistance likely to be offered. Moreover, the US military presence in their

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**Figure 4**  
**US Military Access Abroad: Western Europe and Canada**

Boundary representation is not necessarily authoritative.



**US Security Assistance to NATO Countries <sup>a</sup>** Million US \$ <sup>b</sup>

	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987
Greece	175	171	147	179	283	281	501	501	432	344
Italy							10			
Portugal	325	31	107	188	91	113	148	208	189	147
Spain	141	172	148	132	150	415	415	415	397	113
Turkey	175	231	404	453	703	688	857	878	738	593

<sup>a</sup> These figures constitute the total of ESF disbursements, FMS credits, MAP grants, MASF, and IMET. See inset "Types of Compensation" for explanation.

<sup>b</sup> Total amounts less than \$500,000 have been ignored.

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territory is a NATO matter rather than a purely bilateral one, which Lisbon and Ankara—though not Athens—freely acknowledge. Consequently, we judge that in the end all three of these governments will continue to allow US forces to maintain bases in their countries and will refrain from placing intolerable restrictions on the activities of these forces. [redacted]

US use of European military facilities in support of out-of-area operations will continue to be a prickly issue. Most of the NATO Allies insist that any US facilities on their soil be used only for NATO-related activities, which they tend to define more narrowly than does the United States. Of the major Allies, only the United Kingdom will generally be cooperative about out-of-area contingencies, though even London will be wary of a negative public reaction such as occurred in the aftermath of the US air raid on Libya. West Germany and Portugal may also be helpful, but on a more selective basis. [redacted]

Among mainstream opposition parties, the Labor Party of the United Kingdom and the Social Demo-

cratic Party of West Germany have advocated defense policies that would place US military bases or certain access privileges in their countries in question. It does not now appear likely, however, that either party will return to power within the next five years. Their chances might improve if they moderated some of their antinuclear and weak-defense policies as a means of attracting centrist voters. Then, however, they would pose a smaller threat to US access in their countries—unless they reverted to their old policies once in office. [redacted]

In addition, in most NATO countries there are vocal minorities opposed to any form of US military presence for reasons including pacifism, environmental concerns, fear of nuclear weapons, and plain old anti-Americanism. We do not expect these minorities to gain sufficient political influence to seriously jeopardize US bases or access in any NATO country during the next five years, but over the longer term—especially if the threat from the Soviet Union appears to have lessened—such minorities are likely to grow larger and politically stronger. [redacted]

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**Figure 6**  
**US Military Access Abroad: Middle East and South Asia**

Boundary representation is not necessarily authoritative.



**US Security Assistance to Host Countries <sup>a</sup>**  
**in the Middle East and South Asia** Million US \$ <sup>b</sup>

	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987
Bahrain			5		5	6		206	99	
Egypt	751	2,335	866	1,380	1,673	2,077	2,219	2,241	2,314	2,121
Israel	1,785	3,985	1,785	2,164	2,206	2,485	2,610	3,350	3,621	3,000
Oman			30	40	45	45	55	60	29	15
Pakistan	1				101	461	526	526	551	564

<sup>a</sup> These figures constitute the total of ESF disbursements, FMS credits, MAP grants, MASF, and IMET. See inset "Types of Compensation" for explanation.

<sup>b</sup> Total amounts less than \$500,000 have been ignored.

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**The Middle East and South Asia**

In this region, the United States has military basing or other access arrangements with the following countries. Those in *italics* are the ones in which we judge that the United States may have difficulty retaining its current level of access during the next five years:

- |                |              |
|----------------|--------------|
| <i>Bahrain</i> | <i>Oman</i>  |
| Egypt          | Pakistan     |
| Israel         | Saudi Arabia |

[Redacted]

For several reasons—nationalism, pan-Arabism, Islamic fundamentalism, sensitivity about the colonial past, US support for Israel, and in some cases ideological differences—most Arab countries have been reluctant to grant the United States significant military access privileges. Nevertheless, in the wake of the Camp David accords, the Iranian revolution, and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, a number of Middle Eastern states have permitted US forces to operate in their territory. Indeed, during the past year US operations in the Persian Gulf have led to unprecedented military cooperation with several of these regimes. Still, US military access in the Middle East remains very modest, compared with that in other parts of the world where US strategic interests are at stake. [Redacted]

