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DRAFT

MINUTES

SEVENTEENTH MEETING

OF

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE SCIENCE

AND TECHNOLOGY ADVISORY PANEL

26-27 JUNE 1980

(Approved by STAP on )

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CIA AGENCY-WIDE LONG-RANGE PLANNING- [redacted] Special Assistant to the DCI 25X1

The Agency long-range plan is still evolving. Last July (1979) in response to STAP recommendations, the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence sent a memorandum to the Executive Committee (ExCom) asking that a study of the Agency long-range planning process be undertaken by the ExCom Staff. A long-range issues planning paper was produced. The paper concluded that although the Agency is doing well in planning, improvements are in order. [redacted] 25X1

The current plan is to evaluate the present planning and management issues, recommend areas for improvement, and identify long-range planning issues. This should be completed by November. Weekly meetings of Agency planners are being held. They have discovered that a number of planning programs already exist. For example, Data Processing already has an Agency-wide long-range plan; NFAC has a five-year plan; and the Office of Communications has a nine-year plan. [redacted] 25X1

The next step will be to identify major foreign policy and management issues. This raises a number of questions. Should, or can, the two lists be linked and interrelated? Should they be tied to resources? If so, how will the Agency comptroller fit into the plan? How much detail should be included? It is hoped that this first cut will be completed by November 1980. [redacted] 25X1

In the discussion that followed, STAP felt that it was good that the Agency was facing up to the issues in planning and that the

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planning is being tied to resources. The process is considered the most important benefit of long-range planning, not the production of a formal planning document; it must be a continuous process that actively involves top management. Constant support is important and is necessary for R&D plannig. Some concern was expressed that the planning process described was not for the entire Intelligence Community, but only CIA. Exemplary projects, 25X1
should be publicized as examples of things 25X1
that have gone well. There was concern that the planning period was only five years, a period too short when lead-times of 10-20 years are involved in scientific and technical areas. 25X1

STAP believes that the real value of the planning exercise is that it forces the players to go through the planniing process, not to produce a report or product. 25X1

CIA RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT PLAN-- Chief, Planning and Resources Staff, DDS&T 25X1

The principal goals of the R&D Plan were identified as: 1) support for the Operations Directorate; 2) enhancement of the Foreign Broadcast Information Service; 3) complete and timely exploitation of new types of imagery; 4) CIA support for the SIGINT Program 25X1
5) continued support to National Intelligence Programs; 6) 25X1
planning and execution of an Agency-wide RD&E program responsive to and consistent with the other goals, as well as the requirements of the Administration Directorate and the National Foreign Assessment

Center. 25X1

The two major requirements of the plan are to enhance productivity throughout the Agency and to respond tc world trends and/or increasingly hostile environments. Because of that, the highest quality equipment must be used everywhere. In days past, there were relatively few areas of the world that required the best equipment. 25X1

A number of problems result. 25X1 25X1

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R&D planning is a year-long process. Each directorate develops its long-term requirements, reviews RDSE proposals and then ranks the requirements and proposals. The DDS&T develops the proposals and structures a comprehensive program consistent with on-going activities, new initiatives, and funding constraints. 25X1

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[redacted] 25X1

[redacted] 25X1

Operations support gets the largest single share of the RD&E budget primarily because the hostile threat is increasing. [redacted] 25X1

[redacted] 25X1

[redacted] 25X1

Because resources are not keeping pace with requirements, productivity must be enhanced. [redacted] 25X1

[redacted] 25X1

Future improvements appear to be limited by the growth of available funds. The RD&E program funds will grow in excess of 5% real growth per year. Most of this will go to upgrading NPIC. Growth of this size will allow only modest endeavors to be undertaken and it will not allow more than one significant program simultaneously. The RD&E costs may tend to be overshadowed by the high costs associated with producing many copies of multi purpose devices. Production costs

which are too high are becoming an increasing problem, especially in DDO support. Some development has been cancelled because of this. 25X1

STAP feels that the Agency R&D Plan appears to be well developed with clear goals and requirements. 25X1

