

Foreign Intelligence Literary Scene

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EDITOR: THOMAS F. TROY

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An Intelligence Museum: Not "Whether?" But "Where?"

The idea of an intelligence museum has made so much progress in the past year, on two fronts in particular, that the question now is not "whether?" but "where?"

In the first place, progress has been made in the U.S. Senate. There Resolution No. 267 supporting the establishment of a National Historical Intelligence Museum was introduced by Sen. Barry Goldwater of Arizona, chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee, was given a public hearing on Nov. 3, and finally was unanimously passed by the Senate on Nov. 17.

While the Senate action might strike the skeptic as paper progress, it clearly means much to the museum's proponents. Martin G. Cramer, president of the National Historical Intelligence Museum Association, considers it a "most tangible" accomplishment, the passing of a milestone. He says it provides an impressive endorsement that will be most helpful in soliciting funds and cooperation in many quarters. Likewise, Geoffrey M.T. Jones, president of the William J. Donovan Memorial Foundation, calls it "the stamp of legitimacy."

That stamp of legitimacy was given even earlier, at that November hearing, when CIA Director William J. Casey, as the leadoff witness, spoke of the museum as "a highly important way of educating and informing the public" about the role of intelligence in American history. Other distinguished intelligencers—former CIA chief William E. Colby, authors David Kahn, Joseph E. Persico, and Lt. Gen. William W. Quinn—added their own cachets. Noted book collector Walter L. Pforzheimer provided the committee with an impressive display of the kinds

In Canada:

John Sawatsky, Lips Zipped about One Book, at Work on Another

Canadian investigative reporter and author John Sawatsky, called to court in Ottawa on Nov. 14, sat down, folded his arms against his chest, and refused to answer any of eight questions put to him by the Crown's attorney. Sawatsky had been called to testify at the preliminary hearing of charges under the Official Secrets Act against an ex-Mountie once code named "Long Knife." (See "Will Canada See That the Mounties Finally Get Their Man?" *FILS*, August 1983, p. 1.)

Meanwhile, Sawatsky, the author of two books on the Security Service of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), has let it be known that he is at work on yet a third book about the Security Service, which is the Canadian counterintelligence service. An independent source reports that the book "is claimed... [to] be as sensational as his last one." It was the last one, *For Services Rendered: Leslie James Bennett and the RCMP Security Service* (New York: Doubleday, 1982), which triggered a chain of events that has led to Long Knife's trial for offenses committed no less than 28 years ago.

In that book Sawatsky told the story of, but did not identify, Long Knife as a Mountie who betrayed to the Soviets a KGB agent who had gone to work for the Mounties. In breaking the story Sawatsky also revealed the story of the Mounties' failure to prosecute Long Knife for the betrayal. It was primarily this embarrassment which prompted Ottawa to take action against Long Knife, only recently identified as James Finley Douglas Morrison, 67, a construction safety supervisor from British Columbia. The case against him, however, rests heavily upon Sawatsky's testimony, and Sawatsky had

Author Calls CIA "Callous and Indifferent" on Defectors

Vladimir Sakharov, a former Soviet diplomat and co-author of his autobiographical *High Treason* (Ballantine Espionage/Intelligence Library) has labeled the CIA policy on resettling Soviet bloc defectors "callous and indifferent." Writing in *FIRM*, the newsletter he edits (see "In the Magazines," p. 10), Sakharov says that CIA has so badly handled the resettlement of defectors that it is actually discouraging them or losing them to West Germany and Great Britain, where, he says, they receive better treatment. Sakharov says the agency's attitude results in the loss of "a vital source of intelligence" on the Soviets.

Because of some complaints from defectors (is there no better term for these welcome additions to our population?), their situation was investigated last year by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, which recommended some changes in the agency's program but nevertheless found that "taken as a whole, the defector program is functioning effectively." Even so, the Standing Committee on Law and National Security of the American Bar Association has, as Sakharov pointed out, been looking into the problem. The committee's newsletter, *Intelligence Report*, contains an article by editor William C. Mott (see "In the Magazines," p. 10), on a new foundation being privately organized to help resettle defectors.


The problem will soon be getting TV treatment. CBS's "60 Minutes" has been filming a program likely to be shown early in 1984.

let it be known before the November hearing that he would refuse to answer any of eight questions put to him at the preliminary hearing has been adjourned until Jan. 24.

Book Buffs Honor Bowen: NISC and Georgetown University Hold Reception

Some 100 persons gathered on Nov. 3 at Georgetown University in Washington, D.C., to pay tribute to Col. Russell J. Bowen, an unusual collector of intelligence books. The occasion was the formal opening of an exhibit of books from the Bowen Collection on Intelligence, National Security and Covert Activities, on deposit in Georgetown's Lauinger Library. The event, which took place in the library's Gunlocke Special Collections Room, was jointly sponsored by the university's Library Associates and the National Intelligence Study Center (NISC).

The towering, snow-capped gentleman at top left is Bowen. His collection, which now numbers over 6,000 books and documents and is constantly growing, is probably the world's largest publicly available collection of books on intelligence and intelligence-related subjects. Bowen delivered a short talk on the development of the literature of intelligence. Other speakers included Georgetown Librarian Joseph J. Jeffs, NISC President Ray S. Cline, and intelligence authority Walter L. Pforzheimer.



Col. Russell J. Bowen

Among the many who turned out for the speeches, the books, and the wine and cheese was George C. Constantini-des, shown at the lower left. His *Intelligence and Espionage: An Analytical Bibliography* is reviewed on p. 6. The price surely puts him among the world's highest-priced intelligencers!

A particularly distinguished visitor was Clare Booth Luce, who along with Herbert W. Fockler, a library official, are seen at the upper right inspecting some of the Bowen books put on display. Mrs. Luce is a member of the NISC advisory board. NISC arranged the publication of *Scholar's Guide to Intelligence Literature: Bibliography of the Russell J. Bowen Collection*.


Shown at the lower right in front of his own book is Marquette University historian Dr. Ralph E. Weber. His book is *United States Diplomatic Codes and Ciphers 1775-1938* (Chicago: Precedent Publishing, 1979). It received the NISC award as the best American intelligence book of that year.

Another distinguished visitor, unfortunately not shown here, was CIA chief William J. Casey, who was also seen checking the books, perhaps even his own *Where & How the War Was Fought: An Armchair Tour of the American Revolution* (New York: Morrow, 1976), which contains interesting sections on the intelligence of the war. In the morning Casey had testified on Capitol Hill in favor of an intelligence museum.



Clare Booth Luce


Herbert W. Fockler



George C. Constantini-des



Dr. Ralph E. Weber



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(Museum. . . cont. from p. 1)

of books and documents which might be included in the museum.

The other area of progress was the joining of forces of the two groups that have hitherto been working more or less separately in support of the idea. These are Cramer's museum association and Jones' Donovan foundation. The former includes among its advisors Colby, Kahn, Richard Dunlop, Lyman B. Kirkpatrick, Lt. Gen. Eugene F. Tighe, Jr., and Lawrence Houston. The Jones group is basically the Veterans of Strategic Services (VSS). The two groups, which have many members in common, have now set up a coordinating committee to work together on such practical problems as raising money and finding space for the museum.