The Arab-Israeli dispute and US support to Israel color most US dealings with Arab states. The Arab regimes believe that, in a crisis between Israel and any Arab states, the United States would always back Israel. Furthermore, they object to US Government restrictions on their purchases of US weapons that might threaten Israel. And they fear that a high-profile US presence would stimulate antiregime activities among those who object to US support for Israel. [Redacted]

*The Persian Gulf.* Arab states in the Persian Gulf currently favor a US military presence, both as an immediate check on Iranian adventurism and as insurance against the expansion of Soviet influence over the longer term. But most of them prefer that presence just over the horizon, not in plain view in their own territory; they mean to keep their military relationships with the United States as low-key as possible. [Redacted]

For one thing, ties to the US military can put these governments at odds with the radical Arab governments. In addition, they do not want to be drawn into regional conflicts like the Iran-Iraq war; indeed, most try to stay on reasonable terms with all their neighbors. On the other hand, if Iran, for instance, appeared to present an immediate military threat or stepped up its efforts to foment subversion and rebellion in one or more of the small Gulf states, most of them would probably be willing to grant the United States additional access privileges in order to gain US protection. [Redacted]

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If the Iran-Iraq cease-fire leads to an end to the war, the Arab states of the Persian Gulf may conclude that the threat to their security has lessened. In that event, they are likely to move to reduce US access privileges. However, they have already become at least somewhat acclimated to the idea of having a military relationship with the United States, and they have developed a better understanding of US military access needs. In the future, should they again come to believe that an expanded US military presence would enhance their security, arranging for US access would probably go more smoothly. [Redacted]

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*Egypt.* In contrast with the Persian Gulf, continued US access appears relatively ensured in Egypt, where enormous US aid (exceeded only by US aid to Israel) has facilitated the establishment of a rather congenial bilateral relationship whose military access component is relatively small. We anticipate no challenge to the modest US access to facilities in Egypt so long as Mubarak or a similar successor retains control, major Arab states remain at odds, and a military confrontation with Israel is avoided. [Redacted]

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But the potential for instability arising from Egypt's intractable and worsening social and economic difficulties is a cause for concern, as is the growth of anti-Western sentiment and Islamic fundamentalism among the Egyptian people. Many combinations of potential developments both inside Egypt and elsewhere in the volatile Middle East could result in reduced US access to military facilities in Egypt. [Redacted]

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**Figure 7**  
**US Military Access Abroad: East Asia and the Pacific**

Boundary representation is not necessarily authoritative.



**US Security Assistance to Host Countries <sup>a</sup>**  
**in East Asia and the Pacific**

Million US \$ <sup>b</sup>

	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987
South Korea <sup>c</sup>	277	238	252	262	298	187	232	232	165	2
Philippines	36	32	96	105	102	102	102	182	415	338
Thailand	38	32	50	56	86	98	110	110	93	57

<sup>a</sup> These figures constitute the total of ESF disbursements, FMS credits, MAP grants, MASF, and IMET. See inset "Types of Compensation" for explanation.

<sup>b</sup> Total amounts less than \$500,000 have been ignored.

<sup>c</sup> Seoul now provides substantial financial support for US forces stationed in South Korea.

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### East Asia and the Pacific

In this region, the United States has military basing or other access arrangements with the following countries. Only in the Philippines (shown in *italics*) does it appear that the United States may have difficulty retaining its current level of access during the next five years:

Australia	New Zealand
Japan	Palau
South Korea	<i>Philippines</i>
Marshall Islands	Thailand

Nevertheless, US military access privileges are likely to become increasingly controversial:

- Throughout this region there is a growing perception that US interests are diverging from those of the host countries. The only ones that still largely share the US strategic outlook are Japan and Australia, along with the Marshall Islands, since 1986 an independent country in free association with the United States.
- Some of these governments, fearing that US trade policies may seriously damage their economic interests, will seek to use US military access privileges as bargaining chips to exchange for exemptions or other relief from such policies.
- Antinuclear sentiment is growing in many of these host countries. It is one of the major impediments to achieving a new bases agreement in the Philippines, and it has already led to a US military break with New Zealand.

