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FRIDAY
27 APR 90
W.P.

*Rowland Evans
And Robert Novak*

Democrats Vs. Appeasement

The Bush administration has reversed unseemly hostility to next week's visit by Lithuania's prime minister and now promises a hospitable reception because of three words from President Vytautas Landsbergis and the reaction to them by congressional Democrats.

"This is Munich," said the soft-spoken Landsbergis, comparing President Bush's acceptance of Soviet strangulation of Lithuania to the West's sellout of Czechoslovakia to Hitler in 1938. Farfetched or not, that galvanized the administration into a private pledge to concerned House Democratic leaders. When she asks for it, Prime Minister Kazimiera Prunskiene will be granted a visa "instantly."

Previously, the Lithuanians had been informed Bush wanted no sight of Prunskiene along the Potomac until the superpower summit concludes June 3. President Gorbachev might be offended by her earlier presence. Even more disturbing to the White House, however, is a revolt on the Democratic left, whose support Bush needs for his pro-Gorbachev Baltic policy.

Closest Democratic critics of the president's retreats from one promised defense after another for Lithuania want more than hospitality for the prime minister. They say Bush's policy, a product of the White House rather than the State Department, feeds Moscow's illusion that Bush will offer up ever more concessions to make the Soviet Union safe for Mikhail Gorbachev.

Congressional Democrats are stunned that voters seem to be accepting Bush's appeasement policy. But they attribute it to the administration's success in hiding dirty little facts about what is really going on, both in Lithuania and in Moscow. Until those facts become common knowledge, few Democrats want to attack the 74 percent popular president on his commitment to salvage Gorbachev.

To put the spotlight on one truth, Sen. Robert Byrd (D-W.Va.), as chairman of the Senate Appropriations Committee, quietly pushed through a \$10 million amendment Tuesday to build an American Embassy in Vilnius. Such nose-thumbing at Gorbachev is exactly what Bush does not want and is strongly opposed by Secretary of State James A. Baker III. But congressional debate on the embassy could emphasize the historic U.S. refusal to recognize Lithuania's incorporation into the Soviet Union.

House Democrats are making elaborate plans to give Prime Minister Prunskiene maximum publicity, including an appearance before congressional members of the Helsinki Commission. House Foreign Affairs Chairman Dante Fascell (D-Fla.), a commission member trying to get the truth out, discussed some facts of life in the congressional leaders' meeting with Bush in the Oval Office Tuesday.

Fascell said economic sanctions against Moscow, pondered but rejected by Bush, would do nothing for Lithuania, because Europe would quickly fill the vacuum to make Gorbachev whole. But, the chairman continued, Gorbachev's stranglehold on Lithuania might be loosened by postponing the summit—depriving him of the public relations bonanza he needs before facing the hostile 28th Communist Party Congress. But that reality conflicts with Bush's conviction: since the future of the world depends on Gorbachev's retaining power, nothing must be allowed to hurt him.

Other facts never recited by White House or State Department spokesmen are more emotional. The Lithuanian member of parliament attacked by Soviet troops taking over a printing plant is in critical condition from a severe concussion. He was repeatedly hit by a rifle butt, but voters here have not heard about it from U.S. officials.

In Moscow, the suspected conversion of Gorbachev from perestroika leader to absolute dictator is also ignored by the Bush administration. Under dictatorial powers Gorbachev insisted on writing into the new Soviet constitution, he can declare war all by himself—a power never granted a previous Soviet leader. After anti-Gorbachev reformers took power in the Moscow Soviet (city council) election earlier this year, he countered by issuing a decree giving himself authority to regulate all demonstrations and rallies in the capital—a formidable power.

By covering up unpleasant facts, the Bush administration continues to make U.S. policy hostage to the test of whether it helps Gorbachev survive. Bush's discreet Democratic critics, many of whom helped previous presidents elevate human rights, self-determination and international law as policy yardsticks, think it is time for U.S. self-interest to displace Gorbachev's. With Latvia declaring itself free of Soviet rule on May 3 and Estonia soon to follow, the time has come.

Rowland Evans and Robert Novak

... And a Soviet Food Crisis

MONDAY
23 APR 90
W.P.

While U.S. negotiators wondered whether President Bush would cancel their Soviet trade mission to Paris in response to the Lithuanian crisis, the administration has received private but reliable information that Mikhail Gorbachev faces serious "food riots" this year.

The problem is not bad harvests but unpublicized hoarding from fertile Georgia to the Siberian wheat lands. With the future of the ruble in doubt, farmers are betting the value of their grain will soar. The result is massive refusal by collective farms to deliver grain to the government. Even consumers in Moscow cannot find such essentials as cooking oil. That makes the threat to Gorbachev of food riots no less real than Lithuania.

Even before he received his new information, Bush had linked the food shortage and Lithuania by hinting at postponing talks on the new U.S.-Soviet trade agreement in retaliation

for the Kremlin's blockade of Lithuania. But all signs here are that the president is unclear what to do about the crisis: help out Gorbachev or apply leverage?

U.S. trade negotiators were ordered last week to put on hold their next round of talks with Soviet officials, long scheduled for this week in Paris. "They've got their bags packed, ready to go, but Bush may keep them here," an administration official told us Friday. A delay would cost the Soviets farm credits that Bush has been told Gorbachev desperately needs. Thus, Bush hopes that holding the trade agreement hostage will soften up Gorbachev on Lithuanian independence.

In fact, Gorbachev may have no need for foreign credits to buy grain. "He's got all the credit he needs," confided an unofficial presidential adviser, whose views on the Soviet Union are highly respected by Bush.

"The Germans are seeing to that, and if you don't believe me, just ask the Bundesbank. Every mark in sight is available to Gorbachev."

Soviet food riots are viewed in soon-to-be-reunified Germany as a threat far worse than anything Gorbachev might do to Lithuania. Indeed, the demand for independence by the Baltic states, Georgia, Moldavia, Armenia or any other Soviet republic is regarded in Germany and most of Europe as a threat to the continent's East-West conciliation. Selling out democracy in the Baltics for a piece of the economic action in Gorbachev's Soviet Union comes naturally to many Western Europeans.

That suggests Bush overvalues the effectiveness of his threat to hold up the new trade pact—and not just because of credits from Germany. U.S. officials confirm New York Times columnist William Safire's report that when Continental Grain refused to sell more grain to Moscow because of delays in paying off old loans, Tokyo stepped in. The Japanese bought the grain with cold cash and handed it over to Moscow for a promissory note.

The Soviet problem looks less like a credit crunch than bureaucratic chaos, with Soviet ports clogged and the decaying rail system choked. Before Gorbachev and perestroika, farm collectives that harvested grain over their quota had to deliver it to the state to meet the deficit of collectives that fell short. That kept a level flow of supply.

Gorbachev changed the system, allowing some surplus production to be held in reserve. But he seriously underestimated the political effect of his proposed economic reforms: farmers correctly began to see the ruble as a currency losing real value every day and their grains as a commodity gaining value every day.