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

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SOVIET SEMICONDUCTOR MANUFACTURING-- OER 25X1

The Soviets started late in manufacturing semiconductors compared to other producers. In 1969 they were producing only about 100,000 units compared to 30,000,000 in the United States. In 1973 they launched a major effort to acquire foreign technology to build plants. Most of their acquisitions have been covert. Equipment sometimes passes through three or four countries before arriving in the USSR. Soviet current output is 300-400,000,000 units per year. Western equipment has been critical to their expansion. 25X1

Soviet semiconductor technology primarily uses bipolar logic with digital circuits. Although most Soviet production is based on Western design, the CMOS processor appears to be of indigenous Soviet design. This may be an indicator that they realize that they cannot copy indefinitely or they will be hurt. Still, they may already be so far behind the West that they cannot catch up. 25X1

The Soviets continue to import large quantities of semiconductor items. Besides the equipment mentioned above, they are importing photo resistors and packing materials, both silicon and silicone. 25X1

In the discussion, STAP expressed concern about the flow of equipment and raw materials to the Soviet Union. Although some US 25X1

others appear indifferent. It will be extremely difficult to stem the flow entirely because there are so many sources for technology.

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FUTURE COMMUNICATIONS-- Director of Communications 25X1

The Office of Communications dates back to the OSS. Initially all communication was by HF radio, serving basically two customers--the DDO and the Department of State. There has been a continual growth in volume of traffic and numbers of customers with no signs of abatement. Most of the equipment in use today is extremely old. Although it is still working, it cannot handle the volume, which puts a tremendous load on the people operating the systems. 25X1

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Like other areas of the Agency, inflation is causing problems in

replacing aging equipment. In constant dcllars, the budget is decreasing slightly while the cost cf equipment is rising. In addition, they are losing experienced personnel, putting a heavier burden on those who are left. 25X1

The Office of Communications is currently confronting the following issues:

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+ Demography-changes in the population: people have different interests; more women in work force; zero population growth.

+ Investment Strategy--meeting the new high-technology needs with available resources. 25X1

STAP thinks that communication is clearly an important function and that maximum efforts should be made to keep the Agency current with the technology. In line with this, efforts should be made to join communications with data processing. 25X1

DISCUSSION WITH BRUCE CLARKE AND EVAN HINEMAN

The discussions with Bruce Clarke and Evan Hineman centered on three major topics: How can STAP help NFAC?; Evaluation of ELINT Satellite Collection; and the Senior Review Panel review of NFAC Production. 25X1

On the topic of STAP helping NFAC, the problem of what to present to the new administration after the elections in November. In the discussions that followed STAP suggested that the Agency's view of the world not be presented; in all probability, the new President will already have his own world view. Instead the briefings should concentrate on US capabilities in intelligence and problem areas. Among the problem areas are the vulnerability of satellites, the need to get more deeply into non-military intelligence such as economic warfare and food as a weapon. 25X1

Another suggestion was to give the new administration a sense of thetrends in the world tcda. These would include such areas as Intelligence collection, arms control, verification, and the overall strategic situation, to name a few. 25X1

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Finally, it was suggested that a briefing on the most important problems that the new administrationwculd immediately face. Then present a sort of "intelligence Berlitz course" to help the new administration members assimilate as much infcrmation as quickly as possible to help them meet those problems. 25X1

Evan Hineman then raised the question of ELINT collection and the balance between strategic and tactical. He felt that perhaps too muchemphasis is being placec on the collection of tactical ELINT and asked that STAP review this situatien. His fear is that not enough "strategic ELINT" is available which results in many analysts having "blinders on" in this area. 25X1

Mr. Hineman suggested that STAP: 1) establish a baseline--discover what the NRO is doing currently and what are its plans; and 2) interview technical analysts to determine what they need to do their work and what information they feel that they are lacking. 25X1

Mr. Clarke briefed the STAP on a request that the Agency's Senior Review Panel (SRP) review NFAC prcduction for a one-year period. This effort will be in two phases. The first will be to establish the facts on what NFAC does or does nct do. The seccnd will be to judge how well or how poorly we're doing. 25X1