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50-52 EXTRAS/CB

Prospects for Ballistic Missile Proliferation

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National Intelligence Estimate

Key Judgments

*These Key Judgments represent the views
of the Director of Central Intelligence
with the advice and assistance of the
US Intelligence Community.*

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NIE 4-88W
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***The following intelligence organizations participated
in the preparation of these Key Judgments:***

The Central Intelligence Agency

The Defense Intelligence Agency

The National Security Agency

The Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State

also participating:

The Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army

The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy

The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force

The National Foreign Intelligence Board concurs.

***The full text of this National Intelligence Estimate is being published
separately with regular distribution.***

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Key Judgments

By the year 2000, at least 15 developing countries will either have produced or be able to build ballistic missiles that will contribute to regional instability and could threaten the interests of the United States and its allies. These countries are Argentina, Brazil, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Libya, North Korea, Pakistan, South Africa, South Korea, Syria, and Taiwan.



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More difficult to project are purchases or transfers of complete ballistic missile systems.



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Even countries developing their own ballistic missiles will consider the purchases of interim systems as a stopgap measure until they can field their own missiles.



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At least initially, most of these countries will equip their ballistic missiles with conventional warheads. However, we judge that many of these proliferating ballistic missiles could be armed with improved conventional munitions, chemical, or (in the future) biological or nuclear warheads.



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
We judge that eventually [redacted] will deploy nuclear-armed ballistic missiles. Several other countries have advanced nuclear programs and could produce nuclear warheads for ballistic missiles in five to 10 years if a decision to do so were made today.



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All of the ballistic missile programs of these 15 developing countries rely on foreign technology to some degree.



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- South Korea and North Korea manufacture ballistic missiles based on foreign designs, and India has successfully test launched its own ballistic missile. Programs in these countries would not be significantly affected by reduced foreign assistance.

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[redacted]

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- Argentina, Brazil, South Africa, Egypt, Taiwan, Iraq, and Pakistan have relatively advanced industrial and technological infrastructures and could build ballistic missiles within the next 10 years if they can obtain foreign assistance in such key technological areas as guidance and control.
- The other countries (Indonesia, Iran, Libya, and Syria) would require additional and substantial foreign assistance if they were to build their own missiles by the year 2000. [redacted]

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With regard to transfers of complete systems, the Soviet Union has been the principal supplier of short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs). Egypt, Iraq, Libya, South Yemen, Syria, and Vietnam have all received the 300-kilometer-range Soviet Scud B; Syria and North Yemen have also received the more modern but shorter range SS-21. Moscow, however, has refrained thus far from supplying longer range missiles:

- Only China has been willing to export longer range missiles, but we have no indication it is planning to sell the CSS-2 IRBM. [redacted] [redacted] to other countries. However, the Chinese are aggressively marketing their SRBMs.
- The Condor II/Vector SRBM being developed for coproduction by Argentina, Egypt, and Iraq and the Brazilian SS-300 SRBM could be available for purchase in the early-to-middle 1990s. Argentina and Brazil hope to market medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs)—1,000- to 3,000-kilometer range—by the year 2000. [redacted]

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Efforts to stem the flow of ballistic missile technology—such as the 1987 Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) *—may slow the pace of some programs and discourage countries whose missile programs are in very early stages from further development efforts, but they are unlikely to have a major impact on countries determined to build or acquire missiles:

- The MTCR has been unevenly implemented by the participating countries, with the result that some signatories have not controlled suppliers in their own countries.
- Missile and space launch technology is already widespread, much of it obtained from commercial suppliers and open sources.

* The MTCR has seven signatories: the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, West Germany, France, Italy, and Japan. [redacted]

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- Many key components and technologies are multipurpose, making it difficult to prove that they are destined for military end use.
- Developing countries in many cases are pooling their resources, attempting to rectify their technological deficiencies through acquisitions from each other. Most often the technologies were originally acquired from the West. As these countries' technologies develop, these ties are likely to expand.
- The MTCR does not include several key industrialized missile and missile technology suppliers, particularly the Soviet Union, China, Switzerland, and Austria; some of these countries have become havens for firms seeking to evade MTCR restrictions.
- The unwillingness of suppliers to forgo this lucrative trade portends burgeoning growth in the high-technology arms market. [redacted]

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One key shortcoming in virtually all these missiles is accuracy, since technologies associated with guidance and control systems and reentry vehicles are the most complex. Stringent controls imposed on transfers of these technologies would provide one of the few means by which the United States and other MTCR signatories could impede further progress. [redacted]

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China's growing role as a supplier of ballistic missiles will continue to complicate matters. US ability to restrain Chinese missile sales will be limited since Beijing is using arms sales to generate hard currency required to buy Western technology and to pay for the modernization of the People's Liberation Army. Furthermore, arms sales help China achieve political objectives abroad. [redacted]

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While the deployment of conventionally armed missiles in relatively small numbers would not, in most cases, significantly alter the regional military balance, missiles often have a disproportionate impact on the perceptions of both political and military leaders, an important ingredient in the balance itself. Missiles deployed with chemical, biological, or nuclear warheads, however, are likely to have significant military impact. The regions of greatest potential risk will continue to be the Middle East and South Asia. The deployment of ballistic missiles in these regions will pose an additional threat to US interests and will aggravate existing tensions. These weapons, possibly armed with chemical and nuclear warheads, may very well be used in future conflicts. [redacted]

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
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
We can expect that a growing ballistic missile threat will prompt world-wide interest in anti-tactical-ballistic missiles (ATBMs). The Soviet SA-12a could be available for export in small numbers now, although we judge such exports unlikely in the near term. The United States is currently involved in a cooperative development program with the Israelis. While ATBMs are more difficult to develop than ballistic missiles, experience suggests that it will be very difficult to control the spread of ATBM technology.



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As a result of ballistic missile proliferation, US assets abroad, including permanent military bases, military forces temporarily deployed in or transiting an area, and US Government civilian facilities, will be open to a wider range of possible threats:

- During times of crisis, the presence of deployed missiles would raise the stakes militarily and increase pressure on the United States to become engaged.
- US nuclear forces designed to deter a large-scale nuclear war with the Soviet Union may not be an effective deterrent against smaller, less risk-averse nations. These developments will require the United States to address a more varied, potentially nuclear and chemical, threat.



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