Recent Soviet harvests have been good, but the private report to the White House shows what has happened. Some 30 million tons of grain, out of a total annual production of 200 million, are being hoarded beyond the central government's reach. Since foreign purchases are not going to solve the problem because of the clogged transportation system, Soviet authorities fearfully anticipate demonstrations and riots, not against collectives or private-lot farmers but against the government itself.

"They are desperately putting out the fires," one well-informed eyewitness told us of the Soviet efforts to satisfy shortages flaring up in one area after another. But overall, the situation worsens daily.

Wholly unable to decide how tough to get with Gorbachev over Lithuania, the president soon may have to answer a harder question: whether the United States should help stave off food riots by airlifting tons of foods to Soviet cities most in need, while his Soviet partner tightens the wall around Lithuania.

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Date 13 APR 90

Rowland Evans and Robert Novak

Soviet Military Alarm

Instead of expected cooperation, last week's U.S.-Soviet sessions revealed disorientation among members of Mikhail Gorbachev's team, which Bush officials blamed on the Soviet military's rising political influence.

Several U.S. officials said privately that is why the Soviet arms control chief, Victor P. Karpov, actually absented himself from key sessions on strategic arms. They infer that Karpov fears being accused by the military of submitting to U.S. demands.

The performance by Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze's top aides alarmed their U.S. counterparts, though they do not acknowledge it publicly. One source called the Soviet toughening "a sign of the turmoil" roiling Moscow as perestroika fails and Gorbachev cannot resolve the nationalities issue. The result is a military demand for a greater share of power.

Soviet retreats last week from concessions Secretary of State James A. Baker III thought he had won in Moscow two months ago are dwarfed by the Kremlin's new power relationship exhibited here. Along with political reformers and the KGB, the military has been Gorbachev's indispensable ally in his high-wire act the past two years. Newly politicized generals determined to make the Soviet president pay more for their help could change the face of a landscape that becomes more shrouded every day.

Bush administration officials privately provided us the following account of what went on in Washington. Except for one or possibly two bargaining sessions in Washington, veteran arms specialist Karpov remained out of sight in the Madison Hotel. He made his cameo appearance only when cover of a sort was provided by the presence of a powerful member of the Soviet General Staff: General-Major of Aviation Aleksandr Peresyplkin.

With Peresyplkin monitoring the give-and-take with the Americans, neither Karpov nor any of Shevardnadze's other arms-control officials needed to worry that they would be accused of selling out

the interests of the Soviet military. The general set the pace and tone of the talks.

Nevertheless, Karpov was subjected to severe criticism in front of the Americans at the hands of retired Marshal Sergei Akhromeyev, who used to head the General Staff but has lost influence inside the military. He is now a Gorbachev adviser and party Central Committee member. Even Akhromeyev is concerned about getting crosswise with his old comrades. Thus, his dispute with Karpov may have been dictated by a desire to show his successors on the General Staff that, though he is no longer one of them, his fidelity is beyond question.

When the Soviet defense minister, Gen. Dmitri Yazov, visited Defense Secretary Dick Cheney last fall, he complained bitterly that Baltic independence had emerged from perestroika. He reacted "violently" when asked about Baltic demands to limit military service to home duty in the republics.

Yazov also made clear that the military's bitterness goes far beyond the Baltics. He blamed the invasion of Afghanistan, which the military opposed, for an eightfold increase in draft-dodging and army desertions. He resented orders from political commissars to demobilize Soviet soldiers, mainly in Warsaw Pact nations, to go home and live with their families because there were no jobs to be had. Most of all, the defense minister was upset by Gorbachev's concessions leading to a pro-Western reunified Germany.

President Bush's decision last month not to rile the military, Russian chauvinists and Stalinists on the issue of Baltic independence was supposed to help Gorbachev protect his flank at home. What happened here last week strongly suggests that this policy has failed and, further, that it is folly to assume the military or hard-liners can be appeased at the cost of Lithuanian independence.

The lesson of the week may go further than that. The more Bush plays coy on Baltic independence, the more it may cost him in the end.

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Rowland Evans and Robert Novak

Desk Officer Bush

Date 4 APR 90

George Bush is personally micromanaging the worst U.S.-Soviet crisis since Mikhail Gorbachev took over, imposing his own judgment about Lithuania on working-level State Department diplomats and nearly eliminating the Pentagon's strategic input.

Described by one sympathetic, pro-Bush insider as "his own Baltic desk officer," the president is said by officials to be using Brent Scowcroft more as personal aide than national security adviser. Gen. Scowcroft, a product of military discipline, often relays Bush's decisions to State without submitting them to tightly-housed strategic analysis—or, indeed, any analysis at all.

Bush's refusal to utter a word in public that might undermine President Gorbachev at home is similar to his self-defeating handling of China after Tiananmen Square. Retreat from principle has not improved China. That raises the prospect that Bush's reading of Gorbachev is as flawed as his reading of China. But the president alone decides.

That Bush is a self-confident, hands-on president who wants to grade policy himself is beyond criticism. His judgment that the professionals can be and often are very wrong comes from more than 20 years in key government posts. But carried to excess, that mind-set is disruptive. It is not easy to revise or even fine-tune policy when the president views himself as the desk officer.

That explains silence from the Pentagon. Defense Secretary Dick Cheney's souped-up policy-planning outfit is no player in the Lithuania crisis, even though

the outcome of Gorbachev's tough demands in the Baltics could very much affect U.S. arms policies.

Similarly, awaiting the arrival yesterday of Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze, the Commerce Department had no clear policy guidelines for the simple reason that none had been discussed. Strategy on Soviet high-tech requests for fiber optics and digital switches has not been thrashed out since Lithuanian independence. Bush had not revealed his policy before Shevardnadze's arrival.

The president's conviction that he knows more than anybody else in his administration about how to play great-power politics is also at the root of his decision to dismantle the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board. Though it has not yet been announced, he is in the process of limiting its scope. With former senator John Tower becoming chairman, PFIAB will no longer roam over the strategic landscape but pretty much be restricted to scientific intelligence questions.

Starting in the last few Reagan years, an administration adviser told us, "PFIAB became involved in post-Cold War strategy, particularly in Afghanistan and Eastern Europe, and in questioning Soviet objectives on START [strategic arms treaty]. That gets under Bush's skin. He thinks he knows more than they do."

Working-level diplomats at the State Department are troubled by this concentration of policy-making inside the Oval Office, but that does not apply to Secretary of State James A. Baker III. Baker gets to know Bush's mind as soon as Scowcroft does and, after that, closes off lobbying from his foreign service officers, no matter how much they disagree.

Such smothering of ideas in the Lithuania crisis was behind Baker's unreported rejection of strong urgings by working diplomats for a Bush letter to Gorbachev a week before one was actually sent. They wanted to lay down a red-letter marker limiting Soviet intimidation of Lithuania. If Moscow went beyond that, the United States would retaliate—perhaps by withholding economic aid and trade assistance, delaying arms talks or even postponing the June superpower summit that is a must on Gorbachev's domestic political agenda.

