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The Director of Central Intelligence

Washington, D.C. 20505

National Intelligence Council

NIC 04196-86  
9 September 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR: See Distribution  
FROM: Robert D. Vickers, Jr.  
National Intelligence Officer for Latin America  
SUBJECT: Agenda for September 1986 Latin America  
Warning and Forecast Meeting

1. The September Latin America Warning Meeting will be held on Wednesday, 17 September 1986 at 1015 hours in Room 7D32, CIA Headquarters. Invited agencies and components should please keep their representatives to a necessary minimum because of space limitations.

2. We intend to discuss the following countries/topics: Suriname, [redacted] and Nicaragua.

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Suriname

While rebel forces do not appear to have the capability to overthrow the Bouterse government at present, they do seem to be gathering strength. Ronnie Brunswijk and his followers have thus far carried on a destabilizing campaign that has proven to be quite effective. Support for Bouterse on the other hand is already showing signs of uncertainty and could erode quickly if the rebels continue their attacks. What are the prospects for a rebel takeover? Who is behind Brunswijk? What type of government does Brunswijk contemplate? Is the conflict likely to push Bouterse toward Libya? (CIA/ALA - 30 minutes)

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Nicaragua

The Ministry of Interior (MINT) has been increasing its responsibilities during the past few years, and these now go far beyond its original internal security functions. To a considerable extent, MINT's growth is a reflection of its aggressive and ambitious chief, Tomas Borge, who is using his position to build a power base. A certain ideological rivalry has long existed between Borge, the hardliner, and the Ortegas, who are considered more pragmatic. What are the relative positions of strength between these two factions? Will these differences/rivalries flare up and become more divisive? What is the likely impact of these differences on the military capability of the EPS (Ejercito Popular Sandinista) and MINT, particularly in operations requiring cooperation between the two organizations? (STATE/INR-political aspects; DIA-military aspects -- 30 minutes)

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3. Please have your clearances passed and call [redacted] with your attendance plans no later than Tuesday, 16 September.

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*Robert D. Vickers Jr.*  
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