

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional) Storage and Compartmentation Issues in the New Headquarters Building

FROM: <input type="text"/> C/PASG <input type="text"/>	EXTENSION	NO. OS 87 1381
		DATE 20 October 1987

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE		OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
	RECEIVED	FORWARDED		

1. DD/PTS <input type="text"/>	21 OCT 1987	10/22	D	<p>2 and 1-3:</p> <p><input type="text"/></p> <p>I am driven to view this problem from the user viewpoint. I would have found, in my OSO days, the proposed solution wholly unacceptable. I was managing a program whose existence depended upon tight compartmentation.</p> <p>I believe the DA must bend over backward to assist components who <u>need</u> tight compartmentation to bring it about. If there is no real <u>need</u>, we should adhere strictly to the DA line.</p>
2. EXO / OSO	23 OCT 1987		B	
3. D/Security <input type="text"/>	OCT 28 1987	OCT 28 1987	Y	
4. AO				
5. DD/PTS <input type="text"/>				
6. <input type="text"/> is attempt to get them to lower the				
7. # of paper required. OSWR wants 130 ⁺ , SE-230 ⁺ . One you let clear under permit, it open the				
8. door for other.				
9. <input type="text"/> OSWR is stand by fact. Then <input type="text"/> is in a Mexican standoff. Where it open				
10. beyond their point ??			Y	
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				

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20 OCT 1987

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Security

VIA: Deputy Director for Physical and
Technical Security

FROM:

[Redacted]

Chief, Physical and Area Security Group

SUBJECT: Storage and Compartmentation Issues in the New
Headquarters Building

REFERENCE: Memo for DDI, DDO, DDS&T, from DDA dated 6 Aug
87, Subject: New Headquarters Occupancy

1. As the New Headquarters Building (NHB) nears occupancy, a conflict is brewing between the DDA's desire to occupy the spaces as built and the position taken by some elements of the Intelligence Community that the planned configuration of large, open bays will not satisfy their compartmentation requirements. It appears likely that DDA guidance and perhaps intervention will be required to develop a solution acceptable to everyone. This memo outlines the problem and suggests several potential solutions.

2. The Problem -

° The NHB was conceived and is constructed to open shelf storage standards. Consequently, the DDA expects to find very few floor-to-ceiling cubicles and very few safes in the new building; his attached administrative notice (Attachment A) makes this quite clear.

° Some members of the Intelligence Community (the National Program Office, [Redacted], DOE and National Program Managers) have been recently requested to reaffirm their compartmented storage requirements. Their response indicates that a substantial number of cubicles and safes will be needed and the Special Security Center agrees.

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

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° Obviously these two positions are at opposite poles and a solution agreeable to everyone must be developed prior to occupancy of the "people spaces" circa January 1988.

3. There is no denying that the use of large bay areas with modular furniture affects the enforcement of compartmentation and need-to-know. This was discussed during the design phase of the NHB (although the written record of deliberations is surprisingly thin). I assume, nevertheless, that the compartmentation concept which has been implemented - that of large Sensitive Compartmented Information Facilities (SCIFs) occupied by Offices or DO divisions with similar missions, functions and programs - was agreed to several years ago.

STAT 4. National Programs Security Officer [redacted] however, recently alerted us to their concerns cited above. This caused us to revisit the issue with a number of key IC players and to discover that large "like-component SCIFs" may not completely satisfy their compartmentation concerns after all. Clearly, some IC elements would prefer to have their materials both within safes and "mini-SCIFs" inside of the planned larger SCIFs.

5. It must be noted that compartmentation and need-to-know are not Office of Security requirements. Attachment B contains definitions and a discussion of these twin issues.

6. I believe that we must avoid the position cited by some IC members that safes and additional walls within "like-component SCIFs" should be routinely employed. Given the fact that only persons cleared to Agency staff standards and working on similar issues will have unescorted access, I recommend the following:

° Accept that the NHB is being built to open shelf storage standards, therefore enclosed cubicles and safes are not required except in unusual cases. The originators of these data must define the circumstances.

° Require the Chief Operating Official (Office Chief or DO Division Chief) to identify and, when appropriate, justify the need for additional SCIF and safe storage by project or document(s) to the DDA.

° Use the best available key locks on desks and conserve files to enforce need-to-know. Logistics should administer this project.

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° Accept false floor to false ceiling walls within SCIFs as adequate compartmentation, with the understanding that reasonable sound attenuation must be attained. This is in keeping with the recently issued standards in DCID 121.

° Allow for some renovation prior to occupancy in those areas in which the components cannot align personnel and work spaces in accordance with compartmentation requirements.