**The Philippines.** A formal review of the US-Philippines Military Bases Agreement has just been concluded. In return for a substantial increase in US compensation, US forces will retain use of their facilities in the Philippines through September 1991, when the current treaty expires. If US forces are to remain beyond that time, the Philippine Constitution requires that an entirely new treaty be concluded. At this point it is not clear whether an acceptable treaty can be worked out by 1992. A majority of Filipinos—including President Aquino—apparently want the US

bases to stay, for a mixture of pragmatic and historical reasons, but many influential persons and groups oppose the idea.

One of the chief stumblingblocks, again, has been money. Manila had been demanding more than US \$1 billion in aid—much of it in “hard money”—annually for the remaining years of the bases agreement. That would have represented an enormous increase from the average of \$260 million in US aid furnished to Manila annually over the past four years, which itself constituted a hefty jump from the \$180 million per year that had been promised. The Philippine Government held that such a large increase was justified not only because of the value of the Philippine facilities to the United States but also because Manila had long been undercompensated for them.

Under the new arrangement, during each of the final two years of the current bases agreement, the Philippines will receive \$481 million in US economic, military, and development assistance. Moreover, Washington agreed to speed the disbursement of and remove the strings from ESF allocations already in the pipeline, permitting Manila to use some of this money to pay pressing foreign debts. In addition, Manila received a US pledge that Washington would make further efforts beginning next year to help the Philippines reduce its foreign debt burden.

The focus on compensation obscured disagreements over other fundamental issues, most of them bearing on Manila's wish to be treated as a more equal partner, including:

- Whether Manila's legal jurisdiction over US base areas and personnel should be expanded.
- Whether Manila should enjoy a veto over US military activities in the Philippines.
- Whether Manila would continue to permit unhampered operation of US nuclear-capable ships and aircraft in Philippine territory.

Manila reluctantly agreed to defer consideration of most of these issues for the remaining period of the current bases agreement, but its annoyance over what it regards as an inconsiderate and inflexible US attitude clouds the prospects for concluding a satisfactory new treaty.

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**Figure 10**  
**US Military Access Abroad: Africa and Neighboring Islands**

Boundary representation is not necessarily authoritative.



**US Security Assistance to Host Countries <sup>a</sup>**  
**in Africa and Neighboring Islands**

Million US \$ <sup>b</sup>

	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987
Djibouti				2	2	4	5	6	5	3
Kenya	27	10	35	12	44	50	45	47	35	27
Liberia	1	6	8	38	43	45	48	56	34	16
Morocco	44	46	26	34	31	101	77	64	52	56
Senegal						5	12	20	31	15
Seychelles					2	2	2	2	2	2
Somalia			25	20	45	47	68	64	42	25
Zaire	29	10	7	7	11	12	18	19	32	15

<sup>a</sup> These figures constitute the total of ESF disbursements, FMS credits, MAP grants, MASF, and IMET. See inset "Types of Compensation" for explanation.

<sup>b</sup> Total amounts less than \$500,000 have been ignored.

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**Africa and Neighboring Islands**

In this region, the United States has military basing or other access arrangements with the following countries and dependent territories. Those in *italics* are the ones in which it appears that the United States may have difficulty retaining its current level of access during the next five years:

- |                   |                |
|-------------------|----------------|
| Ascension (UK)    | Senegal        |
| Diego Garcia (UK) | Seychelles     |
| Djibouti          | <i>Somalia</i> |
| Kenya             | South Africa   |
| <i>Liberia</i>    | Zaire          |
| Morocco           |                |

[redacted]

African facilities to which US military forces have access serve currently as way stations and potentially as staging areas to the Middle East and regions beyond. Air routes incorporating stops in various of these countries are useful and occasionally vital alternatives to NATO transit routes. [redacted]

Our conclusion that US access is in jeopardy in Liberia and Somalia is based in part on our judgment that one of the chief reasons they grant US forces access is to obtain compensation in the form of US aid, coupled with our concern that, during the next few years, the likely level of such compensation will fail to satisfy one or both of them. [redacted]

An alternative view, held by the Department of the Treasury, Central Intelligence Agency, and the National Security Agency, is that US access is not in jeopardy in any of the African host countries, whether or not they are satisfied with the amount of US compensation. Most of them have additional reasons, such as security concerns, for maintaining a military relationship with the United States, and the US Government has additional leverage besides compensation, such as its influence over policies of the World Bank and International Monetary Fund relating to these countries. [redacted]