To some extent these matters were laid out at the November hearing by Martin Cramer. He told the Senate committee that temporary and permanent sites for the museum are being sought in Washington, D.C., nearby Virginia and Maryland, and even southern Pennsylvania. What is sought is 12,000 to 16,000 square feet of land. Also being sought, in fund raising scheduled to get under way in 1984, is \$2 million. The Donovan foundation, which has interests other than the museum, has already launched a big campaign for funds. While the museum is a private activity, its supporters undoubtedly welcome the offer of Hawaii's Sen. Daniel K. Inouye to "support any call for grants from federal departments."

As to location, the most specific proposal came from Walter Pforzheimer, who said the museum should be in Washington and "in the hands of the Smithsonian's National Museum of American History" and be "located on one floor of an exhibition wing." He saw this as "an ideal solution." However, when queried about this suggestion, a Smithsonian Institution official, preferring anonymity, was not encouraging. He doubted the basic viability of the museum idea, fearing even if it did flower it might fade fast. He also indicated that the Smithsonian, accustomed to being pressured for specialized halls, thought the intelligence story could and should be integrated with a larger theme in American history, in the present armed forces exhibition, for instance—an idea not likely to find favor with the museum proponents.

The latter are convinced they have the story, the material for the museum

and the voluntary activists to put the museum across and make it a permanent attraction and education for the American public, particularly for the millions of tourists who annually flock to the nation's capital. They found encouragement in the widespread press coverage of the hearing, even in the friendly spoofing of "a spy museum."

The Case against Serge Bassoff

by Peter A. Masley

The Serge Bassoff case was marked closed by the FBI 20 years ago next July but has only recently become known—because of the release under the Freedom of Information Act of the relevant documents. The case deserves at least a footnote in espionage history as one of the country's longest and most fruitless investigations.

The Russian-born Bassoff first came to the attention of the U.S. State Department in 1922 when, unbeknownst to him, Bassoff was fingered by a passenger on a New York-Constantinople ship as a smuggler. Bassoff, so the passenger informed State, told him that the Soviets had a man in Constantinople who smuggled jewelry and other precious stones to Soviets in the United States. Despite State's suspicion that Bassoff himself was the smuggler, he was admitted to the country. He was naturalized in 1931.

Using his American passport, Bassoff then began a long period of residence in and travel to and from Europe. Twice he traveled covertly, but the FBI did not discover this activity until 10 years after it began its investigation. Bassoff told the bureau he had traveled to help members of his family. On one of his trips he went to the Soviet Union on a forged visa bought from a Soviet intelligence agent.

Not until March 1939, however, did Bassoff really attract American attention. Then the State Department interviewed Walter G. Krivitsky, a defector from the Soviet military intelligence service and later that year the author of the then-sensational *In Stalin's Secret Service*. Krivitsky said Bassoff had joined the Soviet secret police in 1920, came to the United States in 1922 as a secret agent, became invaluable as a GPU (later KGB) courier traveling in Europe on an American passport, and was arrested in 1937 in Holland while transporting funds.

The arrest was confirmed by the Dutch. On the basis of old information from Dutch sources, the FBI

on suspicion of hotel robbery and, though carrying thousands of dollars, was released the same day because Berlin had lost interest in him.

Four months after the Krivitsky interview, the State Department alerted the FBI's J. Edgar Hoover to Bassoff's alleged espionage activities. The bureau opened a file which would not be closed until Bassoff's death 25 years later. In the meantime, the FBI, pursuing Bassoff off and on, used virtually every technique at hand: surreptitious entry, mail covers, pretext interviews, surveillance, etc.

With one exception the FBI never got beyond the Krivitsky allegations and the earlier charge of Soviet smuggling. The exception, when the bureau thought it was close, occurred in August 1946. FBI agents inspecting Bassoff's cabin on a ship on the Delaware River, found a "coded message." The discovery, said Hoover, "substantially bears out the allegations" made by Krivitsky. The bureau's New York office was told to "develop a discreet and secure confidential informant who will have access to all [Bassoff's] documents and other material." Hoover also suggested the use of "technical surveillance." In February 1947 "a highly confidential" source, going through Bassoff's apartment, found another "coded message." When studied by FBI experts, however, the messages turned out to be passages from a Morse code practice booklet.

In the spring of 1948 FBI agents finally interviewed Bassoff. He "denied associations or activities as a Soviet agent" and called Krivitsky a liar. He did admit carrying \$7,500 and \$3,000 in cash in Europe but described himself as a successful art dealer and gambler overseas.

In October 1951 an FBI assessment of the case against Bassoff noted that he "is revealed to have possessed ample funds from time to time which were inconsistent with his profession of sailor and house painter. His actions and associations in Europe from 1931 to 1938 are suspicious from an espionage point of view. . . . Bassoff's occupation and travel since 1943 indicate that he could be presently engaged as a Soviet courier." However, by year's end Hoover told the Justice Department that Krivitsky's allegations had "never been verified nor substantiated by evidence."

Five years later the FBI started sharing its information on Bassoff with the

(Bassoff. . . cont. from p. 3)

CIA. In 1959 the bureau again interviewed Bassoff, who said that "about a year ago he was contacted by another intelligence agency, and [was] offered employment." Bassoff said he thought it was the CIA, but did not accept the offer.

On June 12, 1964, Serge Bassoff, a house painter and sailor in New York, died in obscurity, apparently of natural causes. The FBI, leaving no stone unturned, six weeks later went through his personal effects. All that could be found was a Post Office form showing he had sent a letter to a person in the Soviet Union. "Case closed" says the FBI stamp on the Serge Bassoff file.

Masley is a Washington journalist writing a book about the late Walter Krivitsky.

House Subcommittee Hears of Harassment by NSA and CIA, Takes Testimony from Authors Bamford and McGehee

On Nov. 2, authors James Bamford and Ralph W. McGehee told a House of Representatives subcommittee of trouble they and fellow author David Kahn suffered independently at the hands of an intelligence agency, either the National Security Agency or the Central Intelligence Agency, in the course of writing books about intelligence.

Bamford and McGehee gave testimony to the House Judiciary Subcommittee on Courts, Civil Liberties and the Administration of Justice, which is chaired by Rep. Robert W. Kastenmeier (D-Wis.). With George Orwell's 1984 in mind, the committee is pondering "1984: Civil Liberties and the National Security State."

Bamford, author of *The Puzzle Palace*, which was not happily received at NSA, the subject of the book, said that the agency has suffered from an "historical obsession with secrecy" since its establishment in 1952. He said that obsession was later "elevated to paranoia" when NSA discovered that David Kahn was including a chapter on NSA in *The Codebreakers*. Quoting the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Bamford told how NSA considered various proposals for disparaging the book, frustrating the author, and breaking into his home. While none of these proposals was carried out, said Bamford, Kahn's name was approved for

NSA watch list and his communications thereby subjected to the agency's eavesdropping techniques. Also, the director of NSA persuaded Macmillan Publishing Co., Kahn's publisher, to let the agency have a look at his manuscript without Kahn's knowledge.

