Approved For Release 2002/01/08 : CIA-RDP93B01194R001300100046-7

CONFIDENTIAL

16 MAY 1973

Dr. James B. Rhoads
Archivist of the United States
National Archives and Records Service
Eighth and Pennsylvania Avenue
Washington, D. C. 20408

Dear Dr. Rhoads:

Pursuant to Section 5(E) of Executive Order 11652, the Central Intelligence Agency has detailed three experienced officers to the task of conducting a systematic declassification review of those materials originated by the Agency's predecessor organization, the Office of Strategic Services, and now in the custody of the National Archives (NARS Record Group 226). They are currently in the process of developing a list identifying those records which require continued classification, indicating in each instance the reason why continued protection is deemed necessary. When completed, this list will be submitted to me for final determination and specification of the dates on which such material shall become declassified.

Declassification guidelines have been promulgated to assist the reviewing officers in fulfilling their responsibilities. Although formulated with Record Group 226 specifically in mind, the guidance is also generally applicable to related intelligence records of this Agency. The guidelines are forwarded herewith in the belief that they will prove of interest to the National Archives and of possible use in the broader context of the government-wide declassification program.

Sincerely,

/s/ W. E. Colby

for James R. Schlesinger
Director

Enclosure

SAIC:CS:GFD:mj
Distribution:
Orig. - Addee
1 - ES/MC
1 - ER
1 - SAIC
1 - OGC

This document may be downgraded/declassified when classification is deemed...

Approved For Release 2002/01/08 : CIA-RDP93B01194R001300100046-7

CONFIDENTIAL

Approved For Release 2002/01/08 : CIA-RDP93B01194R001300100046-7

CONFIDENTIAL

16 May 1973
CLASSIFIED BY 007622
EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
SCHEDULE OF E. O. 11652, EXEMPTION CATEGORY
§ 5B(1), (2), (3) or (4) (circle one or more)
AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED ON
Impossible to determine
(unless impossible, insert date or event)

Central Intelligence Agency

GUIDELINES FOR DECLASSIFICATION OF OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES RECORDS

General Guidance

The purpose of declassification review is to make available to the general public the maximum amount of data consistent with the obligation to safeguard national security interests, to protect sensitive intelligence methods and sources, to avoid exacerbating foreign relations, and to respect legitimate rights of privacy. Of these, the matter of protection of sensitive intelligence methods and sources will be of paramount concern in determining whether the defense classification of OSS records must be continued. At the risk of oversimplification, "sources" can be defined as the origins of information and "methods" as the ways in which things are accomplished. Often sources and methods utilized in particular programs are essentially inseparable and cannot be considered in isolation.

The Agency's declassification jurisdiction is limited to those records for which the OSS exercised exclusive or final original classification authority. If, as is likely, non-OSS documents are found in the OSS files, such documents should be tabbed or otherwise noted and eventually referred for declassification action to whatever agency exercises current security classification jurisdiction over them. Similarly, classified materials which were received by the OSS from foreign governments or international bodies, with the express understanding that the information would be kept in confidence and that security protection be continued, should be noted for future action but must not be unilaterally declassified or downgraded.

If it is determined that a document must remain classified, but that it could be released provided that certain limited portions (e.g., one or two personal names) were excised, this fact should be noted on the worksheet. This guidance will enable National Archives reference personnel to provide sanitized versions of otherwise classified documents to researchers and should be done, although not required under the provisions of Executive Order 11652.

Detailed Guidance: Named or Identifiable Individuals

1. OSS personnel identities should be protected only if it is known that they continued their association with US intelligence organizations or were otherwise involved in intelligence activities beyond

Approved For Release 2002/01/08 : CIA-RDP93B01194R001300100046-7

CONFIDENTIAL

Approved For Release 2002/01/08 : CIA-RDP93B01194R001300100046-7
CONFIDENTIAL

the date that the OSS was disbanded. If, however, an individual's affiliation with the OSS has been previously surfaced in open literature, no useful purpose would be served by continuing the classification of the document on the basis of his post-OSS intelligence associations. Documents not declassified because OSS personnel are identified can be declassified 40 years after the publication of the document.