Baker, aware of Bush's refusal to offend Gorbachev with what might be seen in the Kremlin as pressure tactics, killed the idea cold. But after Soviet troops manhandled Lithuanian boys who will not serve in the Soviet army, Bush and Baker changed their minds. The president sent Gorbachev a letter described by a key diplomat as "reasonably tough," but it arrived unreasonably late with no viable impact on the Soviet decision to strangle Lithuania's independence.

The sweep of Bush's personal policy-making embarrassed Estonian independence leader Tunne Kellem, due here Friday. Without any strategic analysis, National Security Council officials refused even to discuss with Kellem's representatives the possibility of an NSC meeting with him. When the desk officer for such matters sits in the Oval Office, what is there to discuss?

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Rowland Evans and Robert Novak

... A Hunting License for Gorbachev

President Bush's effort to sell Mikhail Gorbachev on Baltic independence with nothing more than sweet talk and body English may be teaching the Soviet leader that military force can work.

If so, that not only ensures failure of Bush's professed advocacy for Lithuanian independence but stockpiles adversity for the future. White House spokesman Marlin Fitzwater's refusal to use the word "force" to describe Soviet soldiers breaking doors in Lithuanian hospitals to kidnap military "deserters" may give Gorbachev all the running room he needs to block independence for years.

That would taint U.S. values, crippling both the human rights and the self-determination of a people whose claim that they were unlawfully absorbed by the Soviet Union has been affirmed by every U.S. administration since 1940. Bush's restraint may lead him into a cul de sac, giving the Soviet president new leverage and making it far more difficult to switch to a serious independence strategy.

Gorbachev managed to avoid personal blame for the bloody military force used by Soviet troops in the Georgian capital of Tbilisi last April 9. The culprit named in the Soviet press (but never completely accepted by the Soviet establishment) for sending in soldiers with sharpened shovels was Communist hard-liner Yegor Ligachev.

This time, however, Gorbachev cannot escape responsibility for authorizing what any rational person would call "force": Soviet soldiers spilling blood and bashing heads as they dragged two

dozen Lithuanian deserters off to prison or maybe Siberia.

When the Western powers, led by the United States, failed to denounce this as the act of force it was, Gorbachev could assume he was operating well within the good-conduct guidelines privately laid down by Bush and Secretary of State James A. Baker III. Whatever confidential warnings Bush and Baker may have whispered to Gorbachev and Foreign

Any clash can be the lighted match in an explosive mix.

Minister Eduard Shevardnadze, the Soviet leaders got two clear signals from Washington's failure to issue a public protest this week.

The first signal is that the United States can tolerate "not only talks but tanks," as described by The Post in its lead editorial on Wednesday. That imposes "a spectrum of immense pressures for which Lithuania has no match," the newspaper added.

Worse for the courageous Lithuanian leaders, who must now be aware that they too just might end up in Siberia, is the second signal from the White House. By not screaming, the United States in effect informed Gorbachev that he can take as much time as he wants to strangle independence in its crib.

He can let Lithuania's breakaway effort fester for months, without resorting

to tanks and guns. He can contrive an infinite number of ways to provoke Lithuanians of Russian background into confrontations with ethnic Lithuanians. Any such clash can be the lighted match in an explosive mix. That ensures Moscow's control of the political battlefield, not only in Lithuania but in Estonia and Latvia, both of which will soon be declaring their own independence.

In Congress, admirers of George Bush had wanted him to spell out a tough policy if Gorbachev resorted to force. "We should rattle their cage and make them know they will pay a price" in economic deals or arms control treaties, Sen. David Boren (D-Okla.), chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee, told us. This week's silence killed any such policy.

State Department officials, defending kid-glove handling of Gorbachev's truculence, have said Baker specifically suggested to Shevardnadze last fall that Gorbachev might find it easier to yield on independence if a Lithuanian referendum proved strong support for independence. But the secretary has not pressed that wise proposal publicly, presumably for fear of antagonizing Gorbachev. However, it could become a tool for negotiations.

But now that Gorbachev has been given a hunting license by his fellow superpower, he may use it in ways Bush and Baker never intended. The longer he is free to make his own rules about his newly discovered democracy and freedom, the harder it will be to stop him.

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BY ROWLAND EVANS AND ROBERT NOVAK

EXCERPTED

WHAT really steamed Defense Secretary Dick Cheney about CIA Director William Webster's bland testimony on Capitol Hill ruling out any Soviet strategic switch to a military buildup if Mikhail Gorbachev is replaced — or possibly even on orders from Gorbachev himself — was the CIA's failure to send Webster's statements

to Cheney for his comments ahead of time.

A key Pentagon official said privately that although the CIA claims to have made Webster's all-is-well testimony available to both Defense and State, it never got close to the secretary's desk.

Yet the thrust of Webster's words was to make Cheney's job of selling the defense bill to Congress all but impossible.

To the State Department, Webster was saying what the diplomats wanted to hear.

But although Cheney and his aides are not betting on any sudden Soviet arms surge, they deeply believe that every time the United States tries to guess the future of Soviet policy big mistakes are made.

If President Bush has to err, Cheney wants it to be on the side of caution.

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Rowland Evans and Robert Novak

Gorbachev's Procrastination

Date 26 JAN 90

For two years Mikhail Gorbachev ignored advice that he order the Soviet army to quell ethnic warfare in the Transcaucasus, a delay suggesting that procrastination under pressure is a possibly crippling weakness in the Soviet leader's worst time of adversity.

The 1988 advice to move swiftly against ethnic disorder came from several key advisers, including Alexander Yakovlev, at the first hint of trouble in Nagorno-Karabakh. That is the Armenian enclave surrounded by Azerbaijan. When Gorbachev protested that sending the army would raise "a lot of new problems," he was told that "you are going to have all those new problems anyway."

The Soviet leader chose to wait and hope the problem would go away, a choice that has now proved to be disastrous. It has converted what might well have been a brief, perhaps bloodless, 1988 intervention into serious 1990 warfare. It has posed new questions as to whether he has the political skill

and subtlety to solve the more difficult and far more dangerous problem of Baltic independence.

Procrastination is a curious charge against the Soviet reformer who was praised as "a man with iron teeth" by stony-faced Andrei Gromyko when he led the phalanx backing Gorbachev for Communist Party leader in 1985. One Soviet said: "Postponing confrontations is Gorbachev's tactic only when drastic action is required. Moving our troops to the Transcaucasus with orders to shoot was a drastic action."

In dawdling over what he led the world to believe would be free-market economic reforms, once considered the heart of perestroika, Gorbachev suddenly came up far short of expectations. That infuriated his most reform-minded followers. Just as other anti-Gorbachev factions—Great Russian chauvinists who want a crackdown in the Baltics and hard-line Stalinists who ~~lose the glasnost~~—are committed to replacing him with one of their own, so is Gorbachev under fire from vanguard reformers who accuse him

of lacking conviction and follow-through in his promise to revolutionize the Soviet command economy.

The question here is not whether Gorbachev lacks the ruthlessness to carry out his policies. But Bush administration officials say that in trying to polish up his credentials for the United States and other industrialized democracies, he feared that using force would cost him essential economic help.