Relations between the United States and many African host countries are closely associated with a single powerful leader such as King Hassan in Morocco, President Mobutu in Zaire, and President Siad in Somalia. During the next five years, if any of these men leaves power, US access would be less at some risk and perhaps in great jeopardy, depending on the circumstances of his departure and the nature of his successor. Even pro-Western successors might be overwhelmed by the problems they inherited, which, depending on the country, might include hostile neighbors, intractable insurgencies, poor economic prospects, corruption among elites, mounting fundamentalist forces, seemingly irreconcilable tribal tensions, and the ravages of AIDS. [redacted]

In most of the African host countries, security assistance is the principal US lever to obtain, maintain, or expand access. Considering the small amounts of aid involved, relative to the magnitude of the aid granted to host countries like Turkey, Greece, Portugal, and the Philippines, the African leaders are incredulous and resentful when told their requests are too high. They suspect racism; they believe they are being taken for granted. One factor limiting their options, however, is that the Soviet Union appears disinclined to supplant the United States as a financial benefactor to these countries. [redacted]

Besides Cuba (which has no choice), Seychelles is currently the only country with which both the United States and the Soviet Union have established military access arrangements. This reflects the low ideological component of these arrangements. Like Seychelles, a number of other Third World countries grant access to a superpower for reasons more pragmatic than ideological—in Africa, Somalia and Liberia certainly fall into that category. In coming years, under appropriate circumstances, instead of feeling forced to choose between the superpowers, some of these countries may also decide to accommodate both of them at once. [redacted]

**Figure 11**  
**US Military Access Abroad: Central America and the Caribbean**

Boundary representation is not necessarily authoritative.



**US Security Assistance to Host Countries <sup>a</sup>**  
**in Central America and the Caribbean** Million US \$ <sup>b</sup>

	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987
Antigua and Barbuda						1			2	1
Honduras	3	2	4	9	51	93	117	215	142	193
Panama		1			5	5	13	61	14	3

<sup>a</sup> These figures constitute the total of ESF disbursements, FMS credits, MAP grants, MASF, and IMET. See inset "Types of Compensation" for explanation. <sup>b</sup> Total amounts less than \$500,000 have been ignored.

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### Central America and the Caribbean

In this region, the United States has military basing or other access arrangements with the following countries and dependent territories. Those in *italics* are the ones in which it appears that the United States may have difficulty retaining its current level of access during the next five years:

Antigua	Cuba
<i>The Bahamas</i>	<i>Honduras</i>
Bermuda (UK)	<i>Panama</i>

Since the dismantling after World War II of the extensive system of US military bases in the British West Indies, the northern littoral of South America, and Brazil, US military basing and access arrangements in the Western Hemisphere have been concentrated in Central America and the Caribbean. The most important nodes are the installations of the US Southern Command in Panama, the US Navy base at Guantanamo Bay in Cuba, and the missile and submarine tracking stations and naval air station in Bermuda [redacted]

US military access arrangements appear to be in some jeopardy in Panama, Honduras, and The Bahamas:

- The current confrontation between the US Government and Panamanian strongman Noriega has the potential to evolve in a number of ways that would at minimum make it difficult for the US military forces in Panama to continue the full range and extent of their current activities, particularly since Panama can make a case that some of these activities appear to go beyond those authorized by the Panama Canal treaty.
- Public hostility toward the United States has broken out in the wake of recent developments in *Honduras* including the cutback in US aid to Tegucigalpa, the halt in US military assistance to the Nicaraguan insurgents, and the extralegal extradition of Honduran drug trafficking kingpin Juan Ramon Matta. This may lead Tegucigalpa to try to reduce the profile of US military forces and their operations in Honduras.