2. Covert agents' identities, even though it is not clear that they were witting of their OSS connections, should continue to be concealed unless it is known that they have voluntarily publicized their intelligence roles or were otherwise exposed beyond any reasonable doubt. If in doubt, do not declassify; protection of agent sources from compromise is fundamental to the continued effectiveness of an intelligence organization. Ideally, agent identities should never be revealed, but such action would be impractical in the real world. Adequate protection can be afforded them and their families if documents identifying them are withheld from declassification until 75 years after the publication date of the document.

3. The identities of liaison officers from cooperating foreign intelligence or counterintelligence services should be protected from disclosure. Declassification of such matters requires the concurrence of the foreign government concerned. The date that such documents can be declassified is thus impossible to determine.

4. If a contact in a foreign government is identified as the source of information, his identity should be protected unless it is clear that he was consciously passing information to a member of the OSS in accordance with instructions from his superiors. If the document reveals a degree of collaboration between a foreigner and the OSS, the disclosure of which could be a source of acute embarrassment to him, its classification should be continued. Do not rule in favor of declassification if any reasonable doubt exists. The declassification date for such documents should be 75 years after the publication date.

5. The identities of US private citizens who had furnished information, or otherwise cooperated with, the OSS with the understanding that their role would be kept in confidence should be accorded protection from public disclosure. In those instances where they are not identified by name, a judgment should be made as to whether the source description is specific enough to permit their identification. The date that such documents could be declassified is 75 years after the publication date.

Approved For Release 2002/01/08 : CIA-RDP93B01194R001300100046-7
CONFIDENTIAL

Approved For Release 2002/01/08 : CIA-RDP93B01194R001300100046-7
CONFIDENTIAL

6. Individuals, particularly US citizens, mentioned in investigative reports or similar records, the release of which would constitute an unwarranted invasion of privacy or a breach of confidence, should be protected from disclosure. Though covered also in the Freedom of Information Act, the need for protection in national security related documents justifies continued classification. Such documents could be declassified 75 years after the document's publication date.

7. Any report containing information, the disclosure of which would place an identified or identifiable person in immediate jeopardy--whether covered by the foregoing categories or not--should, of course, continue to be classified. Such documents could be declassified 75 years after the publication date.

Detailed Guidance: Intelligence Methods

1. Sensitive intelligence methods which must be afforded protection beyond the 30-year mandatory review period include information concerning or revealing techniques of agent recruitment, nonofficial and other unconventional cover arrangements, deception techniques, methods and equipment employed for covert communications, technical surveillance devices and strategies, microphotographic methods and equipment, escape and evasion techniques, i.a., provided that such methods are not essentially identical to those universally employed by intelligence services and therefore widely known, or that advances in technology have not rendered such methods and supporting equipment entirely obsolete. Documents containing such information must remain classified as long as the methods are utilized in operations, and therefore it is impossible to fix a date for automatic declassification.

2. Methods related to logistical and other support activities--as opposed to intelligence collection and covert action techniques--adapted to the particular operations and circumstances of World War II, do not in themselves qualify as sensitive methods requiring continued protection.

3. Information with respect to the internal organization of the OSS, the chain of command, component functional missions and personnel ceilings, and intercomponent working relationships has lost much of its sensitivity with the passage of time. Moreover, a considerable amount of this sort of information has already appeared in open literature. Documents dealing with the various cover organizations created or employed by the OSS, however, should continue to be classified for 60 years after the publication date of the document.

Detailed Guidance: Communications Intelligence and Cryptography

1. Communications intelligence, cryptography, and related activities must be provided with protection from premature disclosure unless technological improvements have greatly diminished

Approved For Release 2002/01/08 : CIA-RDP93B01194R001300100046-7
CONFIDENTIAL

Approved For Release 2002/01/08 : CIA-RDP93B01194R001300100046-7
CONFIDENTIAL

their sensitive nature. Included are any data concerning or revealing the processes, techniques, technical materiel and equipment, particular operations and overall scope of communications intelligence, and cryptographic security. The date for declassification of such information, being dependent upon the factor of obsolescence, is therefore impossible to predetermine.