Thus, when he belatedly intervened in the Transcaucasus, he tried at first to get away with using army reserves, perhaps to impress on the White House that this was like sending the National Guard to Little Rock. But judging from the plethora of official U.S. statements here trumpeting that the United States understands and approves Gorbachev's use of force to maintain law and order, he had little to worry about from the White House. He got carte blanche, so much so that he may think he can use force whenever he wants.

With the army dispatched to smash the rebellion, Gorbachev shows no hint of worry about bloodshed.

Advising him on how to crack down is Vladimir Kryuchov, a key KGB agent in Budapest during the Soviet suppression of the Hungarian uprising in 1956 and the man Gorbachev picked to head the KGB. "In putting down rebellions," a Bush administration official told us, "Kryuchov is an expert."

In the Baltics, procrastination may be less an answer to Gorbachev's fluctuating policy than retreat under pressure from courageous Baltic patriots demanding a return of their political freedom. But the Baltic independence movement has now been irretrievably affected by civil war in Azerbaijan, though official opinions differ in what way.

One school believes that the overwhelming military force killing Azeris is sending an unmistakable signal to the Baltics: Watch it, or you will get the same. More probable is the opposite: Gorbachev's preoccupation with the Transcaucasus crisis he failed to stop on time gives Baltic leaders more latitude to move faster on independence.

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Rowland Evans and Robert Novak
**Right-Wing Anger
 at Gorbachev**

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Date 23 JAN 90

There has been whispering in the Bush administration by some officials, including Secretary of State James A. Baker III, about the possible removal of Mikhail Gorbachev by right-wing Russian chauvinists. It stems from a dramatic moment during a secret meeting held Jan. 11 in Estonia's capital of Tallinn.

Not one ethnic Estonian was present at this meeting of Russians who live in the Baltic state, enjoying special privileges not available to the native people. They were in an ugly mood, outraged by the unexpected equivocation on Baltic independence displayed by Gorbachev, then visiting neighboring Lithuania.

Yevgeny Kogan, a Russian chauvinist and longtime resident of Tallinn, was presiding. He was asked from the floor whether Chairman Gorbachev should not be "removed" from power because he is "an agent of the CIA." Kogan, a bitter foe of independence

as Estonia's leading supporter of Moscow, did not give the reply. It came from the crowded floor: a spontaneous eruption of applause that flooded the hall for a full minute.

Shocked by the question and the reaction, Kogan replied that only "a court of law" could decide a matter of treason. There was not a word of rebuttal or any defense of Gorbachev.

From Armenia and Azerbaijan to the Baltic states, Russian nationalists who oppose secession from the Soviet Union and were shocked by the loss of Eastern Europe are creating a political earthquake that could topple Gorbachev. "They think he squandered the Eastern Europe buffer states," says a Bush adviser. "They put the cost of those states at 20 million Russian lives in World War II, and they don't like it."

Baker and President Bush are spending anxious hours as they contemplate whether Gorbachev can con-

tinue to exert enough real power to make and enforce tough decisions for perestroika until, as they hope, the flow changes and starts running in his favor. But optimism is fading. The prevailing reaction here is that Gorbachev suffered serious reversals with his flawed trip to Lithuania and his belated, unsuccessful attempt to end bloody ethnic warfare between Armenians and Azeris.

Gorbachev is the first Soviet leader since Lenin who never served in a Soviet republic peopled by ethnic non-Slavs. As a result, claim critics, he never has fully understood the hatred against Russians not only in Moldavia and the three Baltic states annexed in the Hitler-Stalin Pact of 1939 but also in the Ukraine, Georgia and the Transcaucasian states of Armenia and Azerbaijan.

But Gorbachev also is said to lack appreciation of the virulence of Great Russian chauvinism. Ethnic Russians look down on non-Russian Soviet citizens, regarding them as an inferior breed.

It was against this background that Gorbachev performed his stunning reversal on Baltic independence. When he announced Dec. 26 his intention to visit Lithuania, he assailed demands there for an independent Communist Party and an independent country. In telling an emergency meeting of the Soviet Central Committee that "the current party and state leadership will not permit the breakup of the federal state," he tossed around such incendiary concepts as "secession," "illegitimacy" and "disintegration of the Soviet Union."

What antagonized the Russian chauvinists in Estonia and elsewhere was his apparent retreat three weeks later on the scene in Lithuania. He promised to "accelerate the drafting and passing of a law [for] the with-

drawal of a constituent republic from the Soviet Union and for its self-determination. . . . I promise it will be developed".

To the Great Russians, that looked like the beginning of the end of permanent union. In the vicious cycle of violence between the Armenians and the Azeris that broke out almost two years ago, Russian nationalists favored immediate, heavy military intervention, using whatever force was needed to quell the disturbances. Gorbachev deferred action, sending troops to the Transcaucasus only last week.

Of all the threats Mikhail Gorbachev now faces, possible attack from outraged Russian patriots is becoming the most dangerous. The danger will heighten as pressure for the dissolution of the Soviet Union grows more intense.

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D.C. fears Russian nationalists might target Gorby for assassination

BY ROWLAND EVANS
AND ROBERT NOVAK

WHISPERED backstage talk in the Bush administration by officials up to and including Secretary of State James A. Baker about the possible assassination of Mikhail Gorbachev at the hands of right-wing Russian chauvinists is made understandable by a dramatic moment during a secret meeting held Jan. 11 in Estonia's capital, Tallinn.

Not one ethnic Estonian was present at this meeting of Russians who live in the Baltic state, enjoying special privileges not available to the native stock.

They were in an ugly mood, outraged by the unexpected equivocation on Baltic independence displayed by Mikhail Gorbachev, then visiting neighboring Lithuania.

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But optimism is fading. The prevailing reaction in Washington is that Gorbachev suffered serious reversals with his flawed trip to Lithuania and his belated, unsuccessful attempt to end bloody ethnic warfare between Armenians and Azers.

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What antagonized the Russian chauvinists in Estonia and elsewhere was his

apparent retreat three weeks later on the scene in Lithuania.

He promised to "accelerate the drafting and passing of a law [for] the withdrawal of a constituent republic from the Soviet Union and for its self-determination . . . I promise it will be developed."

To the Great Russians, that looked like the beginning of the end of permanent union.

In the vicious cycle of violence between the Armenians and the Azers that broke out almost two years ago, Russian nationalists favored immediate, heavy military intervention, using whatever force was needed to quell the disturbances. Gorbachev deferred action, sending troops to the Transcaucasus only last week.

Of all the threats Mikhail Gorbachev now faces, possible attack from the outraged Russian patriots is becoming the most dangerous. The danger will heighten as pressure for the dissolution of the Soviet Union grows more intense.

The Washington Post _____
The New York Times _____
The Washington Times _____
The Wall Street Journal _____
The Christian Science Monitor _____
New York Daily News _____
USA Today _____
The Chicago Tribune _____
N.Y. Post P-17
Date 22 Jan '90

NEW YORK TIMES
2 MAY 1990

GORBACHEV JEERED AT MAY DAY RALLY

Kremlin's Leaders Astounded as Protesters Shake Fists

By **BILL KELLER**

Special to The New York Times

MOSCOW, May 1 — President Mikhail S. Gorbachev and the Kremlin leadership were jeered today by throngs of protesters who were allowed to march through Red Square at the end of the annual May Day parade.