STAT 7. We have asked for [redacted] office, DOE, the [redacted] and SSC to provide their requirements to us in writing and we are assuming they will stick to their informal responses. We will review their positions vis-a-vis the new regulations, but it already appears that some additional walls and safes will be required. If large scale adjustments are required CIA will have to ask for a waiver. This should be done by the DDA on behalf of the Agency. STAT

8. In sum, Security should support office managers in their concerns for establishing compartmentation and need-to-know controls. If a manger has a genuine requirement for additional safeguards, OS can assist by conducting a physical security survey within his or her area. But we must not allow ourselves to be drawn into a debate as to what constitutes adequate compartmentation and need-to-know with approved NHB SCIFs. STAT

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Compartmentation and need-to-know are generally confused and quite often used interchangeably. Compartmentation results from steps taken to protect a subset of data because of its sensitivity or uniqueness. When data is compartmented, not all individuals have the appropriate clearance or access approval for that data. Need-to-know on the other hand does not assume that the individual does not have the appropriate clearance or access approval, merely that he/she does not have to have access to that information to do their job. Hence, problems regarding need-to-know are almost always problems with individuals, not with physical security controls.

Physical security requirements for the protection of compartmented information (Sensitive Compartmented Information) are delineated in NFIB/NFIC-9.1/47. The problem with this document has always been interpretation, in fact DIA wrote their own manual (DIAM 50-3) to interpret the policy for their use. The NHB conforms in spirit to this policy in every sense of the word. The larger SCIF areas have the appropriate perimeter construct, there is continuous personnel access controls, there is a 24-hour guard force with a 5 minute response, and there are reserve guards as a backup.

Internal compartmentation within the SCIF can be controlled via devices such as unican or simplex push button locks for positive personnel protection access controls. Therefore the remainder of the security protection is a function of people. One should not, for example, allow an unknown individual to "tailgate" through a controlled door nor should someone disable the locking device to make it easier to pass back and forth during the day. When individuals are escorted into the area, material should be covered up and personnel alerted that uncleared individuals are present. In short, the problems of controlling access to large open bay areas are no different than controlling access to smaller offices with safes, it requires diligence on the part of the individual.

All Agency staff employees are cleared to DCID 1/14 standards from the outset, thus meeting the requirements for access to SCI. DCIDs and other pertinent National Directives that govern the control of SCI are global documents intended to apply to the broad range of circumstances; they were never intended to apply to each and every situation. For example, when risk factors are assessed, do we really have to worry about the wall not being true floor to true ceiling? If we are concerned about a cleared Agency employee lifting floor tiles to gain access to the SCIF next door, we have more serious problems than mere physical security will correct.

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National program offices grant waivers to physical security standards to industrial facilities on a daily basis, and those facilities do not have near the protection afforded by our compound. In short, the more important factors for ensuring compartmentation are positive access controls and an educated work force, both of which we have. The definition of what walls actually constitute the SCIF boundary are points that will be argued forever.

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DDA 87-1769

4 6 AUG 1987

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Intelligence
Deputy Director for Operation
Deputy Director for Science and Technology

FROM: William F. Donnelly
Deputy Director for Administration

SUBJECT: New Headquarters Occupancy

1. The Office of Logistics (OL) has informed me that we are now within six months of beginning to occupy the New Headquarters Building (NHB). An extensive planning effort has been underway to assure that the moves of Agency components are accomplished in an efficient and least disruptive manner. In the course of this planning, however, there have been indications that some Agency components are straying from the design concept of the NHB. I take this opportunity to reiterate three ground rules which have been conveyed to the components moving into the NHB by the Office of Logistics' Chief, Integrated Logistics Support Program.

2. The NHB is secured for open shelf storage; as a result, the need for safes will be dramatically reduced. The use of conservafiles will be greatly expanded. OL planners will be working with each component to solve storage issues. As has been suggested before, this represents an excellent opportunity to destroy or archive old files. We intend to hold to the rule that safes should not usually be included in an office's proposed move to the NHB.

3. Regarding furniture, the NHB was designed for maximum flexibility and an open office landscape design, with few exceptions. OL has requested and received funding from components moving to the NHB in order to make a consolidated purchase of Corry Hiebert modular furniture. This furniture fits into the NHB and works well with the partial height partitions that have been included in the basic construction package. Offices are encouraged to stay with this program and not plan on moving other furniture into the NHB. Thus, the rule, with the exception of executive furnishings, OL will not move non-Corry Hiebert furniture into the NHB and is not preparing to stock for future NHB support, other than this modular furniture.

4. The actual occupancy of the NHB will be a year long process beginning in January 1988. Because this effort will tax the resources of the Offices of Logistics, Information Technology, and Security, as well as their respective cleared contractors, it will not be possible to accommodate anything other than minor changes to the spaces as built in the NHB. Therefore, the rule,

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components will be required to move into space as is and wait until all the moves are completed before we consider reconfiguration requests. We are aware this may strain some organizational integrity in that components will not necessarily be in contiguous space. Attempts to modify spaces before total occupancy will delay and unnecessarily complicate the move into the NHB.

5. While some pain may be encountered, I request each of you to support the rules described above within your Directorates.

STAT



William F. Donnelly

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