2. Decrypted cables should be declassified on the basis of their subject matter content. Modern techniques of massive computer attack against encryted intercepts of World War II systems are so effective that it must be assumed that any hostile intelligence service which decided to expend the effort to retrospectively process the data could have read the texts of cable messages.

Detailed Guidance: Subject Matter Content

1. Classified information contained in OSS documents and other record media, regardless of the subject, the origin of which can be clearly traced to another US Government agency, should not be declassified unilaterally. Declassifying or downgrading action must await the decision of the agency exercising current declassification authority and therefore the date would be impossible to determine.

2. Classified information which was passed to the OSS by liaison representatives of foreign intelligence or counterintelligence services and subsequently incorporated into OSS documents should not be declassified unilaterally when it is apparent that this was the case. Declassification of such material must await the concurrence of the foreign government concerned, and the date for declassification is therefore impossible to determine.

3. Any information which would probably adversely affect the conduct of present day or future US foreign policy or international security arrangements if disclosed should not be declassified without the prior concurrence of the Department of State and/or the Department of Defense, even though the document and the information contained therein is exclusively OSS in origin. Declassification or downgrading action must await the decision of the competent agency, and therefore the date would be impossible to determine.

4. Biographic information of a nature that would be highly embarrassing or compromising to friendly or collaborating foreign nationals, the release of which would be likely to impair US relations with the nation involved, should not be disclosed. Documents containing such material should not be declassified until 60 years after the publication date.

5. With the passage of 30 years, the reportorial and analytical content of the bulk of OSS documentation will have lost whatever sensitivity it once had. Illustrative of the subject matter which can be

Approved For Release 2002/01/08 : CIA-RDP93B01194R001300100046-7
CONFIDENTIAL

Approved For Release 2002/01/08 : CIA-RDP93B01194R001300100046-7
CONFIDENTIAL

readily declassified are: translations or summaries from the foreign press and radio broadcasts; prisoner interrogation reports; translations or summaries of captured enemy documents; statistical data or other purely factual reporting, with little or no attempt at predictive analysis; information dealing with conditions prevailing at a particular point in time, e.g., enemy order of battle, and thus highly perishable; and any information which has been extensively and accurately reported in the press or in other open source publications.

Approved For Release 2002/01/08 : CIA-RDP93B01194R001300100046-7
CONFIDENTIAL

Approved For Release 2002/01/08 : CIA-RDP93B01194R001300100046-7

DRAFT

(12)

GUIDELINES FOR DECLASSIFICATION AND RELEASE OF OFFICE OF CENSORSHIP RECORDS AND DOCUMENTS

The President of the United States has removed the "seal" formerly placed on Office of Censorship records and approved these guidelines. The Archivist of the United States shall implement these guidelines for the systematic review for declassification and release of records and documents originated by the World War II Office of Censorship, which have been accessioned by the National Archives and Records Service into the National Archives of the United States.

Part A

All national security-classified information originated by the Office of Censorship is automatically declassified except that information and material categorized under paragraphs 1, 2, or 3 of this part and determined by specialists of the named Departments or agencies of primary subject-matter interest as requiring continued protection. Emphasis will be upon declassification. National security information and material requiring continued protection and exemption from declassification following review shall be listed in accordance with Section 5(E) of Executive Order 11652 and referred through the head of Department to the Archivist of the United States. Only national security information and material originated by the Office of Censorship of the following categories may be exempted from disclosure under Section 552(b)(1) of Title 5, United States Code (Freedom of Information Act):

1. Information concerning communications intelligence or cryptography and their related activities. All such information which might still be sensitive will be referred to the National Security Agency for final determination on declassification and release or the need for continued security protection.