The Soviet leaders watched in evident amazement from the top of Lenin's mausoleum as a shouting, fist-shaking column milled underneath waving banners that condemned the Communist Party and the K.G.B., and supported Lithuania's declaration of independence.

Chants of "Resign!" and "Shame!" were largely drowned out by the blare of parade music, but foreign visitors who watched from the reviewing stand said they could clearly hear the shriek of hoots and whistles that rose up from the cobblestoned square as Mr. Gorbachev led the others off the mausoleum after enduring 25 minutes of protest.

It was the first time the May Day demonstration, traditionally an orchestrated show of worker solidarity, had been opened to unofficial organizations, and several of the Kremlin officials seemed startled at the vehemence of the angry display.

The countries of Eastern Europe marked the first May Day since they emerged from Communist rule without public parades and speeches, concentrating largely on private pursuits like picnics and shopping.

In Moscow, the tone of the hourlong official demonstration that opened the parade was almost as striking as the unofficial protest.

Organized by Moscow trade unions, it became a show of blue-collar concern about the threats to their security that might come with a market economy.

The banners and speeches warned against unemployment, private property and unregulated prices, and one placard called for the removal of Prime Minister Nikolai I. Ryzhkov for failing to lift the country out of its economic misery.

The Government trade unions, trying to halt a sharp decline in their credibility, have recently staked out a position opposing economic changes that might disrupt the traditional security of Soviet workers.

Mr. Gorbachev's economic advisers say the threat of a worker uprising is

the main reason they have pulled back from a "shock-therapy" transition to a market economy.

Several Soviet cities, including the capitals of the Baltic republics and the Caucasus republics of Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan, canceled their May Day festivities altogether as a holdover from a discredited past. In Kiev, the Ukrainian capital, the usual worker brigades were joined by demonstrators protesting Government handling of the Chernobyl nuclear accident in 1986.

Moscow Communist Party officials announced last week that the annual parade would be thrown open to all comers as a sign of increased pluralism. Officials may also have feared a repetition of last November's revolution day, when the official march was upstaged by a huge counterprotest at a soccer stadium.

In another gesture to the new realities of politics in the capital, the insurgent chairman of the Moscow City Council, Gavriil K. Popov, a free-market economist, joined Government and Communist Party leaders atop the mausoleum today.

Shocking to Hierarchy

The unofficial section of the parade was organized by the Moscow Voters Association, which was instrumental in the takeover of the city government by Mr. Popov and other candidates eager to hasten to demise of the Communist monopoly.

As the crowds of factory workers organized by the unions emptied Red Square, they were abruptly replaced by a scene that has become familiar at protest rallies in the city but must have seemed shocking to the assembled Kremlin hierarchy.

The columns included Hare Krishnas and anarcho-syndicalists, social democrats and anti-Stalinists, and at the front a monk from the Russian Orthodox monastery at Zagorsk who held up a nearly life-sized rendition of Christ on the cross and called out to Mr. Gorbachev, "Mikhail Sergeyevich, Christ is risen!"

"Down with the red fascist empire!" said one placard that bobbed conspicuously before the marble mausoleum where the leadership stood. "Down with the cult of Lenin!" read another, its letters painted to simulate bloodstains.

The Flags of Lithuania

One group of marchers waved the red, green and yellow flags of Lithuania and held up signs saying, "Gorbachev: hands off Lithuania," and "the blockade of Lithuania is the shame of the President."

They got an appreciative roar from other unofficial protesters as they entered Red Square and took up a position directly in front of the leadership.

The Kremlin has embargoed fuel and other products to Lithuania and demanded that the republic back down from its declaration of independence, made March 11.

"Lithuania is a bellwether of what is happening in our society," said Aleksandr Guryanov, a Russian physicist, who paraded with a homemade pro-Lithuania placard fixed to a hockey stick. "Their freedom is our freedom."

Broadcast Is Cut Off

Television viewers watching the live coverage of the parade were given only fleeting glimpses of the protest placards, and the broadcast, which normally runs until the parade is finished, was cut off about 15 minutes into the unofficial portion.

Security was unusually tight around the official reviewing stand, but the police made no noticeable attempt to restrict access to the square. Several foreign correspondents and a few Western tourists crossed the square with the flood of marchers.

Atop the mausoleum, Marshal Dmitri T. Yazov, the Defense Minister, glared grimly. Mr. Gorbachev alternately bantered with colleagues and stared out over the heads of the crowd. After the unofficial marchers strode into view, he seemed to make a point of chatting with Mr. Popov.

WASHINGTON POST
2 MAY 90

Protesters Jeer Kremlin Leaders In May Day March

By David Remnick
Washington Post Foreign Service

MOSCOW, May 1—Waving their fists and jeering the Kremlin leadership, tens of thousands of Muscovites today transformed the traditional May Day celebration of "socialist labor" on Red Square into a caustic rebuke of Communist power.

Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev seemed transfixed at times as the parade, once a tightly controlled ritual of hollow hurrahs, suddenly became a boisterous demonstration of popular anger and protest. Some demonstrators carried Lithuanian and Czarist-era Russian flags, and a few even displayed Soviet flags with the hammer and sickle torn out.

As Gorbachev and the rest of the leadership watched from a reviewing stand atop the Lenin Mausoleum, the demonstrators hoisted placards expressing disdain for Kremlin policy and ideology.

"The Blockade of Lithuania Is the President's Shame!" "Socialism? No Thanks!" "Communists: Have No Illusions. You Are Bankrupt." "Marxism-Leninism Is on the Rubbish Heap of History." "Down With the Politburo! Resign!"

It was a stunning drama played out on the cobblestones of Red Square—the Soviet Union's most resonant political stage. As Kremlin loudspeakers boomed out government slogans and marching music, the demonstrators shouted their discontent for the first time to Gorbachev's face. A bearded Russian Orthodox priest in the parade carried a seven-foot-high crucifix and shouted, "Mikhail Sergeyevich, Christ Has Risen!"

For the first time, the Kremlin made participation in the May Day demonstration open and voluntary this year, allowing unofficial groups and parties to join the parade. Moscow's new mayor, radical economist

Gavril Popov, stood alongside the Kremlin leaders on the mausoleum.

The transition from orchestrated enthusiasm to genuine political feeling provided the most startling public evidence yet that Gorbachev's popularity, especially among urban intellectuals and young people, has plunged and that the Communist Party is rapidly losing ground to disparate movements and competing political parties.

"Ceausescus of the Politburo: Out of Your Armchairs and Onto the Prison Floors!" the placards read. "Gorbachev Is the Chief Patron of the Mafia!" "Let the Communist Party Live at Chernobyl!" "Down With Empire and Red Fascism!" "Down With the Cult of Lenin!"

In earlier times, the May Day crowds were compelled to carry giant portraits of the Communist Politburo leaders. Today, the two portraits most in evidence were those of the late human-rights campaigner Andrei Sakharov and maverick politician Boris Yeltsin.