- A US court may indict Bahamian Prime Minister Pindling for facilitating operations in *The Bahamas* of members of the Colombian drug-trafficking cartel during the 1970s and early 1980s. He could retaliate by restricting US military activities in his country. [redacted]

Most of the host governments in this region would be reluctant to grant the United States any new or significantly expanded military access privileges during the next few years. Their reasons include nationalist pride, mistrust of the United States, and sensitivity to the inevitable criticism from both home and abroad. Moreover, fragile civilian governments intent on limiting the power and consequent political influence of their countries' armed forces may be concerned that the military aid component of US compensation offered in return for access or basing privileges would complicate their position. [redacted]

On the other hand, many of the same countries would welcome the involvement of US forces in special situations of limited duration or extent, such as joint exercises and training, disaster relief, public health campaigns, construction projects, and counterinsurgency assistance programs. [redacted]

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**Figure 12**  
**Major US Military Facilities**  
**in the Panama Canal Area**



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# Annex

## Soviet Access to Military Facilities in Distant Regions

Compared with the United States, the Soviet Union maintains relatively few military facilities and relatively slim forces in far-distant regions. The USSR has deployed thousands of aircraft, tens of thousands of armored vehicles, and hundreds of thousands of troops abroad, but mostly around its periphery, in the territory of nearby states within range of tactical aircraft based on Soviet soil. The establishment of Soviet arms supply dependencies, the provision of large numbers of Soviet military advisors; and in a few places the use of surrogate forces—chiefly Cuban—do somewhat reduce the impact of the large US-Soviet disparity in access to military facilities overseas.<sup>3</sup> [redacted]

Soviet military theorists have long viewed US power-projection capabilities as central to the US ability to maintain alliances and influence international developments. Apart from the utility of such capabilities in wartime, the Soviets recognize that they can greatly enhance a country's political and economic influence in peacetime. Consequently, beginning in the 1960s, for more than two decades the Soviets gradually improved their military reach and presence in regions far from the Soviet homeland. Most recently such efforts have flagged; the Soviet military presence overseas has actually shrunk the last couple of years.<sup>4</sup> [redacted]

<sup>3</sup> This annex contains a general overview of Soviet military access in distant areas. It does not address Soviet facilities and access in East European members of the Warsaw Pact, nor in other states that border the USSR like Afghanistan, Mongolia, and North Korea. Similarly, in parallel with the approach taken in the Estimate, the annex does not consider the numerous Soviet military advisers and technicians stationed in foreign countries with which the Soviets have no formal military access arrangements. Brief appraisals of individual countries that grant access to Soviet forces appear in the annex to the Research Study published as a companion to the Estimate. [redacted]

<sup>4</sup> Total Soviet out-of-area deployments are down 13 percent since 1985, while deployments of surface combatants, submarines, and mine-warfare ships are down 30 percent. Other aspects of the Soviet military presence abroad—numbers of advisers, technicians, intelligence personnel, and so on—have remained stable. [redacted]

### The Military Mix Overseas

Currently, the permanent Soviet military presence in distant regions comprises a mix of naval and air deployments, ground combat forces, military and security advisers, communications and intelligence collection sites, and military access arrangements. This presence has, among other things, enabled the Soviets to provide advice, training, and physical assistance to allies; to collect intelligence and conduct reconnaissance; to monitor strategic choke points; to evacuate Soviet personnel from threatening environs; and to complicate the warplanning of potential adversaries. [redacted]

In only two countries has the Soviet Union established a significant forward presence on land:

- In *Cuba*, a brigade of nearly 3,000 Soviet troops provides security for several Soviet military facilities, including satellite communications stations and a huge SIGINT site (2,100 personnel).
- In *Vietnam*, the Soviets have established a major base at Cam Ranh Bay, where there appears to be a composite air regiment comprising Tu-142 Bear-F ASW aircraft, Tu-95 Bear-D reconnaissance aircraft, and TU-16 Badger bombers, as well as a unit of MIG-23 Flogger fighters. [redacted]

Soviet intelligence and communications facilities are located in a number of countries besides Cuba, including Angola, Syria, South Yemen, and Vietnam. In addition, a few Soviet military transport aircraft, complete with crews, operate under Soviet control in Angola, Ethiopia, Mozambique, Madagascar, and Vietnam. Approximately 26,000 Soviet and East European military advisors are stationed in countries outside the Warsaw Pact. [redacted]