As for his own experiences, Bamford told how—and much of this has already appeared in press coverage of his battle with NSA—the agency tried to classify or reclassify either unclassified or declassified documents legally available to him in the writing of his book. He told how NSA tried in 1980 to classify unclassified naval station reports, how in 1981 it sought to reclassify two Justice Department documents on NSA's domestic eavesdropping operations, and how in 1982, even after his book had been published, NSA tried to classify hitherto unclassified private correspondence of the late American cryptologist William F. Friedman.

Bamford denounced the Reagan administration's policy of reclassification, which was effected by an executive order of April 2, 1982. Bamford said, "It would be total anarchy for historians and scholars, who frequently spend years on their research, if one administration would be permitted to recall history by forcing them to return materials released by a previous administration."

Ralph McGehee, a retired CIA officer with 25 years of service, recounted his troubles with the agency's Prepublication Review Board (PRB) and of the agency's harassment of him. All of this was brought about, he said, because of his disillusionment with the agency's performance in Vietnam and his determination to write a book about his experiences—a book which, he said, the agency tried "to stop."

In addition to—as McGehee describes it—almost endless classifying and reclassifying by the PRB of the pages of his manuscript, he said the agency subjected him "to close, intimidating, multiple types of surveillance, a surveillance that continues to this day." He charged that he was "placed under surveillance. My phone is tapped and my mail has probably been opened. Blatant surveillance is conducted not to determine my actions but to frighten me into silence. Agency security personnel have walked up my heels in supermarkets, sit in cars near my house and have probably entered my hotel room and removed docu-

ments. . . . Intimidation is the purpose of all this activity and I am well aware that Big Brother is watching."

In conclusion McGehee—whose testimony he noted was cleared by the PRB and whose story has largely been told in an appendix to his *Deadly Deceits* (New York: Sheridan Square Publications, 1983)—accused the CIA of using the PRB "to prevent the American people from learning of its illegal and embarrassing operations." Like Bamford before him, he denounced the Reagan reclassification order.

Advice from a Book Dealer

by Michael F. Speers

Many *FILS* readers are probably closet book collectors. Those who deny having the malady probably delude themselves. I myself became infected early in life but didn't really admit the addiction until later—until, after my last State Department tour overseas, the books overflowed the apartment. Then I took the only course open to me: I obtained a state tax number and listed myself as a book dealer.

Let me now offer those *FILS* readers having trouble finding that book they have been searching for for years some hard-won and expensively obtained knowledge on book collecting, book dealers, and search services.

While there are many dealers in military history, there are, unfortunately, relatively few in the field of intelligence. There are, like myself, many dealers in first edition detective and spy fiction. There are thousands of rare and out-of-print dealers in this country, Canada, Britain, and Europe. It is an unusual business. I estimate that 75 percent of these dealers' business takes place among themselves; they buy and sell in order to "feed" the few collectors out there.

I try to maintain a stock of about 1,000 books more or less evenly divided among intelligence, military history, detective and spy fiction. Prices range from \$5 to \$250. I find that most customers are less interested in obtaining a first edition in intelligence and military history than in detective or spy fiction. The latter are most sought after and most expensive. Prices vary widely from year to year and dealer to dealer. First editions of established authors can appreciate substantially over a period of years; even so, beware of thinking of book collecting as an investment. Certainly,

(Book Dealer . . . cont. from p. 4)

Hemingway first editions have steadily appreciated; I think Graham Greene will do likewise. On the other hand certain authors go out of style, or the big purchasers of them—big collectors and libraries—become sated. When that happens, prices fall. Thus, I can offer you a Dickens first edition for about \$200, but were I lucky enough to possess a first edition of the first James Bond book, *Casino Royale*, I would offer it to you for \$1,400.

As for yourself, decide what kind of collector you wish to be. A collector of "reading copies" rather than first editions? Or signed books? Or in one field, such as intelligence? Or the works of one author such as Herbert O. Yardley? Once you make your decision, stick to it.

As for book dealers, unless you are prepared to spend hours poking around those dusty secondhand bookstores, find yourself a dealer with whom you can work and who will work for you. You are not likely to find one in the yellow pages. Your best bet is to consult dealers in your area and obtain copies of directories of specialized dealers.

Anyone truly interested in collecting should subscribe to the principal market journal for used and rare book dealers, *The AB Bookmans Weekly*. This journal contains hundreds of classified ads by dealers offering all sorts of books for sale and seeking other books. The subscription is \$50 per year, and it is worth it. I advertise there regularly.

The *American Book Collector* is a magazine for really serious collectors, probably beyond most of us. It contains a few advertisements but nowhere near as many as *AB*. However, it does publish an annual, *Directory of Specialized American Bookdealers*. It is nicely cross-indexed; it is invaluable.

Finally, here is a British title. Since I believe England is more likely to be the best source for uncommon books on military history and intelligence, let me introduce you to Sheppard Press of London. It publishes a series of very useful specialized directories. Among these is *A Directory of Dealers in Secondhand and Antiquarian Books in the British Isles*. It costs \$21 in the United States.

Beside book dealers there are other sources of secondhand and rare books. There is hardly an area which does not have a book sale, a prime source. Know what you want and

price range. In the Washington, D.C., area the Goodwill sale, the Vassar sale, and the Foreign Service Wives Club sale at the Department of State are all worthwhile. State's is best. It has over 100,000 books, though badly organized, and is held each October. I rarely come away without buying a hundred books at prices ranging from \$3 to \$25.

What about search services? My luck has not been good. I do run ads in *AB* for my customers. An ad costs me \$17; hence, the volume of the want list (or its value) must justify the approach. I recently ran a series of ads for an author who wanted certain research material

and I came up with all he wanted and more.

My last suggestion: talk to your local dealer. As one, I welcome inquiries. I deal only in the books I myself like to read and therefore respond to inquiries with some knowledge. Also, I like to meet people, people with the same passion or addiction. I learn a lot, make new friends. So write, call, and, if in the New England area, do drop in. If possible, call beforehand, since, operating out of my home, I am in and out. The address is: Weston Books, RD 1, Box 90, Weston, Vt. 05161. Telephone 802-824-3033.

At the AFIO Convention:

High-Tech Problem Seen Needing Better Policy Coordination; Listeners Dissent on Intelligence Inhibiting Academicians

by Hans Moses

Two issues—technology transfer from the United States to the Soviet Union and cooperation between the academic and intelligence communities—fueled panel discussions in sunny San Diego, Calif., on Oct. 14-15 as some 200 members and guests of the Association of Former Intelligence Officers (AFIO) gathered for their ninth annual convention.

Also on the agenda were several guest speakers, as well as elections to the Board of Directors and votes on several resolutions. The climax was a rousing address at the closing banquet by former FBI Director Clarence M. Kelley. He stressed the need for strong intelligence and law enforcement establishments, not the least reason being the protection of the very civil rights in whose name they had been attacked.