2. Information of an intelligence methodological nature concerning secret writing and microphotography. All such information which might still be sensitive will be referred to the Central Intelligence Agency for final determination on declassification and release or the need for continued security protection.

3. Information concerning foreign governmental censorship activities as disclosed by U.S. liaison with foreign censorship agencies not previously declassified. All such information which might still be sensitive will be referred to the Department of State for guidance and consultation in determining whether to declassify or whether the need for continued protection exists.

Approved For Release 2002/01/08 : CIA-RDP93B01194R001300100046-7

Approved For Release 2002/01/08 : CIA-RDP93B01194R001300100046-7

DRAFT

Part B

Information in Office of Censorship intercept and similar files concerning individuals and organizations the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy (cf. Section 552(b)(6) of Title 5, United States Code) will normally be exempted from release until 50 calendar years after its origin. Such information may be further defined as:

1. All information clearly identifying individuals or organizations whose communications were intercepted, were the object of surveillance or were of particular interest to the intelligence agencies of the United States or its Allies, including the following:

a. Originals, photocopies, or transcripts of intercepted communications;

b. Submission slips (extracts from intercepted communications);

c. Daily reports, also known as "Dayreps" (Office of Censorship messages to stations providing background information on persons and organizations of interest to the Office of Censorship);

d. Special watch instructions, also known as SWIs (instructions or supplemental information on particular persons, addresses, organizations, etc., whose communications are to be intercepted);

e. Watch lists/flash lists (lists of persons, organizations, addresses, etc., with indicator of subject interest, whose communications are to be intercepted, including proposed entries and deletions;

f. White lists (names of persons whose communications were to be bypassed without examination) including entries and deletions thereto;

g. Border watch/flash lists (names of persons whose communications across the U.S. borders were of particular interest to a local censorship station), including entries and deletions thereto.

2. All information identifying individuals or organizations involved in complaints or recommendations about carrying out the specific provisions of the Code of Wartime Practices for the American Press and Broadcasters not previously wholly released.

3. All requests for information of the types described in Part B of these guidelines shall be referred to the Director, Federal Preparedness Agency, GSA, for a determination as to whether that information can be released in whole or in part or should continue to be exempted from public disclosure.

Approved For Release 2002/01/08 : CIA-RDP93B01194R001300100046-7

Approved For Release 2002/01/08 : CIA-RDP93B01194R001300100046-7

2 July 1979

Classification Review Procedure

CRP 79-32 and
CRP 79-008/OSS

GUIDELINES FOR THE REVIEW OF RECORDS FOR THE PERIOD FROM THE END OF OSS TO THE BEGINNING OF CIA 1 October 1945 - 18 September 1947

BACKGROUND

On 20 September 1945 President Harry Truman signed an Executive Order breaking up the OSS as of 1 October 1945 and directing the Secretary of State to take the lead in developing the program for a comprehensive and coordinated foreign intelligence system. The Research and Analysis (R&A) and Presentation Branches of the OSS went intact to the State Department. The remaining activities of the OSS (mostly clandestine services) were assigned to the War Department which was to keep them separate in the Strategic Services Unit (SSU) established by the Executive Order for that purpose and to keep those activities to serve as a nucleus for a possible central intelligence service.

On 22 January 1946 President Truman issued a Presidential Directive which established the Central Intelligence Group (CIG) functioning directly under the National Intelligence Authority (NIA). The NIA consisted of representatives of the Secretaries of State, War and Navy and a personal representative of the President. The Director of CIG was appointed by the President. His duties included planning to coordinate departmental intelligence activities; recommending policies and objectives of the "national intelligence mission;" correlating and evaluating intelligence for strategic and national policy and disseminating it within the Government; performing functions related to intelligence as the President and NIA might direct; and performing services of common concern where those services could be performed more efficiently by a central organization. Significantly, the Director of CIG was not given the duty of directly collecting intelligence. The CIG was described as "a cooperative interdepartmental activity." Since the SSU had been expected only to serve an interim function, the Executive Order of 20 September 1945 directed the Secretary of War to discontinue the SSU as soon as its functions and facilities could be: 1) placed in a new central intelligence organization; 2) placed in the War Department; or 3) dropped entirely. General Magruder, Chief of the SSU, was to superintend the liquidation of those SSU activities to be dropped entirely during peacetime. On 29 January 1946 the Secretary of War directed that the SSU should be liquidated by 30 June 1946. The Director of CIG was to take what records he wanted from SSU through the Secretary of War and retain operational control over them. Title to the records was to be settled later. Magruder felt that SSU plans, properties and personnel must be maintained because they were indispensable for the procurement of intelligence in peacetime. On 14 February 1946 he urged that the SSU be placed under the Director of CIG.

