-SECRET

The Director of Central Intelligence

Washington, D.C. 20505

National Intelligence Council

NIC 01590-86 25 March 1986 **STAT** 

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Director of Central Intelligence

Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

VIA:

National Intelligence Officer for Warning

FROM:

Robert D. Vickers

National Intelligence Officer for Latin America

SUBJECT:

Latin America Warning and Forecast Meeting

March 1986

1. The following items were discussed at the Intelligence Community's Warning and Forecast Meeting held on 19 March 1986.

## Chile

- 2. Barring some unforeseen change, military support for President Pinochet is expected to remain relatively firm until the end of his term. However, there is growing sentiment among the military against supporting a Pinochet candidacy in 1989. Most of them do not want to risk the institution's reputation—nor their individual reputations—for such an unpopular cause.
  - -- With the end of summer vacation, demonstrations are expected to increase in frequency and intensity.
  - -- Cardinal Fresno has lost some of his momentum, and groups supporting the National Accord have been unable or unwilling to coordinate their efforts in recent months.
  - -- Various leaders will be trying to unify and breathe new life into the movement in the next few weeks.
    - The radical right and the radical left may redirect violence toward US commercial and diplomatic interests.

If the radical left increases its level of violence, it could lead to the military's closing ranks in defense of President Pinochet and lead a slowing down of the transition to democracy. At stake are passage of the Electoral Registry and Political Parties Laws, now scheduled for later this year.

1

SECRET

Presi	ARNING ISSUE: Are there any signs of waning military support for dent Pinochet in anticipation of a new round of protest
	strations and associated violence? Will increasing pressure on the ity forces lead to greater unification or divisiveness?
<u>Costa</u>	Rica
Nicar refle wheth Rica, Nicar under Group espec Never preve	President Monge's initiatives to stabilize the Costa Ricanaguan border, including the bilateral border agreement with Managua, at his perception that Costa Rica will have to live with Nicaragua er the United States stays interested in the region or not. Costa however, wants only a cosmetic border inspection force while agua wants a full-blown "peacekeeping" force. Honduras will come pressure especially from the Contadora and Contadora Supports to sign a similar bilateral agreement with Nicaragua, ially if US military aid to the Contras is not approved. theless, it is unlikely that the border force will be able to the Nicaraguan insurgents from using Costa Rican territory. That
	continue to be dependent on the government of Costa Rica, which thus has given no indication that it intends to crack down hard on the as.
Costa	ARNING ISSUE: The bilateral border agreement between Nicaragua and Rica will allow the Sandinistas to focus future Contadora talks on ssue as well as push efforts to conclude a similar agreement with ras.
Jamai	<u>ca</u>

Seaga would like to delay national elections but might be forced to hold them if upcoming local elections indicate that he does not have the votes to ask Parliament for the necessary delay. Any election--particularly a national election--has the potential for turning violent.

SECRET.

**STAT** 

SE	CRET	: CIA-RDP93B01478R000300	
WARNING ISSUE: Unless State the next year or so, he may	Seaga is able to rebui well be forced to hol	ld his popularity over d national elections	
that he would lose.			
	/		

3