The scheduled three-man technology transfer panel was reduced to two members because of the recent resignation of Assistant Secretary of Commerce Lawrence J. Brady. The two were moderator Gen. Richard G. Stillwell, who holds a high Defense Department position, and Henry E. Hockeimer, president of the Ford Aerospace and Communications Corp. Both, along with members of the audience, stressed the continuing seriousness of the problem, but Hockeimer also acknowledged the difficulty of enforcing overly pervasive restrictions and suggested the need for better policy coordination, as well as a presidentially supported committee of industrialists.

Under the chairmanship of retired Gen. Eugene F. Tighe, two profes-

Santa Clara, and Richard Gripp of San Diego State University—tackled the issue of academic-intelligence relationships. Professor Goda, declaring himself torn in different directions as a lawyer, Jesuit priest, and ethnic Hungarian, accepted the need for knowledge, including intelligence, as overriding other considerations. Professor Gripp, (interestingly enough a former short-term CIA employee) saw intelligence connections as an inhibiting factor in academic research, and thereby drew vigorous dissent from the floor.

Convention addresses included AFIO President Gen. Francis X. Larkin's on Soviet active measures, a *tour d'horizon* by General Stilwell, and a commentary by Accuracy-in-Media's Reed Irvine on distorted reporting, with emphasis on the sins of CBS-TV.

Intelligence authors David A. Phillips and Lyman Kirkpatrick were re-elected as AFIO directors. Newly elected were Ann Caracristi, former deputy director of the National Security Agency, and John Anson Smith, the organizer of an annual intelligence symposium in Naples, Fla. The convention adopted resolutions against unauthorized disclosure and for making the government, rather than individuals, liable in certain lawsuits; the relief of intelligence agencies from freedom of information rules; and seeking information on military personnel still missing in action in Southeast Asia.

The *Los Angeles Times* and the major San Diego dailies, as well as local television, provided media coverage. The Eastern Seaboard media remained

Futility Chic: Why Richard Helms Doesn't Like John Le Carré

by Jean Findlay

Thomas Powers, in his biography of Richard Helms, *The Man Who Kept the Secrets*, says that "Helms liked the standard spy stories, but there was one spy novel [he] did not like—John Le Carré's *The Spy Who Came in from the Cold*, a bitter and cynical story of violence, betrayal, and spiritual exhaustion. It was not just the violence Helms minded, but the betrayal, the mood of defeat, the meanness, the numb loneliness of a man for whom loyalty had become a joke."

I dislike *Spy* for the same reasons, and I think it is precisely because it is so skewed toward these qualities that it shows Le Carré to be a bad writer.

A novelist must create a real world, or at least one that seems real for as long as it takes to read the book. Le Carré creates a world but, although he is commonly described as a realistic novelist, his is not a real world. It is a rats' alley, where there is little hope for the favorable outcome of any enterprise, but where this doesn't matter much. It is steeped in gloom of the *Cold Comfort Farm* sort, urbanized: traffic shuffles despondently down wet streets, rooms are scruffy, paint and wallpaper are always peeling, villas are like graves, candles are "yellow and dusty like fragments of a tomb." This dismal ambiance is as remote from reality as a sentimental Pollyanna world; in fact, it is inverse sentimentality.

The novelist must people his world with real characters who, because of what they are and what they therefore do, propel the story believably to its close. The reader must care about them, identify with one or more of them. Now, Le Carré has been called not only a realistic but an existential novelist. "Existentialism" is a word tossed about rather freely since it first became fashionable, but it is defined by Bullock and Stallybrass in *The Harper Dictionary of Modern Thought* as "a body of philosophical doctrine that dramatically emphasizes the contrast between human existence and the kind of existence possessed by natural objects."

This, it seems, is exactly what Le Carré does not do. His characters, like his world, are too awful to be real: grotesque, hapless beings who have three strikes on them from the start as they scuttle dispiritedly through the rubble, their maker observing them coldly as he might bacteria in a culture. There is

no true thing on earth," whines someone in *A Murder of Quality*. George Smiley can say, "During the war the enemy was someone we could point at and read about in the papers. Today all I know is that I have learned to interpret the whole of life in terms of conspiracy." These people lack free will, so that there is little contrast between their existence and that of natural objects.

Am I asking that life be sugar-coated? Of course not; life can be vicious. But in life the reptilian figure of a Blunt is balanced by an Admiral Stockdale, who for eight years sustained his fellow prisoners in North Vietnam through his moral leadership, calling on his love for the great novelists and philosophers for help in "detering self-pity when *in extremis*." And the spectrum between these two personalities progresses through every kind and degree of strength and resolution.

The novelist must have a good story to tell and tell it well, keep the reader reading. The reader turns the pages to find out what will happen. Very little happens in a Le Carré novel. The man seems to be not only contemptuous of people but fed up with life. After the early books—which, though miserable, do move fast and must have been the ones that prompted Walter Laqueur to observe in the June 1983 *Commentary* that Le Carré "might have become the English Simenon"—came *A Small Town in Germany*, no good omen, and then the "straight" novel, *The Naive and Sentimental Lover*. The reception given this embarrassment must have been traumatic for Le Carré—a watershed, as Meg Greenfield would put it. At any rate, it was after the failure of *Lover* that he fled back to the Circus to write tales of such perverse and self-indulgent elaboration

that they are almost impossible to read. The slender plots are so overgrown with thickets of mannered prose that it is hard work to hack one's way through. To change the metaphor, Le Carré lays a lot of smoke, in which characters flicker in and out, dim events pass and are forgotten, endless irrelevant pages must be skipped and left in limbo.

Why then is this writer such a critical and popular success? He is "one of the great storytellers of our time," "the premier spy novelist of his time, perhaps of all time," and writes "with emotional truth and large moral resonance." He sells, I think, because much of the public is cowed by statements like these, made by trendy critics who inflate his talent because it is chic to be futile, to see life as a stacked deck. This is "existential." Laqueur mentions Le Carré's "sensitivity to political fashion... perfectly in harmony with the Zeitgeist." Millions of copies of these books are bought. How many are read to the end with pleasure? What are the word-of-mouth sales?

In *Spy*, the convinced Marxist Fieldler asks Leamas, the spy, what his philosophy is. The movie, as I remember it, improved on this by having Oskar Werner almost shout at Richard Burton, "*How do you live?*" At rare intervals, clearings in the underbrush, we see in the later books a return to the simpler, early manner, and we care, for a while, about the old woman who is mugged in Paris, the murdered Russian general. Le Carré could write about people who live if he had a mind to do so. It would be fun—*fun*—to have an English Simenon.

Jean Findlay served in the OSS in Washington, Algiers, Italy, and Austria. Now retired from the CIA she does many things, especially Russian translations.

Books In Review

What Does Constantinides Say?

Intelligence and Espionage: An Analytical Bibliography. By George C. Constantinides. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1983. 559pp. \$60.

Those who knew George Constantinides was writing this volume found themselves in recent months—it seems like years—asking one another: When is George's book coming out?

Publication having at last made that question passé, there now appears a new question which anyone discussing an intelligence book will be asking: "What does Constantinides have to say about it?"

Despite the unbelievable price, his book is a must. Constantinides is a government retiree with an intelligence background, a lifelong penchant for

(Constantinides . . . cont. from p. 6)

serious reading, and a scholarly habit of making notes on what he reads. The proof is in this volume: 500 books in English on intelligence and counterintelligence all briefly, factually, analytically, and critically evaluated, compared, and contrasted. There simply is nothing like it—the product of Constantinides' scholarship and an idea of Fred Praeger of Westview Press, and no one interested in the field can afford not to consult or read it.

