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The Director of Central Intelligence

Washington, D.C. 20505

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National Intelligence Council

MEMORANDUM FOR: See Distribution

FROM: Robert D. Vickers, Jr.
National Intelligence Officer for Latin America

SUBJECT: Agenda for April 1986 Latin America
Warning and Forecast Meeting

1. The March 1986 Warning Meeting for Latin America will be held on Wednesday, 23 April 1986, at 1015 hours in Room 7 E 32, CIA Headquarters. Invited agencies and components should please keep their representatives to a necessary minimum because of space limitations.

2. We intend to discuss the following countries/topics:
Nicaragua/Honduras, El Salvador, Haiti and Peru.

Nicaragua/Honduras

During his 28 March press conference, Nicaragua's President Daniel Ortega stated defiantly "Nicaragua will continue to regard the border as a 'war zone' as long as there is an aggressor." What are the prospects for more Sandinista incursions into Honduras? What are the likely targets and what will be the size and composition of the force? How are the FDN and the Honduran government likely to respond, politically as well as militarily? (DIA - 15 minutes on the military aspects; CIA - 10 minutes on the political aspects)

El Salvador

The current investigation of a large number of rightist civilian and military personnel involved in kidnappings for ransom has once again placed President Duarte in a potentially difficult situation with the Salvadoran security forces. Should the investigation widen, the high command may be caught in a position of wanting to proceed with the investigation and prosecution yet wanting to maintain armed forces unity. President Duarte may be subjected to pressures from the armed forces to limit the scope of the investigations. What is the likely impact on the armed forces? What are the political implications? (DIA - 10 minutes on military aspects; CIA - 15 minutes on the political aspects)

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Haiti


Civil unrest continues to plague the National Governing Council (CNG) despite its efforts to garner public support. The country appears to be drifting without firm leadership while popular impatience and frustration mount. Why is General Namphy reluctant to announced a timetable for elections? What other steps can the CNG take to win support, short of elections? Although coup plotting has not been a big factor up to now, could this change in light of the military's perception of the CNG's indecisiveness? (CIA/ALA - 25 minutes)

Peru

The near-term outlook for Peru's economic relations with the United States remain bleak. While political relations have not yet reached such a low level, the trend is not encouraging. President Garcia's critical remarks concerning US policy in Central America during a recent trip to Argentina and Uruguay have not been helpful. If Peru's economic strategy is rejected by its creditors, particularly the IMF, will President Garcia repudiate the debt or make new moves against US interests in Peru? Will he also increase his confrontational tactics for the benefit of a Third-World audience? Are the Soviets willing to commit greater military and economic resources to exploit such a development? (State/INR - 25 minutes)

3. On 21 April 1986, CIA's telephone numbers will be changed.

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