

DRAFT

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director, Central Intelligence Agency


FROM: William F. Donnelly, Chief, Information Management Staff, Directorate of Operations (C)

VIA: Deputy Director for Operations

SUBJECT: Department of State Records Retirement - Impact on CIA

1. The routine retirement and permanent release of selected Department of State records to the National Archives & Records Service (NARS) risks exposure of sensitive intelligence information, which is of legitimate concern to the CIA. The potential consequences for CIA are deemed sufficient to warrant discussion between the DCI and the Secretary of State. (C)

2. NARS has discovered during the systematic review for declassification of State Department records dating from the 1940's those which identify cooperative relationships between the Department and CIA including the predecessor organizations OSS, SSU and CIG.




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C O N F I D E N T I A L

5. To remedy the problem and preclude any future potential for compromise, it is recommended that you request the Department of State to have appropriate officials confer with representatives of this Directorate in order to identify those Department records which relate to State-CIA relationships and to discuss disposition of those records in lieu of releasing them to NARS.

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William F. Donnelly (C)

C O N F I D E N T I A L

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

4 March 1981

Mr. Edwin A. Thompson
Director, Records Declassification Division
National Archives and Records Service
Room 18-W, National Archives Building
Eighth Street and Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D. C. 20408

Dear Alan:

My letter to you, dated 23 December 1980, set forth the basic procedures which we agreed upon for protecting CIA information found in Department of State records for the period 1945-49 held by NARS as part of Records Group 59. As implementation of these procedures progressed, a question arose concerning the method of processing those records which require continued protection. Some documents of interest to CIA remain classified and simply require certification by the Director of CIA that they must remain so. Other documents are not classified yet require continued protection because they contain information that falls within the Director's statutory authority to protect certain organizational and other data. This situation often results from the fact that the file number placed on the document by the Department of State identifies the information as relating to CIA or one of its predecessor organizations. The seven files where this situation has been found are: 101.5, 101.502, 101.6, 101.61, 101.6102, 811.20200 (E), and 811.20200 (FAMILY).

The problem is how to handle the documents in these two groups. Following recent discussions it is recommended that this situation be handled as follows: CIA reviewers will again go through the 13 boxes of documents related to these seven files and indicate by tabbing: (1) classified documents which require continued protection; (2) unclassified documents which require continued protection; and (3) documents of no interest to CIA. NARS declassification review personnel will remove all tabbed classified documents, replace them by withdrawal notices, store them in a secure area, and include them on the computer listing for certification by the Director of Central Intelligence. Tabbed, unclassified documents will be left in the boxes. The custodial units will be responsible to protect this latter group of documents as containing privileged information and, according to Mr. Milton Gustafson, Chief of the Diplomatic Archives Branch, such documents will be removed from the boxes and stored separately to ensure that they are not inadvertently released. Any documents of no interest to CIA will, of course, be left in the boxes and any necessary classification review of those documents with other U.S. Government agencies or foreign governments will be handled separately by NARS personnel.

Cards in the indices to these files will be handled in the same way as the documents. Each card will be reviewed by the CIA reviewers. If the card requires protection it will be withdrawn and replaced with a temporary dummy card. The CIA reviewers will indicate how the original card should be sanitized and NARS personnel will prepare the sanitized cards. CIA personnel will then file the sanitized cards in the indices replacing the dummy cards. Withdrawn cards will be kept in a secure area, attached to their referenced document wherever possible.

If this procedure is acceptable to NARS, our reviewers are prepared to implement the required actions immediately.



Chief, Classification Review Division
Office of Information Services
Directorate of Administration

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