Yet the reader might as well know at the outset that this is not a book to be read from cover to cover. Admittedly it is possible; after all, it is a collection of reviews with a common theme which theoretically could carry a reader along a railroad track. However, as the poetess said, "There are shapes by the way; there are things that appall or entice us." It is those "things" which will pull the reader hither and yon—and do so to his excitement. For instance:

Begin at page 53, the first page of text, with Constantinides' first entry (and *en passant* notice the fullness of a typical entry):

Accoce, Pierre, and Quet, Pierre. *A Man Called Lucy*. New York: Coward-McCann, 1967. 248pp., bibliog., no index [London: W.H. Allen. *The Lucy Ring*].

One quickly learns, in 15 lines, of the controversy surrounding this account of the Lucy ring in Switzerland in World War II and particularly of the strong denunciation of it by the Soviet agent Sandor Rado. What will one do at this point: resolutely go on to the second entry or, curious about Rado, turn to the index for guidance and satisfaction? Taking the only route possible, the reader will find in the index 10 more page references to Rado. Turning to the first of these, on page 116, he finds a brief mention of Rado's own book, *Codename Dora*, which, of course, he quickly locates on page 358. There he finds a brief account of Rado plus tempting references to David Dallin's *Soviet Espionage*, Alexander Foote's *Handbook for Spies*, and the CIA's *The Rote Kapelle*. Shall he continue with Rado, or take up with the Rote Kapelle? It probably will be some time before the reader gets back to that second entry, George Agabekov's *OGPU*.

This is a book which one can pick up and read at any page and then wander back and forth, freely and happily, visiting and revisiting books, personalities, events, problems, and controversies and always enjoying—and sometimes

contesting—the evaluations, comparisons, and suggestions, which Constantinides knowingly, responsibly, and succinctly offers the reader.

This is, in short, a standard reference work for anyone dealing with the literature of intelligence. Intelligence officers (active and retired), spy buffs, professors and students, book reviewers and publishers, newsmen, lawyers, and publicists—all these and more will henceforward find themselves first checking with Constantinides. Their disappointment will be the inevitable absence from this collection of some special book which is either too obscure or too remote from intelligence or too new to have been included. At least they can tell Constantinides to get on with the second volume and the publisher not to take so long producing it and to get the price down so even a rich man can buy it!

Absolute Rot

by Joseph F. Hosey

The Children's Game. By David Wise.
New York: St. Martin's/Marek, 1983.
280pp. \$14.95.

If the publisher had not chosen to make a point of presenting this book as one that "takes us deep into the CIA and into the world of espionage," it would not be worth the slightest public notice. However, it has been noticed and extravagantly praised, and it is not very consoling to reflect that such praise could arise only from a profound ignorance of both the art of the novel and the realities of espionage.

In a review in *The Washington Post*, Jonathan Yardley called it a "controlled and sophisticated work of fiction." According to an advertisement in *Book World*, Daniel Schorr thinks it offers "intimate knowledge of the real world of espionage," and Paul Newman says it "reveals the dark underside of U.S. foreign policy."

Absolute rot. Wise has given us a gelatinous slab of tripe which has nothing to do with either the real CIA or the real world of espionage, but which portrays an agency that never was. It's an agency that was perpetually engaged in a tangle of nonoperations conducted by amateur moral philosophers, one of whom pontificates in a moment of sudden illumination that "the agency isn't evil, it's the world we're trying to cope with." Such philosophers are led by a crew of directors whose incompetence would ruin any small retail business, but whose cleverness successfully de-

ceives their colleagues, the public, and the political leaders of the country they serve, and has finally gotten them into a situation in which operations are consistently compromised and the penetration of the agency at a very high level is suspected. Bill Danner, who has left the agency in disgust, is recalled to get at the facts, and he finds himself once again in a world of cross-purposes, double-dealing, mutual distrust, and clubby exclusiveness through which he moves in a mood of sulky defiance until all problems are solved. The standard sexual dimension is provided by a love affair with his colleague Julie Norris. Of course, he doesn't really trust her.

Now it must be admitted that the CIA is an organization of human beings, and it has the tendency of any human group to degenerate into a cynical, self-perpetuating oligarchy with insiders and outsiders, unofficial channels of power, and overlapping circles of influence. The same characteristic has been noticed in the College of Cardinals, the German General Staff, the Comintern, and the U.S. Senate, and competent writers have used this unhappy human condition to create significant works of fiction. Anthony Trollope, for instance, used it with delicate skill in the Barchester novels.

It must also be admitted that engagement in secret work can have disruptive effects on one's personality and philosophy. And the dramatic and often tragic consequences of this disruption can provide a novelist with solid, workable material, such as Joseph Conrad uses superbly in *The Secret Agent* and *Under Western Eyes*.

However, it is also true that these dismal facts of organizational and private life do not constitute the whole story, and mere repetitive, dreary insistence on them does not constitute a novel. Nor does a liberal scattering of pseudo-jargon ("moles," "gnomes," "dirty tricks," and so forth), or knowing allusions ("The Shanghai Restaurant out on Lee Highway was a favorite hang-out for agency people. . ."), or scatological monosyllables convert political journalism into authentic fiction.

A novel develops through a series of credible, consistent, and related events experienced by credible, consistent, and related personalities whose desires, aversions, hopes, anxieties, courage, cowardice, love, hate, energy, laziness, and relationships—in short, whose realized human characteristics—can be seen moving the nar-

rative forward. The plot of this book is a manifest absurdity both in general outline and in detail. The characters are cardboard cutouts the author presents to us in a series of statements, but who do not move through the story under their own power. For instance, even if we are prepared to admit the everyday likelihood that the Director of Central Intelligence might meet the Director of the KGB in a ski lift to plan the assassination of the president of the Soviet Union, we have no firm grasp of the character of either man nor of the necessarily complex course of each life which has brought them to this curious encounter. We are *told*, of course, that "Brooks Jordan lived for power. . . was totally absorbed in its pursuit and exercise" and that Aleksandr Pavlov had "a special talent for protecting his flanks and advancing through the hierarchy at Dzerzhinsky Square." We are told—but we do not see Jordan living for power or Pavlov protecting his flanks. Nor do we see any of the other characters in the book living out what is asserted about them. Their wooden behavior demonstrates only the author's intention to perpetuate the most fatuous, popular misconceptions about intelligence activity and the people who conduct it.

Let us hope that not everyone will be taken in by the venal blurb of a dust jacket and that this novel will mercifully be allowed to find its quiet way to the remainder tables.

Hosey, holding a Ph.D. in English literature and now retired from intelligence service, frequently reviews fiction in *FILS*.

He Ran Thatta Way

by Paul M. Rosa

The Flight of the Falcon. By Robert Lindsey. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1983. 328pp., \$15.95.