**Secret*****Permanent Soviet Naval Forces in Distant Waters***

***The Mediterranean Flotilla.*** In 1964, Soviet naval ships began patrolling the Mediterranean continuously, in an effort to track and monitor US naval ships there. Following the Arab-Israeli war of 1967, Soviet acquisition of port and airfield privileges in Egypt led to the establishment of a permanent naval squadron in the Mediterranean. At its largest, during the Arab-Israeli conflict in 1973, this squadron had 96 ships, including 29 major surface combatants and 23 submarines. Currently, the flotilla has 30 to 35 ships, including about six surface combatants, five submarines, and several intelligence collectors. The flotilla has limited access to port facilities in Tartus, Syria, and to small shipyards in Tunisia and Yugoslavia, but this hardly begins to make up for the loss of Soviet access to Egyptian facilities during the 1970s. Consequently, the flotilla now depends mostly on afloat support. [ ]

***The Indian Ocean Squadron.*** In 1968, only eight months after the United Kingdom announced it would abandon its positions east of Suez, the Soviet Navy established a permanent presence in the Indian Ocean. Eventually formalized as a squadron, it has varied greatly in size since then, usually increasing or decreasing in response to concomitant changes in the size of Western naval forces in the region. In the mid-1980s, however, the Soviets did not respond in kind to the US buildup

in the Persian Gulf. At its largest, during the 1977-78 conflict in the Horn of Africa, the squadron numbered 32 ships. Since 1985 the squadron has averaged about 20 ships. No submarines have been deployed to the squadron since late 1986. [ ]

***The West Africa Patrol.*** In 1970, the detention of Soviet fishing vessels by Guinea led to the establishment of a permanent Soviet naval presence off the coast of West Africa. The West Africa Patrol usually includes one or two minor surface combatants, one amphibious unit with naval infantry embarked, two mine-warfare ships, one or two oceanographic research ships, and two or three auxiliaries, and sometimes includes a submarine. [ ]

***The South China Sea Squadron.*** In 1979, in return for political and materiel support to Vietnam, which had just been invaded by China, the Soviets gained nearly exclusive access to the facilities of the former US military base at Cam Ranh Bay. This facilitated the establishment of a permanent naval presence in nearby waters. From 1983 through 1987 the South China Sea Squadron averaged three to five, mostly minor, surface combatants, four submarines, two mine-warfare, and some 15 auxiliaries. In 1987, the squadron averaged two to three minor surface combatants, two submarines, and about 10 auxiliaries. [ ]

The bulk of the Soviet Union's forward-deployed forces consists of naval contingents largely independent of land support. Though some 95 percent of Soviet naval ships are based in the Soviet Union, Moscow maintains a continuous naval presence in four distant regions—in the Mediterranean Sea, in the Atlantic Ocean off the coast of West Africa, in the Indian Ocean, and in the South China Sea. When not on missions, training exercises, or making port calls, these Soviet ships rest at anchor in "floating rear areas." In addition:

- Small numbers of USSR-based naval ships and submarines conduct deployments outside waters contiguous to the Soviet Union.

- Soviet naval reconnaissance or antisubmarine warfare (ASW) aircraft are deployed several times a year to Cuba, Angola, Libya, Syria, and South Yemen, in addition to Vietnam.
- Moscow is making improvements to a section of the Syrian naval base at Tartus as part of an agreement with Syria that will permit the servicing of Soviet naval vessels there.
- Soviet naval ships frequently visit ports in Vietnam, South Yemen, Libya, Ethiopia, and Angola for replenishment and minor repairs. On occasion they also deploy to Cuba.

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- Soviet naval ships from the Mediterranean Flotilla can undergo more extensive repairs at small shipyards in Tivat, Yugoslavia, and Bizerte, Tunisia.

[redacted]

**Limitations of the Overseas Forces.** Although the Soviet Navy has considerably improved its distant-region capabilities since the mid-1960s, its overseas forces are still neither strong enough nor properly configured for sustained combat operations. In particular, the naval ships deployed overseas have very little air defense capability. Only a scattering of naval aircraft are deployed outside Vietnam. These relatively small forces are limited to showing the flag, performing reconnaissance, maintaining a presence in strategic areas and waterways, and supporting local clients where that does not challenge vital Western interests. [redacted]

Moscow probably expects its forces in distant areas to play only a short-lived, secondary role in a global conflict. It is unlikely they would be reinforced. Still, Western military commanders could not afford to ignore these Soviet units, and their neutralization would require the diversion of forces needed elsewhere. [redacted]