Gorbachev, the politician who set all these forces around him in motion, watched the spectacle for about 25 minutes and then headed down the mausoleum steps and into the Kremlin. The rest of the leadership, as well as guests from labor unions and the Moscow city council, quickly followed Gorbachev's lead. But the demonstration continued.

"We were all stunned. It's as if Gorbachev decided to turn his back on the voices of the people," said one marcher, Alexander Afanasyev, a leader of the new students' Social Democratic movement. "The leadership may try to dismiss what happened here today as just some extremists blowing off a little steam, but it runs deeper. Gorbachev has done a lot of good, but when it

comes to us, the radicals, he turns away from his natural allies."

Soviet television gave extensive coverage to the first hour of the parade, which was dominated by trade unions and workers carrying far more conservative banners, including "Down With Private Property." But once the wave of radicals began, the broadcast was halted abruptly.

When the parade finally ended, two veterans of World War II in their seventies, their chests ablaze with rows of medals and ribbons, stopped at a vending machine near the Lenin Museum to buy glasses of mineral water. They were disgusted with the morning's spectacle, depressed at what modern times had brought.

"As far as I'm concerned, it was just organized slander, an insult to the Communist Party and everything we've ever stood for," said Nikolai Alexeyev. "It shows Gorbachev has no control."

"They just spit on us," said Vassily Estratov. "They spit on the party, the army."

In other Soviet cities, the atmosphere was at least as charged as in Moscow. In Lvov, the center of the Ukrainian independence movement, demonstrators carried icons of the Virgin Mary and signs saying, "USSR: The Prison House of Nations." They cheered former political prisoner Vyacheslav Chornovil, who is now the mayor of Lvov. Crowds in the Moldavian capital, Kishinev, carried Romanian, not Soviet, flags.

In Leningrad, where Soviet state founder Lenin began the Bolshevik Revolution in 1917, city authorities canceled the May Day parade, but independent political groups staged an unofficial rally.

There were unsanctioned May Day rallies in many Soviet cities last year, but what made this year's events so significant, in Moscow especially, was that marginal protests once barely tolerated had taken center stage. The demonstrators from Pushkin Square and Luzhniki Stadium had suddenly turned up at the Kremlin.

The political diversity of the protesting groups was extraordinary: Anarcho-Syndicalists, Constitutional Democrats, Social Democrats, Christian Democrats, Democratic Platform, Democratic Union and many others. Afterward, young activists distributed dozens of independent newspapers and magazines, some of them printed on hand-cranked mimeograph machines. Some featured lampoons and cartoons of Kremlin politicians.

Lithuanian Leader, on 'Private' Visit, to Meet Bush

By ANDREW ROSENTHAL

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, May 1 — President Bush will meet with the Lithuanian Prime Minister on Thursday, the White House announced today. It will be the first time that an American President has met with a leader of the Baltic republic since it was forcibly annexed by the Soviet Union in 1940.

By the Administration's account, the meeting with Prime Minister Kazimiera Prunskiene will also be the first direct contact between Mr. Bush and any Lithuanian official since Lithuania declared independence from Moscow on March 11.

The White House, clearly aware of the diplomatic conundrum posed by the meeting, went out of its way today to portray Mrs. Prunskiene's visit to Washington and the White House talks as a private affair that did not signal a change in United States policy on Lithuania.

Bush Decision Criticized

The announcement of the planned meeting came as Congress sharpened its criticism of Mr. Bush's decision last week not to retaliate for the Kremlin's economic sanctions against Lithuania.

Secretary of State James A. Baker 3d became embroiled in a testy exchange with several prominent Senators during a committee hearing, and the full Senate voted 73 to 24 for a non-binding resolution urging Mr. Bush not to submit legislation to increase trade with the Soviet Union unless Moscow lifts its trade sanctions and begins negotiating with the republic's elected leaders.

Trying to walk a thin line between refusal to recognize the incorporation of Lithuania into the Soviet Union and support for President Mikhail S. Gorbachev, the Bush Administration has not recognized the current government of Lithuania as the government of an independent nation.

The White House has avoided direct contacts with Lithuanian officials during the crisis; Mr. Bush has not even responded to a letter from President Vytautas Landsbergis.

Mrs. Prunskiene has been quoted in news reports from Vilnius as saying that she was initially denied permission to visit Washington before the summit meeting between Mr. Bush and Mr. Gorbachev, scheduled for May 30 to June 3.

But Marlin Fitzwater, the White House spokesman, said today that Mrs. Prunskiene was never denied a visa and sought to portray Mr. Bush's invitation to meet her in the White House as a routine decision without any greater policy implications.

Mr. Fitzwater said: "The President feels that it's important to get an au-

thoritative readout and description of events in Lithuania, hear first hand from her what is occurring there. And so she is in this country, and he thinks it's an important opportunity to hear her views."

Reaction in Lithuania

The Reuters news agency quoted a spokesman for the Parliament in Vilnius as saying the meeting was a positive sign. After Mr. Bush declined to retaliate against Moscow for cutting off shipments of oil and natural gas to Lithuania, President Landsbergis said Mr. Bush had sold out Lithuania in a manner reminiscent of the appeasement of Hitler.

"At least this shows Bush has not taken his comments too personally," the spokesman, Edward Tuskenis, was quoted as saying.

Even with Mr. Fitzwater's careful formulation, the meeting posed some subtle diplomatic problems, since the point was to avoid any suggestion that the meeting was a tacit recognition of an independent Lithuania.

Mr. Fitzwater was asked, for example, if Mr. Bush was meeting with Mrs. Prunskiene as a private citizen, or as the Prime Minister of Lithuania.

'A Private Visit'

"He is meeting with her as an acknowledged and freely elected representative of the Lithuanian people," Mr. Fitzwater said. "She is here on a private visit, as we've said."

Mr. Fitzwater said Mr. Bush "is not meeting with her as Prime Minister of an independent Lithuania. Just so there is no confusion."

But what, Mr. Fitzwater was asked, will Mr. Bush call Mrs. Prunskiene? "Prime Minister, I suppose," Mr. Fitzwater said.

Asked how that fit in with the Administration's position on Lithuania's independence, he said the "title she carries is Prime Minister."

"We'll be glad to call her that title," he said. "We do not recognize Lithuania and there's nothing changed about that."

Message to the Kremlin

During a Senate hearing today, Senator Dennis DeConcini, Democrat of Arizona, told Mr. Baker that Mr. Bush's decision not to retaliate for the Kremlin's economic sanctions sent this message to the republic's leaders: "Oh gosh, yeah, we want you free and we want to help, but you know, we're not

going to do anything to upset Mr. Gorbachev."

Mr. Baker listened with evident irritation and replied, "I think that the President, frankly, Senator DeConcini, is in a better position to judge what might or might not be effective for the long run."

"I realize you guys are the masters here," the Senator said, "and I'm just a little munchkin working around here, trying to express a view." But, he added, "it seems to me that we're talking and that's all we're doing."

Mr. Baker said, "We have a lot of interests at stake here that are very important interests to the United States of America. One of these interests is to see the Soviets destroy 40,000 tanks as a part of a conventional forces agreement, and we want to lock that agreement in."