"Could anyone in this chamber tell me what has become of Mr. Boyce?" asked Daniel Patrick Moynihan on the floor of the U.S. Senate. The senator was posing the question for good reason. Eighteen days before, on Jan. 21, 1980, convicted spy Christopher John Boyce had disappeared without a trace from the maximum security prison at Lompoc, Calif., and thus initiated a nineteen-month manhunt that would span the globe.

No question about it, this one is a thriller. In a brilliant piece of writing, Robert Lindsey, the *New York Times* Los Angeles bureau chief, gives his

readers a spellbinding saga of the Boyce manhunt. *The Flight of the Falcon* is the sequel to Lindsey's first work, *The Falcon and the Snowman*, which chronicled the adventures of Christopher John Boyce, former altar boy, son of an ex-FBI agent, and employee of TRW (a CIA contractor), who became a Soviet spy. *The Falcon and the Snowman*, a resounding success, was ultimately printed in seven languages and is presently being filmed by Twentieth Century Fox for release in the fall of 1984 with Timothy Hutton playing the lead role. The sequel is no less a masterpiece than the first work.

The Flight of the Falcon is as much a story about the U.S. Marshals Service as it is about Christopher Boyce. The Boyce case was the marshals' first big case since they were given jurisdiction over fugitives, a task formerly performed by the FBI. With their reputation on the line, the marshals pulled out all the stops in their quest to find Boyce after his escape from Lompoc. Fueled by media speculation that the KGB or the CIA had engineered Boyce's escape, the barrage of publicity about the event generated over 800 reported sightings of Boyce, each of which had to be checked out. The reports ran the spectrum from genuinely concerned citizens to psychics and a veritable parade of con artists and flimflam artists trying to lead the marshals on a wild goose chase.

And chase wild geese they did. The stories placed Boyce in Australia, South Africa, Costa Rica, Mexico, and numerous points in North America. So good were the con men that the marshals actually deployed their task force to Johannesburg, South Africa, and San José, Costa Rica. Every time they were about to spring their traps, they missed their prey. This happened because Boyce wasn't there. In each case the only people who were waiting were the marshals and the con men. In the end it turned out that at no point did the marshals have any idea where Boyce really was.

While the marshals were running around in Mexico, Boyce was in a bar in Bonners Ferry, Idaho, laughing at their boasts on the evening news that they were one campfire behind him in Mexico. Boyce had made his way up the Pacific Coast and had settled down in the mountainous Idaho panhandle, a scant distance from the Canadian border, a place where Americans still live in log cabins without electricity and where third-generation moonshiners

still recall the fine points of border running handed down by their grandparents. This time, though, Boyce was getting his excitement and his income from robbing banks, rather than spying.

From Idaho Boyce moved on to Montana and then to the rain forests of Washington's Olympic Peninsula, where he lived the life of a fisherman. His ultimate undoing was not good detective work but a well-publicized reward which tempted his partners in crime. Boyce's freedom ended when federal agents with drawn guns cornered him in a drive-in restaurant in Port Angeles, Wash. The irony of the story is that despite the herculean efforts of the Marshals Service, it was the FBI that developed the crucial lead that led to his recapture.

Although Lindsey's book makes good reading, a caveat is in order for the serious historian. Of necessity, Lindsey relied heavily on the accounts given by the marshals. The reader is left with the impression that on more than one occasion the marshals were winking at Lindsey in much the same way as the con men pulled the wool over their eyes. This is apparent in the vignette in which Lindsey tells how the agents conceived a "black bag job" to whisk Boyce out of Costa Rica to avoid extradition problems. The plan supposedly included the surreptitious repositioning of an executive jet painted black with all markings obliterated. This seems a little far-fetched for an operation prepared on the spur of the moment for quiet execution.

The marshals also evidenced a tendency to take credit for much of the FBI's work, as well as to create a false impression of cooperation with other agencies. Rather than the principal informers coming to the FBI in Denver, the marshals imply that they developed their main source in Bonners Ferry. They also tell of an interagency convoy of Border Patrol, Forest Service, and other agencies raiding an abandoned mine where they thought Boyce might be hiding, as well as the repositioning of a Border Patrol tracking team during a stakeout in case Boyce turned rabbit and headed for Canada. In reality, the informers had never been to the mine where Boyce had stayed and thus could not have led the agents there. Further, the mine was inaccessible by road and could only be reached on foot. At no time did the marshals confide in the Border Patrol, the Forest

Service, or the local authorities and, even if they had, the Border Patrol had only two agents to cover 7,000 square miles of mountainous terrain and 23 back roads leading into Canada. They were not in a position to field a tracking team even if they had been asked to do so. In light of these examples, the serious historian is advised to consult the original source documents.

Absent such a professional interest, however, the casual reader can sit back and enjoy a reasonably reliable account that is fast-paced, action-packed, and quite sobering.

The reviewer is an attorney and investigative historian and served as the investigative member of the defense team in *United States v. Christopher J. Boyce, et al.*

Norway, "An Intelligence Big Power"

by Stevan Dedijer

The Secret Norway. By C. Christensen. In Norwegian. Oslo: Atheneum, 1983.

C. Christensen, a well-known Norwegian editor and columnist, served in his country's intelligence service during World War II and from 1947 to 1955. His book, according to the author of the foreword, "represents a breakthrough in greater public openness [on the part of] the Norwegian secret services." Its concluding chapter, "Today—in 1983," pleads for a greater Norwegian intelligence effort in the period when "Moscow is after world domination." It ends with the sentence: "A nation that neglects and that does not support its so-called secret services has no future in freedom."

Based on interviews with some of the top Norwegian intelligencers, and with an endorsement of the research by the Norwegian Department of Defense, the book describes Norway's intelligence effort under the leadership of Vilhelm Evang, from 1946 to 1966, in the "cold war, the third world war," when Norway was among the first European countries to organize a "stay behind" intelligence network under the threat of Soviet invasion. In the chapter "Norway, A Big Power," Christensen claims that at that time Norway was by its own effort—and not as William Colby claims with help from the United States—"an Intelligence Big Power."

Christensen's book, by describing this past intelligence (1946–1966), has raised a considerable political storm by pointing out the somewhat paranoid role of the leftist and social dem-

ocratic parties on the problems of national intelligence. This plea by a politically conservative personality for greater public understanding, and hence openness, on the part of the national intelligence effort would be old hat in the United States. However, in European democracies, still clinging to the traditional dogma that a "secret service must be totally secret," it is a breakthrough.

Dedijer is a pensioned but not retired professor at Lund University in Sweden. See his letter to the editor, p. 12. This review and his letter make, as he notes, a report from *SILS*, the *Scandinavian Intelligence Literary Scene*.

OTHER NEW BOOKS

History

Eccles, David and Sybil. *By Safe Hand: Letters of Sybil and David Eccles.* London: Bodley Head, 1983. 431pp.

Long a resident in Spain before 1939 as a railroad executive, David Eccles on the outbreak of war became advisor to the Ministry of Economic Warfare on Spanish affairs. Unlike the ministry, he favored a flexible policy on economic aid to Spain in order to keep it neutral. In these letters to and from his wife back home—letters carefully and substantially pruned by husband David, his wife being dead—there is much wartime policy, economic warfare, propaganda, some intelligence, and much personal news and views of numerous personalities.