Approved For Release 2002/01/08 : CIA-RDP93B01194R001300100046-7

Approved For Release 2002/01/08 : CIA-RDP93B01194R001300100046-7

As there was some dispute over whether the Director of CIG should get the entire unit, an interdepartmental committee was organized under Colonel [redacted] to study this question. The committee found support for the opinion that the SSU, as was, ought not go to the CIG. The committee had heard that the bulk of intelligence information came from friendly governments; that much material came from other sources than secret collection; that SSU personnel had not been adequately screened; and that many clandestine personnel had become exposed during WW II. The committee thought that the SSU should be reorganized and the desired portion placed under the CIG as a "going concern." The committee thought that CIG should closely coordinate clandestine operations, concentrate on the USSR and the Satellites, penetrate key institutions to aid possible U.S. military operations, develop liaison with foreign intelligence agencies and develop sleeper networks [redacted] while overt collection of intelligence information should remain with the other U.S. Government agencies. The committee also recognized the interrelationship between the SSU and the R&A Branch (still located in the State Department) and urged that their activities be integrated because the R&A Branch was "closely geared to the secret intelligence branches as their chief guide." The committee also felt that the Director of CIG should take authority and responsibility for liquidation of the SSU.

On 3 April 1946 the final liquidation of SSU was postponed from 30 June 1946 to 30 June 1947. Meanwhile, the Chief of SSU was directed to obey the instructions from the Director of CIG. This made it possible for [redacted] Assistant Director and Acting Chief of Operational Services of CIG, to take over such SSU assets as the Director of CIG wanted while unwanted assets would be absorbed into the War Department or abandoned. The arrangements for the transfer of SSU to the CIG through the War Department were complicated but it enabled the CIG to take legally what it wanted while Magruder, Chief of the SSU, got rid of unwanted facilities through the War Department. Although no specific legal action was taken, the passage of time and the inferential approval of the National Security Act of 1947 appears to have vested title of SSU property to the CIG.

In June 1946 General Vandenberg became the Director of CIG (replacing Admiral Souers). Vandenberg felt that the Director of CIG must be the NIA's executive officer and he immediately struck out to obtain greater authority and independence for the CIG. While his ideas met resistance from the member agencies of NIA, Vandenberg did win some points. For example, Vandenberg wanted the CIG to conduct all espionage and counter-espionage for the collection of foreign intelligence abroad. This proposal was modified to allow the Director of CIG to conduct only those "organized federal" operations which were outside the U.S. and its possessions, but still left CIG with the authority to collect intelligence information. The purpose of the revision was to permit the military services to collect intelligence for departmental purposes and it was meant to protect the FBI in performing its duties within the U.S. Vandenberg then established the Office of Special Operations to collect foreign intelligence. During the summer and fall of 1946, the CIG arranged to take over the personnel, undercover agents, and foreign stations of the SSU. By mid-October 1946 the liquidation of SSU was complete. (SSU as a bonafide organization never actually went out of business. The C/IMS/DDO is the current chief of SSU and is authorized to conduct certain business for

Approved For Release 2002/01/08 : CIA-RDP93B01194R001300100046-7

Approved For Release 2002/01/08 : CIA-RDP93B01194R001300100046-7

and on behalf of SSU. Most SSU activities involve checking out special requests from EX-SSU or OSS personnel.) Field stations were notified that effective 19 October 1946 "SSU discontinues all overseas activities and the Office of Special Operations of CIG assumes responsibility for conducting espionage and counterespionage in the field for collection of foreign intelligence information required for national security."