"Another is to see them destroy 50 percent of their heavy strategic missiles which are targeted on United States cities. We want to see that agreement locked in. We want to see a continued approach by the Soviet Union that will permit us to hopefully bring freedom and democracy to other areas of the world."

Mr. Baker said the Administration had to "balance" those concerns with pressure to push Mr. Gorbachev to allow Lithuania to secede. "This is the way we see it for the time being," he said.

WASHINGTON POST
2 MAY 90

Bush to Meet Lithuania's Premier

By Don Oberdorfer
Washington Post Staff Writer

President Bush agreed yesterday to meet Lithuanian Prime Minister Kazimiera Prunskiene later this week as the Senate moved to tie trade benefits for the Soviet Union to Moscow's policies toward Baltic independence.

Bush's decision to see Prunskiene in the Oval Office on Thursday came at the suggestion of conservative senators upset with the president's cautious approach to the Baltic states and after Bush received a request for the meeting from Lithuanian-Americans, a senior White House official said.

Bush "feels it's important to get an authoritative readout and description of events in Lithuania . . . he thinks it's an important opportunity to hear her [Prunskiene's] views," said White House press secretary Marlin Fitzwater. Fitzwater referred to Prunskiene as "prime minister" and said Bush would refer to her that way, even though the administration has declined to recognize the break-away republic as an independent nation.

Several hours after the White House announcement, the Senate by a 73 to 24 vote adopted a resolution objecting to U.S. trade benefits for the Soviet Union until Moscow lifts its economic embargo against Lithuania and begins negotiations with its elected leadership. The measure, sponsored by Sen. Alphonse M. D'Amato (R-N.Y.), is non-binding.

In a related development, a senior Estonian leader said the pro-independence movement there is "really in despair" at the recent posture of the Bush administration and European nations. Marju Lauristin, deputy speaker of the Estonian Supreme Soviet, or legislature, and a founder of the Estonian Popular Front, said a shift in the international atmosphere suggested that major nations are trying to "shut the door" against Baltic independence.

Lauristin, who has asked to meet high-level administration leaders during her U.S. visit, said the Estonian legislature is likely to begin implementation about the middle of this month of its earlier declaration that Estonia has been an "occupied nation" since it became part of the Soviet Union in 1940.

Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev has warned Estonian leaders not to move in this direction and asked them instead to repeal the declaration that Estonia is "occupied." Thus the Estonian action, which is expected by Lauristin about May 14, could produce a new Baltic showdown with Gorbachev just two weeks before his scheduled arrival in Washington for a summit meeting with Bush.

WASHINGTON TIMES
2 MAY 90

Bush to meet Lithuania leader

By Paul Bedard
THE WASHINGTON TIMES

President Bush, who has refused to talk to members of Lithuania's independent government to avoid a confrontation with Moscow, will meet with the Baltic state's prime minister tomorrow, the White House said yesterday.

Mr. Bush's announcement came hours before the Senate, on a 73-24 vote, approved a non-binding resolution that urges him not to submit legislation giving trade benefits to the Soviet Union until it lifts its economic embargo of Lithuania.

Prime Minister Kazimiera Prunskiene, who told Canadian officials during a visit to Ottawa that she was seeking Western guarantees of support for Lithuania's independence drive, will huddle with Mr. Bush for 30 minutes in the Oval Office.

"The president feels it's important to get an authoritative readout and description of events in Lithuania; hear firsthand from her what is occurring there," said White House Press Secretary Marlin Fitzwater.

Mr. Fitzwater said the meeting is not intended to signal that the administration is moving toward recognizing the breakaway government.

"We don't recognize Lithuania and there's nothing changed about that," Mr. Fitzwater said. However, it will be the first White House meeting with any members of the independent Baltic government, which declared independence March 11.

Mr. Bush "is meeting with her as an acknowledged and freely

elected representative of the Lithuanian people. . . . He is not meeting with her as prime minister of an independent Lithuania," Mr. Fitzwater said.

Mrs. Prunskiene told Canadian officials, "We are looking for and must have international assurances and guarantees."

She also said the Baltic republic needs new trading partners and international political support to help it weather the economic blockade.

"We are looking for reliable trading partners. Under the blockade, the Soviet Union is no longer a reliable trading partner for us," Mrs. Prunskiene said in a meeting yesterday with Toronto Mayor Art Eggleton.

Despite the White House's attempt to downplay its significance, the Bush-Prunskiene meeting would send a strong message of support to Lithuania, said Mari-Ann Rikken of the Estonian-American National Council.

"Since she represents the independent government, it does send a good message," Ms. Rikken said. "This is obviously a change."

Ojars Kalnins, spokesman for the American Latvian Association, said the Oval Office meeting "will definitely give a boost" to Latvia's plans to vote on an independence statement similar to Lithuania's. He said the vote is expected as early as tomorrow.

"They will look on the meeting as a sign of support," said Mr. Kalnins. "It must be some kind of a change of attitude" by Mr. Bush, he suggested.

Mr. Bush has been wary to step on Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev's toes as the Soviet leader tries to work out negotiations with Lithuania. For example, Mr. Bush dropped plans to implement U.S. sanctions against the Soviets for cutting off

energy supplies to Lithuania.

His decision prompted Lithuanian President Vytautas Landsbergis to suggest Mr. Bush had sold out Lithuania.

"At least this shows Bush has not taken his [Mr. Landsbergis'] comments too personally," parliament spokesman Edward Tuskenis told Reuters news agency.

"We are looking for more forces of democracy to reveal themselves during these meetings and give a push to the movement to democracy," Mrs. Prunskiene said in Canada. She said Lithuania wants to be involved in the United States' efforts to boost trade with newly democratic Eastern European countries.

Senate Majority Leader George Mitchell said yesterday that Mr. Bush must "clearly demonstrate" that the United States supports a free and independent Lithuania and opposes the Soviet economic sanctions.

Mrs. Prunskiene, a former senior Communist Party official, won assurances of support from Canada as she sought technology and trade help in the areas of agriculture, light industry and raw materials — issues she is expected to raise with Mr. Bush.

The Senate resolution, sponsored by Republican Sen. Alfonse D'Amato of New York, urges Mr. Bush not to act on any U.S.-Soviet trade agreements that would be a key step in granting most-favored-nation trading status to the Soviet Union. It also seeks to have the United States begin negotiations with elected representatives of the Baltic republic.

Mr. D'Amato said the resolution sends a message that the Senate will not permit "business as usual" while the Soviet Union continues to wage "economic warfare" against Lithuania.

• Warren Strobel and Chris Harvey contributed to this report.

WASHINGTON POST
2 MAY 90

Aid Voted To Panama, Nicaragua

Senate Also Urges Support for Lithuania

By Helen Dewar
Washington Post Staff Writer

The Senate approved \$720 million in economic aid to Panama and Nicaragua yesterday and bluntly warned President Bush not to send any U.S.-Soviet trade agreements to Congress until Moscow ends its economic embargo against Lithuania and begins negotiations on independence for the breakaway republic.