Howe, Ellic. *The Black Game: British Subversive Operations against the Germans during the Second World War.* London: Michael Joseph, 1982. 276pp. \$22.95.

Ellic Howe's background made him fit for the job. Before the war he accidentally became a printer—not the conventional commercial printer—but a gentleman scholar deeply interested in the development of printing from the 1450s to the present. Thus he was ready in 1939 for wartime fakery and forgery, for the sophisticated business of fooling Germans by giving them British propaganda in the form of German news, views, and entertainment. He has given us here not an exciting but certainly an informative account of Britain's printed and oral World War II black propaganda. His hero is Sefton Delmer of "Gustave Siegfried Eins" fame and *Black Boomerang*.

Irons, Peter. *Justice at War.* New York and Oxford: Oxford, 1983.

Peter Irons is not only a lawyer and political science professor, but he is also acting as *pro bono publico* attorney for three Japanese-Americans who in 1942 unsuccessfully challenged the wartime internment order. The intelligence angle in this account of that famous action is a high-level administration battle over a key military report of Japanese espionage in this country.

Lorain, Pierre. *Clandestine Operations: The Arms and Techniques of the Resistance, 1941-1944.* Adapted into English by David Kahn. New York: Macmillan, 1983. 185pp. \$24.95.

One might argue that the English title is not as accurate as the original French *Armement Clandestine*; even so, this is a valuable 1972 book which David Kahn has recovered for English readers. With luminously clear line drawings—Lorain is an architect—it presents a detailed, descriptive—but readable—catalogue of clandestine radios, cipher systems, aircraft, and weapons which were such an indispensable element of World War II clandestine operations of the French Resistance.

Rohwer, Jürgen. *Axis Submarine Successes 1939-1945.* Updated translation of *Die U-Boot-Erfolge Der Achsenmächte 1939-1945*, originally published in 1968. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1983. 386pp. \$23.95.

One need only glance at this reference work to appreciate how meticulously and exhaustively German naval historian Jürgen Rohwer has succeeded in identifying and detailing Axis submarine successes in World War II. In tabular form here are such details as the targeted vessel's name, nationality, type, and tonnage; the attacking vessel's name, nationality, and captain; and the date, time, and location of the attack. The indexes provide naval charts, lists of U-boats, U-boat captains, convoys, and ships attacked.

West, Nigel. *MI 6: British Secret Intelligence Operations 1909-45.* London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1983. 266pp. £9.95.

Nigel West has written two books on MI 5, one on the period of 1905 to 1945 and the other on 1945 to 1972, and has covered a hundred years (under his true name of Rupert Allason) of the Metropolitan Police Special Branch. In this new book he gives us the first 30 years of MI 6 in the first half of the book and the wartime years in the second half. Included here are a chapter titled

"OSS: The Unsecret Service" and another called "Soviet Penetration." Also printed here is an English translation of a 1940 German report on British intelligence.

Other Subjects

Daly, Lt. Col. Ron Reid. *Selous Scouts: Top Secret War*. As told to Peter Stiff. Alberton, South Africa: Galago Publishing, 1982. 432pp. £15.95.

This is a regimental history, but not of the ordinary kind of regiment. The Selous Scouts Regiment of Rhodesia was formed in 1973. Its name came from Frederick Courteney Selous, an African hunter known to President Theodore Roosevelt and Kaiser Wilhelm and made famous as Alan Quartermain in Rider Haggard's *King Solomon's Mines*. The regiment's purpose was the clandestine elimination of African terrorists in and outside of Rhodesia. Its story is told here by the man who organized and led it.

Gooch, John, and Amos Perlmutter, eds. *Military Deception and Strategic Surprise*. London: Cass, 1982. 192pp.

This group of articles by Barton Whaley, Michael Mihalka, Janice Gross Stein, Michael I. Handel, Donald C. Daniel, and Katherine L. Herbig first appeared in a special issue of *The Journal of Strategic Studies*, March 1982 (5/1).

Janke, Peter. *Guerrilla and Terrorist Organizations: A World Directory and Bibliography*. Brighton, Sussex, England: Harvester Press, 1983. 531pp. \$65.00

The organizations are listed alphabetically by continent and country. The material for each organization runs to a paragraph or two, or a page or two. The author, Peter Janke, now the head of research at Control Risks, Ltd. in London, has written books on 19th-century Spain, the Spanish Basques, South Africa, and Ulster.

McGarvey, Robert and Elise Caitlin. *The Complete Spy: An Insider's Guide to the Latest in High-Tech Espionage & Equipment*. New York: Perigee Books, 1983. 192pp. \$9.95 (paperback).

You're a Bondian Walter Mitty, a spy for hire but, say the authors, you can't do your job in this "murky" world, this "darkly glittering business," without the tools of the trade. Hey, man, "Technology... is the essence of this world." In this spooked- and spoofed-up catalogue of security equipment you should be able to find what you need: a false identity kit (\$59.95), a Heavy Hand glove, Bulletproof Vest, Wrist-amic camera, Constable's Whistle (only \$6.50), a Supercan, and a Therm-

son submachine gun (\$469.95). And when you're through enjoying *The Complete Spy* run it through your Rexell Shredder, whose models range from \$650 to \$6,995.

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Jeffreys-Jones, Rhodri. "The Defictionalization of American Private Detection." *Journal of American Studies*, August 1983 (17/2), pp. 265-274.

Karpel, Craig S. "John Le Carré's Jerusalem: Time to Bring Smiley in from the Cold." *The Listener*, Sept. 29, 1983 (110/2828), pp. 13-14. So inaccurate, did he really write it?

Morris, Donald R. [On John Le Carré's spy jargon] *Verbatim*, Autumn 1982 (9/2), pp. 3-5. Must reading for non-professionals.

Pope, Sam. "The Study of Intelligence." Comment on intelligence publications of the Consortium for the Study of Intelligence. *RUSI*, September 1983 (128/3), pp. 58-59. Pope, retired from the Marines, now is with the RUSI Research Department.

Summers, Col. Harry G., Jr. "Delta Force: America's Counterterrorist Unit and the Mission to Rescue the Hostages in Iran by Colonel Charlie A. Beckwith U.S. Army, retired, and Donald Knox." *Military Review*, November 1983 (63/11), pp. 21-27.

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FOR YOUR INFORMATION

World War II Printed Propaganda

Do you collect "black" and/or "white" World War II printed propaganda? If so, you might find help in two sources mentioned by Ellic Howe in *The Black Game: British Subversive Operations against the Germans during the Second World War* (London

Michael Joseph, 1982, \$22.95).
 First, there is Herr Klaus Kirchner, who has begun publishing a series of volumes on the production of British, American, German and Soviet printed wartime propaganda. As a hobbyist he runs his *Verlag für Zeitgeschichtliche Dokumente und Curiosa* at Luitpoldstrasse 58, D-8520 Erlangen, West Germany. He has also organized exhibitions of all forms of materials from the leaflet war.
 The second source is British, the Psywar Society, founded in 1958 by R.G. Auckland (60 High St., Sandridge, Herts). The society caters to the interests of collectors and students of similar material and has an international membership of about 200. Auckland edits and publishes *The Falling Leaf* (a quarterly). He and his colleagues have produced a chronological list of white leaflets produced by Britain's wartime Political Warfare Executive and disseminated by the RAF from 1939 onward.