As noted above, the CIG takeover of the SSU stretched over a period of several months in 1946. During this period the CIG took over many of the personnel, installations, facilities and cover arrangements and units as well as administrative practices of the SSU. Thus you will find CIG, after 19 October 1946, using SSU cover unit designations and letterhead stationery from such units making it difficult to identify CIG documents from appearance alone. It could be argued that if the letterhead is SSU then it is an SSU document. Be that as it may, for general purposes in classification review consider all records created before 19 October 1946 as SSU and all records created after that date as CIG.

GUIDELINES

For our general use in the classification review process, the date of 19 October 1946 will be considered the pivotal date marking the "end" of the SSU and the "beginning" of the CIG. Generally speaking, records dated prior to 19 October 1946 will be considered SSU documents and those created after that date will be considered CIG documents.

The methods of organization and operation used by the SSU were very similar to those developed and used by the OSS. The SSU was essentially a military unit, staffed mostly by military personnel and housed in the War Department under military command. It is therefore pertinent for us to review SSU documents under those guidelines developed for and used in the classification review of OSS records. The CIG on the other hand, very soon after its creation began to take on an independent life and although many CIG personnel continued to be military it quickly attracted more civilians and it was not under direct military command. We will, therefore, look at CIG documents as relating closely to the beginnings of the CIA and will review CIG documents under those guidelines developed for and used in the classification review of CIA records. As a general rule, the OSS review team will be responsible for reviewing documents originated before 19 October 1946 and the other CRD reviewers will be responsible for those documents originated after 19 October 1946. This date is not intended to be an absolute rule; as in all review work, individual judgement must be used. For example, a document originated after 19 October 1946 might refer to the past and to activities or problems of the SSU making it in essence a more or less typical SSU document containing material relating to the SSU. Such a document should be reviewed as being essentially a SSU document and using the OSS guidelines to judge the classification action. On the other hand, a document originated before 19 October 1946 might refer to the future and to activities or problems relating to the CIG making it in essence a more or less typical CIG document. This type document should be reviewed as a CIG document using the CIA guidelines.

Approved For Release 2002/01/08 : CIA-RDP93B01194R001300100046-7

Approved For Release 2002/01/08 : CIA-RDP93B01194R001300100046-7

All reviewers should be especially alert for these types of documents and pay particular attention to their classification review. If there is any question, coordination should be effected between the CRD Operations Branch/OSS and the CRD Operations Branch/CIA through the Chief of the CRD Operations Branch.

The major categories of information which most likely will require continued protection are: 1) information which identifies sources; 2) foreign government information and details of intelligence agreements we had with foreign governments; 3) information revealing unique intelligence methods not generally known or used and not outdated; and 4) information which could still cause negative reactions that could impact adversely on current or future U.S. foreign relations. Some more specific guidelines are as follows:

1. Protect all sources to avoid creation of a reputation that U.S. intelligence services cannot protect their sources. A rare exception to this rule might be possible where the contact was fleeting, incidental, insignificant and overt.

2. Identification as an SSU staffer will be judged and handled the same way as it is for an OSS staffer. Staffers generally will not be protected merely because they later worked for the CIG or the CIA. If however, the person engaged in sensitive work for CIG or the CIA, their SSU (and OSS) employment may be exempted from declassification to protect the later sensitive work or position in the CIG or the CIA.

3. Persons who served under non-official cover are protected at all times as is their cover.

STATINTL

[redacted]

Chief,
Classification Review Division

Approved For Release 2002/01/08 : CIA-RDP93B01194R001300100046-7

25X1A

Approved For Release 2002/01/08 : CIA-RDP93B01194R001300100046-7



Approved For Release 2002/01/08 : CIA-RDP93B01194R001300100046-7