The aid package, including Bush's request of \$300 million for Nicaragua and \$420 million of the \$500 million he sought for Panama, was contained in a \$3.4 billion supplemental spending bill to continue funding of hundreds of government programs through the end of the fiscal year Sept. 30.

The bill, approved by voice vote after a week of haggling over its provisions, now goes to a House-Senate conference, which is expected to begin work later this week. A previously approved \$2.4 billion House bill includes the same aid amounts for Panama and Nicaragua but differs on scores of other spending items.

Bush pushed for swift approval of the Panama-Nicaragua aid and criticized the Senate for dawdling through the inauguration of Nicaraguan President Violeto Chamorro last week and a visit here this week by Panamanian President Guillermo Endara.

But the White House has also

threatened a veto if the Senate-passed bill is not stripped in conference of language that would allow the District of Columbia to use local funds to pay for abortions for poor women. The House bill does not refer to D.C. abortions.

The abortion provision was approved late Monday along with another amendment that would allow D.C. courts to impose the death penalty for drug-related murders. The action, ending a brief filibuster against the death-penalty clause, cleared the way for final approval of the bill yesterday after most other controversial amendments faded away.

An exception was the nonbinding "Sense of the Senate" resolution on Lithuania, which was approved 73 to 24, with most Republicans voting for it even though it implied criticism of Bush's reluctance to take any action that might undermine

Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev.

The resolution noted that U.S. and Soviet negotiators reached virtual agreement last week on a trade pact that would grant most-favored-nation status to the Soviet Union and that Congress must approve any agreement and enabling legislation to carry it out.

"Implementation of such a package while the Soviets continue their economic sanctions against Lithuania would constitute implicit support for Soviet activities in Lithuania," the resolution said.

To avoid sending such a signal, the Senate told Bush that he should not submit any agreement or enabling legislation "until at least the Soviet Union has lifted its economic embargo against Lithuania" and begun negotiations with the newly elected Lithuanian government to pave the way for independence "in

an orderly and expeditious manner." The resolution was sponsored by Sen. Alfonse M. D'Amato (R-N.Y.), who said he agreed with Lithuanian President Vytautas Landsbergis that Bush's decision to defer sanctions against the Soviets is tantamount to another "Munich." "What a terrible signal we send to the world, what a terrible signal we sent to the Soviets," D'Amato said.

The bill also includes funds for food stamps, the census, veterans benefits, disaster relief and \$400 million in loan guarantees to build houses for Soviet Jews who immigrate to Israel. While supporting the loan guarantees, Minority Leader Robert J. Dole (R-Kan.) questioned why Israel should get a break on fees for the guarantees and other special treatment. These kind of "side benefits" boost annual aid to Israel at least \$600 million beyond its official \$3 billion level, he said.

NEW YORK TIMES
2 MAY 90

Baker Is Off to Europe, Ready to Sell Soviets on United Germany in NATO

By THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, May 1 — Secretary of State James A. Baker 3d leaves for Europe on Wednesday for the first six-nation talks about the future of a united Germany, carrying a briefcase full of ideas that he hopes will help the Soviets accept what the United States sees as inevitable: a unified Germany in NATO.

The "two plus four" negotiations, which were agreed upon last February at an East-West conference in Ottawa, call for West and East Germany to sit down with the four World War II Allies — the United States, Soviet Union, Britain and France — to resolve all of the external security issues raised by German reunification, and to dissolve the four powers' legal rights and responsibilities in Berlin and Germany as a whole.

Whatever the formal agenda, Administration officials and analysts predict the talks will quickly come down to the Soviets asking the Germans what economic and security incentives they will grant Moscow in return for the Soviets' expeditiously withdrawing their 380,000 troops from East Germany, allowing a united Germany to become a member of NATO and terminating their legal rights in Berlin along with the other Allies.

Package of Initiatives

It is not that the Kremlin is expected to try to prevent German unification, say officials. It is far too late for that. But the Soviets can drag their feet — with bluff, bluster, blandishments and by endless haggling over the arcane legal issues involved in Berlin — until they are satisfied that arrangements for a united Germany will be militarily and politically acceptable.

The question for the West, said an Administration official, "is how we make it digestible for the Soviets so they will accept this inevitable outcome sooner rather than later."

Administration officials say they have in mind a package of initiatives that would not only make the establishment of a united Germany in NATO something palatable for the Soviets, but also acceptable to the other Europeans, many of whom are also nervous about German unification.

Most of the initiatives the Administration has in mind will be discussed only informally in the two-plus-four talks, which begin Saturday, and then parceled out to the relevant negotiating forums, where they will actually be addressed. The package includes these ideas:

¶The Western Allies will suggest to the Soviets that if they are concerned about the size of the West German army, now 500,000 men, then Moscow and Bonn should work out a troop reduction arrangement as part of the ongoing Vienna talks limiting conventional forces in Europe. The Soviets will also be invited to station a limited number of troops in East Germany for a fixed transition period, as will the Allies in Berlin.

¶The united Germany is expected to reaffirm West Germany's promise never to obtain nuclear, chemical or biological weapons, and formally confirm the Oder-Neisse line as its eastern border with Poland.

¶In order to make a united Germany in NATO a less-threatening, more politically acceptable entity to the Soviets, negotiations are expected to begin soon that would result in the elimination of all, or most, United States-controlled, short-range nuclear missiles, and perhaps artillery shells, in Germany in exchange for the removal of the Soviet's short-range missiles and nuclear artillery from Europe. That would leave NATO with only air-delivered nuclear bombs in Germany.

¶West Germany is expected to reassure the Soviets that all of the contracts that they have with East German industries will be assumed by a united Germany, and, say German officials, Bonn will strongly hint to Moscow that if it plays along on two-plus-four, generous economic aid will follow suit. The West Germans are also expected to offer to help subsidize the cost — as the East German Government used to do — of maintaining Soviet troops in East German territory for the transitional period.

¶The 35-nation Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe will be given a new, expanded and formalized role for conflict resolution and intra-European dialogue for its member states, say Administration officials, so that after a united Germany joins NATO — and the Warsaw Pact inevitably fades away — the Soviets, Poles, Czechs, Hungarians, Romanians and Bulgarians won't feel left out in the cold.

This could prove to be the most difficult part of the package to sell, both to the Allies and the Soviets. The French would prefer to see the American-dominated NATO downgraded and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe given a more formal security role that might eventually make it more of an alternative to NATO than

a complement.

The same goes for the Soviets, who will find it hard to accept the notion of NATO emerging as the sole, dominating security structure in Europe. This could create the politically dangerous impression back in Moscow that while Stalin won World War II, Mikhail S. Gorbachev lost the peace.

There is a word that American officials say they have been hearing constantly of late from the Soviet Foreign Minister, Eduard A. Shevardnadze: "Synchronization."

"What we think he means is that until they have a sense that all of their concerns and interests have been addressed — from the conventional forces negotiations to German unification — they will behave as though none of them have been addressed," a senior Administration official said. "I think the Soviets are just now waking up to the monumental consequences of everything that has happened in Europe in the last year and this has introduced a kind of tentative and confused quality to their decision making."