News of Michael John Bettaney

In the last issue, *FILS* noted (p. 9) the cryptic newspaper account of the arrest in London last September of one Michael John Bettaney. Some details are now found in a story in *The Times* (see "In the Newspapers," p. 10). Bettaney, 33, an Oxford graduate and an MI 5 officer, faces several charges under the Official Secrets Act of having, collecting, and passing on to another person information harmful to state safety or interest. In particular, he is said to have disclosed information on the expulsion of three Soviet diplomats from Britain earlier this year and of passing on a British intelligence assessment of a KGB network operating in Britain. Nothing has been said, however, about the identity of those with whom Bettaney has been working.

Seaman Z Steps Forward

FILS, in its June 1982 issue (p. 1), offered a \$100 reward for the identification of "Seaman First-Class Z." His identity became a matter of some interest when some World War II testimony of his was used by John Toland in *Infamy: Pearl Harbor and Its Aftermath* to buttress the thesis that President Franklin D. Roosevelt had advance knowledge of Japanese ships heading toward Hawaii early in December 1941.

Seaman Z, who had personal reasons for remaining anonymous, has now apparently come forward on his own. In May he was interviewed by a retired naval intelligence officer, Cmdr. I.G. New-

(cont. on p. 12)

man. He was identified on Nov. 30 when the text of the interview was turned over by the National Security Agency to the naval historian's office in Washington, D.C. Seaman Z is now known to be Robert D. Ogg, a retired Kentfield, Calif., businessman, who at this juncture seems unwilling to add anything more to that interview or even accept telephone calls on the subject.

Also as of now the interview seems not to settle the controversy about FDR's foreknowledge of the attack at Pearl Harbor on Dec. 7, 1941. For information on availability and price of a copy of the 16,000-word interview, write or call John Taylor, Modern Military Records, National Archives, Washington, D.C. 20408 (Tel.: 202-523-3340). The document is one of the Special Research Histories (SRH) released by NSA and is numbered SRH-255.

HEARD HERE OR THERE

- That Nadya Ulanovskiy, wife of Ulrich, one of the late Whitaker Chambers' controllers, has published in Israel a book about their life.
- That Roy Berkley is doing an illustrated spy guide of London town.
- That author John Toland (*Infamy: Pearl Harbor and Its Aftermath*) has given up writing history and is now at work on a World War II novel.
- That groups in both Canada and Great Britain are interested in setting up something like Roy Godson's Consortium for the Study of Intelligence which was accorded favorable acknowledgement by retired British marine Sam Pope in *RUSI* (September 1983), pp. 58-59.
- That someone on the Senate appropriations committee has blocked the appropriation for the Defense Intelligence College—only recently elevated from a school to a college—by asking, after the fact, "Why is it a college?"
- That Houghton Mifflin Co. will be publishing the book being written by former Director of Central Intelligence Stansfield Turner.

TO THE EDITOR

Clio Goes Spying

May I bring to your attention a book in the works in Sweden? It records one more excursion of Clio, the muse of history, into the field of intelligence. It is *Clio Goes Spying: Eight Essays on the History of Intelligence*. Edited by W. Agrell and B. Hult, Approved For Release 2005/07/28 : CIA-RDP93B01194R001000200009-0

Lund Studies in International History and will be published in 1984 by Sweden's Lund University.

The book is the result of an international conference held in 1979 to honor my effort to promote ARTSI, the Academic Research, Teaching and Study of Intelligence. Chinese modesty makes me record only its appearance and contents.

The book includes two essays on the 17th century: E. Opitz from Germany on diplomacy and secret communications in the age of European absolutism, and mine on an Elizabethan vision of the role of the British secret service in Pax Britannica. Four essays deal with World War II: Germany's J. Rohwer on radio intelligence in the battle of the Atlantic; Denmark's J. Hostrup on intelligence in the European resistance movement, and J. Cederberg and G. Elgemyr from Sweden on Swedish-Finnish intelligence cooperation in the closing stages of the war. The last two essays deal with the future: W. Agrell from Sweden on patterns in the development of future national intelligence and J. Zitomirsky from the United States on historical intelligence as history and intelligence.

On another subject, some corrections in "Tito's 'Air'" (*FILS*, October 1983) are in order: V. Cenich, the author of *The Kopinich Enigma*, is still alive. Kopinich met Tito in 1935, and he established Tito-Moscow radio contact in early 1942.

S. Dedljer
Lund, Sweden

CHRONOLOGY

October 31, 1983

Sawatsky a Prize Winner

John Sawatsky's *For Services Rendered: Leslie James Bennett and the RCMP Security Service* was given the Author's Award in Toronto, Canada, as the best nonfiction paperback book of 1983. The award, carrying a cash prize of \$750, was made at the seventh annual awards dinner of the Periodical Distributors of Canada, who sponsor the awards through their Foundation for the Advancement of Canadian Letters.

November 4, 1983

Proposed CSIS Killed

For the present Canada has killed a proposal to replace the Security Service of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police by a new Canadian Intelligence Security Service (see *FILS*, October 1983).

cy was endorsed by 11 of 12 members of a special bipartisan Senate committee, but the committee, tabling its report on Bill C-157, said almost every section of the bill needed amendments to ensure the writing of proper guidelines and the protection of civil liberties. The bill will be revised and submitted to a new session of Parliament.

November 17, 1983

Senate Endorses Museum

The U.S. Senate unanimously passed Resolution No. 267 favoring the establishment of a proposed National Historical Intelligence Museum. See "An Intelligence Museum: Not 'Whether?' But 'Where?'" (p. 1).

FOR YOUR CALENDAR

May 29, 1984

In celebration of the 40th anniversary of the invasion of Europe in 1944 the Veterans of OSS are helping to organize an interallied Jedburgh Reunion to convene in Paris on May 29 and then to be followed later by regional reunions. Jedburgh was the code name given to the three-man OSS/SOE teams which parachuted into France to help arm, train, and coordinate the activities of the French Resistance. (See Aug. 15-19 entry below.)

July 13-21, 1984

The Consortium for the Study of Intelligence (CSI) will sponsor its third annual summer faculty seminar at Bowdoin College in Brunswick, Maine. The seminar, for college or university teachers of intelligence, aims to deepen knowledge of the intelligence process and product, improve the teaching of the subject, and promote professional contacts among scholars in the field. Approximately 25 candidates will be selected for the seminar. Applications must be returned to CSI by Feb. 17, 1984. Additional information and application forms can be obtained from Professor Roy Godson, CSI, 1730 Rhode Island Ave., N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036 (Tel.: 202-429-0129).

August 15-19, 1984

OSS veterans will cooperate with their French counterpart, "Amicale Action," in the latter's annual reunion. This will be held in St. Raphael-Montellimar and will commemorate the D-Day landings and subsequent military actions in the south of France. Both this celebration and the Jedburgh Reunion are part of the OSS veterans' continuing effort to promote ties among the al-

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