#### **Access Arrangements**

By relying on fleet auxiliaries and Soviet merchant ships, Moscow has demonstrated that it is possible to maintain a forward military presence without extensive land-based support. Even for the Soviets, though, military reach is facilitated and extended by having access to foreign facilities that can serve as staging areas, replenish fuel and supplies, or provide even minor maintenance and repair services. Thus, acquiring access to suitable Third World ports and airfields has helped the Soviets increase the length of time ships can be assigned to distant squadrons, expanded the range and coverage of ASW and reconnaissance aircraft, and enhanced long-distance airlift capabilities. [redacted]

Nevertheless, most of the foreign military facilities to which the Soviets currently have access are not sophisticated. They could not repair major battle

damage. Possibly aside from those at Cam Ranh Bay, they do not have sufficient stockpiles of naval munitions, stores, equipment, or fuel to sustain Soviet naval units in a combat environment. Their value in a military confrontation with the West would be further tempered by their vulnerability to attack and the possibility of an adverse host-nation reaction to becoming a target. [redacted]

#### **Outlook**

During the next few years we expect the Soviet attitude toward seeking and maintaining military facilities in distant areas to be cautious and conservative. Gorbachev's foreign policy appears to deemphasize the use of force to settle regional disputes and to minimize Soviet expenditures of hard currency. The Soviets will probably continue to work in a low-key way to improve their access to shore facilities in the Mediterranean, since that would permit them to strengthen and defend the Mediterranean Flotilla, which promotes their interests in this strategically vital region. They will probably not try as hard to acquire significant new access in other parts of the world. [redacted]

Most foreign governments not already allied with either the US or Soviet Governments harbor nationalist or anticolonial sentiments that make them unwilling to grant any other government more than minimal military access. And most foreign leaders appreciate the downside of granting the Soviets more than occasional visitation rights—the certainty of alienating the United States, the probability of earning the disapproval of neighbors and nonaligned states, the likelihood of increased Communist subversion, the possibility of becoming embroiled in a superpower confrontation, and so on. Moreover, while Soviet client states gladly provide military access in return for Moscow's political backing and perhaps military aid, most prospective host countries would prefer economic aid or other forms of assistance that Moscow is less able and less willing to furnish. [redacted]

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Thus, total Soviet access to military facilities overseas is unlikely to grow much if at all during the next few years. We doubt in particular that Moscow will obtain significant new access in any countries where the Soviets are not already deeply involved. Nevertheless, it should be recognized:

- That most past increases in the permanent Soviet presence in distant areas occurred after unanticipated local developments created a vacuum, an opportunity, or a need (from the Soviet perspective) for a Soviet military presence, if for no other reason than to show the flag. There are a number of improbable but not inconceivable scenarios in which the permanent Soviet military presence could grow in one distant region or another.
- That in most countries resistance to granting the Soviets improved access is probably much lower than resistance to granting them bases. Yet, even a relatively modest improvement in access in a country in the right location could greatly improve Soviet military reach in that region.
- That military port, airfield, and defensive facilities being built or already built to Soviet design with Soviet assistance in semiclient states such as Syria and Libya might be made available to Soviet forces during a future crisis or conflict.


Reductions in Soviet military access in distant regions are also possible. In the past, the setbacks that reduced or eliminated Soviet military access in particular countries—Egypt, for example—were usually outgrowths of local developments that had little to do with Soviet wishes, policies, or actions. But the Soviets could also choose to reduce their military presence overseas, perhaps as a means of cutting costs or beefing up defenses of the homeland—or perhaps to put pressure on the United States to reciprocate or to embolden US host countries to restrict or terminate the access they grant to US forces. This was probably the motive behind Gorbachev's recent offer that, if the United States will pull out of its bases in the Philippines, the Soviet Union will abandon its smaller base at Cam Ranh Bay in Vietnam. Actually, Gorbachev probably assumes that Washington will find a way to retain those bases, making his offer moot.

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US and Soviet Military Access Privileges in Foreign Countries, 1988 <sup>a</sup>

<sup>a</sup> Excluding the Soviet presence in Warsaw Pact countries and other countries contiguous to the Soviet Union.

The United States Government has not recognized the incorporation of German, Latin, and Chinese into the Soviet Union. Other boundary representation is not necessarily authoritative.



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